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It	  is	  only	  fitting	  to	  use	  one	  of	  my	  favorite	  musical	  transportation	  metaphors	  to	  
describe	  my	  academic	  journey	  because	  it	  has,	  indeed,	  been	  a	  long	  and	  winding	  road.	  
During	  this	  time,	  I	  have	  had	  the	  honor	  and	  pleasure	  of	  meeting	  many	  people	  who	  
have	  shared	  so	  much	  with	  me.	  They	  extended	  their	  hands,	  opened	  their	  hearts	  and	  
homes,	  relayed	  important	  documents	  and	  information,	  and	  offered	  what	  scarce	  time	  
they	  could	  to	  share	  their	  thoughts	  and	  opinions.	  We	  engaged	  in	  serious	  debates	  and	  
traveled	  long	  distances	  in	  difficult	  conditions	  to	  meet	  interesting	  people.	  It	  has	  been	  
an	  adventure	  that	  presented	  beautiful	  vistas	  and	  the	  occasional	  danger.	  We	  sang	  
and	  danced,	  and	  we	  sometimes	  shared	  immoderate	  amounts	  of	  laughter,	  food	  and	  
drink.	  Many	  have	  pushed	  me	  when	  I’ve	  needed	  it	  and	  steered	  me	  to	  remarkable	  new	  
insights	  when	  ideas	  already	  seemed	  so	  settled.	  It	  has	  been	  a	  journey	  where	  I	  have	  
learned	  more	  than	  I	  could	  have	  possibly	  ever	  imagined	  when	  I	  started	  it.	  So	  it	  is	  with	  
a	  heart	  full	  of	  both	  appreciation	  and	  a	  tad	  bit	  of	  sadness	  that	  comes	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  
long	  venture	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  those	  people	  who	  helped	  
me	  through	  it.	  
I	  will	  start,	  most	  fittingly	  with	  my	  family,	  which	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  this	  
process.	  Had	  I	  been	  able	  to	  truly	  appreciate	  just	  how	  hard	  this	  path	  would	  have	  
been,	  I	  would	  never	  have	  chosen	  to	  subject	  my	  wife	  Marion	  to	  the	  adversities	  we	  
have	  faced.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  in	  my	  mind	  that	  her	  presence	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  
ingredients	  to	  the	  successful	  outcome	  of	  this	  degree.	  So	  I	  would	  first	  like	  to	  extend	  
my	  apologies	  to	  her	  for	  the	  occasional	  (or	  more)	  translation	  request,	  but	  also	  offer	  
my	  deepest	  appreciation	  for	  her	  support	  and	  sometimes	  much-­‐needed	  impetus	  to	  
get	  going	  again.	  My	  parents	  Ivan	  and	  Christine	  helped	  in	  innumerable	  ways	  and	  for	  
this	  I	  cannot	  thank	  them	  enough.	  I	  have	  a	  great	  and	  collectively	  sizeable	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cheerleading	  section	  in	  the	  form	  of	  my	  siblings	  and	  their	  families,	  for	  which	  I	  am	  
also	  grateful.	  My	  in-­‐laws,	  Jean-­‐Jacques,	  Christiane,	  Yves,	  Cecile,	  Jeanne,	  Marthe,	  Sami	  
and	  Sabrina	  have	  all	  been	  generous	  with	  their	  time	  and	  support.	  And	  although	  she	  is	  
too	  young	  to	  realize	  it,	  Mila	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  motivating	  me	  to	  reach	  the	  finish	  
line.	  Thank	  you	  all	  for	  your	  love	  and	  support.	  	  
I	  could	  not	  have	  hoped	  for	  a	  better	  committee.	  All	  of	  the	  members	  were	  both	  
responsive	  and	  encouraging.	  My	  chair	  Jonathan	  Levine’s	  door	  was	  always	  open	  and	  
gave	  generously	  with	  his	  time	  to	  help	  me	  tease-­‐out	  my	  questions	  and	  ideas	  
throughout	  the	  process	  with	  very	  constructive	  critiques.	  Moreover,	  he	  showed	  me	  
how	  to	  approach	  truly	  complex	  research	  questions	  and	  issue.	  I	  also	  recognize	  how	  
fortunate	  I	  was	  to	  have	  such	  an	  effective	  mentor	  –	  not	  least	  because	  I	  could	  see	  what	  
a	  gifted	  lecturer	  can	  do	  at	  8	  in	  the	  morning.	  My	  other	  committee	  members,	  Elisha	  
Renne,	  Gabrielle	  Hecht	  and	  Gavin	  Shatkin	  were	  not	  only	  excellent	  instructors	  from	  
whom	  I	  learned	  so	  much,	  but	  also	  offered	  essential	  feedback	  that	  greatly	  improved	  
my	  work.	  All	  three	  taught	  fascinating	  courses	  related	  to	  development	  and	  they	  
continued	  to	  strengthen	  my	  knowledge	  in	  this	  field	  through	  our	  conversations	  and	  
recommended	  readings.	  The	  association	  I	  have	  with	  these	  fantastic	  people	  is	  
something	  I	  hope	  to	  sustain	  well	  into	  the	  future	  despite	  the	  great	  distances	  that	  
separate	  us.	  
Being	  a	  foreign	  research	  presents	  both	  opportunities	  and	  challenges,	  and	  I	  
consider	  myself	  extremely	  fortunate	  to	  have	  had	  Patrick	  Marovelo	  and	  Gabriel	  “Pilo”	  
Randriamanjatonony	  as	  my	  research	  assistants	  for	  both	  types	  of	  situations.	  They	  
helped	  me	  navigate	  so	  many	  issues	  with	  their	  top-­‐notch	  translation,	  investigative	  
skills	  and	  intuition.	  Their	  generosity	  with	  their	  time	  and	  patience	  helped	  make	  this	  a	  
successful	  research	  project,	  and	  their	  friendship	  made	  it	  fun.	  Patrick	  exemplified	  
professionalism	  with	  his	  self-­‐initiation	  and	  thoroughness;	  his	  patience	  and	  skills	  are	  
underestimated	  only	  by	  himself.	  It	  is	  his	  passion	  for	  justice	  that	  gives	  me	  hope	  for	  a	  
brighter	  future	  for	  Madagascar.	  Pilo	  is	  indeed	  the	  only	  Pilo	  in	  the	  world.	  His	  
resourcefulness	  is	  beyond	  compare,	  as	  is	  his	  intuition	  in	  dealing	  with	  people	  from	  
all	  types	  of	  backgrounds.	  His	  love	  of	  life,	  rice	  and	  laughter	  are	  things	  that	  even	  the	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hardest	  research	  day	  can’t	  take	  away.	  We	  three	  made	  a	  great	  team	  and	  I	  am	  truly	  
indebted	  to	  them	  for	  all	  their	  hard	  work,	  and	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  working	  with	  them	  
again	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  
It	  takes	  heart	  to	  work	  on	  certain	  endeavors,	  and	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Fianarantsoa-­‐
Côte	  Est	  railway	  (FCE)	  is	  one	  of	  those	  projects	  that	  demonstrate	  this	  fact	  better	  than	  
most.	  It	  was	  serendipitous	  that	  Marion	  and	  I	  rode	  the	  FCE	  in	  2003	  and	  bought	  the	  
tourist	  brochure	  mentioned	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  It	  was	  even	  more	  fortuitous	  that	  so	  
many	  years	  later	  I	  was	  able	  to	  make	  contact	  with	  Karen	  and	  Mark	  Freudenberger	  
before	  they	  left	  Madagascar.	  Their	  archives,	  introductions,	  and	  insights	  proved	  
essential	  to	  the	  telling	  of	  this	  story.	  I	  appreciated	  their	  candor	  and	  reflexivity	  during	  
their	  interviews.	  I	  recognize	  that	  this	  opened	  themselves	  up	  to	  memories	  and	  
regrets	  that	  would	  probably	  have	  been	  easier	  to	  leave	  buried.	  Yet	  I	  also	  know	  from	  
my	  trips	  along	  the	  line,	  and	  from	  speaking	  with	  hundreds	  of	  people,	  that	  their	  
efforts	  were	  not	  in	  vain	  for	  they	  touched	  the	  lives	  of	  so	  many	  people.	  We	  need	  more	  
development	  experts	  who	  approach	  such	  frustrating	  and	  seemingly	  impossible	  
problems	  as	  they	  do,	  and	  I	  am	  glad	  that	  they	  take	  the	  time	  to	  provide	  so	  many	  of	  us	  
“experts”	  with	  the	  practical	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  that	  help	  us	  do	  a	  better	  job.	  
I	  like	  to	  say	  that	  I	  went	  to	  Madagascar	  originally	  (long	  before	  I	  started	  my	  
doctorate)	  to	  see	  the	  beautiful	  landscapes	  and	  unusual	  wildlife,	  but	  that	  I	  
appreciated	  the	  people	  of	  Madagascar	  much	  more.	  This	  sentiment	  was	  only	  
strengthened	  during	  my	  research	  trips	  because	  the	  Malagasy	  people	  went	  very	  far	  
out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  assist	  me.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Marietta	  and	  Richard	  
Ramahafenosoa	  and	  their	  sons	  as	  well	  as	  all	  the	  staff	  at	  the	  Snack	  Imanoela	  for	  
taking	  such	  good	  care	  of	  us	  in	  Fianarantsoa.	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  Claude	  and	  
Laurence	  Ranaivojaona,	  plus	  all	  their	  staff	  in	  both	  Manampatrana	  and	  Fianarantsoa	  
for	  their	  support.	  Madam	  Sophie	  and	  Anselme	  Black	  made	  sure	  my	  accommodations	  
and	  financial	  dealings	  in	  Fianarantsoa	  went	  smoothly,	  which	  I	  appreciate	  very	  much.	  
I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  two	  host	  families—particularly	  Marius	  and	  his	  wife—
for	  their	  attentiveness	  and	  professionalism	  as	  well.	  Pierrot	  Men	  has	  been	  very	  
generous	  by	  allowing	  me	  to	  use	  his	  beautiful	  photographs	  in	  my	  presentations	  and	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dissertation.	  Thank	  you	  also	  to	  all	  of	  the	  ERI	  staff	  in	  Fianarantsoa	  who	  helped	  me	  
and	  my	  research	  team	  with	  logistics.	  	  
I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  Malagasy	  government	  workers	  and	  public	  officials	  
who	  helped	  move	  my	  research	  forward.	  This	  includes	  the	  FCE	  staff	  who	  do	  a	  
fantastic	  job	  at	  keeping	  the	  line	  operational	  with	  so	  few	  resources.	  I	  appreciate	  them	  
taking	  the	  time	  to	  speak	  with	  me,	  and	  for	  the	  access	  given	  to	  me	  by	  the	  director,	  
Medard	  Rakotozafy,	  and	  head	  of	  engineering	  Dauphin	  Ramonjarisoa.	  I	  also	  want	  to	  
thank	  the	  FCE	  station	  managers,	  support	  staff,	  drivers,	  police,	  maintenance	  workers,	  
and	  porters	  for	  their	  time	  as	  well.	  	  
I	  was	  saddened	  to	  hear	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  Samuel	  Razanamapisa,	  who	  was	  so	  
instrumental	  in	  helping	  to	  rally	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  push	  to	  save	  the	  FCE	  and	  who	  
made	  himself	  available	  to	  answer	  my	  questions	  on	  multiple	  occasions.	  	  
The	  many	  villages	  where	  I	  conducted	  research	  welcomed	  me	  into	  their	  
communities	  and	  for	  this	  alone	  I	  would	  be	  appreciative.	  Yet	  they	  also	  took	  time	  out	  
of	  their	  busy	  days—usually	  spent	  tending	  to	  their	  fields,	  stores	  and	  families—to	  
help	  me	  understand	  more	  about	  their	  lives	  and	  what	  has	  happened	  to	  them	  over	  the	  
years.	  I	  appreciated	  their	  help	  in	  answering	  my	  questions	  and	  for	  asking	  their	  own.	  
It	  was	  an	  engaging	  process	  and	  although	  I	  parted	  company	  with	  more	  information	  
than	  I	  left	  behind,	  I	  hope	  to	  repay	  the	  favor	  one	  day.	  Misaotra	  betsaka	  to	  all	  of	  them!	  
As	  I	  have	  learned,	  the	  international	  nature	  of	  the	  development	  field	  can	  spread	  
people	  far	  from	  one	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Glossary	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  Bank	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  development	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  to	  contribute	  to	  the	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  and	  social	  progress	  
of	  African	  countries.	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  Taratra	  (ANTA):	  The	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  agency	  of	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Andrimasom	  Pokonolona:	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  for	  “the	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  who	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  these	  local	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  of	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  guards”	  have	  protected	  vital	  infrastructure	  points	  from	  acts	  of	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Animateurs:	  French	  word	  for	  individuals	  or	  external	  agents	  who	  seek	  to	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changes	  to	  an	  existing	  system	  or	  community	  by	  facilitating	  the	  action	  of	  
others.	  	  
Antemoro:	  An	  ethnic	  group	  generally	  found	  on	  the	  coast	  near	  Manakara	  and	  low-­‐
lying	  areas	  adjacent	  to	  the	  FCE	  Railway	  in	  southeast	  Madagascar.	  
Ariary:	  The	  basic	  monetary	  unit	  of	  Madagascar,	  which	  replaced	  the	  Malagasy	  Franc.	  
Association	  des	  Détenteurs	  d’Intérêts	  de	  la	  FCE	  (ADIFCE):	  A	  transportation-­‐oriented	  
civil	  society	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  protecting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  FCE	  
beneficiaries.	  
Betsileo:	  An	  ethnic	  group	  generally	  found	  on	  the	  high	  plateau	  near	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  
around	  some	  of	  the	  forested	  areas	  adjacent	  to	  the	  FCE	  Railway	  in	  southeast	  
Madagascar.	  
Betsileo	  Railway:	  Another	  name	  for	  the	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  (FCE).	  
CANAC	  Railway	  Services	  Inc.	  (CANAC):	  A	  Canadian	  railway	  consulting	  firm.	  
Commercial	  Agricultural	  Promotion	  (CAP):	  A	  USAID-­‐funded	  project	  in	  Madagascar.	  
Community	  Based	  Organization	  (CBO):	  A	  non-­‐profit,	  nongovernmental	  organization	  
based	  within	  a	  local	  social	  or	  geographical	  community.	  	  
Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  (CBA):	  systematic	  process	  for	  calculating	  and	  comparing	  
benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  a	  project,	  decision	  or	  government	  policy.
	  xix	  
Dina:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  a	  traditional	  law,	  convention,	  or	  charter	  agreed	  upon	  by	  a	  
group.	  
Dinabe:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  the	  overarching	  law	  encompassing	  the	  entire	  railway.	  
Dina-­‐paritra:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  the	  local	  version	  of	  the	  dina.	  
Eco-­‐Regional	  Initiatives	  (ERI):	  A	  USAID-­‐funded	  project	  in	  Madagascar.	  
Economic	  Internal	  Rate	  of	  Return	  (EIRR):	  The	  annualized	  effective	  compounded	  
return	  rate,	  which	  is	  often	  used	  to	  measure	  and	  compare	  the	  profitability	  of	  
investments.	  	  
Enabling	  environment:	  A	  political	  and	  institutional	  climate	  where	  policies	  create	  
and	  maintain	  an	  overall	  macroeconomic	  environment	  that	  brings	  together	  
suppliers	  and	  consumers.	  
Fady:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  a	  taboo.	  
Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  (FCE):	  A	  colonial-­‐era	  railway	  built	  by	  the	  French	  in	  
southeast	  Madagascar.	  
Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Rehabilitation	  project	  (FCER):	  The	  USAID-­‐funded	  project	  
aimed	  at	  rehabilitating	  the	  FCE	  Railway.	  
Foiben-­‐Taosarintanin’i	  Madagasikara	  (FTM):	  The	  National	  Hydrographic	  and	  
Geographic	  Institute	  in	  Madagascar	  is	  a	  public	  geographical	  institute.	  	  
Fokonolona:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  “the	  community.”	  	  
Fokontany:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  a	  traditional	  village.	  
Formal	  rationality:	  A	  form	  of	  rationality	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  means-­‐oriented	  
activity	  or	  process.	  	  
Government	  of	  Madagascar	  (GOM):	  The	  official	  government	  of	  Madagascar	  after	  
independence.	  
Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP):	  	  market	  value	  of	  all	  officially	  recognized	  final	  goods	  
and	  services	  produced	  within	  a	  country	  in	  a	  given	  period	  of	  time.	  GDP	  per	  
capita	  is	  often	  considered	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  country's	  standard	  of	  living.	  
Gross	  National	  Product	  (GNP):	  market	  value	  of	  all	  the	  products	  and	  services	  
produced	  annually	  by	  labor	  and	  property	  supplied	  by	  the	  residents	  of	  a	  
country.	  
Hova:	  An	  ethnic	  classification	  used	  by	  the	  French	  for	  groups	  occupying	  the	  high	  
plateau,	  which	  included	  both	  the	  Merina	  and	  the	  Betsileo.	  
Informants:	  The	  individuals	  responding	  to	  research	  questions.	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International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD):	  Part	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	  Group,	  it	  offers	  loans	  to	  middle-­‐income	  less	  developed	  countries.	  	  
International	  Development	  Association	  (IDA):	  Part	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  targets	  
the	  world’s	  poorest	  countries	  with	  grants	  and	  low-­‐interest	  loans.	  
International	  Development	  Institution	  (IDI):	  Bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  organizations	  
that	  focus	  on	  development	  issues	  in	  less	  developed	  countries.	  
International	  Labor	  Organization	  (ILO):	  A	  specialized	  authority	  within	  the	  United	  
Nations	  that	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  promotion	  of	  social	  justice	  and	  internationally	  
recognized	  human	  and	  labor	  rights.	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF):	  An	  international	  development	  institution,	  
which	  is	  charged	  with	  stabilizing	  exchange	  rates	  and	  countries’	  economies.	  
Investigators	  (sometimes	  principal):	  The	  researchers,	  practitioners,	  and	  experts	  
leading	  a	  particular	  inquiry.	  
Joro:	  A	  traditional	  Malagasy	  ceremony	  used	  to	  honor	  ancestors	  and	  ask	  for	  their	  
blessing	  through	  a	  ritual	  sacrifice,	  usually	  of	  a	  zebu.	  
Landscape	  Development	  Interventions	  (LDI):	  A	  USAID-­‐funded	  project	  in	  
Madagascar.	  
Less	  Developed	  Country	  (LDC):	  A	  nation	  with	  a	  relatively	  low	  standard	  of	  living,	  and	  
economic/industrial	  base.	  	  
Lovantsika:	  Malagasy	  word	  for	  inheritance	  or	  heritage.	  
Merina:	  An	  ethnic	  group	  generally	  found	  on	  the	  high	  plateau	  near	  Antananarivo	  
Miaramilam-­‐potaka:	  Malagasy	  name	  for	  SMOTIG	  pioneers,	  which	  translates	  into	  
“mud	  soldiers.”	  
Mpanjaka:	  A	  Malagasy	  king	  (traditional	  leader).	  
Non-­‐Governmental	  Organization	  (NGO):	  A	  local	  or	  international	  legally	  constituted	  
entity	  that	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  state.	  
Northern	  Railway:	  The	  colonial-­‐built	  Tananarive-­‐Côte	  Est	  railway	  connecting	  
Antananarivo	  and	  Toamasina.	  
Pioneers:	  The	  official	  name	  given	  by	  the	  French	  Colonial	  Administration	  to	  SMOTIG	  
workers.	  	  
Post-­‐Traumatic	  Stress	  Disorder	  (PTSD):	  A	  severe	  anxiety	  disorder	  that	  can	  develop	  
after	  exposure	  to	  an	  event	  that	  causes	  psychological	  trauma.	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Products	  of	  Primary	  Necessity	  (PPN):	  Essential	  household	  items	  such	  as	  salt,	  fuel,	  
and	  staple	  foods.	  
Rapid	  Rural	  Appraisal	  (RRA):	  A	  research	  method	  typically	  used	  to	  elicit	  information	  
in	  a	  participatory	  manner	  by	  empowering	  informants.	  	  
Rationality:	  The	  accounting	  for	  an	  action	  or	  belief.	  
Réseau	  National	  des	  Chemins	  de	  Fer	  Malagasy	  (RNCFM):	  The	  name	  of	  the	  Malagasy	  
railway	  company	  when	  it	  was	  under	  public	  management.	  
Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  (RUF):	  A	  rebel	  group	  that	  fought	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  
Sierra	  Leone	  (1991-­‐2002).	  
Right-­‐of-­‐way:	  a	  strip	  of	  land	  granted	  for	  a	  transportation	  facility.	  
Road	  Traffic	  Injury	  (RTI):	  Fatal	  and	  non-­‐fatal	  injuries	  sustained	  as	  part	  of	  a	  road-­‐
based	  accident.	  
Rolling	  stock:	  vehicles	  that	  move	  on	  a	  railway	  (e.g.,	  locomotives,	  railroad	  cars,	  
coaches,	  wagons,	  etc.).	  
Service	  de	  la	  Main	  d’Oeuvre	  des	  Travaux	  d’Intérêt	  Général	  (SMOTIG):	  The	  forced	  labor	  
program	  used	  by	  the	  French	  Colonial	  Administration	  to	  build	  large	  public	  
works	  projects	  across	  Madagascar	  (including	  the	  FCE	  Railway).	  
Sierra	  Leone	  Government	  Railway	  (SLGR):	  A	  colonial-­‐built	  railway	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  
which	  was	  closed	  in	  1974.	  
Sphere	  of	  action:	  “one	  of	  four	  partially	  autonomous	  and	  overlapping	  spheres	  of	  
action	  and	  valued	  social	  practices”	  –	  the	  others	  being	  the	  state,	  the	  corporate	  
economy,	  and	  political	  community	  (Friedmann	  1998:	  22).	  
Structural	  Adjustment	  Program	  (SAP):	  A	  set	  of	  conditions	  or	  policies	  developed	  by	  
the	  World	  Bank	  or	  IMF	  for	  less	  developed	  countries,	  usually	  as	  conditions	  for	  
loans.	  
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA):	  The	  area	  of	  Africa	  south	  of	  the	  Saharan	  Desert.	  This	  term	  
is	  sometimes	  used	  in	  the	  geopolitical	  sense	  to	  distinguish	  between	  Northern	  
African	  countries	  and	  those	  that	  are	  located	  south	  of	  the	  Sahara.	  
Substantive	  rationality:	  Value-­‐based	  rationality.	  
Tanala:	  An	  ethnic	  group	  found	  around	  the	  forests	  of	  southeast	  Madagascar	  adjacent	  
to	  the	  FCE	  Railway.	  	  
Tavy:	  A	  form	  of	  slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture	  practiced	  in	  Madagascar.	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Tanzania-­‐Zambia	  railway	  (TAZARA):	  A	  post-­‐independence	  railway	  built	  in	  
partnership	  with	  the	  Chinese	  that	  crosses	  from	  landlocked	  Zambia	  to	  the	  
Tanzanian	  coast.	  	  
Transportation-­‐oriented	  civil	  society	  organization	  (TCSO):	  Civil	  society	  
organizations	  dedicated	  specifically	  to	  transportation	  issues	  and/or	  
infrastructure	  and	  services.	  
Triangulation:	  The	  process	  of	  developing	  accurate	  information	  through	  cross-­‐
referencing,	  discussion	  and	  comparison.	  	  
Ujaama:	  	  The	  Tanzanian	  national	  development	  project	  that	  included	  a	  
“villageization”	  campaign.	  
Unité	  FCE:	  A	  consultancy	  team	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  technical	  experts	  working	  on	  
FCE	  rehabilitation	  efforts.	  
United	  Nations	  Educational,	  Scientific	  and	  Cultural	  Organization	  (UNESCO):	  A	  
specialized	  authority	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  that	  is	  focused	  on	  issues	  of	  
education,	  science,	  and	  culture.	  
United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (USAID):	  the	  United	  States	  
federal	  government	  agency	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  administering	  civilian	  
foreign	  aid.	  
Vetiver	  (Chrysopogon	  zizanioides):	  a	  perennial	  grass	  used	  in	  efforts	  targeting	  soil	  
conservation	  and	  water	  quality	  management.	  
Working	  Group	  of	  Practitioners	  in	  Conservation	  and	  Development	  (WGPCD):	  An	  ad	  
hoc	  group	  of	  development	  practitioners	  formed	  during	  Madagascar’s	  2002	  
crisis.	  
World	  Bank:	  an	  international	  development	  institution	  that	  provides	  loans	  and	  
grants	  to	  developing	  countries	  for	  capital	  programs.	  
World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO):	  A	  specialized	  authority	  within	  the	  United	  
Nations	  that	  is	  focused	  on	  public	  health	  related	  issues	  internationally.	  
Zatovo	  Mikalo	  Gasy	  (ZMG):	  A	  Malagasy	  band.	  
Zebu:	  A	  domesticated	  ox	  with	  a	  humped	  back	  and	  long	  horns	  and	  a	  large	  dewlap	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Colonial-­‐era	  railways	  support	  the	  life	  needs	  of	  many	  communities	  and	  
households	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA).	  Although	  the	  end	  of	  colonial	  rule	  
removed	  some	  justifications	  used	  for	  their	  construction,	  as	  well	  as	  resources	  
that	  supported	  these	  lines’	  infrastructure	  and	  operations,	  these	  railways	  still	  
serve	  millions	  of	  people.	  Despite	  the	  important	  role	  they	  play	  in	  this	  
infrastructure-­‐poor	  region,	  a	  lack	  of	  resources	  has	  left	  many	  lines	  in	  various	  
states	  of	  disrepair.	  Complicating	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  railway	  service,	  
international	  development	  institutions	  (IDIs)	  have	  repeatedly	  relied	  on	  a	  
relatively	  narrow	  economic	  rationality	  and	  loan	  conditions	  to	  ensure	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governments	  stop	  supporting	  underperforming	  lines	  either	  by	  closing	  or	  
privatizing	  them.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  a	  colonial-­‐built	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  (FCE)	  in	  
Madagascar,	  which	  has	  faced	  closure	  numerous	  times	  from	  various	  causes,	  
provides	  insight	  into	  how	  effectively	  railway	  supporters	  can	  organize,	  
support,	  and	  frame	  their	  arguments	  to	  preserve	  service.	  This	  case	  was	  also	  
selected	  because	  the	  presence	  of	  civil	  society	  organizations	  (CSOs)	  dedicated	  
to	  protecting	  the	  FCE	  was	  unique.	  	  
The	  findings	  show	  that	  the	  main	  CSO	  dedicated	  to	  protecting	  the	  FCE	  
helped	  build	  ownership	  for	  the	  line	  among	  the	  local	  population	  and	  users	  
based	  on	  its	  heritage	  value.	  This	  heritage	  was	  based	  largely	  on	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  
ancestors	  who	  built	  the	  line	  –	  a	  trait	  the	  FCE	  shares	  with	  other	  colonial-­‐era	  
railways	  in	  SSA.	  The	  resulting	  sense	  of	  solidarity,	  and	  activities	  in	  which	  they	  
participated,	  curbed	  farming	  practices	  that	  threatened	  the	  line’s	  
infrastructure.	  This	  solidarity	  also	  facilitated	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  second	  CSO	  that	  
protected	  the	  line	  from	  saboteurs	  during	  a	  political	  crisis.	  Although	  officials	  
from	  IDIs	  and	  government	  had	  little	  direct	  contact	  with	  CSOs,	  the	  noticeable	  
atmosphere	  of	  civic	  engagement	  along	  the	  line	  affected	  their	  opinions	  about	  
the	  FCE.	  	  
This	  case	  holds	  lessons	  for	  planning	  theory	  and	  policymaking.	  Balancing	  
traditional	  economic	  justifications	  for	  operating	  transportation	  services	  with	  
other	  benefits,	  finding	  a	  champion	  and	  building	  solidarity,	  and	  recognizing	  the	  
value	  of	  study	  tours	  can	  improve	  transportation	  decisions	  and	  outcomes.	  
Likewise,	  planners	  and	  policymakers	  can	  encourage	  the	  formation,	  
sustainability	  and	  active	  involvement	  of	  CSOs	  by	  ensuring	  they	  remain	  
democratic,	  transparent,	  well	  funded	  and	  engaged	  with	  all	  stakeholders.	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Chapter	  1	  	  
Introduction	  
I. Continuing	  Importance	  of	  Colonial-­‐era	  Railways	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  
Colonial-­‐era	  railways	  have	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  many	  less	  developed	  countries	  
(LDCs),	  particularly	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA)	  where	  transportation	  
infrastructure—of	  any	  mode—is	  sparse.	  Colonial	  powers	  financed	  and	  built	  (often	  
with	  the	  help	  of	  forced	  labor)	  scores	  of	  railways	  in	  this	  region.	  The	  footprints	  of	  
colonial-­‐era	  railroads,	  which	  almost	  invariably	  run	  from	  the	  countries’	  ports	  to	  the	  
inland	  areas,	  demonstrate	  their	  faithfulness	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  colonizing	  country.	  
Specifically,	  European	  powers	  sought	  railways	  to	  assure	  their	  own	  political	  and	  
military	  control,	  access	  to	  natural	  resources	  and	  benefits	  from	  new	  markets	  for	  their	  
own	  economic	  advantage	  (Hilling	  1996:	  77;	  Simon	  1996:	  50;	  Gray	  1999:	  87).	  
Indigenous	  people	  often	  worked	  for	  free	  building	  or	  maintaining	  these	  railways.	  For	  
better	  or	  worse,	  these	  lines	  changed	  the	  territories	  and	  the	  people	  who	  lived	  there.	  
Colonial-­‐era	  railways	  continue	  to	  play	  an	  influential	  role	  in	  LDCs’	  transportation	  
systems	  and	  economies.	  Many	  lines	  continue	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  backbone	  of	  national	  or	  
regional	  transportation	  systems	  and	  they	  support	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  millions	  of	  
people.	  Besides	  transporting	  bulk	  items	  for	  either	  importation	  or	  exportation,	  
railways	  also	  transport	  smallholders’	  goods,	  bring	  children	  to	  school,	  provide	  food	  
to	  urban	  centers	  and	  evacuate	  the	  sick.	  People	  make	  their	  living	  by	  working	  for	  
these	  lines,	  by	  transporting	  their	  wares	  on	  them	  or	  by	  selling	  goods	  to	  their	  
passengers.	  Railways	  can	  even	  prevent	  deforestation	  because	  they	  enable	  people	  to	  
support	  their	  families	  without	  having	  to	  resort	  to	  slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture	  
(Freudenberger	  2003:	  142).
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Yet	  despite	  their	  continuing	  importance,	  these	  railways’	  conditions	  vary	  
substantially.	  Some	  countries	  have	  ceased	  or	  reduced	  railway	  service,	  thereby	  
producing	  undesirable	  consequences	  for	  people	  at	  the	  local,	  regional	  and	  even	  
national	  level.	  Many	  LDCs	  had	  railways	  at	  independence	  that	  required	  more	  
financial	  and	  technical	  resources	  than	  they	  had	  available,	  and	  these	  countries	  did	  
what	  they	  could	  to	  keep	  the	  train	  whistles	  blowing.	  The	  departure	  of	  colonial	  
powers	  had	  taken	  away	  the	  source	  of	  funding	  that	  maintained	  many	  colonial	  lines	  
and	  kept	  them	  operating.	  Just	  over	  70	  percent	  of	  African	  nations	  still	  have	  railways	  
operating	  within	  their	  borders	  today	  (see	  Appendix	  A)	  –	  most	  of	  which	  were	  built	  in	  
the	  colonial	  period.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  news	  reports	  that	  even	  on	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  heavily	  trafficked	  lines	  that	  performance	  and	  conditions	  can	  be	  
extremely	  poor	  (Hilling	  1996:	  104-­‐105;	  Bullock	  2005:	  27;	  Bullock	  2009:	  viii).	  A	  
line’s	  reliability	  affects	  many	  people’s	  decisions	  about	  whether	  to	  continue	  using	  
railway	  service	  or	  seek	  alternatives.	  Declining	  use	  reduces	  revenue	  and	  makes	  
covering	  operating	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  more	  difficult,	  which	  means	  they	  have	  
increasingly	  come	  to	  depend	  on	  external	  funding	  sources.	  Many	  LDCs	  have	  not	  been	  
able	  to	  adequately	  subsidize	  these	  lines	  even	  after	  receiving	  an	  infusion	  of	  funding.	  
The	  lack	  of	  financial	  resources	  for	  maintaining,	  operating	  and	  extending	  LDCs’	  
transportation	  systems	  has	  impacted	  colonial	  railways	  and	  the	  populations	  that	  
depend	  on	  them.	  While	  all	  countries	  have	  limited	  budgetary	  resources	  for	  
transportation	  provision,	  the	  gaps	  between	  LDCs’	  revenues	  and	  their	  transportation	  
needs	  are	  indeed	  greater	  than	  in	  developed	  countries.	  Most	  LDCs	  do	  not	  produce	  the	  
railway	  equipment	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  a	  railway’s	  rolling	  stock	  and	  
infrastructure.	  Importing	  their	  lines’	  infrastructure	  and	  vehicle	  spare	  parts	  reduces	  
these	  countries’	  purchasing	  power	  (Moriarty	  and	  Beed	  1989:	  128).	  Weak	  currencies	  
and	  expensive	  shipping	  costs	  factor	  into	  high	  maintenance	  costs	  that	  have	  led	  LDCs	  
to	  defer	  maintenance	  and	  renewal	  projects.	  So	  even	  if	  railways	  are	  not	  intentionally	  
shuttered,	  many	  close	  due	  to	  benign	  neglect	  caused	  by	  how	  finite	  resources	  are	  
distributed	  to	  a	  country’s	  many	  needs.	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Decisions	  about	  transportation-­‐infrastructure	  investment	  have	  traditionally	  
been	  the	  purview	  of	  government.	  Governments	  must	  make	  decisions	  on	  how	  to	  
allocate	  scarce	  resources	  between	  competing	  transportation	  alternatives.	  
Constructing	  new	  roads,	  port	  facilities	  or	  airports	  potentially	  draws	  funding	  away	  
from	  maintaining	  and	  operating	  existing	  transportation	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  
colonial-­‐era	  railways.	  Moreover,	  railway	  maintenance	  and	  operations	  already	  vie	  for	  
their	  share	  of	  funding	  against	  essential	  roadway	  maintenance	  and	  rehabilitation.	  
The	  relatively	  high	  costs	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  even	  basic	  railway	  operations	  and	  
their	  geographically	  concentrated	  benefits	  partially	  explain	  why	  LDCs	  in	  SSA	  have	  
invested	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  their	  scarce	  transportation	  funding	  in	  roadways.	  
The	  lack	  of	  internal	  funding	  sources,	  though,	  has	  also	  resulted	  in	  the	  
participation	  of	  international	  development	  institutions	  (IDIs)	  in	  efforts	  to	  support	  
these	  countries’	  transportation	  systems.	  Countries	  have	  received	  technical	  and	  
financial	  support	  from	  IDIs,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  UNDP,	  for	  decades.	  In	  fact,	  
IDIs	  are	  the	  largest	  source	  of	  non-­‐state	  funding	  for	  transportation	  projects	  in	  LDCs,	  
but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  railways,	  these	  institutions	  tend	  to	  fund	  new	  projects	  rather	  than	  
maintain	  existing	  networks	  (Hilling	  1996:	  102).	  IDIs’	  penchant	  for	  financing	  new	  
construction,	  though,	  has	  meant	  existing	  railways	  must	  compete	  with	  an	  even	  larger	  
network	  of	  roads	  for	  maintenance	  funds.	  Schroeder	  explains	  that	  because	  much	  of	  
the	  road	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  in	  LDCs	  is	  externally	  financed	  by	  IDIs,	  this	  
brings	  these	  institutions—and	  their	  experts,	  staff,	  and	  consultants—in	  as	  
“stakeholders”	  (Schroeder	  1997:	  396).	  He	  notes	  that	  IDIs	  rarely	  take	  entirely	  
passive	  roles	  (ibid.).	  In	  fact,	  IDIs	  have	  the	  power	  to	  provide	  or	  block	  financing	  that	  
could	  help	  these	  distressed	  countries	  and	  their	  crumbling	  transportation	  systems.	  
This	  has	  had	  significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  railways	  in	  SSA	  given	  that	  these	  
countries	  are	  highly	  dependent	  upon	  foreign	  aid.	  
Although	  IDI	  experts	  often	  portray	  their	  rationality	  as	  positivistic	  and	  their	  
methods	  as	  objective,	  many	  of	  them	  in	  fact	  adhere	  to	  neoliberal	  theory	  that	  
maintains	  this	  appearance	  but	  has	  an	  ideological	  bent.	  Experts	  who	  base	  decisions	  
on	  a	  neoliberal	  approach	  embrace	  an	  ideological	  stance	  whereby	  the	  state	  and	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public	  should	  be	  as	  much	  removed	  from	  decisions	  about	  transportation	  services	  as	  
possible	  (World	  Bank	  1983:	  i;	  Moore	  1993:	  7;	  Simon	  2008:	  96-­‐97).	  Railways’	  
dependence	  on	  state	  subsidies	  for	  renewal	  and	  even	  operations,	  therefore,	  made	  
them	  targets	  of	  IDIs’	  neoliberal	  policies.	  IDIs	  have	  used	  their	  power	  to	  push	  for	  
reforms	  or	  loan	  conditions	  that	  have	  led	  to	  many	  spur	  line	  closures,	  the	  halting	  of	  
passenger	  service	  on	  some	  lines	  or	  even	  the	  closing	  of	  entire	  railway	  systems	  (e.g.,	  
Sierra	  Leone).	  Decisions	  to	  suspend	  railway	  service	  on	  unprofitable	  lines	  are	  being	  
made	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  IDIs	  with	  little	  to	  no	  input	  from	  local	  
communities.	  	  
Yet	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  financial	  resources	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  IDIs	  in	  pushing	  
their	  perspectives,	  the	  public	  has	  not	  always	  accepted	  decisions	  adversely	  affecting	  
their	  interests.	  They	  have	  exerted	  their	  own	  pressure	  through	  various	  means—
mostly	  through	  political	  action—to	  protect	  a	  railway	  facing	  cutbacks	  or	  an	  imminent	  
closure.	  This	  can	  preserve	  service,	  but	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  well	  to	  long-­‐term	  
planning	  or	  coordination	  with	  other	  important	  actors	  in	  the	  transportation	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  (e.g.,	  IDI	  staff).	  Action	  by	  civil	  society	  often	  tends	  to	  be	  
geographically	  concentrated,	  ad	  hoc	  and	  ephemeral.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  context	  that	  this	  
dissertation	  considers	  the	  role	  that	  an	  organized	  civil	  society	  can	  have	  in	  impacting	  
transportation	  outcomes	  in	  LDCs	  –	  particularly	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  preserving	  benefits	  
from	  railway	  service	  in	  SSA.	  
	  
II. Benefits	  of	  Railways	  in	  Less	  Developed	  Countries	  
Even	  as	  railways	  have	  disappeared	  or	  as	  service	  quality	  degraded,	  their	  
importance	  has	  not	  necessarily	  diminished.	  Gakenheimer	  notes	  that	  LDCs’	  existing	  
transportation	  systems	  are	  woefully	  inadequate	  to	  serve	  existing	  demand	  
(Gakenheimer	  1999:	  673).	  Many	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  continue	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  
backbone	  of	  national	  or	  regional	  transportation	  systems	  and	  support	  the	  livelihoods	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of	  millions	  of	  people.1	  The	  lines	  that	  still	  offer	  passenger	  service	  often	  act	  as	  lifeline	  
transportation	  service	  for	  vulnerable	  populations	  in	  LDCs,	  including	  long-­‐distance	  
migrants	  and	  commuting	  workers	  (Simon	  1996:	  23).	  	  
Most	  railways	  built	  in	  SSA	  had	  some	  type	  of	  extractive	  purpose	  in	  mind.	  From	  a	  
strictly	  macro-­‐economic	  perspective,	  these	  lines	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  country’s	  gross	  
development	  product	  (GDP)	  by	  facilitating	  the	  exportation	  of	  unfinished	  resources	  
such	  as	  ore,	  lumber	  and	  agricultural	  goods.	  To	  many	  experts,	  moving	  bulk	  goods	  to	  
increase	  GDP	  is	  a	  benefit,	  if	  not	  the	  benefit,	  of	  these	  lines.	  A	  railway’s	  worth	  has	  
often	  been	  measured	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  freight	  that	  it	  transports,	  regardless	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  resource	  extraction	  causes	  social,	  environmental	  or	  political	  harm.	  
So	  while	  the	  yields	  of	  a	  mining	  operation	  or	  logging	  concession	  can	  increase	  a	  
country’s	  GDP	  thanks	  to	  the	  lines	  transporting	  these	  raw	  resources,	  researchers	  
have	  argued	  that	  they	  actually	  increase	  LDCs’	  dependence	  on	  foreign	  countries	  
while	  doing	  little	  to	  improve	  life	  for	  the	  average	  person	  (Mabogunje	  1981;	  Pirie	  
1982	  in	  Simon	  1996:	  51-­‐52).	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  development	  benefits	  can	  be	  ambiguous	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  
railways	  have	  played	  a	  clear	  role	  in	  reorganizing	  space	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  by	  
enlarging	  existing	  populated	  areas	  and	  even	  creating	  new	  cities	  and	  markets	  next	  to	  
these	  lines	  (Hilling	  1996:	  75;	  Pourtier	  2007:	  193).	  Sometimes	  this	  change	  was	  top-­‐
down	  and	  dramatic	  such	  as	  in	  Tanzania	  when	  the	  government	  forced	  rural	  
populations	  to	  move	  closer	  to	  the	  TAZARA	  Railway	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ujaama	  
“villageization”	  campaign (Monson	  2006:	  114-­‐115).	  Yet	  other	  cases	  show	  a	  more	  
organic	  evolution	  over	  time	  with	  varying	  effects	  of	  the	  railway’s	  influence	  on	  its	  
surroundings.	  Railways	  have	  been	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  influence	  for	  up	  to	  25	  
miles	  (40	  kilometers)	  of	  the	  railway	  (Kolars	  and	  Malin	  1970:	  231).	  In	  Mozambique,	  
districts	  with	  a	  railway	  presence	  had	  a	  much	  higher	  average	  density	  than	  those	  
areas	  served	  exclusively	  by	  roads	  (Béranger	  2006:	  343).	  The	  denser	  development	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Just	  three	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  SSA,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Congo’s	  Congo	  Ocean	  Railway,	  the	  
Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo’s	  Matadi-­‐Kinshasa	  Railway	  and	  Angola’s	  Benguela	  Railway,	  serve	  
populated	  areas	  totaling	  more	  than	  11	  million	  people.	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along	  railways	  provides	  those	  people	  living	  nearby	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
participate	  in	  regional	  markets	  while	  enabling	  the	  state	  to	  save	  money	  on	  public	  
services	  (ibid.:	  344).	  The	  accessibility	  of	  services	  may,	  in	  fact,	  help	  stem	  urban	  
migration	  to	  already	  overburdened	  cities;	  railways	  certainly	  help	  structure	  urban-­‐
rural	  relations	  by	  acting	  as	  an	  economic	  regulator,	  an	  integrator	  and	  a	  means	  of	  
repatriation	  (ibid.:	  343).	  For	  example,	  urban	  migrants	  often	  maintain	  connections	  to	  
their	  rural	  families,	  which	  they	  support	  through	  remittances	  (Morella	  et	  al.	  2010:	  
126).	  
The	  potential	  of	  railways	  to	  produce	  environmental	  benefits	  is	  often	  quite	  high.	  
Railways	  are	  viewed	  as	  an	  environmentally	  friendly	  mode	  of	  transportation	  due	  to	  
their	  ability	  to	  transport	  their	  loads	  in	  a	  fuel-­‐efficient	  manner	  (Galenson	  and	  
Thompson	  1994:	  41-­‐42).2	  This	  reduces	  the	  need	  of	  LDCs	  to	  import	  refined	  fuels,	  
which	  cuts	  down	  on	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  A	  dispersed	  population	  
understandably	  increases	  the	  footprint	  of	  agricultural	  or	  urban	  development	  
(Béranger	  2006:	  344).	  The	  loss	  of	  pristine	  lands	  to	  agriculture	  or	  urban	  uses	  has	  
direct	  impacts	  on	  wildlife,	  water	  systems,	  etc.	  While	  railways	  have	  and	  continue	  to	  
impact	  the	  natural	  environment	  through	  land	  conversion	  or	  resource	  extraction,	  
many	  of	  the	  existing	  colonial	  railways	  have	  long-­‐since	  shifted	  to	  an	  environmentally	  
protective	  posture.	  Roads	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  have	  superseded	  railways	  in	  their	  
ability	  to	  open	  more	  land	  to	  settlement	  and	  exploitation.	  
Railways	  can	  also	  protect	  existing	  infrastructure	  investments	  because	  their	  
ability	  to	  carry	  heavy	  loads	  reduces	  damage	  to	  the	  roadway	  network.	  Rural	  road	  
maintenance	  in	  SSA	  particularly	  suffered	  during	  the	  1980s	  due	  to	  structural	  
adjustment	  programs	  (SAPs)	  that	  placed	  strict	  cost	  controls	  on	  government	  
spending	  (World	  Bank	  1988	  and	  Riverson	  et	  al.	  1991	  in	  Bryceson	  et	  al.	  2008:	  461).	  
Such	  restrictions	  came	  as	  countries	  continued	  to	  adopt	  liberalized	  trucking	  policies	  
that	  further	  increased	  truck	  traffic	  (Griffiths	  1995:	  186).	  Creating	  this	  “enabling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  ability	  to	  deliver	  on	  this	  promise	  does,	  however,	  depend	  on	  many	  variables	  including	  how	  
effectively	  the	  railways	  are	  used	  and	  the	  alternatives	  that	  exist	  (Galenson	  and	  Thompson	  1994:	  41-­‐
42).	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environment”	  through	  liberalization	  came	  at	  a	  great	  cost	  to	  Africa	  where	  now	  over	  
20%	  of	  main	  roads	  and	  40%	  of	  rural	  roads	  require	  rehabilitation	  (Foster	  and	  
Briceño-­‐Garmendia	  2010:	  10).	  Given	  the	  tendency	  of	  African	  road	  operators	  to	  
overload	  their	  vehicles	  (Bullock	  2005:	  30),	  their	  vehicles	  have	  the	  high	  potential	  of	  
damaging	  roads	  –	  particularly	  during	  inclement	  weather.	  Meanwhile,	  road	  
maintenance	  costs	  are	  increasing	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  competing	  contractors	  and	  rising	  
inputs,	  which	  some	  researchers	  suggest	  will	  likely	  remain	  on	  an	  upward	  trajectory	  
(Gwilliam	  et	  al.	  2010:	  225).	  Keeping	  a	  railway	  operational	  and	  reliable	  would	  help	  
prevent	  a	  shift	  of	  traffic,	  especially	  heavy	  loads,	  to	  already	  tenuous	  roads.	  
Reducing	  road	  traffic	  can	  also	  produce	  public	  health	  benefits	  by	  keeping	  
roadway	  accidents	  to	  a	  minimum.	  If	  railways	  and	  roadways	  were	  compared	  for	  
safety,	  roadways	  would	  lose	  almost	  every	  time	  no	  matter	  how	  the	  numbers	  are	  
parsed	  (Simon	  1996:	  179).	  Roadway	  traffic	  accidents	  are	  a	  significant	  cause	  of	  
morbidity	  and	  mortality	  in	  Africa	  with	  regional	  mortality	  rates	  trailing	  only	  
HIV/AIDS	  and	  malaria	  (Hyder	  et	  al.	  2008:	  1108;	  Gwilliam	  2011:	  37).3	  According	  to	  
the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO),	  Africa	  leads	  the	  world	  in	  road	  traffic	  injury	  
(RTI)	  deaths	  among	  those	  who	  are	  less	  than	  15	  years	  old	  with	  consequently	  many	  
years	  of	  lost	  life	  (Hyder	  et	  al.	  2008:	  1108).	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  calculate	  an	  
economic	  value	  for	  lives	  lost	  (i.e.,	  “value	  of	  statistical	  life”),	  these	  figures	  are	  highly	  
variable	  and	  mostly	  unavailable	  for	  LDCs	  (Bullock	  2009:	  19-­‐20).	  Simon	  notes,	  “apart	  
from	  the	  overall	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  lives,	  medical	  treatment,	  damage	  and	  repairs,	  
among	  the	  dead	  are	  many	  religious,	  political	  and	  business	  leaders	  and	  other	  
professionals	  for	  whom	  long-­‐distance	  work-­‐related	  travel	  is	  regular.	  Developing	  
countries	  can	  ill	  afford	  to	  lose	  so	  many	  skilled	  people”	  (Simon	  1996:	  179).	  On	  a	  
continent	  that	  suffers	  from	  extremely	  high	  RTI	  fatality	  rates,	  shifting	  passenger	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  A	  study	  found	  that	  individuals	  involved	  in	  road	  traffic	  accidents	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  
posttraumatic	  stress	  disorder	  than	  the	  general	  population;	  professional	  treatment	  for	  individuals	  
suffering	  from	  PTSD,	  though,	  is	  very	  limited	  in	  SSA	  (Iteke	  et	  al.	  2011:	  1,	  9).	  Chilson’s	  book	  Riding	  the	  
Demon	  describes	  the	  anxiety	  that	  grips	  many	  Africans	  when	  they	  use	  the	  roads	  and	  the	  ways	  they	  
mitigate	  their	  fear	  (Chilson	  1999:	  15).	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freight	  traffic	  to	  relatively	  safe	  railways	  would	  protect	  both	  vehicle	  occupants	  and	  
other	  road	  users	  (Bullock	  2009:	  18-­‐19).	  
Railways	  also	  provide	  health	  benefits	  by	  providing	  rural	  populations	  with	  
affordable	  access	  to	  medical	  attention.	  Many	  roads	  become	  impassable	  during	  
certain	  times	  of	  the	  year,	  making	  travel	  by	  car	  to	  reach	  health	  services	  less	  reliable.	  
Moreover,	  dispersing	  the	  population	  more—moving	  them	  farther	  from	  health	  
services—increases	  healthcare-­‐related	  costs	  for	  everyone	  and	  likely	  adversely	  
impacts	  people’s	  health.	  This	  could	  be	  why	  in	  Mozambique,	  the	  regions	  served	  by	  
rail	  rather	  than	  just	  roads	  have	  a	  higher	  life	  expectancy	  and	  lower	  infant	  mortality	  
rate	  (Béranger	  2006:	  340,	  344).4	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Transnet	  railways	  even	  offers	  
the	  “Phelophepa	  health	  train”	  –	  a	  mobile	  clinic	  on	  a	  train	  that	  provides	  affordable	  
primary	  healthcare	  to	  roughly	  45,000	  poor	  rural	  inhabitants	  annually	  (Berry	  2010).	  
Although	  evaluations	  often	  examine	  railways’	  effects	  on	  GDP	  or	  impact	  on	  a	  
government’s	  budget	  (Galenson	  and	  Thompson	  1994;	  World	  Bank	  2000:	  21),	  they	  
pay	  less	  attention	  to	  the	  vital	  roles	  these	  lines	  play	  in	  stimulating	  regional	  
economies	  as	  well	  as	  preserving	  individual	  and	  household	  livelihood.	  Individuals	  
make	  their	  living	  by	  working	  for	  these	  lines,	  by	  transporting	  their	  wares	  on	  them	  or	  
even	  by	  selling	  goods	  to	  passengers.	  In	  Mozambique,	  the	  railway	  serves	  as	  the	  
“regulator	  of	  exchange	  and	  the	  prices	  of	  foodstuffs”	  in	  nearby	  villages	  –	  increasing	  
the	  revenue	  of	  local	  farmers	  and	  merchants	  more	  than	  if	  they	  relied	  solely	  on	  the	  
local	  market	  (Béranger	  2006:	  350).	  Decreasing	  railway	  service	  would	  actually	  raise	  
the	  price	  of	  transporting	  all	  goods	  on	  the	  roadways	  (ibid.:	  349-­‐350),	  at	  least	  in	  the	  
short-­‐term,	  which	  would	  have	  a	  particularly	  significant	  impact	  on	  households	  
buying	  imported	  products	  and	  selling	  their	  own	  wares.	  For	  example,	  providing	  
essential	  revenue	  to	  the	  population	  selling	  their	  agricultural	  products	  has	  proved	  
essential	  for	  reducing	  malnutrition	  along	  the	  Mozambique	  railways	  (ibid.:	  355).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A	  more	  detailed	  study	  is	  needed	  to	  determine	  causality.	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These	  lines	  also	  provide	  benefits	  to	  culture	  and	  society.	  Many	  have	  claimed	  that	  
railways	  foster	  national	  unity	  and	  pride,	  as	  is	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Transgabonais	  railway	  (Schissel	  1982:	  2280;	  Yates	  1996:	  179).	  Although	  the	  
evidence	  for	  fostering	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  national	  unity	  is	  lacking,	  railways	  have	  
united	  populations	  at	  the	  local	  and	  regional	  level	  thanks	  to	  shared	  interests	  and	  
pasts.	  For	  example,	  the	  Bassa	  living	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  Transcam	  I	  Railway	  in	  
Cameroon	  viewed	  this	  line	  as	  a	  heritage	  from	  the	  ancestors	  who	  were	  forced	  to	  
build	  it	  (Abé	  2006:	  224).	  The	  population	  opposed	  elimination	  of	  railway	  stops	  
because	  they	  believed	  it	  would	  lead	  people	  to	  forget	  these	  workers’	  sacrifices	  and	  
lose	  some	  sense	  of	  their	  self-­‐identity	  (ibid.).	  Railways	  also	  facilitate	  regional	  
integration	  and	  prevent	  isolation	  (Pourtier	  2007:	  194).	  Whereas	  economists	  write-­‐
off	  the	  value	  of	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  already	  been	  built	  and	  exceeded	  its	  useful	  life	  
as	  “sunk	  costs”,	  some	  people	  see	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  protecting	  railway	  
infrastructure	  due	  to	  these	  lines’	  intangible	  heritage.	  
If	  a	  railway	  can	  bring	  people	  together,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  one	  can	  lead	  
to	  conflict.	  The	  World	  Bank	  made	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Sierra	  Leone	  Government	  
Railway	  (SLGR)	  a	  loan	  condition	  for	  a	  highway	  infrastructure	  project	  –	  an	  action	  
taken	  in	  the	  name	  of	  economic	  rationality.	  Although	  the	  highway	  was	  supposed	  to	  
serve	  the	  same	  areas,	  it	  never	  reached	  some	  communities	  that	  traditionally	  opposed	  
sitting	  President	  Siaka	  Stevens	  and	  took	  decades	  to	  reach	  others	  (Abraham	  and	  
Sesay	  1993:	  120).	  Richards	  asserts	  that	  cutting	  off	  railway	  service	  only	  served	  to	  
alienate	  the	  area	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  and	  enable	  the	  rebel	  force	  
Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  to	  build	  an	  alternative	  regime	  ‘from	  below’	  (Richards	  
1996:	  140).	  This	  seems	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  given	  that	  shortly	  before	  his	  death,	  
Stevens	  stated	  that	  the	  only	  decision	  he	  regretted	  making	  during	  his	  presidency	  was	  
closing	  down	  the	  SLGR	  (Abraham	  and	  Sesay	  1993:	  120).	  Although	  many	  factors	  
likely	  contributed	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  country’s	  lengthy	  civil	  war,	  isolating	  this	  
area	  would	  certainly	  have	  increased	  discontent	  with	  the	  Stevens	  government.	  
Exacerbating	  and	  protracting	  the	  conflict	  would	  have	  had	  an	  economic	  toll	  from	  lost	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lives	  and	  economic	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  investment	  –	  one	  
perhaps	  many	  times	  the	  savings	  garnered	  by	  closing	  the	  railway.	  
Experts	  focused	  solely	  on	  performance	  measures	  such	  as	  the	  line’s	  profitability	  
or	  contribution	  to	  GDP	  risk	  overlooking	  many	  railway	  benefits.	  Given	  the	  
importance	  these	  railways	  have	  for	  so	  many	  people	  and	  communities,	  it	  is	  not	  
surprising	  that	  the	  users	  and	  beneficiaries	  are	  motivated	  to	  protect	  lines	  when	  
threatened	  in	  some	  way.	  Yet	  this	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  when	  railway	  
beneficiaries	  decide	  to	  act,	  what	  form	  their	  collective	  actions	  take	  and	  how	  they	  
work	  to	  protect	  their	  interests	  within	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  power	  relations	  and	  
constraints.	  The	  next	  section	  explains	  in	  greater	  detail	  why	  civil	  society	  
organizations	  (CSOs)	  dedicated	  to	  transportation	  issues	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study.	  
	  
III. Focusing	  on	  Civil	  Society	  Organizations	  in	  the	  Transportation	  Sector	  	  
While	  researchers	  and	  the	  public	  frequently	  condemn	  the	  graft,	  favoritism	  and	  
politics	  that	  affect	  transportation	  decisions,	  surprisingly	  little	  analysis	  is	  provided	  of	  
the	  actual	  processes	  to	  understand	  whether	  other	  concealed	  factors	  also	  impact	  
decisions.	  This	  lack	  of	  attention	  is	  particularly	  pronounced	  in	  examining	  how	  
average	  and	  marginalized	  transportation	  beneficiaries	  make	  their	  voices	  heard	  in	  
this	  process.	  The	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  LDCs	  is	  
particularly	  understudied.	  
Although	  many	  other	  sectors	  in	  LDCs,	  and	  SSA	  in	  particular,	  have	  dedicated	  
CSOs,	  organizations	  dedicated	  to	  transportation	  issues	  in	  LDCs	  are	  relatively	  rare.	  
Researchers	  have	  not	  critically	  examined	  the	  role	  and	  efficacy	  of	  CSOs	  in	  
transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  LDCs.	  The	  raison	  d’être	  of	  transportation-­‐
oriented	  civil	  society	  organizations	  (TCSOs)	  is	  to	  promote	  their	  members’	  actual	  or	  
perceived	  transport	  interests.	  However,	  actions	  taken	  by	  civil	  society	  to	  support	  
their	  transportation	  interests	  tend	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived	  (e.g.,	  preventing	  a	  planned	  
station	  closure	  or	  repairing	  damaged	  infrastructure).	  While	  self-­‐help	  groups	  
dedicated	  to	  maintaining	  rural	  roads	  appear	  sporadically	  in	  the	  literature,	  these	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CSOs	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  do	  much	  more	  than	  repair	  roads	  leading	  to	  their	  respective	  
villages.	  Our	  knowledge	  is	  incomplete	  as	  to	  how	  TCSOs	  function,	  whether	  they	  
attempt	  to	  influence	  transportation	  policy	  or	  related	  decisions,	  and	  whether	  they	  
make	  any	  difference	  for	  their	  members’	  interests.	  
The	  nature	  and	  capabilities	  of	  civil	  society’s	  lobbying	  appears	  to	  differ	  
substantially	  from	  the	  highly	  organized,	  well-­‐funded	  efforts	  of	  various	  private	  or	  
political	  interest	  groups	  (e.g.,	  trucking	  lobby,	  unions,	  political	  parties,	  etc.)	  that	  
promote	  their	  long-­‐term	  transportation	  interests	  in	  various	  venues.	  My	  main	  
research	  objective,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  capacity	  of	  CSOs	  to	  aid	  the	  
preservation	  of	  colonial	  railways	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  other	  developing	  
regions	  of	  the	  world.	  My	  secondary	  objective	  is	  to	  scrutinize	  activities	  and	  framings	  
affecting	  the	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  process	  in	  LDCs	  by	  TCSOs	  and	  the	  
railway	  supporters	  who	  work	  with	  them.	  The	  following	  section	  discusses	  the	  
research	  questions	  and	  arguments	  used	  to	  reach	  these	  objectives.	  	  	  
	  
IV. Research	  Questions	  	  
My	  first	  set	  of	  questions	  examines	  the	  role	  and	  importance	  CSOs	  have	  played	  in	  
attempting	  to	  avert	  a	  railway	  closure.	  Specifically,	  what	  effect	  does	  the	  presence	  of	  
CSOs	  have	  on	  preventing	  railway	  closures?	  In	  addition,	  what	  makes	  these	  CSOs	  
effective	  or	  ineffective?	  I	  argue	  that	  CSOs	  can	  raise	  the	  awareness	  of	  government	  
officials	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  populations	  that	  depend	  upon	  a	  railway,	  but	  they	  have	  
little	  direct	  impact	  on	  IDIs.	  I	  also	  propose	  that	  while	  CSOs	  may	  not	  exert	  sufficient	  
direct	  political	  pressure	  on	  IDIs	  to	  reverse	  their	  conclusions,	  they	  can	  still	  play	  an	  
essential	  role	  in	  preserving	  railway	  service	  when	  a	  railway	  faces	  closure	  through	  
neglect.	  	  
The	  second	  primary	  research	  question	  asks,	  what	  strategies	  have	  CSOs	  
successfully	  used	  to	  motivate	  their	  prospective	  members	  and	  galvanize	  broad	  
support	  for	  an	  unprofitable	  railway	  facing	  a	  permanent	  closure?	  I	  examine	  how	  
CSOs	  and	  their	  allies	  offered	  different	  arguments	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  intended	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audience	  was	  local,	  national	  or	  international.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  
framings	  (i.e.,	  local	  livelihood,	  environmental	  protection,	  cultural	  values)	  depend	  on	  
how	  they	  are	  conveyed	  and	  whether	  they	  coincide	  with	  the	  intended	  audience’s	  
interests.	  	  
My	  dissertation	  considers	  these	  questions	  by	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  TCSOs	  and	  
their	  actions	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  closure	  of	  “unprofitable”	  railways.	  Their	  
existence	  and	  actions	  are	  both	  understudied	  as	  a	  transportation	  phenomenon	  just	  as	  
colonial	  railways	  are	  underappreciated	  as	  a	  transportation	  resource.	  I	  direct	  my	  
research	  questions	  specifically	  at	  the	  colonial-­‐era	  Fianarantsoa	  Côte-­‐Est	  railway	  
(FCE)	  in	  Madagascar,	  which	  has	  been	  threatened	  with	  closure	  numerous	  times,	  in	  
order	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  its	  advocates	  have	  organized,	  supported,	  and	  
framed	  their	  arguments	  to	  preserve	  railway	  service.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  a	  TCSO	  
called	  Association	  des	  Détenteurs	  d’Intérêts	  de	  la	  FCE	  (ADIFCE)	  helped	  further	  the	  
railway’s	  rehabilitation	  efforts	  by	  working	  to	  stop	  landslides	  caused	  by	  local	  farmers	  
practicing	  slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture	  too	  close	  to	  the	  railway.	  A	  second	  group	  called	  
Andrimasom-­‐Pokonolona	  (ANP),	  which	  in	  this	  context	  was	  a	  TCSO,	  actively	  worked	  
to	  protect	  the	  line’s	  infrastructure	  from	  saboteurs	  during	  the	  2002	  political	  crisis	  
when	  road	  bridges	  were	  being	  bombed.	  The	  next	  section	  discusses	  in	  greater	  detail	  
why	  the	  FCE	  is	  an	  ideal	  case	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions.	  
	  
V. Case	  Selection	  
The	  FCE	  shares	  many	  traits	  with	  other	  colonial-­‐built	  railways	  in	  Africa	  and	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  FCE’s	  layout	  from	  the	  port	  city	  of	  Manakara	  to	  the	  
central	  highland	  city	  of	  Fianarantsoa	  reflects	  the	  strategy	  of	  railway	  building	  across	  
SSA.	  This	  furthered	  the	  colonial	  objective	  of	  facilitating	  the	  export	  of	  natural	  
resources	  and	  the	  import	  of	  finished	  products	  from	  the	  colonizing	  countries.	  Like	  
other	  narrow-­‐gauge	  railways,	  the	  French	  used	  the	  FCE	  primarily	  to	  export	  cash	  
crops	  (Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  2002).	  One	  study	  notes	  that	  the	  French	  
military	  also	  pushed	  for	  the	  FCE	  because	  it	  served	  France’s	  “strategic”	  interest	  –	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namely	  advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  navigable	  500-­‐kilometer	  canal	  between	  the	  main	  
port	  at	  Tamatave	  and	  Manakara	  (Sorca-­‐Beceka	  1966:	  10-­‐11).	  Madagascar’s	  first	  
colonial	  Governor-­‐General,	  Joseph	  Gallieni,	  saw	  the	  canal	  des	  pangalanes	  as	  key	  to	  
bolstering	  both	  local	  trade	  and	  the	  quick	  provisioning	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  stationed	  
inland	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  294).	  Still,	  the	  railway’s	  core	  function	  was	  and	  
ultimately	  remained	  true	  to	  colonial	  form	  with	  the	  exportation	  of	  cash	  crops	  such	  as	  
bananas,	  cloves,	  and	  coffee	  (Freudenberger	  2003:	  139).	  
Just	  as	  in	  other	  colonies,	  the	  French	  built	  the	  FCE	  using	  forced	  labor	  that	  resulted	  
in	  the	  deaths	  and	  suffering	  of	  many	  indigenous	  people	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965).	  
The	  French	  constructed	  the	  FCE	  between	  1926	  and	  1936	  using	  a	  forced	  labor	  
program	  disguised	  as	  military	  service	  called	  Service	  de	  la	  Main	  d’Oeuvre	  des	  
Travaux	  d’Intérêt	  Général	  (SMOTIG).	  France	  faced	  intense	  criticism	  about	  the	  use	  of	  
forced	  labor	  in	  SMOTIG	  from	  both	  members	  of	  its	  parliament	  and	  from	  the	  
International	  Labor	  Organization	  (Sodikoff	  2005:	  422).	  Besides	  documented	  cases	  of	  
physical	  and	  psychological	  abuse	  by	  commanding	  officers	  and	  work	  bosses,	  disease,	  
landslides,	  tunnel	  collapses,	  mine	  explosions	  and	  starvation	  killed	  thousands	  of	  
Malagasy	  workers	  (Sodikoff	  2005:	  419;	  Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  27).	  SMOTIG	  continues	  
to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  despised	  colonial	  programs	  implemented	  on	  the	  island	  (Sharp	  
2003:	  82).	  Yet	  this	  program	  also	  was	  important	  to	  the	  more	  recent	  rehabilitation	  of	  
the	  line,	  which	  realized	  its	  greatest	  gains	  between	  2000	  and	  2005.	  
While	  building	  a	  narrow-­‐gauge	  railway	  for	  agricultural	  purposes	  saved	  colonial	  
administrations	  on	  initial	  construction	  costs,	  it	  now	  makes	  acquiring	  the	  non-­‐
standard	  replacement	  rolling	  stock	  more	  difficult	  and	  expensive.	  Moreover,	  the	  FCE	  
previously	  transported	  fuel,	  but	  political	  considerations	  from	  powerful	  lobbying	  
interests	  have	  cut	  off	  this	  lucrative	  revenue	  stream	  in	  favor	  of	  tanker	  trucks.	  The	  
FCE’s	  relative	  unprofitability	  has	  repeatedly	  made	  it	  a	  target	  of	  some	  IDIs	  that	  seek	  
to	  reduce	  government	  expenditures	  through	  the	  cessation	  of	  railway	  service	  
(Freudenberger	  2003).	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  FCE	  continues	  to	  operate	  despite	  
unfavorable	  evaluations	  and	  the	  many	  trials	  it	  has	  endured,	  while	  other	  colonial	  
railways	  in	  SSA	  have	  since	  closed	  indicates	  that	  important	  differences	  exist.	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Despite	  what	  is	  clearly	  a	  rich	  history	  behind	  the	  FCE,	  this	  dissertation	  treats	  the	  
CSOs	  involved	  in	  its	  protection	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  Choosing	  to	  focus	  on	  TCSOs	  
rather	  than	  the	  FCE	  shines	  a	  spotlight	  onto	  the	  importance	  of	  transportation	  service	  
to	  people	  and	  does	  not	  assume	  a	  priori	  that	  transportation	  service	  or	  infrastructure	  
necessarily	  possess	  intrinsic	  value.	  The	  case	  of	  two	  CSOs	  dedicated	  to	  preserving	  the	  
FCE	  in	  Madagascar	  promises	  to	  show	  how	  such	  groups	  can	  impact	  processes	  usually	  
reserved	  for	  government	  actors,	  donors	  and	  well-­‐funded	  special	  interests.	  In	  
examining	  the	  attempts	  made	  by	  TCSOs	  to	  keep	  the	  FCE	  running,	  I	  aim	  to	  address	  
deficiencies	  in	  the	  transportation	  literature	  about	  the	  participation	  of	  these	  groups;	  
it	  will	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  history	  and	  planning	  processes	  
for	  Madagascar.	  
Focusing	  on	  the	  FCE	  as	  a	  “critical	  case”	  provides	  researchers,	  practitioners	  and	  
advocates	  with	  a	  concrete	  example	  of	  how	  TCSOs	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  
transportation	  outcomes.	  A	  researcher	  can	  further	  define	  a	  critical	  case	  as	  either	  a	  
“most-­‐likely”	  or	  “least-­‐likely”	  case	  where	  someone	  would	  most	  likely	  or	  least	  likely	  
expect	  to	  find	  certain	  conditions	  and	  outcomes	  based	  on	  our	  preexisting	  knowledge	  
(Flyvbjerg	  1998:	  74-­‐78).	  The	  FCE	  is	  certainly	  a	  railway	  we	  most	  likely	  would	  have	  
expected	  to	  close	  already	  given	  its	  age	  and	  limited	  resources.	  Therefore,	  the	  FCE	  is	  
not	  only	  a	  critical	  case	  given	  the	  active	  and	  organized	  efforts	  by	  civil	  society,	  but	  also	  
given	  the	  possibility	  that	  civil	  society	  participation	  could	  explain	  why	  the	  line	  had	  
not	  already	  closed.	  	  
	  
VI. Methods	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  posed	  above	  for	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  I	  used	  
three	  qualitative	  methodological	  approaches	  targeting	  various	  sources.	  The	  first	  
research	  method,	  the	  use	  of	  archival	  material,	  helped	  answer	  these	  questions	  and	  
also	  developed	  the	  contextual	  background	  and	  history	  of	  events	  as	  well	  as	  railway-­‐
related	  policies	  –	  both	  generally	  and	  specifically	  in	  Madagascar.	  Archival	  research	  
also	  helped	  me	  formulate	  questions	  for	  the	  second	  research	  method:	  the	  use	  of	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semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (SSIs)	  with	  key	  informants.	  These	  informants	  included	  
public	  officials,	  railway	  workers,	  IDIs’	  and	  development	  organizations’	  staff,	  TCSO	  
members,	  and	  other	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  communities	  along	  the	  railways.	  I	  also	  used	  
rapid	  rural	  appraisal	  (RRA)	  techniques	  with	  larger	  groups	  in	  communities	  along	  the	  
railway	  as	  a	  way	  to	  obtain	  perspectives	  of	  civil	  society	  members	  as	  well	  as	  to	  verify	  
information	  and	  minimize	  bias	  collected	  during	  those	  interviews.	  These	  interviews	  
also	  proved	  useful	  in	  verifying	  information	  contained	  in	  archival	  documents	  and	  
conveyed	  in	  individual	  SSIs.	  	  
	  
1. Archival Research  
The	  archival	  materials	  reviewed	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions	  came	  from	  
both	  formal	  government	  archives	  and	  the	  collections	  of	  individuals	  who	  worked	  on	  
the	  FCE	  dossier.	  I	  examined	  colonial	  government	  reports,	  correspondence,	  photos	  
and	  other	  materials	  located	  in	  various	  research	  centers,	  archives	  and	  libraries	  
including:	  the	  French	  National	  Library	  (Paris,	  France),	  the	  Archives	  Nationales	  
d’Outre-­‐Mer	  or	  ANOM	  (Aix-­‐en-­‐Provence,	  France),	  the	  Malagasy	  National	  Archives	  
(Antananarivo,	  Madagascar),	  the	  Foiben-­‐Taosarintanin’i	  Madagasikara	  or	  FTM	  
(Antananarivo,	  Madagascar),	  the	  Académie	  Nationale	  Malagasy	  (Antananarivo,	  
Madagascar),	  and	  the	  Agence	  Nationale	  d'Information	  (ANTA)	  in	  Antananarivo,	  
Madagascar.	  I	  also	  retrieved	  reports	  on	  the	  use	  of	  forced	  labor	  in	  Madagascar	  from	  
the	  International	  Labor	  Office	  (ILO).	  	  
Documents	  and	  other	  materials	  generated	  after	  independence	  came	  from	  a	  
variety	  of	  public	  and	  private	  collections.	  The	  World	  Bank	  Archives	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  
U.S.A.)	  was	  a	  rich	  source	  for	  information	  about	  the	  FCE	  from	  independence	  to	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s	  –	  particularly	  about	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  effort	  to	  close	  the	  railway.	  The	  
private	  archives	  of	  Karen	  Freudenberger	  (Director	  of	  the	  FCE-­‐Rehabilitation	  
project)	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  USAID-­‐financed	  programs	  (i.e.,	  CAP,	  LDI,	  ERI)	  based	  
in	  Fianarantsoa,	  Madagascar	  contained	  more	  recent	  information	  (e.g.,	  reports,	  
power	  points,	  photos,	  correspondence,	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  other	  documents)	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related	  to	  the	  FCE	  rehabilitation	  effort	  that	  started	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Particularly	  
useful	  reports	  and	  documents	  included	  information	  about	  the	  initial	  formation	  and	  
structure	  of	  ADIFCE,	  its	  members,	  outreach	  strategies	  to	  local	  communities	  during	  
the	  railway’s	  reconstruction	  effort	  and	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  a	  railway	  closure.	  A	  
key	  actor	  who	  helped	  obtain	  donated	  resources	  from	  Switzerland,	  Frank	  West,	  had	  a	  
number	  of	  reports	  and	  a	  video	  documentary	  about	  the	  FCE.	  Individuals	  living	  along	  
the	  railway	  also	  provided	  relevant	  documents,	  journals	  and	  other	  materials.	  
Documents	  and	  information	  found	  in	  archives	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  biased	  or	  
incorrect,	  but	  may	  be	  revealing	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  My	  research	  required	  analyzing	  
data	  critically,	  including	  understanding	  the	  circumstances	  and	  context	  under	  which	  
documents	  were	  produced.	  Identifying	  the	  undercurrents	  and	  organizational	  bias	  
that	  affected	  the	  production	  or	  absence	  of	  documents	  in	  the	  various	  archives	  was	  an	  
essential	  task.	  Archival	  materials	  were	  therefore	  critically	  reviewed	  by	  considering	  
who	  the	  authors	  were	  as	  well	  as	  who	  they	  expected	  their	  intended	  (and	  expected)	  
audiences	  to	  be.	  
	  
2. Semi-Structured Interviews  
My	  research	  relied	  heavily	  on	  SSIs	  with	  36	  key	  informants	  knowledgeable	  about	  
the	  FCE’s	  history	  extending	  from	  colonial	  times	  up	  to	  present	  day	  (see	  Appendix	  B).	  
Individuals	  familiar	  with	  the	  FCE	  on	  a	  firsthand	  basis	  during	  colonial	  times	  were	  
exclusively	  Malagasy—namely	  elders	  and	  traditional	  leaders—and	  these	  interviews	  
occurred	  in	  person	  in	  Madagascar.	  A	  translator	  was	  present	  to	  translate	  to	  and	  from	  
either	  Malagasy	  or	  French	  as	  necessary.	  Informants	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  FCE	  
after	  independence	  included	  public	  officials,	  consultants	  or	  staff	  from	  government	  
agencies,	  IDIs,	  or	  development	  projects.	  Some	  of	  these	  individuals	  were	  expatriates.	  
These	  SSIs	  took	  place	  both	  in	  Madagascar	  and	  over	  the	  phone.	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  development	  field,	  many	  IDI	  staff	  and	  consultants	  had	  transitioned	  to	  other	  
projects	  around	  the	  world	  since	  the	  effort	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  FCE.	  A	  handful	  of	  
informants	  were	  familiar	  with	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  effort	  to	  close	  the	  FCE	  during	  the	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1980s.	  Other	  informants	  from	  IDIs	  and	  USAID-­‐financed	  development	  projects	  
provided	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  efforts	  to	  revitalize	  the	  FCE	  starting	  in	  
the	  late	  1990s	  to	  present.	  IDI	  staff	  members	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  
provided	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  arguments	  affected	  their	  opinions	  about	  
the	  railway,	  how	  they	  were	  conveyed	  and	  who	  communicated	  them.	  	  
These	  informants	  also	  helped	  me	  learn	  whether	  CSOs’	  appeals	  were	  heard	  at	  the	  
international	  level	  and	  whether	  they	  affected	  IDI	  support.	  This	  included	  information	  
about	  significant	  events	  that	  threatened	  the	  FCE	  as	  well	  as	  events	  that	  paved	  the	  
way	  to	  its	  partial	  rehabilitation.	  They	  also	  included	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  
formation	  of	  different	  advocacy	  groups	  (i.e.,	  TCSOs),	  their	  members	  and	  their	  
activities.	  I	  also	  interviewed	  individuals	  in	  a	  leadership	  position	  of	  one	  TCSO	  about	  
the	  formation	  and	  role	  of	  their	  group.	  In	  addition,	  I	  interviewed	  traditional	  leaders	  
(Mpanjaka)	  and	  local	  elected	  officials	  about	  the	  FCE.	  FCE	  employees,	  including	  its	  
director,	  provided	  useful	  information	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  railway	  at	  various	  times	  
and	  the	  role	  of	  TCSOs	  in	  keeping	  it	  running.	  	  
	  
3. Rapid Rural Appraisal  
The	  third	  method	  I	  used,	  RRA,	  allowed	  me	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  
understanding	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  rehabilitate	  and	  protect	  the	  FCE	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  its	  users	  and	  villagers	  who	  depend	  on	  it.	  RRA	  has	  been	  most	  plainly	  described	  as	  a	  
coherent	  (if	  not	  well-­‐defined)	  “family	  of	  techniques”	  for	  outsiders	  to	  learn	  about	  
local	  people’s	  lives	  (Chambers	  1983:	  199).	  As	  its	  name	  implies,	  researchers	  have	  
used	  RRA	  to	  “elicit”	  valid	  information	  from	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas—people	  who	  
are	  often	  overlooked	  or	  excluded—about	  their	  living	  conditions	  and	  environment	  in	  
a	  “cost-­‐effective	  and	  timely	  manner”	  (Chambers	  1997:	  112-­‐113).	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  word	  “rural”	  seems	  to	  limit	  RRA’s	  scope,	  researchers	  can	  readily	  extend	  RRA	  to	  
urban	  areas	  because	  its	  main	  strengths	  are	  the	  its	  philosophical	  chassis	  and	  flexible	  
techniques	  that	  generate	  information	  while	  enabling	  all	  actors	  to	  better	  learn.	  	  
	   	  18	  
RRA	  formally	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  a	  response	  to	  disenchantment	  by	  
development	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  over	  the	  duration,	  cost,	  and	  flawed	  
results	  of	  traditional	  development	  research	  methods	  in	  rural	  environments	  (ibid.:	  
110-­‐111).	  Recognizing	  how	  both	  the	  “long-­‐and-­‐dirty”	  methods	  like	  rural	  survey	  
work	  and	  the	  “quick-­‐and-­‐dirty”	  expeditions	  of	  rural	  tourism	  could	  yield	  inaccurate	  
or	  unreliable	  information,	  these	  experts	  started	  experimenting	  with	  research	  
techniques	  that	  could	  deliver	  valid	  results	  in	  a	  shorter	  timeframe	  with	  fewer	  
associated	  costs	  (Chambers	  2008:	  72).5	  Eventually	  these	  techniques	  formally	  
melded	  into	  the	  “fairly-­‐quick-­‐and-­‐fairly-­‐clean”	  method	  labeled	  RRA.	  At	  RRA’s	  heart	  
lies	  the	  impetus	  to	  do	  research	  that	  encourages	  effective	  learning	  to	  discover	  new	  
information,	  while	  also	  minimizing	  bias	  and	  empowering	  informants	  to	  participate	  
and	  learn	  about	  their	  own	  lives	  (Chambers	  1997:	  156-­‐157).	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  spoke	  with	  20	  focus	  groups	  with	  
approximately	  150	  members	  of	  the	  general	  public	  about	  the	  FCE.	  The	  people	  I	  
interviewed	  in	  this	  process	  can	  be	  generally	  classified	  as	  falling	  into	  the	  following	  
focus	  groups:	  women;	  members	  of	  TCSOs	  (i.e.,	  ADIFCE	  or	  ANP);	  elders	  and	  
traditional	  leaders;	  descendents	  of	  FCE	  workers;	  merchants;	  and	  employees	  of	  the	  
FCE.	  I	  selected	  six	  villages	  (five	  different	  stations)	  along	  the	  railway	  to	  conduct	  my	  
fieldwork	  targeting	  the	  general	  population:	  Ranomena,	  Tolongoina,	  Ambohimalaza,	  
Manampatrana,	  Sahasinaka	  and	  Ambila.	  I	  selected	  villages	  rather	  than	  the	  termini	  
cities	  of	  Fianarantsoa	  or	  Manakara	  because	  ADIFCE	  and	  the	  USAID-­‐funded	  FCE-­‐
Rehabilitation	  project	  (FCER)	  focused	  on	  populations	  living	  in	  the	  rural	  villages.	  I	  
selected	  Ranomena	  because	  its	  ethnic	  composition	  is	  primarily	  Betsileo,	  and	  it	  sits	  
in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  remaining	  forest	  corridor	  and	  has	  no	  access	  to	  regional	  roadways.	  
It	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  smaller	  village	  stations	  along	  the	  line	  serving	  a	  population	  that	  is	  
dispersed	  over	  a	  larger	  area.	  I	  selected	  Tolongoina,	  Manampatrana	  and	  Sahasinaka	  
because	  these	  are	  the	  largest	  villages	  that	  have	  populations	  living	  relatively	  close	  to	  
the	  station.	  Ambohimalaza	  is	  a	  small	  village	  located	  approximately	  three	  kilometers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  “Dirty”	  in	  these	  cases	  means	  not	  cost-­‐effective.	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from	  the	  Manampatrana	  station	  and	  is	  representative	  of	  many	  of	  the	  villages	  located	  
slightly	  farther	  from	  the	  FCE,	  but	  still	  within	  walking	  distance	  to	  the	  line.	  The	  ethnic	  
composition	  of	  these	  villages	  is	  primarily	  Tanala,	  who	  are	  known	  for	  practicing	  tavy	  
(slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture).	  Tolongoina	  also	  has	  a	  relatively	  large	  contingent	  of	  
immigrants.	  These	  three	  stations	  all	  have	  access	  to	  regional	  roadways,	  but	  the	  
conditions	  of	  the	  roads	  and	  bridges	  are	  rather	  poor.	  They	  also	  received	  a	  
disproportionate	  amount	  of	  attention	  from	  those	  working	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  FCE.	  I	  
selected	  Ambila	  to	  represent	  another	  smaller	  village	  along	  the	  FCE.	  Its	  population	  is	  
comprised	  of	  Antemoro,	  the	  third	  ethnicity	  along	  the	  line.	  Of	  all	  the	  selected	  villages,	  
it	  has	  the	  best	  road	  access.	  
	  
Figure	  1	  FCE	  Railway	  and	  studied	  villages	  
Rather	  than	  replace	  traditional	  SSIs	  or	  archival	  research,	  RRA	  tools	  complement	  
them.	  For	  example,	  I	  used	  participatory	  mapping	  and	  transect	  walks	  that	  allowed	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villagers	  to	  identify	  specific	  locations	  of	  historical	  or	  social	  significance.	  I	  also	  used	  
historical	  matrices	  with	  focus	  groups,	  which	  facilitated	  understanding	  the	  timeline	  
of	  certain	  events	  with	  villagers	  and	  yielded	  valuable	  details	  about	  strategies	  they	  
employed	  at	  different	  times	  to	  preserve	  railway	  service.	  Drawing	  Venn	  diagrams	  on	  
butcher	  paper	  also	  proved	  useful	  in	  understanding	  the	  conflicts	  between	  various	  
actors	  and	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  how	  these	  informants	  perceived	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  
relationships	  (e.g.,	  power	  relations).	  I	  also	  used	  various	  RRA	  tools	  and	  techniques	  to	  
inquire	  about	  villagers’	  interaction	  with	  or	  participation	  in	  TCSOs	  working	  on	  the	  
railway	  rehabilitation.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Practicing	  RRA	  in	  Madagascar	  
Given	  the	  efforts	  of	  one	  TCSO	  in	  particular	  to	  reduce	  the	  harmful	  agricultural	  
practice	  of	  tavy	  along	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way,	  I	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  villagers	  who	  
use	  land	  along	  the	  railway	  and	  who	  were	  asked	  to	  abide	  by	  traditional	  law	  (i.e.,	  the	  
dinabe)	  that	  limited	  this	  practice.	  I	  also	  used	  RRA	  tools	  to	  develop	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  2002	  crisis	  when	  villagers	  camped	  
along	  the	  railway	  tunnels	  and	  bridges	  to	  prevent	  sabotage.	  This	  included	  
documenting	  how	  the	  CSOs’	  organizing	  and	  support	  strategies	  affected	  villagers	  
during	  the	  crisis.	  I	  also	  asked	  questions	  about	  the	  FCE’s	  colonial	  past	  and	  the	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heritage	  railway	  slogan	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  this	  reference	  motivated	  wider	  
participation	  by	  the	  public	  to	  protect	  the	  railway.	  
VII. Dissertation	  Approach	  and	  Organization	  	  
I	  present	  the	  information	  collected	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  using	  a	  
three-­‐article	  model.	  The	  reader	  can	  expect	  the	  next	  three	  chapters	  of	  the	  
dissertation	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  stand-­‐alone	  articles.	  Together	  these	  chapters	  tell	  a	  
complicated,	  but	  coherent	  story	  in	  a	  relatively	  succinct	  way.	  They	  cover	  the	  history	  
of	  the	  FCE	  from	  its	  colonial	  planning	  and	  construction	  up	  through	  its	  rehabilitation.	  
In	  addition,	  they	  show	  the	  pressures	  placed	  upon	  the	  railway	  and	  the	  Malagasy	  
people	  who	  use	  the	  line.	  Readers	  will	  learn	  who	  the	  major	  actors	  were	  that	  
participated	  in	  the	  FCE’s	  story	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rationalities,	  motivations	  and	  politics	  to	  
which	  they	  were	  subjected	  or	  which	  they	  furthered.	  Moreover,	  readers	  will	  better	  
understand	  the	  role	  of	  CSOs	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  of	  LDCs	  and	  specifically	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE.	  
	  
1. Heritage Infrastructure Constructed, Constructing Heritage Infrastructure 
(Chapter 2) 
In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  titled	  “Heritage	  Infrastructure	  Constructed,	  Constructing	  
Heritage	  Infrastructure,”	  readers	  are	  provided	  with	  key	  information	  about	  the	  FCE’s	  
history	  and	  why	  the	  forced	  labor	  program	  used	  to	  build	  it	  was	  so	  memorable.	  More	  
than	  just	  impressive	  feats	  of	  labor,	  African	  colonial	  railways’	  histories	  endow	  them	  
with	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  heritage.	  Yet	  as	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  shows,	  heritage	  is	  as	  much	  a	  
process	  as	  it	  is	  a	  definition.	  Railways’	  histories,	  and	  efforts	  to	  recall	  them,	  can	  make	  
them	  heritage	  infrastructures	  rather	  than	  lines	  simply	  inherited	  from	  colonial	  
powers.	  	  
Of	  particular	  importance	  to	  the	  FCE’s	  sense	  of	  heritage	  is	  the	  colonial	  work	  
program	  used	  to	  build	  it:	  the	  Service	  de	  la	  Main	  d’Oeuvre	  des	  Travaux	  d’Intérêt	  
Général	  (SMOTIG).	  Although	  researchers	  concur	  that	  SMOTIG	  was	  a	  forced	  labor	  
program,	  they	  offer	  a	  mixed	  picture	  of	  the	  program	  that	  insufficiently	  explain	  why	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the	  FCE	  evokes	  such	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  heritage.	  SMOTIG	  has	  been	  called	  both	  the	  
worst	  form	  of	  colonial	  enslavement	  (Sharp	  2002:	  217)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  “milder”	  form	  of	  
past	  labor	  practices	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  180-­‐181).	  	  
This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  reconcile	  the	  conflicting	  views	  of	  SMOTIG	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  
why	  the	  FCE	  has	  such	  a	  strong	  heritage	  link.	  I	  offer	  another	  perspective	  that	  SMOTIG	  
can	  simultaneously	  be	  called	  the	  safest	  yet	  most	  pernicious	  form	  of	  forced	  labor	  to	  
befall	  the	  Malagasy	  people.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  French	  efforts	  to	  allay	  
international	  concern	  about	  SMOTIG	  actually	  inflicted	  deeper	  wounds	  on	  Malagasy	  
society	  and	  these	  have	  endured	  longer	  than	  the	  injuries	  caused	  by	  other	  types	  of	  
forced	  labor.	  I	  critically	  reevaluate	  its	  major	  aspects,	  including	  its	  “educational”	  
component,	  casualty	  rates	  and	  labeling	  as	  “slavery.”	  I	  offer	  new	  explanations	  for	  its	  
infamy	  by	  arguing	  that	  moving	  Malagasy	  men	  away	  from	  their	  communities	  for	  
years	  at	  a	  time	  heightened	  their	  anxiety	  of	  falling	  ill	  or	  dying	  far	  from	  ancestral	  
tombs	  with	  no	  guarantee	  of	  repatriation.	  This	  chapter	  also	  examines	  how	  the	  sense	  
of	  heritage	  has	  been	  reinforced	  through	  public	  education	  curricula,	  story	  telling	  and	  
public	  relations	  campaigns.	  	  
Besides	  strengthening	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  FCE	  is	  a	  cultural	  heritage	  for	  
Malagasy,	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  how	  the	  shared	  suffering	  by	  colonial	  subjects	  could	  
be	  harnessed	  to	  protect	  other	  African	  railway	  infrastructure	  facing	  similar	  
challenges.	  This	  chapter	  explains	  how	  the	  events	  in	  colonial	  railways’	  past	  can	  
imbue	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  patrimony	  around	  which	  today’s	  supporters	  can	  rally.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  also	  dubbed	  the	  Heritage	  Railway,	  the	  line’s	  supporters	  used	  its	  
lamentable	  colonial	  past	  to	  galvanize	  public	  support.	  Extensive	  community	  support	  
proved	  vital	  during	  post-­‐colonial	  rehabilitation	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  efforts	  to	  protect	  
the	  railway	  from	  sabotage,	  theft	  and	  natural	  events.	  When	  threatened	  with	  closures	  
caused	  by	  cyclones	  or	  sabotage	  during	  the	  2002	  political	  crisis,	  supporters	  rallied	  
public	  support	  to	  protect	  the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure	  based	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  heritage.	  For	  
example,	  the	  TCSOs	  ADIFCE	  and	  ANP,	  used	  a	  slogan	  appealing	  to	  the	  railway’s	  
colonial	  past:	  Harovy	  ny	  Lalamby	  fa	  Lovantsika	  (“Save	  the	  train	  because	  it	  is	  our	  
heritage”)	  to	  unite	  communities	  behind	  efforts	  to	  protect	  the	  railway.	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2. Rationality and Railways: Hitting a Moving Target (Chapter 3) 
Chapter	  3,	  “Rationality	  and	  Railways:	  Hitting	  a	  Moving	  Target,”	  provides	  readers	  
with	  the	  context	  necessary	  to	  understand	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  
in	  LDCs.	  It	  lays	  out	  who	  the	  actors	  are	  that	  typically	  participate	  in	  these	  processes	  
and	  what	  rationalities	  they	  use	  to	  guide	  their	  decisions.	  It	  also	  examines	  how	  these	  
forms	  of	  rationality	  impact	  colonial-­‐era	  lines	  and	  how	  railway	  supporters	  can	  
change	  the	  positions	  of	  those	  powerful	  interests	  who	  typically	  shape	  decisions.	  
Although	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  railway	  supporters	  more	  broadly,	  understanding	  
the	  context	  of	  transportation	  investment	  and	  decision-­‐making	  is	  key	  to	  
understanding	  the	  role	  of	  TCSOs	  in	  the	  transport	  sector	  and	  how	  they	  can	  impact	  
the	  policy-­‐making	  context.	  
Understanding	  how	  certain	  rationalities	  and	  values	  impact	  the	  transportation	  
sector	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  explaining	  why	  railway	  service	  continues	  to	  
diminish	  despite	  the	  important	  role	  it	  plays.	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  ideological	  
framings	  within	  the	  development	  and	  transportation	  fields	  have	  unduly	  influenced	  
railway	  service	  in	  LDCs.	  Railways	  in	  SSA	  have	  largely	  not	  fared	  well	  under	  the	  
development	  and	  transportation	  fields’	  positivist	  and	  neoliberal	  framings.	  
Positivism	  in	  transportation	  planning	  has	  promoted	  the	  view	  that	  decisions	  could	  be	  
made	  objectively,	  and	  it	  has	  held	  efficiency	  (e.g.,	  economic)	  as	  the	  ultimate	  guiding	  
principle.	  	  
Specifically,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  how	  neoliberal	  theory	  and	  positivistic	  
analyses	  used	  by	  IDIs	  have	  influenced	  transportation	  investments	  in	  LDCs	  and	  with	  
respect	  to	  railways	  in	  particular.	  Given	  the	  belief	  that	  government	  should	  limit	  its	  
involvement	  and	  responsibility	  for	  transportation	  operations	  has	  not	  benefited	  
railways	  where	  government	  typically	  plays	  a	  large	  role.	  IDIs	  wield	  significant	  power	  
through	  their	  financing	  of	  LDCs’	  infrastructure,	  which	  means	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  
assert	  their	  perspective	  through	  conditions	  they	  attach	  to	  the	  funding	  they	  provide.	  
IDIs	  are	  important	  players	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  transportation	  investment	  in	  LDCs.	  
As	  institutions,	  they	  embody	  particular	  values	  and	  rationalities	  that	  guide	  their	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practice.	  They	  have	  largely	  grounded	  their	  evaluations	  and	  policies	  in	  positivist	  
terms.	  Their	  use	  of	  quantitative	  methods	  masks	  what	  many	  experts,	  particularly	  
critics,	  have	  termed	  neoliberal	  theory.	  The	  primary	  defining	  quality	  used	  to	  label	  
actors	  and	  institutions	  as	  neoliberal	  has	  been	  their	  belief	  that	  removing	  “state	  
‘distortions’	  of	  markets”	  (including	  transportation	  subsidies)	  creates	  the	  conditions	  
for	  macro-­‐scale	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  (Ferguson	  2006:	  11).	  This	  
perpetuates	  a	  narrow	  view	  of	  railways	  as	  best	  suited	  only	  for	  exporting	  raw	  natural	  
resources.	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  though,	  IDI	  staff	  can	  be	  persuaded	  to	  
consider	  other	  forms	  of	  rationality	  and	  arguments.	  Railway	  supporters	  used	  certain	  
strategies	  to	  sway	  IDI	  staff.	  This	  included	  utilizing	  both	  quantitative	  tools	  and	  
qualitative	  means	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  preserving	  the	  FCE.	  For	  example,	  traditional	  
cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  (CBA)	  can	  be	  modified.	  Studies	  of	  the	  FCE	  showed	  that	  keeping	  
the	  railway	  operational	  would	  prevent	  deforestation	  of	  roughly	  100,000	  hectares	  of	  
tropical	  forest	  over	  20	  years.	  Railway	  supporters	  helped	  broaden	  the	  CBA	  to	  include	  
this	  metric.	  Yet	  qualitative	  approaches	  made	  to	  convey	  the	  line’s	  importance,	  
including	  study	  tours	  that	  brought	  IDI	  staff	  to	  meet	  railway	  beneficiaries	  and	  see	  the	  
FCE	  with	  their	  own	  eyes,	  also	  made	  a	  difference.	  The	  most	  striking	  turn-­‐around	  
came	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  that	  had	  repeatedly	  called	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  closure	  and,	  after	  
railway	  supporters	  had	  organized	  and	  rehabilitated	  parts	  of	  the	  line,	  actually	  
allocated	  millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  help	  finish	  revitalizing	  the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure.	  
	  
3. Engaging Civil Society to Protect Transportation Infrastructure and Services in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 4) 
Chapter	  4,	  “Engaging	  Civil	  Society	  to	  Protect	  Transportation	  Infrastructure	  and	  
Services	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,”	  directly	  aims	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions.	  It	  
begins	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  LDCs’	  transport	  
sector	  –	  particularly	  what	  role	  and	  impact	  TCSOs	  can	  have.	  It	  defines	  TCSOs	  to	  
better	  understand	  their	  role	  and	  the	  characteristics	  that	  distinguish	  them	  from	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other	  actors	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  ADIFCE,	  the	  TCSO	  that	  
worked	  to	  preserve	  railway	  service	  on	  the	  FCE,	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  few	  examples	  of	  
civil	  society	  working	  on	  a	  transportation	  issue	  in	  an	  organized	  fashion	  for	  years	  at	  a	  
time.	  This	  chapter	  discusses	  how	  they	  differ	  from	  other	  civil	  society	  actors	  working	  
on	  behalf	  of	  transportation	  interests.	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  three	  key	  strategies	  used	  by	  ADIFCE,	  often	  in	  concert	  
with	  other	  railway	  supporters,	  to	  protect	  the	  FCE.	  The	  first	  intervention	  was	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  “Heritage	  Campaign”	  that	  drew	  upon	  the	  railway’s	  
lamentable	  past	  –	  particularly	  the	  line’s	  construction	  through	  the	  use	  of	  SMOTIG	  –	  to	  
give	  a	  common	  bond	  to	  the	  communities	  spread	  over	  the	  line’s	  163	  kilometers.	  
ADIFCE	  furthered	  this	  outreach	  effort	  though	  the	  visible	  communication	  campaign	  
and	  interaction	  with	  villagers.	  A	  second	  key	  strategy	  that	  united	  communities	  and	  
aimed	  to	  protect	  local	  forests	  and	  the	  railway	  infrastructure	  finds	  its	  basis	  in	  
traditional	  Malagasy	  law,	  which	  ADIFCE	  helped	  implement	  and	  enforce.	  ADIFCE	  also	  
assisted	  in	  mobilizing	  local	  farmers	  to	  cultivate	  the	  deep-­‐rooting	  plant	  vetiver	  
(Chrysopogon	  zizanioides)	  that	  was	  used	  to	  combat	  erosion	  on	  the	  hillsides	  along	  the	  
FCE’s	  right-­‐of-­‐way.	  	  
Efforts	  by	  civil	  society	  and	  ADIFCE	  also	  had	  unintended	  consequences.	  Their	  
efforts	  proved	  crucial	  for	  rehabilitation	  work	  and	  the	  privatization	  process,	  but	  they	  
also	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  unity	  that	  proved	  vital	  in	  protecting	  this	  transportation	  line’s	  
infrastructure	  when	  political	  turmoil	  literally	  threatened	  the	  railway’s	  existence.	  
The	  ADIFCE	  worked	  alongside	  ANP	  (the	  second	  TCSO)	  to	  prevent	  the	  bombing	  of	  
the	  railway’s	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  during	  the	  2002	  political	  crisis.	  The	  ADIFCE’s	  
ability	  to	  catalyze	  local	  community	  support	  for	  the	  railway,	  particularly	  during	  
tumultuous	  times,	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  that	  a	  TCSO	  brings	  to	  a	  table	  most	  
frequently	  reserved	  for	  government	  and	  international	  aid	  actors.	  	  
4. Concluding Chapter (Chapter 5) 
Following	  these	  three	  chapters	  described	  above,	  I	  summarize	  and	  elaborate	  on	  
the	  findings	  of	  my	  research	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  implications	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	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It	  is	  clear,	  even	  without	  the	  research	  I	  conducted,	  that	  civil	  society	  plays	  a	  less	  
visible	  role	  than	  in	  other	  sectors.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  more	  noticeable	  
participation	  by	  CSOs	  translates	  into	  results	  that	  serve	  their	  interests.	  The	  case	  of	  
the	  FCE	  is	  a	  useful	  example	  on	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limits	  of	  how	  an	  organized	  civil	  
society	  can	  impact	  transportation	  decisions	  that	  affect	  them.	  	  
This	  research	  could	  prove	  useful	  to	  the	  supporters	  of	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  
SSA.	  The	  condition	  of	  many	  of	  these	  lines	  is	  dire	  and	  millions	  of	  people	  still	  depend	  
on	  them.	  Identifying	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  ADIFCE	  in	  this	  case	  could	  
provide	  other	  advocates	  of	  transportation	  infrastructure	  with	  useful	  lessons	  that	  
they	  can	  apply	  to	  other	  communities	  who	  want	  to	  make	  their	  voices	  heard	  in	  
transportation	  decisions	  that	  affect	  their	  lives.	  It	  holds	  lessons	  for	  all	  actors	  who	  
participate	  in	  transportation	  investment	  decisions	  in	  LDCs	  and	  particularly	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  railways.	  Although	  the	  conclusions	  and	  recommendations	  speak	  largely	  to	  
the	  context	  of	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  SSA,	  many	  of	  the	  lessons	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  
other	  regions	  and	  other	  types	  of	  transportation	  infrastructure.	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Chapter	  2	  	  
Heritage	  Infrastructure	  Constructed,	  Constructing	  Heritage	  Infrastructure	  
	  
“It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  we	  treasure	  the	  relics	  of	  bygone	  eras	  is	  that,	  
if	  we	  did	  not,	  how	  could	  we	  value	  the	  future,	  which	  itself	  will	  soon	  pass	  into	  history?”	  	  
(John	  Friedmann	  2006:	  7)	  
I. Introduction	  
Colonial	  powers	  built	  scores	  of	  railways	  across	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA)	  to	  
serve	  their	  strategic	  interests.	  Constructing	  these	  massive	  public	  works	  came	  at	  a	  
great	  cost	  to	  the	  indigenous	  populations	  forced	  to	  build	  them.	  Yet	  like	  many	  colonial	  
contradictions,	  these	  lines	  provided	  benefits	  to	  numerous	  local	  communities	  in	  their	  
vicinity.	  Many	  of	  these	  railways	  continue	  to	  support	  local	  livelihood	  and	  provide	  
other	  non-­‐economic	  benefits,	  sometimes	  for	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  rural	  populations.	  
Yet	  the	  declining	  state	  of	  their	  fixed	  infrastructure	  and	  rolling	  stock	  makes	  such	  
public	  service	  more	  precarious.	  Railway	  supporters	  and	  beneficiaries,	  often	  spread	  
over	  hundreds	  of	  kilometers	  and	  as	  many	  communities,	  could	  benefit	  from	  a	  new	  
strategy	  that	  builds	  public	  support	  for	  the	  preservation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  these	  
lines	  based	  on	  their	  past.	  	  
Researchers	  have	  often	  called	  colonial-­‐built	  transportation	  infrastructures	  as	  
inheritances	  (Griffiths	  1995:	  181;	  Njoh	  1999:	  225;	  Simon	  1996:	  49),	  but	  colonial	  
railways’	  rich	  histories	  mean	  many	  could	  more	  appropriately	  be	  called	  “heritages.”	  
Economic	  and	  other	  less	  tangible	  benefits	  generated	  by	  these	  infrastructures	  may	  
engender	  popular	  appreciation,	  but	  their	  worth	  includes	  significant	  unquantifiable	  
aspects	  and	  thus	  extends	  beyond	  net	  present	  value	  and	  balance	  sheets.	  Under	  the	  
Convention	  Concerning	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  World	  Cultural	  and	  Natural	  Heritage,	  
colonial	  railways	  fit	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  cultural	  heritage	  site,	  which	  includes	  “works	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of	  man	  or	  the	  combined	  works	  of	  nature	  and	  man,	  and	  areas	  including	  
archaeological	  sites	  which	  are	  of	  outstanding	  universal	  value	  from	  the	  historical,	  
aesthetic,	  ethnological	  or	  anthropological	  point	  of	  view”	  (UNESCO	  1972:	  Article	  1).	  
More	  than	  just	  impressive	  feats	  of	  labor,	  colonial	  railways’	  histories	  endow	  them	  
with	  a	  deeper	  sense	  of	  heritage.	  Yet	  as	  discussed	  later,	  “heritage”—as	  distinguished	  
from	  “inheritance”	  —is	  as	  much	  a	  process	  as	  it	  is	  a	  definition.	  The	  lines’	  histories,	  
and	  efforts	  to	  recall	  them,	  can	  render	  them	  heritage	  infrastructures	  rather	  than	  lines	  
simply	  inherited	  from	  colonial	  powers.	  
As	  demonstrated	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Madagascar’s	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  
(FCE),	  keeping	  a	  colonial	  railway	  operational	  is	  not	  easy	  even	  when	  valued	  as	  a	  
patrimony.	  The	  “Heritage	  Railway,”	  as	  the	  FCE	  is	  known,	  has	  struggled	  for	  decades	  
to	  remain	  open	  even	  under	  normal	  conditions.	  Despite	  the	  many	  benefits	  it	  provides	  
for	  the	  region	  and	  especially	  nearby	  households,	  degraded	  infrastructure,	  aging	  
rolling	  stock,	  adverse	  weather,	  and	  rising	  operating	  expenses	  have	  pushed	  it	  to	  the	  
brink	  of	  closure	  many	  times.	  The	  World	  Bank	  even	  attempted	  to	  make	  its	  closure	  a	  
condition	  of	  further	  loans	  to	  the	  Malagasy	  government	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Freudenberger	  
2003:	  140).	  One	  would	  most	  likely	  have	  expected	  it	  to	  close	  given	  these	  pressures	  
that	  had	  closed	  many	  of	  its	  sister	  railways	  across	  SSA.	  However,	  when	  threatened	  
with	  closure	  from	  landslides	  caused	  by	  cyclones	  or	  from	  sabotage	  during	  the	  2002	  
political	  crisis,	  supporters	  of	  the	  FCE	  used	  its	  past	  and	  shared	  heritage	  to	  galvanize	  
public	  support	  for	  the	  line.	  	  
The	  FCE’s	  strong	  sense	  of	  heritage	  is	  inseparable	  from	  its	  history	  –	  particularly	  
the	  forced	  labor	  program	  that	  facilitated	  its	  creation:	  the	  Service	  de	  la	  Main	  d’Oeuvre	  
des	  Travaux	  d’Intérêt	  Général	  (SMOTIG).	  Although	  the	  colonial	  administration	  used	  
SMOTIG	  to	  build	  public	  works	  projects	  across	  Madagascar,	  it	  dedicated	  between	  50	  
and	  75	  percent	  of	  its	  workers	  in	  any	  given	  year	  to	  the	  FCE.	  It	  is	  also	  no	  coincidence	  
that	  SMOTIG’s	  existence	  overlaps	  precisely	  with	  the	  FCE’s	  10-­‐year	  construction	  
timeline.	  The	  French	  would	  most	  likely	  never	  have	  built	  the	  railway	  without	  
SMOTIG	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  446).	  Understanding	  why	  the	  FCE	  continues	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to	  exist	  requires	  delving	  into	  its	  past	  and	  particularly	  how	  SMOTIG	  affected	  
Malagasy.	  
SMOTIG	  workers	  built	  a	  physical	  structure	  that	  has	  endured	  many	  decades	  of	  
use,	  but	  they	  also	  left	  behind	  an	  intangible	  heritage.	  FCE	  supporters	  often	  invoked	  
the	  memory	  of	  these	  workers	  to	  unite	  villagers	  behind	  efforts	  to	  protect	  and	  
rehabilitate	  the	  railway	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  railway	  was	  everyone’s	  heritage.	  
Descendants	  of	  SMOTIG	  workers	  have	  argued	  that	  to	  let	  the	  railway	  close	  would	  be	  
disrespectful	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  their	  ancestors	  who	  reportedly	  suffered	  and	  
sacrificed	  so	  much.	  The	  concept	  of	  “sacrifice”	  often	  surfaces	  in	  discussions	  about	  
SMOTIG	  and	  the	  FCE.	  Yet	  workers’	  suffering	  has	  proved	  both	  memorable	  and	  
galvanizing	  for	  subsequent	  generations	  born	  long	  after	  the	  FCE	  was	  finished.	  
Existing	  research	  on	  SMOTIG	  offers	  a	  mixed	  picture	  of	  the	  program.	  Frémigacci	  
claims	  that	  compared	  to	  previous	  forms	  of	  forced	  labor	  in	  Madagascar,	  it	  was	  
“milder”	  because	  it	  recruited	  only	  young	  men	  “who	  did	  not	  yet	  have	  roots,”	  paid	  
them	  relatively	  well	  and	  instituted	  protective	  measures	  that	  translated	  into	  lower	  
official	  casualty	  and	  desertion	  rates	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  180-­‐182,	  187).i	  Sharp	  asserts,	  
however,	  that	  “among	  such	  sanctioned	  forms	  of	  colonial	  enslavement,	  SMOTIG	  
emerges	  as	  the	  most	  dreadful	  of	  all,	  robbing	  local	  communities	  of	  many	  of	  their	  most	  
productive	  workers”	  for	  years	  at	  a	  time	  (Sharp	  2002:	  217).	  This	  sentiment	  is	  
reinforced	  by	  the	  well-­‐documented	  cases	  of	  worker	  abuse	  (Sodikoff	  2005).	  A	  more	  
compelling	  explanation	  is	  still	  needed	  as	  to	  why	  SMOTIG	  created	  such	  a	  strong	  sense	  
of	  heritage	  for	  the	  line.	  
Based	  on	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  colonial	  documents,	  secondary	  sources	  and	  
interviews,	  this	  article	  aims	  reconcile	  the	  conflicting	  views	  of	  SMOTIG.	  This	  article	  
considers	  the	  possibility	  that	  SMOTIG	  can	  simultaneously	  be	  called	  one	  of	  the	  safest	  
yet	  most	  pernicious	  forms	  of	  forced	  labor	  to	  befall	  the	  Malagasy	  people.	  Specifically,	  
I	  argue	  that	  French	  efforts	  to	  allay	  international	  concerns	  about	  the	  use	  of	  forced	  
labor	  on	  railways	  by	  portraying	  SMOTIG	  as	  military	  service	  actually	  increased	  
Malagasy	  suffering	  over	  previous	  forms	  of	  forced	  labor.	  Malagasy	  men	  lost	  their	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freedom	  for	  at	  least	  two	  years	  only	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  live	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  intense	  
surveillance	  and	  discipline.	  The	  pivotal	  reason	  why	  SMOTIG	  has	  had	  such	  a	  long-­‐
lasting	  impact,	  though,	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  workers’	  deaths	  than	  how	  
they	  were	  treated	  when	  they	  were	  alive.	  Namely,	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  references	  to	  
repatriation	  of	  remains	  and	  the	  significant	  costs	  it	  would	  have	  incurred	  suggest	  that	  
the	  French	  did	  not	  return	  the	  bodies	  of	  fallen	  workers	  to	  their	  home	  villages	  where	  
they	  could	  be	  put	  to	  rest	  in	  family	  tombs.	  SMOTIG	  effectively	  made	  the	  FCE	  into	  both	  
a	  symbol	  of	  workers’	  suffering	  and	  a	  makeshift	  tomb	  for	  those	  workers	  whose	  
bodies	  were	  not	  recovered.	  	  
Although	  recalling	  the	  FCE’s	  past,	  and	  SMOTIG	  in	  particular,	  does	  not	  alone	  
explain	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  FCE	  to	  withstand	  storms—whether	  political,	  financial	  or	  
actual	  weather	  events—it	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  important	  factor.	  This	  paper	  closes	  
with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  FCE	  as	  a	  heritage	  has	  been	  articulated	  
and	  reinforced	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  its	  supporters.	  Specifically,	  FCE	  supporters	  
focused	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  heritage	  in	  their	  communications	  campaign,	  which	  aimed	  to	  
build	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  so	  that	  the	  population	  along	  the	  line	  would	  protect	  it	  
from	  various	  threats.	  This	  effort	  could	  offer	  lessons	  to	  other	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  
SSA.	  
	  
II. Colonial	  Railways	  and	  Forced	  Labor	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  	  
“Development”	  dreams	  danced	  in	  the	  heads	  of	  colonial	  administrators	  who	  
viewed	  transportation	  projects	  as	  essential	  to	  realizing	  their	  country’s	  development	  
goals.	  The	  Sarraut	  Plan,	  France’s	  first	  development	  plan	  for	  the	  French	  empire,	  
called	  transportation	  projects	  “economic	  tools”	  that	  would	  improve	  the	  material	  
welfare	  of	  its	  colonies’	  population	  as	  they	  moved	  “little	  by	  little	  towards	  civilization”	  
(Sarraut	  1923:	  310).ii	  Colonial	  governments	  particularly	  favored	  railways	  because	  
they	  provided	  better	  performance,	  superior	  safety	  and	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  
movement	  of	  goods	  than	  alternative	  transportation	  modes	  (Roques	  1900:	  14-­‐15;	  
Azevedo	  1981:	  3).	  The	  footprints	  of	  African	  railroads,	  which	  almost	  invariably	  run	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from	  the	  countries’	  ports	  to	  the	  inland	  areas,	  demonstrate	  their	  faithfulness	  to	  
colonial	  goals	  rather	  than	  those	  serving	  a	  broader	  public	  interest.	  Specifically,	  
colonial	  powers	  sought	  to	  assure	  their	  own	  political	  and	  military	  control,	  access	  to	  
natural	  resources	  and	  economic	  benefits	  from	  new	  markets	  (Hilling	  1996:	  77;	  
Simon	  1996:	  50;	  Gray	  1999:	  87).	  Simon	  observes	  “the	  colonial	  infrastructural	  
inheritance,	  especially	  rail	  networks,	  had	  been	  designed	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  
political	  rulers	  thousands	  of	  kilometers	  away	  rather	  than	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
indigenous	  population”	  (Simon	  1996:	  49).	  Serving	  local	  needs,	  by	  contrast,	  might	  
have	  involved	  creating	  actual	  networks	  that	  connected	  secondary	  inland	  cities	  to	  
each	  other	  to	  facilitate	  internal	  trade	  and	  communication.	  
Building	  these	  railways	  was	  no	  simple	  feat,	  as	  they	  required	  tremendous	  
amounts	  of	  financial,	  natural	  and	  human	  resources.	  Yet	  the	  costs	  of	  forced	  labor	  
used	  to	  build	  these	  railways	  had	  an	  arguably	  greater	  effect	  on	  the	  indigenous	  
populations.	  Every	  major	  colonial	  power	  used	  their	  authority	  to	  requisition	  men	  for	  
railway	  work	  (ILO	  1929a).	  Forcing	  the	  indigenous	  population	  to	  work	  on	  railways	  
served	  colonial	  interests	  because	  the	  voluntary,	  paid	  labor	  necessary	  to	  construct,	  
maintain	  and	  operate	  these	  lines	  in	  SSA	  was	  mostly	  not	  forthcoming.	  Wages	  largely	  
failed	  to	  motivate	  men	  to	  volunteer	  because	  they	  had	  few	  material	  desires	  
(Thompson	  and	  Adloff:	  444;	  also	  see	  ILO	  1929a).	  Sometimes	  the	  local	  population	  
would	  eschew	  paid	  work	  because	  “the	  native,	  forced	  to	  work,	  sees	  in	  labour	  a	  
punishment,	  an	  oppression	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  employer	  and	  of	  the	  State”	  (Lourenço	  
Marques	  1926	  in	  ILO	  1929a:	  237).	  The	  lack	  of	  voluntary	  labor	  is	  also	  unsurprising	  
given	  the	  inherently	  hard	  and	  dangerous	  nature	  of	  railway	  work.	  One	  International	  
Labor	  Organization	  (ILO)	  report	  observed	  that	  “their	  size	  and	  the	  number	  of	  
workers	  employed	  on	  [railways	  and	  road	  systems],	  besides	  bringing	  them	  more	  to	  
public	  notice,	  has	  special	  dangers	  which	  are	  less	  evident	  in	  other	  cases	  of	  
compulsion,	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  this	  subject	  is	  particularly	  unhappy	  reading”	  (ILO	  
1929a:	  246).	  	  
Although	  colonial	  proponents	  often	  claimed	  forced	  labor	  did	  not	  inflict	  harm	  like	  
slavery	  did,	  physical	  and	  psychological	  harm	  undeniably	  befell	  many	  native	  workers	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who	  were	  conscripted	  against	  their	  will.	  Many	  of	  these	  workers	  suffered	  from	  
depression	  due	  to	  forced	  labor’s	  “humiliating	  restriction	  of	  liberty”	  (ibid.:	  236,	  247).	  
Besides	  suffering	  from	  work-­‐related	  injuries,	  corporal	  punishments	  and	  the	  
humiliation	  of	  physical	  restraints	  (i.e.,	  being	  roped	  or	  chained	  together),	  these	  
laborers	  experienced	  physical	  problems	  simply	  from	  being	  forcibly	  relocated	  to	  new	  
regions	  where	  climate,	  diet	  and	  infectious	  diseases	  impacted	  their	  health	  (ibid.:	  
261).	  The	  abhorrent	  and	  confined	  conditions	  of	  many	  work	  camps,	  along	  with	  the	  
constant	  turnover	  of	  workers,	  aided	  the	  transmission	  of	  communicable	  illnesses	  
such	  as	  tuberculosis,	  hookworms,	  and	  syphilis	  (ibid.:	  248,	  261).	  	  
Besides	  critics	  lamenting	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  workers,	  they	  also	  raised	  
concerns	  about	  the	  larger	  social	  and	  economic	  ills	  wrought	  by	  forced	  labor.	  Taking	  
young	  men	  away	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  forced	  labor	  meant	  that	  communities	  
frequently	  lost	  a	  key	  demographic	  essential	  for	  local	  cultivation	  work,	  which	  in	  turn	  
led	  to	  famine	  or	  caused	  detrimental	  economic	  consequences	  for	  the	  local	  area	  (ibid.:	  
261).	  Many	  communities	  also	  suffered	  from	  depopulation	  caused	  by	  men	  fleeing	  
their	  villages	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  colonial	  obligations	  (ibid.:	  234).	  Anthropological	  
experts	  at	  the	  time	  even	  worried	  that	  forced	  labor	  led	  to	  ‘deviant’	  behavior	  among	  
workers:	  “the	  absence	  of	  their	  wives	  tends	  to	  encourage	  abnormal	  sexual	  habits;	  the	  
cessation	  of	  tribal	  authority	  which	  they	  respect	  and	  which	  provides	  the	  sanctions	  of	  
their	  code	  of	  conduct	  leaves	  them	  unguided	  amid	  strange	  circumstances;	  they	  lose	  
their	  own	  standards	  without	  gaining	  new	  ones”	  (ibid.:	  261).	  
Media	  reports	  of	  abuses	  and	  deaths,	  notably	  at	  railway	  worksites,	  had	  already	  
made	  forced	  labor	  controversial.	  Criticism	  of	  forced	  labor	  practices	  only	  increased	  
following	  WWI	  (Sharp	  2002:	  197).	  The	  1926	  Slavery	  Convention	  included	  a	  clause	  
denouncing	  forced-­‐labor	  practices	  because	  “there	  was	  no	  lack	  of	  evidence	  that	  
forced	  labour	  might	  result,	  and	  had	  resulted,	  in	  evils	  analogous	  to	  some	  of	  those	  
produced	  by	  slavery”	  (ILO	  1929a:	  2).	  	  The	  ILO	  then	  led	  the	  effort	  to	  pass	  an	  
international	  convention	  against	  forced	  labor.	  Although	  member	  states	  expressed	  
their	  support	  for	  prohibiting	  forced	  labor	  by	  private	  parties,	  the	  same	  consensus	  did	  
not	  extend	  to	  projects	  with	  a	  “public	  purpose”	  (ibid.:	  12).	  So	  even	  though	  the	  Forced	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Labor	  Convention	  of	  1930	  stated	  that	  ratifying	  members	  would	  agree	  to	  “suppress	  
the	  use	  of	  forced	  or	  compulsory	  labor	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  within	  the	  shortest	  period	  
possible,”	  an	  exemption	  still	  existed	  for	  using	  it	  as	  “an	  exceptional	  measure”	  for	  
“public	  purposes”	  (Article	  1	  of	  Forced	  Labor	  Convention	  of	  1930).6	  	  
The	  ILO	  developed	  criteria	  for	  the	  Forced	  Labor	  Convention	  so	  as	  to	  judge	  the	  
“necessity”	  of	  resorting	  to	  forced	  labor	  for	  any	  given	  public	  project	  (ILO	  1929a:	  
258).	  Forced	  labor	  could	  be	  justified	  if	  the	  work:	  (1)	  was	  of	  direct	  interest	  to	  the	  
workers’	  communities;	  (2)	  was	  of	  current	  or	  imminent	  necessity;	  (3)	  did	  not	  have	  
enough	  voluntary	  labor	  to	  be	  realized;	  and	  (4)	  did	  not	  place	  too	  heavy	  a	  burden	  
upon	  the	  present	  population.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  third	  point,	  supporters	  
would	  find	  many	  of	  their	  justifications	  for	  colonial	  railways	  feeble	  even	  then.	  In	  
emphasizing	  this	  point,	  the	  ILO	  specifically	  stated	  that	  “the	  construction	  of	  a	  railway	  
may	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘essential’	  to	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  a	  colony,	  but	  its	  carrying	  
out	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  bigger	  burden	  than	  the	  present	  population	  can	  support”	  
(ibid.).	  Ultimately	  the	  colonial	  administration,	  not	  the	  ILO	  or	  those	  people	  actually	  
called	  upon	  to	  forfeit	  their	  time	  and	  wellbeing	  to	  build	  the	  railways,	  had	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  deciding	  whether	  the	  burden	  was	  too	  great.	  	  	  
Workers	  sacrificed	  much	  to	  build	  colonial	  railways.	  They	  experienced	  abuse,	  
starvation,	  disease,	  debilitating	  injuries	  and	  death	  on	  a	  massive	  scale	  at	  hundreds	  of	  
worksites	  across	  SSA.	  They	  lost	  their	  liberty	  to	  choose	  their	  job	  or	  where	  they	  slept.	  
The	  forced-­‐labor	  program	  SMOTIG,	  which	  the	  French	  used	  to	  build	  Madagascar’s	  
FCE	  Railway,	  illustrates	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  French	  to	  minimize	  forced	  labor	  criticism,	  
but	  at	  an	  arguably	  greater	  cost	  to	  Malagasy.	  	  
	  
III. Madagascar’s	  Little	  Railway	  and	  Big	  Labor	  Problem	  
The	  French	  approach	  to	  developing	  Madagascar’s	  transportation	  system,	  and	  
railways	  in	  particular,	  was	  consistent	  with	  broader	  colonial	  development	  patterns	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Last	  accessed	  on	  20	  October	  2012:	  http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-­‐lex/convde.pl?C029	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SSA.	  Colonial	  officials	  in	  Madagascar	  initially	  favored	  “stand-­‐alone”	  railways	  over	  
roads	  to	  facilitate	  the	  island’s	  “external	  relations”	  given	  the	  island’s	  vast	  size	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  unreliability	  and	  perils	  of	  contemporary	  road-­‐based	  travel	  (Roques	  1900:	  14-­‐
16,	  32).	  One	  of	  Madagascar’s	  four	  initial	  railways	  was	  the	  “Southern	  Railway”	  or	  
“Betsileo	  Railway,”	  which	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	  FCE	  (ibid.:	  19).	  Instead	  of	  
connecting	  with	  the	  populous	  capital	  Tananarive,	  though,	  the	  French	  decided	  to	  link	  
the	  island’s	  second	  largest	  populated	  city	  Fianarantsoa	  directly	  with	  Madagascar’s	  
east	  coast	  so	  as	  to	  “unlock”	  the	  rich	  agricultural	  area	  it	  would	  traverse	  (ibid.:	  21-­‐22).	  	  
One	  colonial	  official	  affirmed	  that	  “the	  idea	  of	  a	  railway	  from	  Fianarantsoa	  to	  the	  
sea	  is	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  fair	  and	  rational	  idea	  whose	  achievement	  must	  be	  pursued	  
as	  soon	  as	  circumstances	  permit	  it”	  (ibid.:	  22).iii	  However,	  the	  weak	  French	  franc,	  
coupled	  with	  financial	  resources	  dedicated	  to	  the	  other	  Malagasy	  lines	  and	  France’s	  
WWI	  military	  campaign,	  delayed	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  
169-­‐170).	  Interest	  in	  building	  this	  line	  actually	  rekindled,	  though,	  with	  the	  start	  of	  
WWI	  when	  Madagascar	  served	  as	  a	  source	  of	  troops,	  foodstuffs	  and	  other	  materials	  
for	  France’s	  war	  effort	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  248;	  Razafindralambo	  1998:	  5).	  
Railway	  boosters	  argued	  that	  a	  southern	  line	  would	  prevent	  congestion	  of	  these	  
supplies	  on	  the	  other	  transportation	  routes	  to	  the	  coast,	  thereby	  increasing	  
Madagascar’s	  export	  capacity	  (Sarraut	  1922:	  506;	  Olivier	  1931:	  104).	  In	  1924,	  
recently	  appointed	  Governor	  General	  Marcel	  Olivier	  proposed	  a	  slate	  of	  large	  public	  
works	  projects	  called	  the	  Programme	  de	  Grands	  Travaux	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  
the	  Grands	  Travaux	  program),	  which	  featured	  the	  FCE	  as	  the	  most	  ambitious	  and	  
expensive	  venture,	  and	  eventually	  secured	  financial	  support	  for	  it	  (Olivier	  1931:	  
104;	  Frémigacci	  2006:	  170).	  	  
Like	  many	  other	  African	  railway	  projects,	  the	  FCE	  construction	  effort	  was	  
complicated	  by	  the	  especially	  daunting	  task	  of	  finding	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  Malagasy	  
workforce.	  The	  colonial	  administration	  claimed	  the	  island	  suffered	  from	  an	  “absence	  
of	  labor”	  (Olivier	  1931:	  104).	  Their	  experience	  constructing	  the	  northern	  rail	  
network	  revealed	  the	  difficulties	  in	  recruiting	  voluntary	  labor	  for	  railway	  work	  even	  
with	  wages	  and	  recruitment	  bonuses	  significantly	  above	  the	  island’s	  prevailing	  rates	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(Frémigacci	  2006:	  172).	  Meanwhile,	  colonial	  settlers	  who	  struggled	  to	  find	  local	  
labor	  for	  their	  ventures	  after	  WWI	  had	  already	  increased	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  
administration	  to	  find	  additional	  Malagasy	  workers	  (Olivier	  1931:	  105;	  Heseltine	  
1971:	  161).	  The	  administration	  therefore	  needed	  to	  find	  railway	  workers	  “without	  
disrupting	  the	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  companies”	  (Olivier	  1925:	  40).iv	  One	  ILO	  
report	  stated	  that	  “in	  Madagascar,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  labour	  supply	  has	  become	  
urgent,	  the	  postwar	  economic	  expansion	  in	  the	  colony	  having	  been	  threatened	  
owing	  to	  the	  increasing	  difficulties	  experienced	  in	  recruiting	  workers	  for	  private	  
and	  public	  undertakings”	  (ILO	  1927:	  70-­‐71).	  	  
The	  colonial	  administration	  had	  previously	  dealt	  with	  the	  labor	  problem	  by	  
forcing	  Malagasy	  to	  work	  for	  both	  public	  and	  private	  purposes,	  primarily	  through	  
prestation	  labor	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  18).	  Prestation	  labor,	  otherwise	  
known	  as	  a	  “labor	  tax”	  ranging	  from	  three	  to	  thirty	  days	  of	  service	  each	  year,	  did	  
little	  to	  solve	  what	  colonial	  officials	  viewed	  as	  the	  inherent	  root	  of	  the	  island’s	  “labor	  
problem”	  –	  namely	  the	  quality	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  Malagasy	  worker.	  Some	  
observers	  believed	  that	  “the	  acute	  character	  of	  the	  labor	  crisis	  is	  due	  to	  the	  
instability	  of	  the	  Malagasy.	  Neither	  laws	  nor	  wages	  can	  make	  him	  keep	  his	  
promises”	  (Manicacci	  1947:	  253	  in	  Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  444).	  French	  
colonial	  administrators	  and	  settlers	  frequently	  described	  Malagasy	  as	  “naturally	  
apathetic,”	  “unreliable,”	  “indolent,”	  or	  “unstable”	  (Gallieni	  1905:	  62	  in	  Frémigacci	  
2006:	  174;	  Olivier	  1927c:	  11;	  Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  445).	  When	  Malagasy	  
eschewed	  paid	  work	  for	  subsistence	  farming	  or	  left	  their	  jobs	  without	  notice,	  they	  
attributed	  this	  to	  the	  Malagasy	  mentalité	  indigène	  or	  “indigenous	  mentality”	  
(Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  445;	  Sharp	  2002:	  206).	  Sharp	  notes	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  colonial	  administration	  promulgated	  more	  labor	  laws	  in	  Madagascar	  than	  in	  any	  
other	  French	  colony	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  their	  frustration	  towards	  the	  Malagasy	  
population’s	  failure	  to	  work	  as	  expected	  (Sharp	  2002:	  206;	  cf.	  Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  
1965:	  449).	  	  
While	  anticipating	  the	  need	  to	  use	  forced	  labor	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  construction,	  
colonial	  administrators	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  Grands	  Travaux	  program	  was	  an	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opportunity	  to	  reform	  the	  Malagasy	  mentality	  that	  so	  often	  seemed	  to	  mire	  France’s	  
mission	  civilisatrice	  or	  “civilizing	  mission.”	  Namely,	  changing	  the	  mindset	  of	  the	  
colonized	  population	  could	  advance	  the	  mise	  en	  valeur	  [i.e.,	  development]	  of	  
Madagascar	  (Sodikoff	  2005:	  418).	  Olivier	  argues	  in	  France	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Problem,	  
an	  essay	  describing	  France’s	  civilizing	  mission,	  “colonisation	  is	  a	  guardianship.	  It	  is	  
an	  education.	  Moral	  and	  spiritual	  worth,	  and	  the	  educative	  capacity	  of	  the	  Mother	  
Country	  colonizing	  should	  be	  the	  first	  consideration”	  (Olivier	  1938:	  36).	  
Madagascar’s	  first	  governor	  general,	  Joseph	  Gallieni,	  called	  railways	  a	  “civilizer”	  
(Frémigacci	  2006:	  164).	  Yet	  he	  probably	  never	  envisaged	  how	  Olivier	  would	  use	  the	  
colony’s	  ability	  to	  build	  a	  railroad	  as	  the	  attempt	  to	  transform	  the	  Malagasy	  into	  a	  
compliant	  labor	  force	  necessary	  for	  their	  overarching	  project	  of	  modernity.	  	  
	  
IV. SMOTIG:	  Teaching	  “Soldiers”	  to	  Shovel,	  Not	  Shoot	  	  
Although	  the	  ‘labor	  problem’	  had	  changed	  little	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  colony,	  
attitudes	  towards	  labor	  use	  shifted	  substantially	  by	  the	  time	  the	  French	  
administration	  moved	  in	  earnest	  to	  build	  the	  FCE.	  The	  increasingly	  sharp	  criticism	  
of	  forced	  labor—both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  France—coincided	  almost	  exactly	  with	  
the	  planning	  of	  the	  FCE.	  This	  attention	  to	  forced	  labor	  practices	  clearly	  raised	  the	  
French	  colonial	  administration’s	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  its	  own	  labor-­‐extracting	  
practices	  and	  especially	  how	  outsiders	  judged	  them.	  So	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  ongoing	  
challenge	  of	  finding	  enough	  workers,	  colonial	  administrators	  now	  had	  to	  contend	  
with	  a	  potential	  public	  relations	  problem.	  Although	  vocal	  criticism	  would	  not	  halt	  
French	  plans	  to	  use	  forced	  labor	  on	  the	  FCE,	  it	  changed	  how	  they	  portrayed	  the	  use	  
of	  indigenous	  labor	  on	  this	  and	  other	  Grands	  Travaux	  projects.	  As	  described	  below,	  
the	  French	  sought	  to	  convince	  outsiders,	  and	  arguably	  even	  themselves,	  that	  
SMOTIG	  was	  more	  akin	  to	  military	  service	  than	  manual	  labor.	  	  
Olivier	  clearly	  grasped	  that	  shifting	  views	  of	  forced	  labor	  threatened	  to	  stymie	  
their	  ambitious	  public	  works	  program.	  Consequently,	  he	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  
SMOTIG	  in	  a	  law	  passed	  in	  1926.	  This	  allowed	  the	  colonial	  administration	  to	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requisition	  Malagasy	  men	  between	  18	  and	  27	  who	  were	  liable	  to	  serve	  three	  years	  
in	  the	  French	  military	  but	  who	  were	  never	  actually	  drafted	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  
1965:	  446).7	  Of	  the	  roughly	  38,000	  Malagasy	  men	  eligible	  for	  French	  military	  service	  
in	  1927,	  for	  example,	  the	  French	  armed	  forces	  only	  needed	  4,500	  men	  (Olivier	  
1927a:	  1).	  Colonial	  officials	  also	  reasoned	  that	  thousands	  of	  men	  deemed	  inapt	  for	  
military	  service	  because	  of	  “minor”	  health	  deficiencies	  (e.g.,	  bad	  teeth,	  poor	  eyesight,	  
hearing	  problems,	  syphilis,	  etc.)	  were	  still	  sufficiently	  healthy	  to	  toil	  at	  construction	  
sites	  (Trautmann	  1928;	  Olivier	  1931:	  110-­‐111).	  Olivier	  therefore	  relaxed	  the	  
physical	  standards	  for	  Malagasy	  eligible	  for	  SMOTIG	  service	  so	  that	  men	  who	  were	  
adequate	  only	  for	  “service	  within	  the	  colony”	  came	  to	  form	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  workforce	  
(Olivier	  1927a:	  3).	  Instead	  of	  calling	  them	  soldiers,	  though,	  Olivier	  issued	  an	  official	  
decree	  that	  labeled	  these	  men	  as	  “pioneers”	  (Olivier	  1928b:	  2).	  
The	  French	  still	  clearly	  meant	  to	  portray	  SMOTIG	  as	  mandatory	  military	  service.	  
Rather	  than	  accept	  the	  label	  of	  forced	  labor	  subsequently	  raised	  by	  ILO	  critics	  upon	  
SMOTIG’s	  creation,	  Olivier	  sought	  to	  reframe	  it	  as	  “obligatory	  labor”	  just	  like	  
military	  service	  (Olivier	  1931:	  103).	  Debates	  on	  forced	  labor	  largely	  recognized	  
military	  service	  as	  a	  legitimate	  duty	  that	  the	  colonial	  powers	  could	  impose	  on	  the	  
indigenous	  population	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “public	  interest”	  (Benson	  1931:	  146).	  
Olivier	  claimed	  that	  SMOTIG	  “maintained	  the	  character	  of	  a	  military	  unit	  in	  all	  its	  
cogs”	  (ibid.:	  114).v	  The	  colonial	  administration	  reportedly	  equipped	  men	  with	  
military-­‐style	  uniforms.8	  They	  also	  organized	  pioneers	  into	  units	  and	  assigned	  them	  
ranks	  as	  part	  of	  a	  strict	  chain	  of	  command	  (SMOTIG	  1927).	  Pioneers	  lived	  a	  highly	  
regimented	  life	  under	  the	  watchful	  eye	  of	  various	  levels	  of	  supervision.	  These	  men	  
even	  received	  rudimentary	  military	  training	  and	  performed	  drills	  daily	  (ibid:	  46).	  
Olivier	  further	  justified	  this	  branding	  by	  claiming	  “a	  colony	  would	  stay	  in	  a	  ‘state	  of	  
war’	  so	  long	  as	  it	  suffered	  from	  mediocre	  tools,	  and	  a	  small	  population	  and	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It	  is	  questionable	  that	  these	  age	  limits	  were	  respected	  given	  the	  difficulty	  that	  the	  French	  had	  in	  
determining	  the	  true	  age	  of	  Malagasy	  (Office	  Central	  du	  Travail	  1935).	  
8	  The	  standards	  of	  these	  uniforms	  differed	  over	  time	  and	  location.	  However,	  pioneers	  worked	  
primarily	  in	  their	  traditional	  attire	  and	  only	  wore	  uniforms	  in	  their	  “free”	  time	  when	  not	  laboring	  
(SMOTIG	  1927:	  42).	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insufficient	  adaptation	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  civilized	  life	  that	  keep	  them	  at	  the	  mercy	  
of	  a	  financial	  crash	  or	  a	  cyclone,	  a	  stock	  market	  hit	  or	  a	  drought”	  (Olivier	  1931:	  
112).vi	  
Olivier	  also	  conjured	  an	  argument	  that	  this	  “military”	  experience	  would	  provide	  
Malagasy	  men	  with	  valuable	  training.	  The	  ILO’s	  Temporary	  Slavery	  Commission	  at	  
the	  time	  reportedly	  accepted	  educational	  and	  social	  welfare	  motives	  as	  potentially	  
valid	  reasons	  to	  force	  native	  populations	  to	  work,	  namely	  by	  imbuing	  indigenous	  
populations	  with	  agricultural	  or	  trade	  skills	  (ILO	  1929a:	  13).	  Colonial	  
administrators	  affirmed	  that	  once	  pioneers	  had	  completed	  their	  service,	  they	  could	  
then	  apply	  their	  skills	  voluntarily	  as	  mechanics,	  carpenters,	  woodworkers	  or	  drivers	  
(Chardon	  1930a:	  24).	  A	  member	  of	  France’s	  Colonial	  Committee	  claimed	  SMOTIG	  
was	  “in	  reality	  merely	  a	  local	  system	  of	  training	  engineers,	  the	  nucleus	  of	  which	  
consisted	  of	  professional	  soldiers	  and	  which	  gave	  physical	  and	  occupational	  training	  
under	  rules	  of	  military	  discipline,	  thus	  forming	  a	  nursery	  of	  skilled	  workers”	  (ILO	  
1929c:	  474).	  	  
Colonial	  administrators	  thought	  that	  making	  Malagasy	  work	  for	  wages	  would	  
teach	  them	  to	  be	  loyal	  capitalist	  subjects	  (Heseltine	  1971:	  160-­‐162	  in	  Sharp	  2003:	  
83).	  Olivier	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  be	  conscientious	  regarding	  these	  
workers’	  physical	  disposition;	  instead	  SMOTIG	  “must	  still	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  
moral	  evolution	  of	  individuals	  and	  strive	  to	  inculcate	  a	  taste	  for	  work	  that	  they	  so	  
often	  miss"	  (Olivier	  1927c:	  2).vii	  Olivier	  wrote	  that	  the	  former	  military	  officers	  who	  
formed	  the	  core	  of	  SMOTIG’s	  supervisory	  structure	  had	  “the	  aptitude	  to	  shape	  the	  
men	  and	  know	  how	  to	  operate	  the	  organization”	  (ibid.:	  6).viii	  By	  using	  SMOTIG	  to	  
change	  these	  Malagasy	  men’s	  work	  ethic	  so	  that	  they	  would	  presumably	  choose	  to	  
work,	  colonial	  administrators	  hoped	  to	  render	  moot	  the	  increasingly	  vocal	  
criticisms	  of	  forced	  labor.	  They	  also	  believed	  that	  military-­‐style	  instruction	  would	  
instill	  in	  SMOTIG	  pioneers	  “respect	  for	  their	  superiors	  and	  obedience	  to	  their	  
orders”	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  45)ix	  –	  a	  trait	  that	  would	  transfer	  to	  other	  work	  situations.	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  annual	  reports,	  the	  public	  works	  director	  proclaimed,	  “the	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natives,	  who	  could	  not	  work	  because	  no	  one	  had	  ever	  taught	  them,	  are	  now	  broken	  
by	  the	  discipline	  at	  the	  work	  sites…”	  (Forgeot	  1931:	  3).x	  	  	  	  
	  
V. A	  Labor	  Force	  Stabilized	  or	  Stabled?	  	  
The	  military-­‐style	  work	  camps	  played	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  SMOTIG	  –	  one	  that	  left	  a	  
lasting	  mark	  in	  popular	  memory	  long	  after	  the	  physical	  structures	  disappeared.	  
True	  to	  SMOTIG’s	  military	  pretense,	  these	  camps’	  physical	  setting	  consisted	  of	  
neatly	  arranged	  16	  square-­‐meter	  cabins	  made	  from	  local	  materials	  that	  each	  housed	  
four	  single	  men	  or	  two	  households	  (Trautmann	  1928:	  14).	  Pioneers	  had	  shared	  
kitchens,	  latrines	  as	  well	  as	  a	  foyer	  in	  which	  to	  recreate	  or	  receive	  lessons	  (SMOTIG	  
1927).	  The	  FCE	  had	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  work	  camps	  of	  all	  large	  public	  works	  
projects	  (22	  out	  of	  45	  in	  1930),	  each	  of	  which	  could	  accommodate	  at	  least	  500	  men	  
and	  their	  families	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  9;	  Boudry	  1931:	  80-­‐81).	  
	  
Figure	  3	  SMOTIG	  camp	  at	  Tolongoina	  (June	  1930)	  
Source:	  ANTA	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Figure	  4	  SMOTIG	  camp	  barracks	  at	  Tolongoina	  (June	  1930)	  
	  
These	  guarded	  work	  camps	  were	  doubtlessly	  difficult	  places	  to	  live.	  Instead	  of	  
these	  men	  doing	  no	  more	  than	  30	  days	  of	  prestation	  work	  near	  their	  home	  each	  
year,	  pioneers	  had	  to	  live	  between	  two	  to	  three	  years	  in	  these	  camps	  under	  the	  close	  
supervision	  of	  colonial	  agents.9	  Malagasy	  detested	  SMOTIG’s	  “educational”	  
component	  that	  emphasized	  surveillance,	  discipline	  and	  punishment	  so	  as	  to	  fashion	  
“indolent”	  Malagasy	  into	  a	  stable	  source	  of	  labor	  (Sharp	  2003:	  80).	  If	  supervisors	  
judged	  workers	  to	  be	  disobedient,	  negligent	  or	  lazy,	  pioneers	  could	  officially	  be	  
punished	  with	  increasingly	  severe	  “disciplinary	  sanctions”	  of	  pay	  deductions,	  
confinement	  to	  barracks,	  camp	  chores,	  or	  prison	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  40).10	  	  
Vacillating	  between	  his	  hope	  to	  portray	  these	  camps	  as	  humane	  yet	  still	  military	  
in	  nature,	  Olivier	  stated	  that	  the	  work	  camps	  were	  neither	  “camps	  for	  vacationing	  
students	  nor	  camps	  for	  convicts”	  (Olivier	  1931:	  119).xi	  Perhaps	  best	  illuminating	  
what	  the	  French	  intended,	  though,	  Minister	  of	  Colonies	  Léon	  Perrier	  referred	  to	  
SMOTIG	  work	  camps	  as	  camps	  de	  concentration	  or	  “concentration	  camps”	  (Perrier	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  colonial	  administration	  later	  reduced	  pioneer’s	  time	  of	  service	  to	  two	  years.	  One	  SMOTIG	  critic	  
said	  that	  if	  SMOTIG	  had	  applied	  to	  all	  occupants	  of	  Madagascar	  and	  not	  just	  Malagasy,	  “one	  could	  be	  
certain	  that,	  from	  the	  time	  when	  the	  settlers	  were	  made	  subject	  to	  it,	  they	  would	  very	  soon	  have	  the	  
period	  of	  service	  reduced	  from	  three	  years	  to	  three	  months,	  if	  not	  to	  three	  days”	  (ILO	  1929b:	  8-­‐9).	  
10	  This	  did	  not	  stop	  corporal	  punishment	  and	  psychological	  abuse	  from	  taking	  place	  (see	  Sodikoff	  
2005:	  419).	  
Source:	  ANTA	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1927:	  4).	  Unlike	  the	  European	  death	  camps	  of	  WWII,	  though,	  the	  French	  clearly	  
tried	  to	  safeguard	  pioneers’	  wellbeing.	  SMOTIG	  administrators	  constant	  scrutiny	  of	  
the	  workers,	  lodgings,	  shared	  kitchens	  and	  latrines	  helped	  maintain	  sanitary	  
conditions	  in	  the	  camps	  (SMOTIG	  1930b).	  Still,	  it	  is	  indisputable	  that	  this	  type	  of	  
concentration	  camp	  shared	  a	  defining	  trait	  with	  its	  infamous	  cousins:	  to	  confine	  
people	  under	  close	  supervision	  for	  an	  exploitive	  purpose.11	  Moreover,	  these	  
concentration	  camps’	  occupants	  consisted	  of	  the	  indigenous	  population	  who	  did	  not	  
have	  any	  recourse	  to	  oppose	  their	  internment.	  	  
The	  colony	  had	  a	  strong	  practical	  interest	  in	  retaining	  Malagasy	  men	  this	  way	  as	  
opposed	  to	  forcing	  them	  to	  work	  as	  prestation	  laborers.	  Keeping	  the	  same	  men	  for	  
longer	  periods	  allowed	  them	  to	  master	  the	  same	  task	  and	  minimized	  the	  time	  
wasted	  getting	  organized	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  45).	  It	  also	  allowed	  SMOTIG	  supervisors	  
who	  kept	  pioneers	  under	  close	  watch	  to	  know	  each	  worker’s	  capabilities,	  thereby	  
ensuring	  a	  consistent	  output.	  This	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  FCE	  because	  the	  colonial	  
administration	  guaranteed	  the	  labor	  output	  to	  the	  private	  contractors	  who	  built	  it.	  
According	  the	  head	  of	  SMOTIG,	  “with	  ordinary	  or	  prestation	  laborers,	  it	  is	  almost	  
impossible	  to	  maintain	  a	  rational	  organization	  at	  the	  worksites	  because	  the	  workers	  
vary	  daily	  in	  significant	  ways…The	  reliability	  of	  the	  SMOTIG	  workers	  and	  the	  
discipline	  of	  the	  worksites	  presents	  the	  greatest	  advantages	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  
work”	  (Olivier	  1931:	  122).xii	  	  
Geographical	  constraints	  also	  factored	  into	  the	  creation	  of	  SMOTIG	  and	  its	  
placement	  of	  workers	  in	  these	  camps.	  Perrier	  affirmed,	  “it	  follows	  that	  the	  
recruitment	  of	  the	  [pioneers]	  will	  focus	  on	  areas	  where	  we	  do	  not	  work,	  at	  least	  for	  
the	  moment”	  (Perrier	  1927:	  11-­‐12).xiii	  Such	  recruitment	  also	  served	  the	  colonial	  goal	  
of	  putting	  the	  “idle”	  Malagasy	  men	  from	  the	  island’s	  southern	  and	  western	  areas	  to	  
work	  (Perrier	  1926:	  1).	  Olivier	  also	  argued	  prestation	  labor	  placed	  a	  greater	  burden	  
on	  poorer	  people	  living	  next	  to	  public	  works,	  namely	  roads	  and	  railways	  (Olivier	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/130884/concentration-­‐camp	  last	  accessed	  
4/11/12.	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1931:	  106-­‐107).	  The	  equity	  argument	  was	  plainly	  misleading	  because	  the	  French	  
could	  not	  have	  relied	  solely	  on	  villagers	  living	  next	  to	  large	  public	  works	  projects—
especially	  the	  FCE—due	  to	  labor	  scarcity	  in	  these	  plantation-­‐rich	  areas.	  Moreover,	  
the	  colonial	  administration	  had	  already	  limited	  prestation	  labor	  to	  within	  six	  
kilometers	  of	  a	  Malagasy	  man’s	  home	  (ILO	  1929a:	  172).	  	  
Despite	  some	  government	  documents	  claiming	  that	  recruitment	  efforts	  were	  
focused	  on	  nearby	  villages	  (SMOTIG	  (undated):	  3;	  Sodikoff	  2005:	  423),	  the	  need	  for	  
labor	  for	  projects	  like	  the	  FCE	  was	  too	  great	  to	  respect	  this	  commitment.	  The	  French	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  find	  the	  9,300	  workers	  required	  annually	  at	  its	  peak	  to	  
build	  just	  the	  FCE	  (Chardon	  1931:	  56-­‐58).	  Statistics	  from	  1930	  show	  6,720	  men	  out	  
of	  15,128	  SMOTIG	  workers	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  FCE	  camps	  (Boudry	  1931:	  81).12	  
However,	  only	  3,035	  SMOTIG	  workers	  came	  from	  regions	  next	  to	  the	  FCE’s	  route	  
(ibid.:	  80-­‐81).13	  	  
The	  French	  clearly	  would	  not	  have	  opted	  for	  a	  resettlement	  approach	  unless	  
they	  viewed	  it	  as	  absolutely	  necessary.	  It	  would	  not	  have	  been	  cheap	  to	  support	  
workers	  and	  their	  families	  coming	  from	  the	  far	  south	  as	  the	  400	  km	  journey	  to	  the	  
FCE	  worksites	  could	  take	  a	  month	  or	  longer	  (Chardon	  1930b:	  1).	  The	  administration	  
also	  had	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  care	  of	  these	  workers	  and	  their	  families	  at	  the	  work	  
camps	  whereas	  under	  prestation	  labor	  such	  costs	  remained	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
requisitioned	  Malagasy.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  just	  a	  few	  years	  after	  its	  initiation,	  the	  
French	  looked	  to	  secure	  cheaper	  voluntary	  labor.	  As	  Frémigacci	  rightly	  notes,	  
pioneers	  were	  a	  very	  expensive	  form	  of	  labor	  and	  this	  ultimately	  led	  to	  SMOTIG’s	  
demise	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  179).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  I	  selected	  this	  year	  because	  it	  had	  comparable	  information	  about	  where	  recruited	  workers	  came	  
from.	  These	  22	  sections	  were	  responsible	  for	  building	  the	  Port	  of	  Manakara	  and	  the	  FCE	  railway.	  
13	  The	  regions	  were	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  Fort-­‐Dauphin,	  which	  included	  the	  province	  of	  Farafangana	  
adjacent	  to	  the	  FCE	  (Boudry	  1931:	  80).	  This	  is	  a	  conservative	  assumption	  because	  the	  city	  of	  Fort-­‐
Dauphin	  is	  almost	  350	  kilometers	  away	  from	  the	  FCE.	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VI. Abuses,	  Lost	  Bodies	  but	  no	  Desertions	  
When	  crafting	  SMOTIG,	  an	  optimistic	  Olivier	  believed	  it	  would	  prevent	  abuse	  
and	  improve	  worker	  safety	  (Olivier	  1927c:	  1).	  While	  the	  welfare	  of	  pioneers	  
working	  on	  the	  FCE	  received	  more	  attention	  than	  workers	  on	  earlier	  railway	  
projects,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  Malagasy	  appreciated	  the	  changes.	  Colonial	  
administrators	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  relocating	  and	  confining	  
workers	  under	  supervision	  for	  years	  at	  a	  time,	  while	  preventing	  some	  deaths,	  would	  
be	  more	  unbearable	  than	  earlier	  forms	  of	  forced	  labor.	  Ironically,	  SMOTIG	  can	  be	  
argued	  to	  have	  generated	  greater	  harm	  that	  fomented	  a	  deeper,	  longer-­‐lasting	  
resentment	  than	  if	  the	  French	  had	  continued	  relying	  on	  nearby	  villagers	  for	  shorter-­‐
term	  forced	  labor.	  
Forcibly	  removing	  native	  laborers	  from	  their	  villages	  had	  started	  to	  be	  criticized	  
just	  as	  SMOTIG	  activities	  increased	  (ILO	  1929a:	  260-­‐261).	  Relocating	  workers	  in	  
Madagascar	  had	  particular	  significance,	  though.	  The	  French	  had	  long	  recognized	  
that	  Malagasy	  of	  all	  ethnicities	  viewed	  being	  close	  to	  their	  “foyer”	  or	  communities	  as	  
very	  important	  –	  particularly	  for	  maintaining	  their	  family	  tombs	  and	  holding	  
ceremonies	  honoring	  their	  ancestors	  (Chardon	  1932:	  34).	  Roques	  wrote	  that	  the	  
“Hova	  have	  a	  strong	  attachment	  to	  their	  tombs;	  the	  families	  will	  put	  all	  their	  
resources	  to	  their	  construction”	  xiv	  (Roques	  1900:	  36).14	  Other	  French	  observers	  
recognized	  tombs,	  funerals	  and	  other	  ceremonies	  as	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  workers	  
deserted	  their	  paid	  employment	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  324;	  Chardon	  1932:	  
34).	  The	  likelihood	  of	  causing	  distress	  and	  malaise	  by	  separating	  Malagasy	  men	  
from	  their	  villages	  and	  family	  tombs	  for	  years	  at	  a	  time	  was	  therefore	  not	  lost	  on	  
colonial	  officials.	  
The	  French	  constantly	  worried	  about	  SMOTIG’s	  impact	  on	  the	  psychological	  
wellbeing	  of	  pioneers	  because	  they	  believed	  this	  would	  affect	  their	  physical	  state	  
(Olivier	  1927c:	  9).	  Olivier	  cautioned,	  “of	  course	  the	  failure	  [to	  maintain	  pioneers’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  French	  classified	  “Hova”	  as	  an	  ethnic	  group	  occupying	  the	  high	  plateau	  and	  that	  included	  both	  
the	  Merina	  and	  the	  Betsileo.	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morale]	  would	  be	  less	  apparent	  than	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  sanitation	  program,	  but	  the	  
very	  fact	  that	  its	  results	  reflect	  less	  clearly	  encourages	  us	  to	  exercise	  greater	  
vigilance”	  (ibid.).xv	  SMOTIG	  organized	  workers	  into	  units	  based	  primarily	  on	  their	  
ethnicity	  and	  geographical	  origin	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  would	  reduce	  depression	  and	  
potential	  suicides	  (SMOTIG	  (undated):	  3).	  	  
Beside	  the	  obvious	  reasons	  for	  such	  malaise—separating	  these	  young	  men	  from	  
their	  families	  and	  confining	  them	  to	  years	  of	  hard	  labor—Olivier	  also	  feared	  that	  
“the	  natives	  are	  tempted	  to	  regard	  individuals	  employed	  on	  large	  public	  works	  as	  
slaves”	  because	  the	  Merina	  ethnicity,	  who	  once	  ruled	  Madagascar,	  used	  the	  slave	  
class	  for	  this	  purpose	  (Olivier	  1927c:	  3).xvi	  Olivier	  hoped	  that	  SMOTIG’s	  military	  
appearance	  would	  avoid	  this	  grave	  social	  stigma	  given	  to	  those	  who	  labored	  on	  
public	  works	  (ibid.).15	  Few	  Malagasy,	  though,	  believed	  pioneers	  were	  really	  soldiers.	  
Descendants	  of	  pioneers	  noted	  that	  workers	  called	  themselves	  miaramilam-­‐potaka,	  
or	  “mud	  soldiers,”	  because	  they	  were	  armed	  not	  with	  a	  rifle	  but	  with	  a	  spade	  to	  
move	  soil	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009;	  cf.	  Razafindralambo	  1998:	  10).	  
Critics	  at	  the	  ILO	  and	  even	  in	  the	  French	  parliament	  accused	  the	  colony	  of	  practicing	  
slavery	  (Sharp	  2002:	  200).	  Although	  informants	  also	  likened	  SMOTIG	  service	  to	  
slavery,	  when	  pressed,	  they	  acknowledged	  that	  pioneers	  who	  left	  SMOTIG	  were	  
reintegrated	  into	  local	  life	  and	  did	  not	  acquire	  a	  slave-­‐class	  status	  (SMOTIG	  sons	  
focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).	  	  
Colonial	  records	  show	  that	  SMOTIG’s	  professional	  pretense	  did	  not	  halt	  worker	  
mistreatment.	  When	  reports	  that	  commanders	  and	  supervisors	  were	  abusing	  
workers	  reached	  Olivier,	  he	  sent	  out	  a	  notice	  that	  all	  allegations	  would	  be	  
thoroughly	  investigated	  (Olivier	  1928a:	  2).	  Olivier	  asserted	  that	  investigating	  and	  
punishing	  any	  guilty	  party	  was	  “necessary	  to	  not	  let	  it	  develop	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  
natives	  that	  the	  workers	  are	  often,	  if	  not	  always,	  sacrificed	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
agents	  in	  charge	  of	  overseeing	  them”	  (ibid.).xvii	  Unfortunately,	  abuse	  of	  pioneers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  implications	  of	  being	  identified	  as	  being	  from	  a	  slave	  
class,	  see	  Kottak	  1980:	  103-­‐105	  and	  Evers	  2002).	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persisted.	  In	  one	  striking	  case,	  the	  FCE’s	  Vohimasina	  camp	  commander	  was	  relieved	  
of	  duty	  because	  he	  “used	  to	  amuse	  himself	  by	  shooting	  his	  gun	  at	  night	  above	  the	  
tunnel	  where	  pioneers	  were	  working,	  thus	  making	  them	  fear	  the	  explosions	  that	  
would	  bury	  them	  at	  the	  back	  of	  the	  tunnel”	  (Coursin	  1930:	  61	  in	  Sodikoff	  2005:	  
419).	  	  
Colonial	  officials	  could	  have	  reasonably	  claimed	  pioneers’	  risk	  of	  death	  along	  the	  
FCE	  worksites	  was	  greatly	  reduced	  compared	  to	  other	  colonial	  railway	  projects.	  
After	  their	  journeys	  to	  one	  of	  SMOTIG’s	  large	  “assembling	  camps,”	  pioneers	  received	  
vaccinations	  and	  reportedly	  spent	  roughly	  one	  to	  two	  months	  resting	  and	  training	  
before	  transferring	  to	  the	  work	  camps	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  46;	  SMOTIG	  1930b:	  23).	  
Camp	  commanders	  instituted	  cleaning	  protocols	  to	  reduce	  disease-­‐carrying	  pests	  
such	  as	  rats,	  fleas	  and	  ticks	  (SMOTIG	  (undated):	  1).	  Water	  pumps	  and	  natural	  
springs	  provided	  access	  to	  clean	  water	  that	  likely	  reduced	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
contracting	  debilitating	  diseases	  such	  as	  schistosomiasis	  and	  other	  waterborne	  
maladies	  (Trautmann	  1927:	  14).	  When	  necessary,	  the	  French	  even	  added	  bleach	  to	  
the	  water	  to	  make	  it	  potable	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  56).	  Moreover,	  camp	  occupants	  
reportedly	  received	  the	  malaria	  prophylactic	  quinine	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  day	  and	  
some	  pioneers	  even	  received	  mosquito	  nets	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  56;	  Trautmann	  1928:	  
21;	  SMOTIG	  1929:	  34).16	  	  
Nevertheless,	  building	  infrastructure	  like	  a	  railway	  through	  rugged	  terrain	  and	  
dense	  forest	  proved	  perilous	  to	  pioneers’	  welfare.	  Colonial	  reports	  blame	  landslides,	  
falling	  trees,	  collapsed	  wood	  structures,	  mine	  explosions	  and	  asphyxiation	  in	  the	  
tunnels	  as	  official	  causes	  of	  death	  for	  SMOTIG	  workers	  (Chardon	  1932:	  48;	  SMOTIG	  
1930b:	  40;	  Sodikoff	  2005:	  419).	  Explosions	  of	  rock	  and	  wood	  in	  their	  excavation	  
work	  also	  injured	  and	  maimed	  many	  more	  workers	  (Sodikoff	  2005:	  419).	  The	  work	  
on	  the	  FCE	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  dangerous.	  In	  just	  one	  year,	  more	  workers	  died	  
building	  the	  FCE	  than	  all	  of	  the	  other	  large	  public	  works	  projects	  together	  (SMOTIG	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	  French	  likely	  gave	  quinine	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  because	  quinine	  can	  have	  sickening	  side-­‐
effects	  and	  this	  would	  have	  hampered	  pioneers’	  ability	  to	  work.	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1930b:	  41).	  This	  is	  understandable	  given	  the	  project’s	  ambitious	  effort	  to	  build	  56	  
tunnels	  extending	  over	  five	  kilometers	  underground	  as	  well	  as	  40	  bridges	  (Public	  
Works	  1932:	  6).	  	  
Frémigacci	  rightly	  contends,	  “the	  FCE	  was	  no	  Congo-­‐Ocean	  Railway,”	  a	  project	  
notable	  for	  a	  high	  worker	  mortality	  rate	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  181).	  The	  FCE’s	  
mortality	  rate,	  though,	  still	  seems	  improbably	  low	  even	  given	  its	  protective	  
measures,	  particularly	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  conservative	  death	  rate	  of	  12%	  for	  
France’s	  Congo-­‐Ocean	  Railway	  being	  built	  around	  the	  same	  time	  (Azevedo	  1981:	  
12).17	  Colonial	  documents,	  when	  available,	  report	  a	  consistently	  low	  casualty	  rate	  for	  
pioneers	  compared	  to	  other	  colonial	  projects	  using	  forced	  labor.	  In	  its	  initial	  years,	  
SMOTIG’s	  mortality	  rates	  remained	  below	  one	  percent	  (SMOTIG	  1929:	  52;	  SMOTIG	  
1930b:	  8,	  51).	  The	  mortality	  rate	  reported	  in	  1930	  was	  similar	  with	  exactly	  75	  men	  
perishing	  out	  of	  precisely	  10,000	  workers	  (SMOTIG	  1930a:	  8).18	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1934,	  
though,	  the	  colonial	  administration	  reported	  that	  just	  above	  two	  percent	  of	  workers	  
had	  perished	  (SMOTIG	  1935:	  10).	  Over	  roughly	  10	  years,	  the	  death	  toll	  could	  have	  
easily	  climbed	  above	  1,000	  if	  such	  rates	  held	  steady.	  
Moreover,	  the	  collective	  memory	  of	  the	  Malagasy	  living	  along	  the	  FCE	  suggests	  
thousands	  of	  workers	  perished	  from	  tunnel	  collapses,	  disease	  and	  starvation	  
(Wiersema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  27).	  Informants	  claimed	  that	  many	  men,	  ranging	  from	  as	  few	  
as	  36	  to	  over	  1,000,	  died	  in	  a	  single	  major	  tunnel	  collapse	  at	  the	  kilometer-­‐long	  
Ankarampotsy	  Tunnel	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  Aug	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  
group,	  Sahasinaka,	  16	  Sep	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  22	  Sep	  2009).	  
Although	  an	  article	  in	  1931	  by	  a	  newspaper	  critical	  of	  the	  colonial	  regime	  claimed	  
that	  1,200	  men	  died	  in	  one	  tunnel	  accident	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  181),	  this	  is	  almost	  
certainly	  impossible	  because	  this	  many	  men	  would	  not	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  
worksite	  and	  would	  not	  have	  even	  fit	  in	  the	  tunnel	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Unfortunately,	  
the	  colonial	  archives	  contains	  no	  annual	  SMOTIG	  report	  for	  the	  years	  1931	  to	  1933,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  Congo-­‐Ocean	  might	  have	  been	  longer,	  but	  it	  required	  much	  less	  tunnel	  work.	  
18	  This	  is	  an	  astoundingly	  similar	  number	  to	  the	  figure	  from	  1929	  when	  exactly	  75	  men	  out	  of	  10,216	  
workers	  also	  died.	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the	  years	  tunneling	  activity	  peaked,	  to	  confirm	  or	  deny	  the	  events	  at	  this	  tunnel.19	  
Although	  no	  written	  reports	  mention	  a	  tunnel	  collapse,	  a	  photo’s	  caption	  in	  the	  1934	  
Public	  Works	  Report	  indicates	  that	  the	  French	  abandoned	  an	  entrance	  for	  a	  tunnel	  
entrance	  near	  the	  Ankarampotsy	  Tunnel	  (Public	  Works	  1934).	  This	  is	  consistent	  
with	  informants’	  reports	  that	  the	  French	  chose	  a	  new	  entrance	  after	  a	  major	  
collapse	  in	  this	  area	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  Aug	  2009;	  SSI	  with	  
Informant	  20,	  Sahasinaka,	  16	  Sep	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  22	  Sep	  
2009).	  
An	  oft-­‐repeated	  reference	  in	  the	  literature	  states	  that	  someone	  at	  the	  1928	  ILO	  
convention	  claimed	  SMOTIG	  “had	  been	  responsible	  for	  a	  million	  ‘victims’	  in	  
Madagascar”	  (Priestley	  1938:	  329-­‐330;	  Kent	  1962:	  77;	  Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  
446;	  Sodikoff	  2005:	  433,	  fn	  63).	  The	  only	  instance	  closely	  resembling	  this	  claim,	  
though,	  appears	  in	  Olivier’s	  own	  memoir	  when	  he	  refutes	  an	  accusation	  “printed	  
tactlessly	  by	  a	  large	  foreign	  newspaper	  that	  SMOTIG	  was	  responsible	  for	  many	  
thousands	  of	  victims	  in	  1928”	  (Olivier	  1931:	  103).xviii	  Olivier	  goes	  on	  to	  show	  how	  
ridiculous	  even	  that	  unattributed	  claim	  is	  by	  offering	  the	  mortality	  statistics	  noted	  
above	  (ibid.:	  119).20	  Whether	  or	  not	  Olivier	  built	  a	  straw	  man	  to	  discredit	  critics	  as	  
hysterical	  and	  thereby	  defend	  SMOTIG’s	  relatively	  paltry	  official	  death	  rates,	  it	  is	  
clearly	  impossible	  that	  Madagascar	  had	  a	  million	  casualties	  with	  its	  1928	  
population.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  colonial	  administration	  took	  steps	  to	  strictly	  control	  SMOTIG’s	  
image	  to	  outside	  observers	  does	  provide	  grounds	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  SMOTIG’s	  official	  
casualty	  rates.	  Olivier	  admitted	  in	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  Marseilles	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  
that	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  create	  SMOTIG	  and	  "therefore	  I	  shall	  say	  little	  about	  it,	  for	  if	  I	  
spoke	  much	  I	  would	  endanger	  the	  whole	  organization	  and	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  A	  public	  works	  report	  dated	  15	  December	  1931	  states	  that	  work	  on	  the	  tunnel	  had	  not	  yet	  begun	  
(Public	  Works	  1931:	  5).	  A	  second	  report	  dated	  15	  September	  1932	  reports	  that	  work	  had	  started	  on	  
the	  Manakara-­‐side	  of	  the	  tunnel	  (Public	  Works	  1932:	  7).	  The	  tunnel	  collapse	  reportedly	  happened	  on	  
the	  other	  side	  that	  faces	  Fianarantsoa.	  	  
20	  It	  appears	  that	  Priestly	  incorrectly	  translated	  milliers	  into	  “millions”	  rather	  than	  “thousands”	  and	  
that	  other	  researchers	  cited	  Priestly’s	  translation	  or	  the	  authors	  that	  subsequently	  cited	  him.	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give	  up	  the	  hope	  of	  doing	  anything	  at	  all	  in	  Madagascar"	  (ILO	  1929b:	  8).21	  The	  
colonial	  administration	  prohibited	  photography	  at	  worksites	  or	  during	  working	  
hours	  without	  the	  express	  permission	  of	  the	  head	  of	  SMOTIG	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  50).	  As	  
compared	  to	  the	  close-­‐up	  photos	  taken	  during	  the	  northern	  railway	  network’s	  
construction	  two	  decades	  earlier,	  photos	  of	  pioneers	  are	  rare,	  especially	  with	  
European	  supervisors,	  and	  hardly	  close	  enough	  to	  see	  any	  real	  exertion	  (see	  Figures	  
3,	  4).	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  government’s	  Political	  Affairs	  Services	  became	  
involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  SMOTIG	  instructions	  for	  reporting	  work-­‐related	  
accidents	  given	  that	  critics	  actively	  sought	  this	  information	  (Chardon	  1931:	  21).	  In	  
addition,	  the	  head	  of	  SMOTIG’s	  medical	  service	  circulated	  a	  notice	  to	  worksite	  
supervisors	  that	  praised	  SMOTIG’s	  initiative	  while	  simultaneously	  requesting	  an	  
accurate	  accounting	  of	  daily	  camp	  life	  (Trautmann	  1928:	  22).	  He	  reminded	  them	  
that	  the	  ILO	  and	  League	  of	  Nations	  wanted	  to	  review	  reports	  on	  SMOTIG’s	  work	  
camps.	  
	  
Figure	  5	  Northern	  Railway	  laborers	  (1903)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  While	  these	  efforts	  to	  hide	  the	  reality	  of	  SMOTIG	  did	  not	  prevent	  criticism,	  it	  probably	  stemmed	  it	  
and	  clearly	  shows	  that	  historical	  records	  about	  SMOTIG	  are	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  program.	  
Source:	  FTM	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Figure	  6	  FCE	  laborers	  at	  tunnel	  (August	  1933)	  
Perhaps	  more	  important	  to	  Malagasy	  than	  an	  accurate	  body	  count,	  though,	  is	  
how	  the	  French	  handled	  pioneers’	  remains.	  Colonial	  archives	  contain	  few	  details	  
about	  what	  happened	  to	  Malagasy	  men	  who	  died	  in	  service	  to	  the	  French	  empire	  
(Sharp	  2002:	  186).	  We	  can	  presume,	  though,	  that	  the	  French	  did	  not	  repatriate	  all	  of	  
the	  bodies	  of	  workers	  who	  died	  along	  the	  FCE	  back	  to	  their	  customary	  place	  of	  
residence.	  Returning	  workers’	  bodies	  to	  their	  villages	  hundreds	  of	  kilometers	  away	  
would	  have	  taken	  significant	  resources.	  It	  would	  also	  have	  increased	  the	  chance	  of	  
spreading	  disease	  in	  a	  mostly	  tropical	  climate.22	  Although	  a	  16-­‐square-­‐meter	  
morgue	  was	  added	  to	  the	  Sahasinaka	  assembly	  camp	  in	  1930,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  
that	  any	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  other	  work	  camps	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  prepare	  dead	  pioneers’	  
bodies	  for	  repatriation	  (Coursin	  1931:	  44).	  The	  morgue’s	  existence	  also	  does	  not	  
explain	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  bodies	  in	  Sahasinaka	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  intended	  for	  
European	  employees	  or	  pioneers.	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  SMOTIG	  guidelines	  never	  
mention	  the	  process	  for	  the	  handling	  or	  repatriation	  of	  bodies,	  even	  though	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  French	  discuss	  the	  careful	  and	  respectful	  handling	  of	  Europeans’	  bodies	  who	  were	  killed	  
during	  the	  1947	  rebellion.	  They	  were	  placed	  in	  iron	  coffins	  with	  disinfectant	  (Dugas	  1947).	  
Source:	  ANTA	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stipulates	  in	  detail	  how	  to	  transmit	  the	  deceased’s	  wages	  and	  their	  personal	  effects	  
to	  their	  next	  of	  kin	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  86).	  	  	  
Interviews	  with	  villagers	  living	  along	  the	  FCE	  reinforce	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  
French	  did	  not	  return	  deceased	  pioneers’	  bodies	  back	  to	  their	  home	  regions.	  
Descendants	  of	  pioneers	  claimed	  that	  the	  French	  would	  not	  permit	  Malagasy	  to	  
exhume	  the	  bodies	  of	  some	  dead	  workers	  for	  repatriation	  so	  that	  they	  could	  have	  
traditional	  burials	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambohimalaza,	  06	  Sep	  2009;	  SMOTIG	  Sons	  
focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  22	  Sep	  2009).	  
Informants	  in	  one	  village	  claimed	  that	  fellow	  workers	  would	  sometimes	  return	  at	  
night	  to	  “steal	  the	  bodies”	  to	  send	  back	  to	  the	  families	  of	  those	  killed	  in	  work	  
accidents	  (SMOTIG	  Sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).	  Informants	  from	  two	  
different	  villages	  along	  the	  FCE	  stated	  that	  when	  pioneers’	  family	  members	  came	  
looking	  for	  their	  missing	  relatives	  while	  the	  camps	  were	  still	  operational,	  the	  French	  
would	  tell	  them	  that	  these	  workers	  had	  been	  “transferred”	  to	  another	  camp,	  
“deported”	  or	  that	  they	  were	  never	  assigned	  to	  that	  work	  camp	  in	  the	  first	  place	  
(Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  Aug	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambohimalaza,	  06	  
Sep	  2009).	  These	  responses	  became	  euphemisms	  for	  workers	  dying	  because	  these	  
men	  never	  returned	  home.23	  Relatives	  who	  came	  looking	  for	  missing	  relatives	  
during	  the	  FCE’s	  construction	  sometimes	  suffered	  beatings	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  SMOTIG	  
supervisors	  carrying	  riding	  crops	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  22	  Sep	  2009).	  
Workers’	  families	  therefore	  sometimes	  came	  after	  Madagascar	  gained	  independence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Private	  companies	  and	  SMOTIG	  officers	  overseeing	  the	  workers	  arguably	  had	  motives	  to	  avoid	  
reporting	  deaths,	  even	  to	  the	  head	  of	  SMOTIG.	  If	  a	  work-­‐related	  accident	  killed	  a	  pioneer,	  the	  
company	  would	  have	  had	  to	  compensate	  the	  worker’s	  next	  of	  kin	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  90).	  It	  would	  have	  
also	  reflected	  poorly	  upon	  camp	  commander’s	  leadership.	  Olivier	  stated	  that	  avoiding	  work-­‐related	  
accidents	  would	  be	  beneficial	  “not	  only	  for	  labor	  recruitment	  but	  also	  from	  a	  political	  perspective”	  
(Olivier	  1927b:	  1).	  It	  is	  conceivable,	  therefore,	  that	  even	  if	  Olivier	  and	  his	  superiors	  sought	  an	  honest	  
accounting,	  their	  subordinates	  and	  contractors	  may	  have	  sought	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  the	  reporting	  of	  
deaths.	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to	  find	  the	  bodies	  of	  their	  relatives	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambohimalaza,	  06	  Sep	  
2009).24	  
It	  was	  a	  real	  possibility	  that	  bodies	  of	  Malagasy	  who	  died	  in	  service	  outside	  or	  
even	  within	  the	  colony	  would	  not	  be	  repatriated.	  The	  bodies	  of	  conscripted	  
Malagasy	  men	  who	  died	  in	  the	  boats	  en	  route	  to	  France	  during	  WWI	  were	  
reportedly	  thrown	  overboard	  (Sharp	  2002:	  184).	  One	  young	  Malagasy	  man	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  French	  ‘just	  threw	  away	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  dead	  [Malagasy]	  like	  
they	  were	  garbage.	  They	  are	  out	  there,	  but	  they	  are	  lost.	  Unclaimed.	  Forever.’	  (ibid.:	  
185).	  Although	  the	  French	  may	  have	  granted	  pioneers	  a	  more	  respectful	  burial	  near	  
the	  place	  where	  they	  died,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  the	  French	  would	  have	  gone	  to	  great	  lengths	  
to	  repatriate	  dead	  workers	  so	  that	  they	  would	  not	  become	  “lost	  ancestors.”25	  If	  we	  
are	  to	  judge	  SMOTIG	  by	  values	  that	  Malagasy	  hold	  as	  vitally	  important,	  namely	  being	  
able	  to	  remain	  close	  to	  their	  communities	  and	  ensuring	  dead	  workers	  would	  be	  
returned	  for	  proper	  burial,	  then	  SMOTIG	  truly	  does	  deserve	  its	  horrible	  reputation.	  
Failing	  to	  return	  dead	  workers	  to	  their	  villages	  for	  interment	  in	  the	  family	  tombs	  
perhaps	  explains	  why	  SMOTIG	  stands	  out	  so	  strongly	  and	  negatively	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  
Malagasy	  even	  today.	  All	  Malagasy	  ethnic	  groups	  place	  an	  especially	  strong	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  proper	  handling	  of	  ancestors’	  remains.	  Sharp	  notes,	  
In	  Madagascar,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  lost	  bodies	  of	  ancestors	  is	  a	  terrifying	  one,	  for	  
the	   dead	   must	   be	   placed	   carefully	   and	   lovingly	   in	   tombs	   if	   they	   are	   to	   be	  
remembered	  as	  ancestors	  (OM:	  razana;	  SAK:	  razaña).	  If	  displaced	  they	  become	  
lolo,	   joining	   instead	   an	   obscure	   category	   of	   unnamed,	   lonely,	   and	   vindictive	  
dead…All	  Malagasy	  place	  great	  emphasis	  on	   the	  elaborate	   rituals	   surrounding	  
the	  care	  for	  and	  placement	  of	  corpses	  (Sharp	  2002:	  185).	  
Bloch	  also	  notes	  that	  Merina	  experience	  ‘terror’	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  being	  buried	  alone	  
(Bloch	  1971:	  162	  in	  Kottak	  1980:	  228).	  Even	  today,	  Malagasy	  villagers	  experience	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Some	  families	  had	  the	  fortune	  of	  meeting	  a	  former	  pioneer	  or	  nearby	  villager	  who	  knew	  where	  to	  
find	  their	  relative’s	  body,	  while	  others	  were	  not	  so	  fortunate	  (SMOTIG	  sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  
Sep	  2009).	  
25	  This	  is	  key	  for	  tunnel	  collapses	  and	  landslides	  that	  buried	  workers.	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anxiety	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  falling	  ill	  and	  dying	  far	  from	  their	  homes	  and	  family	  
tombs	  (Sharp	  1993:	  61;	  see	  also	  Keenan	  1974).	  
Malagasy	  men	  facing	  such	  difficult,	  dangerous	  work	  that	  could	  result	  in	  their	  
death	  without	  a	  proper	  burial	  would	  certainly	  have	  an	  understandable	  impulse	  to	  
run	  away.	  Sharp	  states	  that	  SMOTIG	  kept	  pioneers	  in	  guarded	  camps	  to	  prevent	  
desertion,	  which	  was	  a	  chronic	  problem	  (Sharp	  2002:	  199).	  The	  ILO	  reported	  that	  
forced	  laborers	  in	  colonies	  were	  sometimes	  chained	  to	  prevent	  their	  absconding,	  or	  
kept	  under	  armed	  guard	  and	  shot	  if	  they	  attempted	  to	  run	  away	  (ILO	  1929a:	  261).	  
Some	  informants	  claimed	  that	  a	  few	  villagers	  ran	  away	  to	  avoid	  serving,	  but	  that	  
most	  remained	  behind	  and	  suffered	  from	  abuse	  or	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  building	  the	  
railway	  (SMOTIG	  sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).	  The	  annual	  SMOTIG	  
reports,	  however,	  do	  not	  mention	  desertions	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  a	  curious	  omission	  given	  
the	  colonial	  administration’s	  obsession	  with	  pioneers’	  morale	  and	  the	  likelihood	  
that	  even	  a	  handful	  of	  men	  out	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  would	  have	  decided	  to	  leave	  
before	  their	  release	  date.	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  colonial	  administration	  
recognized	  that	  desertions	  would	  have	  contradicted	  their	  claims	  that	  pioneers	  were	  
happy	  and	  adjusting	  well	  to	  life	  in	  the	  camps.	  	  
French	  attempts	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  dangers	  of	  forced	  labor,	  or	  at	  least	  conceal	  
them,	  actually	  made	  the	  SMOTIG	  experience	  both	  more	  intolerable	  and	  more	  
memorable.	  The	  preceding	  description	  of	  SMOTIG	  highlights	  many	  of	  the	  most	  
disdainful	  and	  well-­‐known	  aspects,	  but	  they	  surely	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  detailed	  
stories	  told	  by	  pioneers	  to	  their	  descendants.	  Still,	  while	  Malagasy	  have	  viewed	  
SMOTIG	  with	  contempt,	  they	  have	  also	  recognized	  how	  subsequent	  generations	  
have	  benefitted	  from	  the	  fruits	  of	  its	  labor.	  This	  sentiment	  is	  specifically	  expressed	  
for	  the	  FCE	  and	  the	  ancestors	  who	  built	  it	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Sahasinaka,	  15	  Sep	  
2009).	  As	  one	  Mpanjaka	  stated,	  “SMOTIG	  was	  very	  hard,	  but	  it	  left	  a	  great	  benefit	  for	  
the	  Malagasy”	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).26	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Mpanjaka	  is	  a	  Malagasy	  traditional	  leader	  or	  king.	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VII. Constructing	  Heritage	  Infrastructure	  and	  Ownership	  	  
Appreciation	  of	  the	  FCE	  is	  tied	  both	  to	  its	  colonial	  history	  as	  well	  as	  to	  activities	  
in	  its	  more	  recent	  past.	  The	  FCE	  most	  likely	  qualifies	  as	  a	  UNESCO	  heritage	  site	  given	  
its	  remarkable	  physical	  character	  as	  well	  as	  the	  significant	  historical	  and	  social	  
consequences	  associated	  with	  it.	  As	  Simon	  and	  Ashley	  have	  proposed,	  though,	  
“reduced	  to	  its	  simplest	  form,	  heritage	  refers	  to	  the	  contemporary	  activities	  through	  
which	  the	  past	  comes	  to	  matter	  in	  the	  present…Within	  such	  activities,	  judgments	  are	  
made	  as	  to	  which	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  past	  are	  worthy	  of	  preservation	  and	  are	  
of	  potential	  significance	  for	  social	  memory”	  (Simon	  and	  Ashley	  2010:	  247).	  
Conveying	  the	  heritage	  value	  of	  the	  FCE	  by	  drawing	  on	  its	  colonial	  past	  has	  proved	  
more	  essential	  for	  keeping	  the	  trains	  running	  than	  if	  supporters	  had	  just	  pursued	  an	  
international	  heritage	  designation.	  
The	  contemporary	  activities,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  local	  christening	  of	  the	  
FCE	  as	  the	  Heritage	  Railway,	  started	  when	  actors	  aimed	  to	  rehabilitate	  and	  privatize	  
the	  line.	  By	  the	  1990s,	  the	  unreliability	  of	  the	  already	  dilapidated	  FCE	  led	  to	  
declining	  revenue	  that	  hindered	  even	  basic	  maintenance.	  The	  FCE’s	  director	  
requested	  assistance	  from	  the	  USAID-­‐funded	  Commercial	  Agricultural	  Promotion	  
(CAP)	  agribusiness	  development	  project,	  which	  had	  a	  roadway	  infrastructure	  
rehabilitation	  program.	  CAP’s	  regional	  director	  recognized	  that	  the	  FCE	  served	  as	  a	  
lifeline	  transportation	  link	  for	  rural	  farmers	  sending	  their	  agricultural	  goods	  to	  
regional	  markets	  and	  agreed	  to	  help	  improve	  the	  railway’s	  operations	  and	  
infrastructure	  (SSI	  with	  H	  Schar,	  Phone	  interview,	  Aug	  2009).	  The	  hope	  was	  to	  
rehabilitate	  the	  line	  enough	  to	  attract	  private	  investors	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  concession	  the	  
FCE.27	  	  
Yet	  despite	  some	  key	  investments,	  farmers	  practicing	  tavy	  (slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  
agriculture)	  next	  to	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  were	  inadvertently	  causing	  landslides	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Privatization	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  save	  the	  railway	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  not	  least	  of	  
which	  was	  the	  insistence	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  that	  this	  occur	  before	  they	  spend	  millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  
rehabilitate	  the	  infrastructure.	  There	  was	  a	  healthy	  amount	  of	  skepticism	  that	  privatization	  would	  be	  
beneficial	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  users	  and	  beneficiaries,	  particularly	  following	  the	  experience	  of	  privatizing	  
the	  northern	  railway	  network.	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washouts	  during	  the	  rainy	  season.	  These	  events	  cut	  the	  line	  for	  weeks	  or	  even	  
months	  at	  a	  time,	  which	  made	  it	  more	  likely	  other	  farmers	  would	  shift	  from	  
sustainable	  tree-­‐based	  cash	  crops	  to	  subsistence	  crops	  grown	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  
tavy.28	  FCE	  supporters—including	  FCE	  staff,	  public	  officials,	  foreign	  aid	  workers,	  and	  
members	  of	  Malagasy	  civil	  society—recognized	  that	  any	  effort	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  
line	  would	  have	  to	  find	  compelling	  motivations	  for	  farmers	  to	  halt	  the	  effective,	  but	  
damaging	  practice	  of	  tavy.	  	  
Railway	  supporters	  believed	  that	  strengthening	  people’s	  sense	  of	  ownership	  
over	  the	  line	  would	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  would	  protect	  it	  for	  themselves	  
and	  future	  generations.	  When	  FCE	  rehabilitation	  project	  (FCER)	  staff	  initiated	  a	  
participatory	  research	  process	  with	  communities	  along	  the	  railway,	  their	  Malagasy	  
and	  expatriate	  staff	  realized	  that	  heritage	  was	  a	  key	  motivation	  for	  rural	  people	  to	  
protect	  the	  railway	  because	  it	  conferred	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership.	  According	  to	  a	  key	  
FCER	  staff	  member,	  one	  village’s	  mayor	  made	  the	  observation	  during	  a	  meeting	  that	  
the	  FCE	  was	  their	  heritage	  because	  their	  ancestors	  built	  it	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  26,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  10	  Oct	  2009).	  Both	  project	  staff	  and	  villagers	  stated	  that	  the	  sentiment	  
had	  already	  existed	  along	  the	  line	  before	  FCER	  helped	  improve	  it	  for	  a	  formal	  public	  
relations	  effort	  dubbed	  the	  “Heritage	  Campaign”	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008;	  SSI	  with	  Informant	  23,	  Fianarantsoa,	  25	  Sep	  2009;	  SSI	  
with	  Informant	  26,	  Fianarantsoa,	  10	  Oct	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  
Aug	  2009;	  SMOTIG	  sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).	  FCER	  director	  Karen	  
Freudenberger	  noted,	  “we	  did	  not	  create	  that	  ownership,	  but	  we	  identified	  that	  it	  
existed,	  figured	  out	  how	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  amorphous,	  disparate	  sentiment	  that	  was	  
floating	  around	  out	  there,	  and	  then	  packaged	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  it	  a	  positive	  
‘usable’	  force	  in	  the	  community”	  (Correspondence	  with	  Karen	  Freudenberger,	  28	  Jul	  
2009).	  	  
The	  campaign	  aimed	  to	  strengthen	  solidarity	  and	  ownership	  by	  reminding	  
Malagasy	  living	  along	  the	  line	  about	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  the	  ancestors	  forced	  to	  build	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  CAP’s	  successor	  projects	  recognized	  the	  FCE	  as	  key	  to	  protecting	  the	  forest	  corridor	  it	  traversed.	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FCE	  formed	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  Heritage	  Campaign.	  Weisema	  et	  al.	  notes	  that	  the	  FCE	  is	  a	  
“regional	  cultural	  heritage”	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  lives	  that	  were	  lost	  
constructing	  it	  (Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  26).29	  Pioneers’	  “sacrifice”	  and	  their	  suffering	  
dominate	  discussions	  about	  the	  FCE’s	  construction,	  but	  such	  recognition	  transcends	  
mere	  historical	  information	  for	  today’s	  Malagasy.	  Ancestors	  in	  Malagasy	  culture	  are	  
viewed	  as	  always	  ever-­‐present	  (Dahl	  1999).30	  Freudenberger	  noted,	  “what	  villagers	  
told	  us	  during	  the	  [participatory	  research	  process]	  was	  in	  so	  many	  cases	  that	  their	  
ancestors	  had	  died	  building	  the	  railway	  and	  that	  to	  let	  the	  railway	  die	  would	  be	  
sacrilegious	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  those	  who	  had	  died	  in	  its	  construction”	  
(Correspondence	  with	  Karen	  Freudenberger,	  28	  Jul	  2009).	  
The	  actors	  leading	  the	  rehabilitation	  effort	  developed	  the	  slogan,	  Lovantsika	  ny	  
lalamby	  ka	  arovy	  (“The	  train	  is	  our	  heritage	  so	  save	  it”),	  to	  rally	  the	  support	  of	  
villagers	  living	  along	  the	  railway.31	  Variations	  of	  the	  slogan	  were	  used	  on	  signs	  next	  
to	  FCE-­‐adjacent	  hillsides	  reinforced	  with	  the	  deep-­‐rooted	  vetiver	  plant	  (Figure	  6).	  
The	  civil	  society	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  protecting	  the	  railway,	  the	  Association	  
des	  Détenteurs	  d’Intérêts	  de	  la	  FCE	  (ADIFCE),	  adopted	  this	  slogan	  and	  used	  it	  on	  its	  
official	  letterhead	  and	  newsletters.	  ADIFCE	  members	  and	  FCER	  staff	  began	  using	  
this	  catchphrase	  in	  their	  communications	  campaign	  to	  unite	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
train	  service	  behind	  the	  rehabilitation	  effort	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  This	  message	  was	  
carried	  in	  various	  mediums.	  FCER	  took	  a	  train	  down	  the	  line	  and	  had	  a	  theatrical	  
group	  perform	  a	  puppet	  show	  at	  each	  station	  that	  explained	  why	  “the	  FCE	  is	  ours”	  
(Freudenberger	  2000:	  7).	  FCER	  staff	  even	  hired	  the	  well-­‐known	  band	  ZMG	  to	  write	  
and	  perform	  the	  song:	  Lovantsika	  ny	  lalamby	  (“the	  Railway	  is	  our	  Heritage”)	  that	  
became	  a	  hit	  on	  Malagasy	  radio.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The	  appeal	  of	  the	  FCE	  is	  arguably	  greater	  than	  regional	  because	  of	  its	  scenic	  vistas	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  
SMOTIG	  workers	  came	  from	  across	  Madagascar	  to	  build	  it.	  	  
30	  Also	  see	  Chapter	  7	  in	  Kottak	  1980	  for	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  enduring	  role	  afforded	  to	  deceased	  
ancestors	  in	  the	  Betsileo	  culture,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  principal	  ethnicities	  along	  the	  FCE.	  
31	  Another	  variation	  of	  the	  slogan	  was	  Harovy	  ny	  Lalamby	  fa	  Lovantsika	  (“Save	  the	  Train	  because	  it’s	  
our	  Heritage”)	  and	  was	  used	  in	  the	  communications	  campaign	  to	  unite	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  train	  
service	  behind	  the	  rehabilitation	  effort	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  In	  Malagasy,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  
between	  “inheritance”	  and	  “heritage”	  for	  the	  word	  Lovantsika.	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Figure	  7	  Farmer’s	  sign	  with	  “Heritage	  Slogan”	  
The	  broad	  appeal	  of	  the	  slogan,	  and	  the	  abstention	  of	  specifying	  from	  whom	  it	  is	  
a	  heritage,	  arguably	  makes	  it	  more	  effective.	  Some	  Malagasy	  believed	  that	  the	  FCE	  
was	  a	  heritage	  the	  French	  who	  ordered	  it	  built,	  while	  others	  said	  it	  was	  from	  the	  
pioneers	  who	  actually	  built	  it.	  Many	  thought	  it	  was	  a	  heritage	  from	  both.	  As	  the	  son	  
of	  one	  pioneer	  said,	  “[The	  FCE]	  is	  a	  heritage	  from	  both	  the	  vazaha	  (Europeans)	  who	  
enslaved	  their	  ancestors	  and	  the	  ancestors	  who	  did	  the	  work.	  It	  is	  not	  right	  to	  blame	  
the	  vazaha	  because	  something	  sweet	  was	  left	  after	  the	  vazaha	  were	  gone”	  (SMOTIG	  
sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  2009).	  The	  effort	  to	  frame	  the	  heritage	  in	  a	  broad,	  
positive	  manner	  makes	  it	  more	  universally	  appealing.	  The	  slogan	  is	  still	  recalled	  
today	  when	  people	  are	  asked	  about	  the	  railway	  rehabilitation	  effort	  and	  in	  response	  
to	  questions	  about	  why	  the	  FCE	  needs	  to	  be	  protected.	  	  
FCE	  supporters	  also	  drew	  upon	  and	  reinforced	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  
heritage	  in	  their	  effort	  to	  institute	  a	  traditional	  Malagasy	  law	  called	  a	  dina.	  This	  dina	  
had	  the	  “central	  intention	  of	  halting	  all	  crop	  production	  within	  two	  meters	  of	  the	  
tracks	  and	  bridges”	  (Freudenberger	  2000:	  7),	  and	  all	  tavy	  within	  50	  meters	  of	  the	  
right-­‐of-­‐way	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  In	  a	  country	  that	  is	  known	  for	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
enforcing	  laws	  handed	  down	  from	  the	  national	  government,	  one	  author	  states,	  “in	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practice,	  a	  social	  pact	  [like	  a	  dina]	  is	  a	  force	  of	  regulation	  between	  its	  members”	  
(ibid.).	  FCE	  supporters	  worked	  with	  the	  traditional	  leaders	  and	  elected	  officials	  of	  
each	  community	  along	  the	  line	  to	  secure	  their	  support	  so	  they	  would	  adopt	  and	  
enforce	  the	  dina.	  In	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  dina,	  though,	  they	  had	  to	  organize	  a	  
traditional	  ritual	  sacrifice	  called	  joro.	  Joro	  is	  a	  “ceremony	  that	  is	  held	  to	  honor	  the	  
ancestors	  and	  give	  thanks	  for	  their	  blessing	  and	  assistance”	  (Sharp	  1993:	  167).	  
According	  to	  Dahl,	  
If	  a	  project…is	  to	  succeed,	  the	  fady	  [taboo]	  has	  to	  be	  lifted	  before	  the	  enterprise	  
starts.	  This	  is	  often	  done	  with	  the	  help	  of	  joro	  (invocation	  and	  eventually	  
sacrifice).	  A	  cow	  or	  calf	  is	  slaughtered,	  and	  the	  traditional	  healer	  performs	  rites	  
and	  offers	  prayers	  to	  the	  ancestors	  to	  take	  away	  all	  sorts	  of	  fady.	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  
contractual	  agreement	  with	  the	  ancestors.	  (Dahl	  1999:	  65).32	  
The	  joro	  performed	  for	  the	  dina	  was	  a	  very	  public	  act	  recognizing	  the	  connection	  
between	  the	  FCE	  and	  Malagasy	  ancestors.	  Practicing	  tavy,	  thereby,	  became	  
synonymous	  with	  dishonoring	  the	  ancestors	  and	  risked	  the	  condemnation	  by	  local	  
officials	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  	  
Tangible	  evidence	  also	  attests	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  FCE	  is	  a	  heritage	  based	  on	  a	  
connection	  to	  the	  ancestors.	  Malagasy	  often	  commemorate	  particularly	  important	  
events	  or	  people	  using	  monoliths	  (Kottak	  1980:	  13).	  At	  the	  Mandriampotsy	  Falls	  
stands	  an	  obelisk	  dedicated	  to	  the	  men	  who	  perished	  during	  the	  FCE’s	  construction	  
or	  who	  were	  killed	  in	  the	  1947	  rebellion	  (Figure	  7).33	  Every	  year,	  the	  FCE	  staff,	  
ADIFCE	  and	  local	  Malagasy	  hold	  a	  ceremony	  at	  a	  monument	  recognizing	  the	  
sacrifice	  of	  SMOTIG	  workers	  and	  the	  victims	  of	  1947.	  For	  those	  pioneers	  whose	  
bodies	  could	  not	  be	  recovered	  and	  placed	  ceremoniously	  into	  a	  family	  tomb,	  the	  
whole	  FCE	  can	  actually	  serve	  as	  both	  a	  physical	  testament	  to	  their	  sacrifice	  and	  as	  a	  
final	  resting	  place.	  When	  walking	  through	  the	  long	  Ankarampotsy	  Tunnel,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Feeley-­‐Harnik	  notes,	  “the	  elder	  male	  members	  of	  lineages	  are	  formally	  charged	  with	  interceding	  
between	  the	  living	  and	  their	  dead	  ancestors	  by	  means	  of	  the	  ritual	  known	  as	  joro”	  (Feeley-­‐Harnik	  
1984:	  3).	  
33	  The	  role	  of	  the	  1947	  rebellion	  also	  played	  into	  the	  FCE’s	  heritage	  because	  a	  lot	  of	  fighting	  occurred	  
along	  the	  line.	  The	  Northern	  Railway	  also	  had	  as	  much	  fighting	  and	  potentially	  more	  deaths	  occurring	  
on	  the	  line	  during	  the	  conflict.	  However,	  multiple	  sources	  have	  confirmed	  the	  FCE’s	  sense	  of	  heritage	  
and	  ownership	  by	  people	  along	  the	  line	  is	  much	  stronger.	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example,	  many	  Malagasy	  leave	  a	  small	  tribute	  to	  the	  workers	  reportedly	  killed	  
building	  the	  collapsed	  tunnel	  (Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  Aug	  2009).	  	  
	  
Figure	  8	  FCE	  monument	  to	  victims	  of	  SMOTIG	  and	  1947	  
The	  solidarity	  built	  by	  FCER	  and	  the	  ADIFCE	  through	  the	  Heritage	  Campaign	  
paid	  dividends	  in	  halting	  tavy,	  but	  also	  in	  unforeseen	  ways	  during	  Madagascar’s	  
2002	  political	  crisis.	  When	  political	  rivals	  bombed	  bridges	  or	  established	  roadblocks	  
across	  the	  country	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  force	  a	  run-­‐off	  election	  (Tiersonnier	  2004:	  105),	  
the	  FCE’s	  population	  united	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  According	  to	  Mark	  
Freudenberger,	  regional	  director	  for	  CAP’s	  successor	  project,	  “both	  sides	  agreed	  
that	  they	  can	  fight	  on	  other	  things,	  but	  they	  had	  to	  support	  the	  FCE”	  (SSI	  with	  Mark	  
Freudenberger,	  Fianarantsoa,	  Jul	  2008).	  Up	  and	  down	  the	  line,	  community	  members	  
organized	  to	  form	  the	  Andrimasom	  Pokonolona	  (ANP),	  which	  means	  “the	  people	  who	  
watch”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  18,	  Manampatrana,	  07	  Sep	  2009).	  These	  local	  
“community	  guards”	  protected	  the	  FCE’s	  vital	  infrastructure	  points	  from	  acts	  of	  
sabotage	  (ibid.;	  Rarivony	  2002:	  26).	  	  
These	  men	  camped	  out	  along	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  at	  night,	  seven	  days	  a	  week	  for	  up	  
to	  four	  months	  at	  some	  locations.	  Members	  of	  ANP	  gave	  different	  reasons	  for	  
protecting	  the	  FCE,	  including	  national	  unity	  and	  protecting	  their	  own	  economic	  
interests.	  But	  in	  every	  ANP	  focus	  group	  I	  interviewed,	  the	  men	  broached	  the	  idea	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that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  heritage	  that	  needed	  protection.34	  When	  asked	  if	  they	  realized	  the	  
danger	  that	  awaited	  them	  if	  saboteurs	  came	  to	  blow	  up	  the	  key	  Sahasinaka	  Viaduct,	  
one	  informant	  stated,	  “it	  would	  be	  worth	  it	  to	  die	  for	  this	  patrimony”	  (ANP	  focus	  
group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  Their	  role	  was	  not	  trivial	  because	  with	  so	  many	  
roads	  out	  of	  commission,	  including	  the	  only	  road	  supporting	  the	  port	  of	  Manakara,	  
the	  FCE	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  supplying	  fuel	  and	  salt	  to	  both	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  the	  
capital.	  Remarkably,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  unreliable	  pieces	  of	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  
country,	  which	  had	  almost	  been	  written	  off	  a	  number	  of	  times	  as	  unprofitable	  and	  
not	  worth	  the	  cost	  of	  operating,	  helped	  avert	  a	  serious	  health	  crisis	  for	  much	  of	  the	  
population	  and	  played	  a	  potentially	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  political	  trajectory.	  
To	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  sunk	  human	  costs	  of	  the	  men	  who	  built	  the	  
FCE	  prevented	  the	  country	  from	  sinking	  into	  a	  worse	  state.	  
SMOTIG	  left	  a	  deep	  mark	  in	  Malagasy	  popular	  memory,	  and	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  
the	  experiences	  of	  laborers	  forced	  to	  build	  other	  colonial	  railways	  were	  just	  as	  
potent.	  Abé	  notes	  that	  the	  Bassa	  living	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  Cameroon’s	  Transcam	  I	  
Railway	  also	  view	  it	  as	  a	  heritage	  from	  the	  ancestors	  who	  were	  forced	  to	  build	  the	  
line	  (Abé	  2006:	  224).	  The	  population	  feared	  a	  concessionaire’s	  elimination	  of	  
railway	  stops	  would	  lead	  people	  to	  forget	  these	  workers’	  sacrifices	  and	  lose	  some	  
sense	  of	  their	  self-­‐identity	  (ibid.).	  	  
Given	  the	  lamentable	  histories	  of	  colonial	  railways	  in	  SSA	  that	  caused	  such	  
immense	  suffering	  by	  colonial	  subjects,	  relabeling	  these	  colonial	  railways	  as	  
heritage	  infrastructures	  worth	  protecting	  could	  give	  their	  proponents	  another	  point	  
around	  which	  to	  rally	  support.	  Colonial	  railways	  like	  these	  could	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  
position	  to	  approach	  UNESCO	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  secure	  the	  status	  of	  a	  World	  Heritage	  Site.35	  
Perhaps	  it	  is	  merely	  that	  nobody	  has	  yet	  revived	  these	  memories	  or	  framed	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  In	  the	  Manampatrana	  ANP,	  they	  even	  included	  heritage	  in	  the	  category	  of	  national	  unity.	  	  
35	  Many	  colonial	  railways,	  including	  the	  FCE	  and	  Transcam	  I,	  would	  qualify	  for	  World	  Heritage	  Site	  
status	  based	  on	  criterion	  vi.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  case	  could	  be	  made	  for	  other	  criteria	  as	  well	  
depending	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  candidate	  railway	  (http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/).	  Although	  
this	  status	  would	  offer	  very	  little	  direct	  financial	  support,	  it	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  source	  of	  pride	  to	  the	  local	  
population	  and	  raise	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  railway	  both	  nationally	  and	  internationally.	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lines	  as	  heritages.	  Railway	  supporters	  could	  therefore	  focus	  on	  the	  shared	  suffering	  
of	  colonial	  subjects	  to	  protect	  other	  railway	  infrastructure	  in	  SSA	  facing	  similar	  
challenges.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  shows	  that	  supporters	  of	  colonial	  railways	  have	  the	  
potential	  of	  changing	  the	  image	  of	  these	  lines	  from	  decrepit,	  anachronistic	  public	  
works	  to	  infrastructure	  heritages	  full	  of	  resilience	  and	  value.	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Chapter	  3	  	  
Rationality	  and	  Railways:	  Hitting	  a	  Moving	  Target	  
I. Introduction	  	  
Colonial	  railways	  play	  key	  roles	  in	  many	  less	  developed	  countries	  (LDCs),	  
particularly	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA)	  where	  transportation	  infrastructure—of	  
any	  mode—is	  relatively	  sparse.	  Colonial	  powers	  built	  scores	  of	  railways	  in	  SSA,	  but	  
these	  lines	  have	  generally	  fallen	  into	  disrepair	  since	  independence	  despite	  the	  
important	  contributions	  they	  make	  to	  the	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  they	  serve.	  While	  
beneficiaries	  lament	  these	  railways’	  conditions,	  their	  perspectives	  are	  not	  always	  
shared	  by	  those	  actors	  who	  influence	  transportation	  investment	  in	  these	  countries.	  
In	  fact,	  some	  experts	  have	  implied	  or	  even	  explicitly	  portrayed	  colonial	  railways	  as	  
relics	  from	  a	  bygone	  era	  that	  consume	  an	  undue	  amount	  of	  public	  resources	  (e.g.,	  
Bickers	  1976,).	  Typically,	  these	  railways	  only	  receive	  endorsement	  when	  they	  are	  
profitable,	  which	  in	  most	  cases	  necessitates	  the	  transportation	  of	  bulk	  goods	  (e.g.,	  
Alston	  1984a:	  2;	  Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam	  2010:	  235).	  It	  is	  unsurprising,	  therefore,	  that	  
so	  many	  deficit-­‐running	  railways	  in	  SSA	  are	  in	  such	  poor	  shape	  or	  have	  already	  
closed.	  	  
Beneficiaries	  of	  railway	  service	  have	  usually	  sought	  to	  preserve	  these	  lines	  by	  
appealing	  to	  their	  political	  representatives.	  Such	  appeals,	  though,	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
change	  the	  minds	  of	  experts	  who	  affect	  decisions.	  This	  is	  because	  transportation	  
experts	  often	  rely	  on	  positivistic	  methods	  to	  justify	  their	  decisions.	  In	  fact,	  
transportation	  planning	  is	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  empirical	  observation,	  predictive	  
models	  and	  data	  analysis	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  those	  espousing	  positivist	  
thought	  (Simon	  1996:	  2,	  35;	  Willson	  2001:	  22).	  Quantifiable	  performance	  measures,	  
especially	  economic	  measures,	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  transportation	  analyses,	  in	  part	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because	  they	  give	  the	  appearance	  of	  being	  objective.	  Experts	  who	  lead	  the	  analyses,	  
however,	  determine	  these	  variables	  that	  tend	  to	  capture	  selected	  economic	  
measures	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  actually	  contribute	  to	  larger	  goals	  such	  as	  
poverty	  reduction	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  local	  livelihood.	  This	  tilts	  decisions	  about	  
railways	  in	  a	  certain	  direction	  even	  before	  examining	  the	  broader	  context	  –	  often	  to	  
the	  detriment	  of	  the	  railways	  that	  now	  require	  significant	  rehabilitation	  work	  due	  to	  
age	  and	  neglect.	  	  
While	  justifying	  railway	  investment	  and	  renewal	  decisions	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  
economic	  rationale	  and	  financial	  performance	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  transportation	  
field’s	  appreciation	  of	  instrumental	  rationality,	  it	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  new	  tone	  thanks	  to	  
neoliberal	  theory.36	  Experts	  who	  adhere	  to	  neoliberal	  theory	  argue	  that	  market	  
forces	  should	  provide	  transportation	  service	  to	  ensure	  efficiency	  and	  profitability	  
(e.g.,	  Moore	  1993).	  Whereas	  the	  instrumental	  rationality	  largely	  focuses	  on	  the	  
execution	  of	  a	  process	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner	  without	  necessarily	  concerning	  itself	  
with	  the	  larger	  goals,	  a	  neoliberal	  approach	  focuses	  on	  achieving	  an	  ideological	  end.	  
Specifically,	  it	  seeks	  to	  remove	  state	  and	  public	  involvement	  in	  transportation	  
services	  to	  the	  greatest	  degree	  possible	  (World	  Bank	  1983:	  i;	  Moore	  1993:	  7;	  Simon	  
2008:	  96-­‐97).	  Neoliberal	  advocates	  have	  sought	  to	  excise	  government	  and	  politics	  
from	  transportation	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  itself.	  Its	  adherents,	  particularly	  
within	  international	  development	  institutions	  (IDIs),	  call	  for	  deregulating	  and	  
privatizing	  this	  sector	  where	  governments	  have	  historically	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  
the	  name	  of	  the	  public	  interest.	  Experts	  at	  IDIs	  have,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  institutions’	  
power	  and	  resources,	  pushed	  neoliberal	  goals	  and	  the	  measures	  that	  will	  determine	  
whether	  a	  transportation	  service	  merits	  support	  because	  of	  their	  power	  and	  
resources.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Many	  experts,	  particularly	  critics,	  use	  the	  term	  “neoliberalism.”	  Neoliberalism	  is	  often	  used	  
pejoratively,	  but	  this	  article	  aims	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “neoliberal”	  in	  a	  value-­‐neutral	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  
broader	  approach	  taken	  to	  use	  market-­‐oriented	  approaches	  that	  its	  proponents	  support	  while	  also	  
speaking	  to	  the	  larger	  audience	  interested	  in	  critiquing	  this	  approach.	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Neoliberal	  principles	  have	  hit	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  particularly	  hard,	  yet	  not	  
without	  the	  occasional	  amount	  of	  resistance.	  As	  this	  paper	  argues,	  despite	  being	  
formidable	  barriers,	  the	  perspectives	  and	  analyses	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  reductions	  in	  
railway	  service	  in	  SSA	  are	  not	  as	  unyielding	  as	  they	  initially	  appear.	  Typically,	  users	  
have	  enlisted	  their	  own	  local	  power	  to	  resist	  reductions	  in	  railway	  service.	  For	  
example,	  faced	  with	  service	  cuts,	  station	  closures	  or	  even	  shuttering	  an	  entire	  line	  
due	  to	  poor	  financial	  performance,	  railway	  supporters	  and	  beneficiaries	  have	  
sometimes	  sought	  to	  protect	  their	  interests	  by	  appealing	  to	  their	  political	  
representatives	  (see	  Monson	  2006:	  114;	  Kerr	  2007:	  146).	  Yet	  in	  an	  era	  when	  
transportation	  decisions	  in	  LDCs	  are	  highly	  influenced	  by	  IDIs,	  which	  are	  relatively	  
immune	  to	  local	  political	  pressure,	  railway	  supporters	  need	  new	  strategies	  if	  they	  
are	  to	  make	  an	  effective	  case	  for	  these	  lines.	  Such	  strategies	  need	  to	  convince	  
experts	  and	  public	  officials	  who	  may	  be	  initially	  entrenched	  in	  a	  culture	  that	  values	  
a	  positivistic	  approach	  over	  all	  others.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  Madagascar’s	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  (FCE)	  shows	  how	  its	  
advocates	  sought	  to	  also	  sway	  the	  opinions	  of	  IDI	  staff	  using	  both	  qualitative	  and	  
quantitative	  arguments.	  Keeping	  the	  railway	  operational	  in	  spite	  of	  cyclones	  and	  
threats	  of	  sabotage	  during	  a	  political	  crisis	  was	  not	  an	  easy	  feat.	  International	  
lending	  policies	  and	  negative	  evaluations	  by	  IDIs,	  though,	  posed	  a	  consistently	  
significant	  threat	  to	  the	  line’s	  existence	  and	  the	  livelihood	  of	  the	  100,000	  people	  
who	  benefit	  from	  its	  service.	  The	  railway	  illustrates	  how	  the	  predominant	  
rationalities	  for	  transportation	  investments	  have	  shifted	  over	  time	  from	  a	  colonial	  
justification	  to	  a	  public	  service	  obligation	  before	  being	  subjected	  to	  a	  neoliberal	  
rationality	  emphasizing	  full-­‐cost	  recovery	  and	  privatization.	  Yet	  unlike	  other	  cases	  
where	  railway	  supporters	  directed	  their	  appeals	  only	  to	  political	  leaders	  within	  the	  
country,	  FCE	  supporters	  resisted	  intentional	  efforts	  to	  close	  the	  line	  by	  drawing	  
upon	  benefits	  not	  usually	  considered	  in	  traditional	  positivistic	  analyses.	  
Demonstrating	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  line	  to	  IDI	  staff,	  particularly	  through	  personal	  
tours,	  helped	  change	  preconceived	  notions.	  The	  effects	  are	  noticeable	  considering	  
that	  the	  World	  Bank	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  Bank”)	  went	  from	  a	  position	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making	  its	  closure	  a	  condition	  of	  further	  loans	  to	  one	  where	  they	  programmed	  
millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  help	  rehabilitate	  the	  line.	  
This	  paper	  relies	  on	  focus	  groups	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (SSI),	  archival	  
documents	  and	  other	  secondary	  sources	  about	  colonial	  railways	  and	  transportation	  
policy	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  the	  views	  of	  these	  lines	  can	  
shift.	  The	  next	  section	  discusses	  the	  general	  downward	  trajectory	  of	  colonial	  
railways	  in	  SSA.	  To	  appreciate	  the	  task	  of	  convincing	  transportation	  experts	  as	  to	  
the	  value	  of	  a	  railway,	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  understand	  what	  their	  general	  
perspective	  is	  and	  how	  they	  assess	  the	  value	  of	  transportation	  investments.	  The	  
subsequent	  section,	  therefore,	  discusses	  how	  positivist	  and	  neoliberal	  development	  
ideologies	  and	  their	  rationalities	  have	  impacted	  transportation	  investment	  in	  LDCs,	  
followed	  by	  a	  look	  at	  how	  they	  specifically	  impact	  the	  railway	  sector.	  A	  discussion	  of	  
the	  FCE	  case	  follows	  before	  this	  paper	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  
broadening	  rationality	  through	  an	  inclusive,	  context-­‐sensitive	  approach	  is	  an	  
essential	  first	  step	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  balanced	  view	  of	  railways	  that	  better	  serves	  
the	  public	  interest.	  	  
	  
II. Sub-­‐Saharan	  Railways:	  From	  Robust	  to	  Rust	  	  
Railways	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  colonial	  powers’	  development	  vision	  for	  SSA.	  
During	  the	  colonial	  period,	  railways	  received	  extensive	  and	  often	  uncritical	  support	  
that	  enabled	  their	  realization.	  Governments	  helped	  secure	  loans	  and	  laborers	  for	  
railway	  construction	  while	  contending	  that	  these	  lines	  would	  enable	  indigenous	  
populations	  to	  live	  in	  civilized,	  developed	  territories.	  Colonial	  administrators	  
sometimes	  claimed	  that	  their	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  material	  welfare	  in	  Africa	  was	  
the	  development	  of	  new	  markets	  through	  their	  investment	  in	  transportation	  
technology	  (Lugard	  1922	  in	  Hilling	  1996:	  5,	  9;	  Austen	  and	  Headrick	  1983:	  177).	  
Colonial	  supporters	  and	  critics	  alike	  also	  saw	  railways	  as	  key	  to	  ending	  the	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backbreaking	  practice	  of	  porterage	  that	  caused	  the	  abuse	  and	  suffering	  of	  many	  
indigenous	  people	  (ILO	  1927:	  61;	  cf.	  Pourtier	  2007:	  192).37	  
In	  reality,	  colonial	  railways	  were	  not	  the	  humanitarian	  endeavor	  their	  
proponents	  sought	  to	  portray	  them	  as.	  Indigenous	  people	  suffered	  and	  died	  in	  great	  
numbers	  while	  working	  as	  forced	  laborers	  to	  construct	  these	  railways.	  Colonial	  
profiteers	  and	  administrators	  strongly	  lobbied	  their	  governments	  for	  the	  authority	  
and	  infrastructure	  to	  recruit	  these	  workers.	  	  They	  also	  sought	  government	  financing	  
because	  these	  transportation	  infrastructures	  facilitated	  the	  exploitation	  of	  new	  
territory	  and	  the	  transport	  of	  merchandise	  from	  the	  colonizing	  country.	  
Governments	  also	  surely	  found	  it	  desirable	  to	  support	  their	  national	  railway	  
manufacturers	  and	  the	  contractors	  who	  built	  these	  lines.	  The	  footprints	  of	  these	  
railroads,	  which	  almost	  invariably	  run	  from	  the	  countries’	  ports	  to	  strategic	  
hinterlands,	  reveal	  the	  desire	  by	  colonial	  powers	  to	  assert	  political	  and	  military	  
control,	  access	  natural	  resources	  and	  create	  new	  markets	  for	  their	  own	  economic	  
advantage	  (Hilling	  1996:	  77;	  Simon	  1996:	  50;	  Gray	  1999:	  87;	  Pourtier	  2007:	  192).	  
This	  also	  harmonized	  with	  local	  administrations’	  aims	  to	  make	  their	  territories	  
economically	  self-­‐sufficient	  at	  a	  minimum	  and,	  ideally,	  generate	  a	  surplus	  
production	  for	  export	  (Sharp	  2003:	  78).	  
The	  end	  of	  colonialism	  removed	  railways’	  major	  source	  of	  financing	  as	  well	  as	  
some	  of	  the	  initial	  justifications	  for	  subsidizing	  their	  infrastructure	  and	  operations.	  
Many	  railways	  had	  long	  depended	  upon	  colonial	  subsidies	  for	  operations	  and	  free	  
indigenous	  labor	  for	  maintenance	  and	  renewal	  projects.	  Even	  “profitable”	  or	  break-­‐
even	  railway	  operations	  received	  external	  subsidies	  for	  infrastructure	  and	  rolling	  
stock	  renewal	  (Bullock	  2005:	  2,	  27).	  Independent	  countries	  sometimes	  built	  trunk	  
roads	  that	  duplicated	  railway	  routes,	  which	  shifted	  traffic	  to	  motor	  vehicles	  and	  cut	  
into	  railway	  revenue	  (Bickers	  1975:	  3;	  Griffiths	  1995:	  186).	  They	  also	  gradually	  
eliminated	  colonial	  policies	  prohibiting	  trucks	  from	  directly	  competing	  with	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Indigenous	  populations	  were	  often	  hired	  or	  forced	  to	  work	  as	  porters	  to	  carry	  colonial	  goods	  or	  
the	  colons	  themselves	  for	  hundreds	  of	  kilometers.	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lines,	  which	  has	  adversely	  impacted	  railways’	  budgets	  –	  especially	  considering	  that	  
road-­‐based	  travel	  is	  priced	  too	  low	  to	  cover	  routine	  maintenance	  and	  is	  therefore	  
given	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  (Taaffe	  et	  al.	  1963:	  513;	  Gwilliam	  2011:	  134,	  364).	  These	  
factors	  made	  funding	  railway	  maintenance	  work	  even	  more	  challenging,	  decreasing	  
these	  lines’	  reliability,	  which	  thereby	  increased	  the	  appeal	  of	  road-­‐based	  travel	  and	  
further	  cut	  into	  railway	  revenue	  –	  trapping	  many	  lines	  in	  a	  “downward	  spiral”	  that	  
they	  have	  not	  survived	  (Hilling	  1996:	  110).	  	  
Keeping	  the	  trains	  running	  in	  SSA	  has	  been	  anything	  but	  simple	  without	  their	  
former	  resources	  and	  due	  to	  their	  declining	  ridership.	  Harsh	  climatic	  conditions	  
present	  a	  pervasive	  challenge	  to	  maintaining	  railway	  service	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  
tropical	  counties	  where	  intense	  tropical	  storms	  frequently	  cut	  lines	  by	  causing	  
landslides	  and	  washouts	  (Gleave	  1992:	  264;	  Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  
2002:	  189).	  Armed	  conflicts	  and	  social	  unrest	  have	  also	  led	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  
railway	  infrastructure	  (Griffiths	  1995:	  120;	  Bullock	  2005:	  27).	  Even	  standard	  use	  
has	  taken	  its	  toll	  on	  aging	  infrastructure	  and	  rolling	  stock	  –	  resulting	  in	  broken	  
axles,	  cracked	  rails	  and	  failed	  traction	  motors.	  The	  lack	  of	  domestically	  produced	  
equipment	  and	  spare	  parts,	  particularly	  in	  SSA,	  has	  increased	  the	  expense	  of	  
maintaining	  these	  lines	  because	  everything	  must	  be	  imported	  (Moriarty	  and	  Beed	  
1989:	  128).	  Those	  railways	  that	  have	  remained	  operational	  following	  independence	  
have	  regularly	  deferred	  essential	  maintenance	  and	  cut	  back	  on	  service.	  Bullock	  
notes	  that	  the	  African	  continent	  is	  full	  of	  railways	  best	  described	  as	  “walking	  
wounded”	  (Bullock	  2005:	  27).	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  fewer	  railways	  exist	  now	  and	  declining	  reliability	  is	  making	  even	  
those	  remaining	  ones	  less	  competitive	  with	  other	  transportation	  services.	  Even	  the	  
conditions	  on	  some	  of	  the	  largest	  railways	  in	  LDCs	  can	  be	  extremely	  poor	  (Hilling	  
1996:	  104-­‐105).	  In	  a	  sample	  looking	  at	  the	  broader	  statistics	  of	  roadway	  and	  
railway	  provision	  in	  LDCs,	  each	  country	  added	  thousands	  of	  kilometers	  of	  paved	  
roadways	  in	  the	  first	  three	  decades	  after	  independence	  whereas	  roughly	  half	  of	  
these	  countries’	  trackage	  figures	  actually	  declined	  (Simon	  1996:	  18-­‐19).	  This	  trend	  
is	  well	  reflected	  in	  the	  infrastructure-­‐poor	  region	  of	  SSA,	  which	  has	  had	  a	  greater	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funding	  gap	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  (Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam	  2010).	  Today,	  
railway	  lines	  extend	  almost	  90,000	  kilometers	  in	  39	  countries	  on	  the	  African	  
continent	  (Pourtier	  2007:	  190;	  Bullock	  2009:	  vii;	  Gwilliam	  2011:	  85).38	  However,	  the	  
actual	  number	  of	  kilometers	  that	  are	  actually	  operational	  is	  far	  lower	  (see	  Appendix	  
A).	  
While	  all	  countries	  have	  limited	  budgetary	  resources	  for	  transportation	  
provision,	  the	  gaps	  between	  LDCs’	  resources	  and	  their	  transportation	  needs	  are	  
indeed	  greater	  than	  in	  developed	  countries.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  SSA	  where	  
governments	  have	  had	  to	  make	  tough	  decisions	  on	  how	  to	  allocate	  scarce	  resources	  
across	  large	  areas	  for	  competing	  interests.	  Railways	  not	  only	  vie	  for	  their	  share	  of	  
renewal	  funding	  against	  other	  transportation	  investments,	  but	  also	  compete	  against	  
other	  publicly	  funded	  services	  such	  as	  healthcare,	  education	  and	  security	  (Bullock	  
2009:	  18).	  Therefore,	  the	  more	  a	  railway	  can	  cover	  its	  costs,	  the	  less	  of	  a	  burden	  it	  
will	  be	  for	  any	  given	  government.	  	  
The	  relatively	  high	  costs	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  even	  basic	  railway	  operations,	  
their	  limited	  resource	  base	  and	  their	  geographically	  concentrated	  benefits,	  however,	  
do	  not	  fully	  explain	  why	  LDCs	  have	  increasingly	  invested	  more	  on	  roadways.	  The	  
rapid	  decline	  is	  also	  due	  to	  ideological	  commitments	  of	  those	  being	  asked	  to	  support	  
these	  LDCs’	  transport	  sector.	  Governments	  have	  had	  to	  repeatedly	  borrow	  money	  
from	  IDIs—especially	  the	  World	  Bank—just	  to	  keep	  lines	  running.	  However,	  these	  
funds	  would	  only	  be	  provided	  if	  the	  railways	  (and	  governments)	  met	  certain	  
stipulations.	  Such	  financial	  and	  external	  pressures	  have	  not	  benefited	  SSA	  railways.	  
Unfortunately	  for	  those	  users	  who	  rely	  on	  or	  benefit	  from	  them,	  colonial	  railways	  in	  
SSA	  have	  been	  closing	  down	  with	  ever-­‐increasing	  frequency.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  two	  sections,	  the	  perspectives	  of	  IDIs	  have	  
impacted	  transportation	  planning	  processes	  in	  LDCs.	  The	  next	  section	  examines	  and	  
critiques	  the	  dominant	  forms	  of	  rationality	  commonly	  used	  by	  IDIs	  and	  others	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Bullock	  notes	  that	  there	  are	  36	  countries	  (Bullock	  2009:	  vi),	  but	  this	  figure	  has	  been	  updated	  in	  
Appendix	  A.	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justify	  transportation	  decisions.	  The	  implications	  of	  extending	  their	  ideological	  
views	  to	  railways	  in	  LDCs	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  section.	  	  
	  	  
III. The	  Partiality	  Hiding	  behind	  Rationality	  
IDIs	  have	  often	  employed	  the	  words	  “rationality”	  and	  “rational”	  to	  describe	  their	  
work	  and	  goals	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  a	  unitary	  form	  
exists.	  Clearly	  nobody	  wants	  transportation	  decisions	  to	  be	  made	  on	  an	  irrational	  
basis,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  “rationality”	  is	  a	  multifaceted,	  contested	  
concept.	  Rationality	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  accounting	  for	  an	  action	  of	  belief,	  or	  
in	  other	  words,	  why	  a	  person	  acts	  or	  thinks	  a	  certain	  way	  (Darke	  1985:	  16).	  A	  
distinction,	  however,	  has	  been	  made	  between	  the	  means	  and	  the	  ends	  in	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  For	  example,	  the	  positivist	  tradition	  emphasizes	  “formal”	  
rationality,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  means-­‐oriented	  activity	  –	  the	  process	  of	  offering	  
an	  explanation	  for	  certain	  actions	  and	  beliefs	  rather	  than	  dealing	  with	  the	  beliefs	  
themselves	  (see	  Brehany	  and	  Hooper	  1985:	  9;	  Darke	  1985:	  16).	  This	  functional	  or	  
instrumental	  rationality	  allows	  for	  the	  “systematic	  identification	  of	  alternative	  
courses	  of	  action,	  and	  selection	  of	  those	  most	  likely	  to	  achieve	  given	  ends”	  (Teitz	  
1985:	  138).	  Some	  theorists	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  social	  sciences	  generally	  hold	  a	  
“rational”	  act	  to	  mean	  one	  whereby	  an	  actor	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  it	  will	  most	  
efficiently	  produce	  the	  sought-­‐after	  goals	  (Reade	  1985:	  77-­‐78).	  Formal	  rationality	  
therefore	  depends	  on	  experts	  who	  use	  procedures	  and	  analyses	  such	  as	  quantitative	  
calculations	  to	  deem	  what	  is	  rational	  or	  not	  (Darke	  1985:	  18).	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  “objectivity”	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  this	  positivist	  planning	  tradition	  
because	  it	  holds	  that	  these	  planning	  experts	  should	  and	  can	  be	  impartial	  observers	  
and	  analysts	  of	  any	  given	  planning	  concern	  –	  much	  like	  a	  scientist	  or	  neutral	  
technician	  (Goldberg	  1985:	  122).	  As	  such,	  objectivity	  requires	  that	  the	  examiner	  be	  
separated	  from	  any	  given	  entity,	  idea	  or	  phenomenon	  being	  studied	  (ibid).	  Willson	  
asserts	  that	  instrumental	  rationality	  draws	  its	  epistemological	  foundation	  from	  
scientific	  objectivism	  whereby	  experts	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  objective	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facts	  without	  affecting	  the	  results	  (Willson	  2001:	  5).	  He	  argues	  that	  instrumental	  
rationality	  and	  objectivist	  epistemology	  are	  so	  strongly	  linked	  that	  failing	  to	  support	  
one	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  justify	  the	  other	  (ibid.).	  In	  short,	  positivist	  ideology	  like	  
instrumental	  rationality	  holds	  that	  planning	  experts	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  means	  of	  
reaching	  certain	  ends	  in	  a	  supposedly	  objective	  way	  if	  they	  want	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  
acting	  rationally.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  planners	  have	  sought	  to	  portray	  their	  
methods	  and	  recommendations	  as	  rational	  “so	  as	  to	  give	  these	  an	  aura	  of	  
objectivity”	  (Reade	  1985:	  92).	  	  
Many	  planning	  researchers	  have	  take	  exception	  with	  the	  positivistic	  tradition’s	  
emphasis	  on	  formal	  rationality	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  true	  objectivity	  (e.g.,	  
Simon	  1983;	  Darke	  1985;	  Goldberg	  1985;	  Forester	  1993;	  Willson	  2001;	  etc.).	  
Achieving	  true	  objectivity	  is	  not	  only	  unrealistic,	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  undesirable	  
(Goldberg	  1985:	  122-­‐123).	  Darke	  warns	  of	  allowing	  rationality	  to	  be	  identified	  
solely	  as	  the	  process	  that	  produces	  reasons	  rather	  than	  include	  an	  examination	  of	  
the	  substance	  of	  those	  reasons	  (Darke	  1985:	  16).	  The	  process	  essentially	  becomes	  a	  
goal	  in	  itself	  where	  the	  process	  becomes	  an	  activity	  “divorced	  from	  theorized	  end-­‐
states”	  (McCarthy	  1978:	  26	  in	  Breheny	  and	  Hooper	  1985:	  9).	  As	  Forester	  so	  aptly	  
notes,	  relegating	  our	  definition	  of	  rationality	  to	  one	  consistent	  with	  instrumental	  
rationality’s	  focus	  on	  process	  could	  produce	  disquieting	  results	  that	  violate	  our	  
common	  sense	  (Forester	  1993:	  69).	  	  
This	  emphasis	  on	  process	  has	  been	  especially	  pronounced	  at	  bureaucracies.	  At	  
these	  institutions,	  Darke	  asserts,	  rules	  that	  have	  been	  created	  as	  a	  means	  to	  certain	  
ends	  can	  turn	  into	  the	  ends	  themselves	  (Darke	  1985:	  19).	  This	  can	  cause	  
bureaucracies	  to	  “become	  rigid,	  inflexible,	  unresponsive	  to	  public	  pressure	  and	  
more	  impersonal	  than	  necessary,	  because	  formal	  rationality	  is	  emphasized	  above	  all	  
else”	  (ibid.,	  19-­‐20).	  Such	  accusations	  have	  been	  leveled	  against	  the	  Bank,	  for	  
example,	  which	  makes	  its	  decisions	  “on	  a	  rational	  basis	  referring	  to	  rules,	  
regulations,	  procedures,	  contracts	  and	  expertise”	  (Vetterlein	  2012:	  53).	  Although	  
the	  Bank	  has	  experienced	  a	  significant	  cultural	  shift	  following	  sustained	  advocacy	  
campaigns	  since	  the	  1980s,	  critics	  of	  the	  Bank	  have	  continued	  to	  critique	  the	  lack	  of	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responsiveness	  and	  transparency	  (Ebrahim	  and	  Herz	  2007:	  9-­‐10).	  It	  has	  been	  
argued	  that	  the	  Bank	  uses	  quantification	  and	  economization	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  out	  
of	  a	  bureaucratic	  desire	  for	  standardization	  and	  efficiency,	  but	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
complexity	  that	  results	  in	  the	  overlooking	  local	  and	  practical	  knowledge	  (Vetterlein	  
2012:	  37,	  49-­‐50).39	  As	  discussed	  below,	  the	  Bank’s	  emphasis	  on	  procedural	  
rationality	  actually	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  not	  only	  minimizing	  concerns	  important	  to	  
communities	  affected	  by	  its	  policies,	  but	  also	  serves	  to	  elevate	  a	  neoliberal	  
rationality.	  	  
Researchers	  critical	  of	  formal	  rationality	  and	  its	  various	  iterations	  emphasize	  the	  
need	  to	  consider	  how	  goals	  are	  formulated	  as	  well	  as	  how	  those	  ends’	  meet	  societal	  
needs	  (e.g.,	  Darke	  1985;	  Forester	  1993;	  Willson	  2001).	  Determining	  the	  desired	  
outcomes	  requires	  consideration	  of	  “substantive”	  rationality,	  which	  explicitly	  seeks	  
to	  bring	  “values,	  ideals	  and	  moral	  thinking	  into	  the	  discussion	  of	  action”	  (Darke	  
1985:	  19).	  Essentially,	  the	  formulation	  of	  desired	  outcomes	  to	  meet	  human	  needs	  is	  
a	  normative	  exercise	  that	  stands	  outside	  analytic	  rationality	  that	  only	  evaluate	  the	  
most	  efficient	  means	  to	  predetermined	  goals.	  Substantive	  rationality	  is,	  therefore,	  an	  
essential	  counterpart	  to	  balance	  instrumental	  rationality	  used	  by	  any	  social	  
organization	  (Flyvbjerg	  2004:	  285).	  
Despite	  the	  importance	  given	  to	  substantive	  rationality	  and	  the	  critiques	  of	  
relying	  solely	  on	  formal	  rationality,	  the	  transportation	  field	  maintains	  a	  particularly	  
strong	  philosophical	  connection	  with	  positivist	  thought.	  Flyvbjerg	  notes	  that	  while	  
“many	  planning	  researchers	  consider	  positivism	  a	  long-­‐dead	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  
1960s	  and	  1970s,”	  others	  have	  argued	  persuasively	  that	  positivism	  has	  decreased	  
“only	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  things”	  (Flyvbjerg	  2004:	  286).	  This	  certainly	  appears	  to	  be	  
the	  case	  given	  the	  transportation	  field’s	  reliance	  on	  hard	  statistics	  and	  push	  for	  
economic	  rationality.	  In	  fact,	  the	  social	  sciences	  largely	  view	  transportation	  planning	  
as	  “unimaginative”	  or	  “technical”	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  transportation	  field’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Vetterlein	  notes	  that	  the	  economization	  of	  the	  ‘social’	  can	  lead	  to	  social	  issues	  only	  being	  
considered	  by	  the	  Bank	  if	  there	  is	  an	  economic	  benefit	  (Vetterlein	  2012:	  50).	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strong	  disciplinary	  “ethos	  of	  ‘rational	  science’”	  that	  focuses	  on	  technical	  design	  
issues,	  empirical	  measurement	  or	  analyses	  using	  an	  uncritical	  lens	  of	  neoclassical	  
economics	  (Simon	  1996:	  1).	  The	  field	  tends	  to	  characterize	  the	  researcher	  as	  an	  
impartial	  analyst	  who	  works	  to	  inform	  or	  evaluate	  policy	  and	  investment	  decisions	  
(Willson	  2001:	  5).	  Moreover,	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  is	  best	  characterized	  
as	  elevating	  instrumental	  rationality	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  process	  over	  other	  forms	  
of	  understanding	  (ibid.,	  3).	  
IDIs	  like	  the	  Bank,	  which	  significantly	  influence	  transportation	  investments	  in	  
LDCs,	  have	  exemplified	  this.	  Simon	  argues	  that	  positivism,	  rational	  science	  and	  
modernization	  theory	  “form	  the	  conceptual	  foundation”	  of	  the	  major	  IDIs	  (Simon	  
1996:	  35).	  Certainly	  this	  assertion	  seems	  true	  for	  their	  activities	  in	  the	  
transportation	  sector	  given	  how	  much	  they	  rely	  on	  formal	  rationality	  and	  its	  
emphasis	  on	  quantitative	  methods.	  Although	  IDIs	  like	  the	  Bank	  have	  considered	  
non-­‐economic	  impacts	  of	  transportation	  investments	  for	  decades	  (e.g.,	  Sorca-­‐Beceka	  
1966;	  Galenson	  and	  Thompson	  1994),	  the	  assumption	  that	  higher	  measures	  of	  
economic	  growth	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  equate	  with	  increased	  development	  still	  
dominates	  (Friedmann	  1992:	  38;	  Simon	  1996:	  8).	  This	  thinking	  extends	  even	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  individual	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  because	  their	  contribution	  to	  national	  
economic	  growth	  becomes	  the	  primary	  justification	  for	  investment.	  The	  field	  does	  
not	  lack	  reports,	  analyses	  and	  other	  publications	  claiming	  or	  seeking	  to	  understand	  
the	  link	  between	  transportation	  investments	  to	  the	  gross	  development	  product	  
(GDP)	  or	  gross	  national	  product	  (GNP).	  	  
Contributing	  to	  the	  economic	  growth	  of	  a	  nation	  is	  a	  desirable	  aim,	  but	  this	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  result	  in	  development	  (Friedmann	  1992:	  38).	  The	  metrics	  used	  to	  
measure	  it	  can	  be	  instructive	  when	  used	  appropriately	  and	  critically,	  but	  the	  use	  of	  
those	  measures	  as	  the	  final	  determinants	  of	  development	  decision-­‐making	  also	  have	  
many	  valid	  critiques.	  Many	  times	  an	  economic	  average,	  such	  as	  GDP,	  masks	  serious	  
inequity	  (Rodney	  1981:	  15).	  Moreover,	  much	  that	  society	  would	  deem	  undesirable,	  
including	  ill-­‐being	  and	  accidents,	  actually	  contributes	  to	  GDP	  (Chambers	  1997:	  40).	  
Even	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  simply	  determine	  the	  effects	  of	  transportation	  investments	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on	  a	  macroeconomic	  level	  without	  putting	  it	  into	  a	  larger	  context	  risk	  reinforcing	  
the	  assumption	  strongly	  held	  by	  many	  experts	  that	  these	  measures	  are	  the	  most	  
critical	  ones	  that	  should	  be	  used	  –	  elevating	  them	  to	  the	  status	  of	  ends	  rather	  than	  
just	  means.	  As	  Chambers	  cautions,	  though,	  “what	  is	  measured	  may	  also	  not	  be	  what	  
matters”	  (ibid.:	  40).	  Stated	  another	  way,	  it	  may	  matter	  to	  a	  few	  experts	  and	  not	  to	  
those	  people	  who	  are	  the	  target	  of	  development	  efforts.	  Even	  when	  analyses	  are	  
done	  at	  the	  project	  level,	  the	  assumption	  is	  a	  project’s	  realization	  will	  somehow	  
contribute	  to	  national-­‐level	  development.	  
Cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  (CBA)	  is	  a	  highly	  positivistic	  tool	  widely	  used	  to	  evaluate	  
transportation	  projects	  and	  facilitate	  comparison	  with	  other	  potential	  investments	  –	  
even	  those	  in	  other	  sectors.	  As	  Damart	  and	  Roy	  (2009:	  205)	  observe,	  CBA	  “is	  
frequently	  judged	  capable	  of	  scientifically	  revealing	  objective	  elements	  that	  will	  
justify	  a	  decision	  to	  implement	  or	  abandon	  an	  investment	  project.”	  The	  benefits	  of	  a	  
given	  investment	  are	  monetized	  using	  figures	  from	  the	  context,	  projections	  based	  on	  
any	  changes	  and	  values	  from	  other	  examples.	  Sen	  states	  that	  economists’	  preference	  
for	  market-­‐price-­‐based	  evaluation	  is	  rather	  strong	  (Sen	  1999:	  80).	  Experts	  tailor	  the	  
figures,	  with	  varying	  degree	  of	  success,	  to	  the	  infrastructure	  or	  service	  under	  
examination.	  Ultimately,	  they	  arrive	  at	  a	  bottom-­‐line	  number—either	  an	  economic	  
internal	  rate	  of	  return	  (EIRR)	  or	  a	  benefit-­‐to-­‐cost	  ratio—that	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  
other	  competing	  uses	  or	  another	  standard	  used	  to	  denote	  an	  opportunity	  cost.	  IDIs	  
consider	  this	  analysis	  important	  for	  determining	  whether	  a	  project	  should	  receive	  
financial	  support	  (Rebelo	  1992:	  33).	  For	  example,	  the	  Bank	  would	  not	  consider	  
funding	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  Madagascar	  with	  an	  EIRR	  below	  12%	  –	  the	  
predetermined	  discount	  rate	  that	  served	  as	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  for	  capital	  (World	  
Bank	  2000:	  17,	  46).	  	  
Critics	  of	  CBA	  have	  taken	  it	  to	  task	  on	  many	  points.	  One	  critique	  is	  that	  experts	  
have	  almost	  complete	  control	  of	  this	  process	  wherein	  they	  shape	  what	  variables	  are	  
included	  and,	  therefore,	  what	  values	  they	  produce	  (Chambers	  1997:	  44,	  54).	  Besides	  
introducing	  the	  experts’	  own	  source	  of	  bias,	  the	  values	  can	  be	  skewed	  by	  misleading	  
market	  values	  or	  stated	  preferences	  that	  differ	  from	  what	  users	  actually	  do	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(Chambers	  1997:	  45;	  Root	  2003:	  5;	  Damart	  and	  Roy	  2009:	  205-­‐206).	  Experts	  may	  
also	  be	  susceptible	  to	  influence,	  both	  inside	  their	  organization	  and	  outside	  of	  it,	  and	  
have	  been	  known	  to	  adjust	  goals	  to	  fit	  the	  analysis	  –	  thereby	  doing	  CBA	  backwards	  
(Chambers	  1997:	  45).	  Although	  using	  only	  monetized	  values	  make	  CBA	  and	  its	  
quantification	  appealing	  to	  those	  who	  have	  positivist	  leanings,	  the	  consideration	  of	  
some	  factors	  (e.g.,	  environmental	  externalities,	  the	  value	  of	  human	  life,	  etc.)	  can	  be	  
complicated,	  highly	  subjective	  and	  controversial	  (Root	  2003:	  4;	  Damart	  and	  Roy	  
2009:	  206).	  
The	  use	  of	  multicriteria	  analysis	  (MCA)	  strives	  to	  reduce	  the	  overreliance	  on	  
(and	  bias	  by)	  experts	  and	  still	  maintain	  a	  formally	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
Critiques	  of	  MCA,	  though,	  do	  not	  stray	  far	  from	  those	  leveled	  against	  CBA.	  It	  looks	  a	  
lot	  like	  CBA	  when	  experts	  are	  the	  ones	  controlling	  the	  values.	  In	  a	  revealing	  
statement	  about	  the	  use	  of	  MCA	  in	  planning	  railway	  investments,	  Rebelo	  notes	  “it	  
would	  be	  ideal	  to	  have	  a	  multi-­‐criteria	  analysis,	  including	  economic	  and	  financial	  
rates	  of	  return.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  that	  all	  the	  regions	  or	  
districts	  would	  have	  the	  personnel	  to	  do	  such	  calculations”	  (Rebelo	  1992:	  28).	  So	  
even	  though	  MCA	  allows	  different	  actors	  to	  weight	  variables	  according	  to	  their	  own	  
perspective,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  final	  outcome	  adequately	  considers	  impacts	  
that	  will	  disproportionately	  affect	  some	  actors	  and	  not	  others.	  	  
Criticism	  of	  positivistic	  measures	  and	  approaches	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  those	  
attributes	  the	  transportation	  field	  has	  traditionally	  investigated	  do	  not	  matter;	  
rather	  that	  the	  transportation	  field	  has	  fallen	  victim	  to	  what	  Flyvbjerg	  has	  called	  the	  
“rational	  fallacy.”	  The	  rational	  fallacy	  “consists	  of	  raising	  analysis	  and	  rationality	  
into	  the	  most	  important	  mode	  of	  operation	  for	  human	  activity,	  and	  allowing	  these	  to	  
dominate	  our	  view	  of	  human	  activity:	  so	  much	  so	  that	  other	  equally	  important	  
modes	  of	  human	  understanding	  and	  behavior	  are	  made	  invisible”	  (Flyvbjerg	  2001:	  
23).	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  rationality	  is	  not	  a	  single	  monolithic	  concept	  and	  so	  it	  
would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  state	  those	  who	  fall	  victim	  to	  the	  rational	  fallacy	  raise	  
a	  very	  specific	  form	  of	  rationality	  (i.e.,	  formal	  or	  instrumental)	  above	  all	  others.	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If	  either	  CBA	  or	  MCA	  were	  just	  one	  of	  many	  tools	  used	  in	  a	  balanced	  decision-­‐
making	  process,	  it	  would	  be	  less	  of	  a	  concern	  because	  it	  is	  a	  reasonable	  step	  to	  
attempt	  to	  calculate	  a	  project’s	  opportunity	  cost	  given	  that	  investment	  resources	  in	  
LDCs	  are	  limited.	  Yet	  all	  too	  often,	  CBA	  and	  similar	  types	  of	  analyses	  become	  the	  
primary	  tool	  by	  which	  experts	  and	  public	  officials	  make	  decisions	  (Chambers	  1997:	  
45).	  Flyvbjerg	  asserts,	  “we	  should	  not	  criticize	  rules,	  logic,	  signs	  and	  rationality	  in	  
themselves.	  We	  should	  criticize	  only	  the	  dominance	  of	  these	  phenomena	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  others	  in	  modern	  society	  and	  in	  social	  science”	  (Flyvbjerg	  2001:	  49).	  	  
Indeed,	  by	  focusing	  so	  heavily	  on	  measures,	  models	  and	  technical	  processes—
especially	  economic	  and	  financial	  performance—the	  transportation	  field	  too	  often	  
leaves	  concealed	  the	  true	  genesis	  of	  planning	  decisions.	  Reade	  has	  argued	  that	  
planners	  use	  of	  the	  word	  rationality	  as	  a	  slogan	  that	  “serves	  to	  conceal	  the	  real	  
nature	  of	  their	  activity,	  even	  from	  themselves”	  (Reade	  1985:	  92).	  Believing	  that	  the	  
most	  rational	  argument	  can	  be	  found	  and	  will	  prevail	  is	  highly	  problematic	  when	  
considering	  the	  fact	  that	  power	  can	  determine	  who	  participates	  in	  the	  process	  as	  
well	  as	  what	  counts	  as	  “rational.”	  Foucault	  argues,	  “to	  respect	  rationalism	  as	  an	  ideal	  
should	  never	  constitute	  a	  blackmail	  to	  prevent	  analysis	  of	  the	  rationalities	  really	  at	  
work”	  (Foucault	  1980:	  317	  in	  Flyvbjerg	  2001:	  98).	  Power	  is	  self-­‐reinforcing,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  existing	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  that	  through	  
their	  technical	  nature	  excludes	  many	  participants	  who	  could	  argue	  for	  including	  
certain	  factors	  currently	  ignored	  or	  minimized.	  As	  Foucault	  would	  contend,	  “power	  
produces	  rationality	  and	  truth;	  rationality	  and	  truth	  produce	  power”	  (Flyvbjerg	  
2001:	  124).	  In	  other	  words,	  those	  who	  currently	  wield	  power	  determine	  to	  a	  large	  
degree	  what	  goals	  and	  measures	  are	  important;	  yet	  the	  tools	  and	  measures	  that	  are	  
deemed	  important	  remain	  largely	  inaccessible	  except	  to	  those	  who	  already	  have	  
power.	  	  
Traditionally,	  prominent	  players	  have	  included	  bureaucrats,	  politicians	  and	  
other	  public	  officials,	  but	  IDI	  experts	  have	  come	  to	  play	  increasingly	  crucial	  roles	  in	  
the	  development	  process.	  On	  the	  whole,	  IDIs	  have	  exerted	  significant	  influence	  
impacting	  LDCs’	  transportation	  decisions.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  influence	  they	  garner	  by	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providing	  grants	  and	  loans	  in	  other	  sectors,	  their	  perspectives	  remain	  influential	  for	  
transportation	  decisions	  because	  they	  are	  the	  largest	  source	  of	  non-­‐state	  funding	  for	  
transportation	  projects	  in	  LDCs	  (Hilling	  1996:	  102).	  Given	  that	  much	  of	  the	  road	  
construction	  and	  maintenance	  in	  LDCs	  is	  externally	  financed	  by	  IDIs,	  this	  brings	  
these	  institutions—and	  their	  expert	  staff	  and	  consultants—in	  as	  “stakeholders”	  
whose	  role	  is	  rarely	  passive	  (Schroeder	  1997:	  396).	  In	  fact,	  IDIs	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
provide	  or	  even	  block	  financing	  that	  could	  help	  LDCs	  and	  their	  crumbling	  
transportation	  systems.	  Receiving	  Bank	  approval,	  for	  example,	  impacts	  the	  
willingness	  of	  other	  IDIs	  and	  private	  lenders	  to	  fund	  transportation	  projects	  because	  
their	  approval	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  guarantee	  that	  a	  project	  has	  been	  vetted	  (George	  and	  
Sabelli	  1994:	  12;).	  
Although	  IDIs	  portray	  their	  goals	  as	  consistent	  with	  positivist	  ideals	  that	  adhere	  
to	  a	  single	  form	  of	  rationality	  that	  assumes	  objectivity	  is	  possible,	  their	  positions	  are	  
in	  fact	  often	  undergirded	  by	  a	  series	  of	  implicit	  ideological	  commitments	  most	  aptly	  
labeled	  as	  “neoliberal”	  theory.	  Those	  experts	  falling	  into	  this	  category	  believe	  free	  
market	  resource	  allocation	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  “state	  ‘distortions’	  of	  markets”	  (e.g.,	  
regulations,	  fare-­‐setting,	  public	  subsidies)	  will	  create	  better	  opportunities	  for	  
macro-­‐scale	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  (Ferguson	  2006:	  11;	  cf.	  Moore	  1993;	  
Murray	  and	  Overton	  2011:	  308).	  They	  have	  often	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  decision-­‐
making	  based	  on	  politics	  rather	  than	  “economic	  optimization”	  is	  undesirable	  
“interference”	  (Briceño-­‐Garmendia	  et	  al.	  2010:	  70-­‐71;	  Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam	  2010:	  
238).	  IDI	  experts	  have	  argued	  that	  transportation	  decisions	  based	  on	  politics	  are	  
problematic	  because	  public	  officials	  and	  bureaucrats	  are	  motivated	  not	  so	  much	  by	  
the	  public	  interest	  as	  their	  own	  personal	  concerns	  in	  pleasing	  their	  supervisors	  and	  
influential	  interest	  groups	  (e.g.,	  Moore	  1993:	  8;	  Gwilliam	  2011:	  109).	  This	  assertion	  
may	  be	  correct,	  but	  it	  also	  wrongly	  implies	  that	  IDIs,	  their	  staff	  or	  the	  free	  market	  
have	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  objective	  decisions	  that	  are	  inherently	  more	  rational	  
because	  they	  conform	  to	  procedures	  and	  rules.	  
Following	  what	  came	  to	  be	  called	  “the	  Washington	  Consensus,”	  the	  overarching	  
agenda	  of	  what	  critics	  have	  termed	  pejoratively	  “neoliberalism”	  called	  for	  the	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“disengagement	  of	  the	  state”	  (Diouf	  1997:	  309;	  Harvey	  2005:	  13;	  cf.	  Stiglitz	  2002:	  
74).	  Supporters	  even	  acknowledge	  that	  “it	  took	  a	  change	  in	  the	  ideological	  climate	  
for	  the	  political	  system	  to	  change	  its	  policies”	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  market-­‐based	  approach	  
(Moore	  1993:	  11).	  Adhering	  to	  this	  ideology	  goes	  even	  beyond	  the	  pursuit	  of	  goals	  
that	  a	  sizeable	  number	  of	  IDI	  experts	  deem	  “rational”	  (e.g.,	  profitability	  and	  
efficiency).	  Instead,	  it	  dictates	  that	  governments	  should	  participate	  as	  little	  as	  
possible	  in	  transportation	  provision	  –	  a	  sector	  where	  government	  has	  traditionally	  
played	  a	  large	  role	  (Doyen	  1991:	  5-­‐6;	  Carbajo	  1993:	  11).	  In	  its	  purest	  form,	  this	  
means	  that	  governments	  should	  not	  regulate	  the	  transportation	  sector	  nor	  subsidize	  
its	  services.	  The	  state	  can	  still,	  however,	  provide	  transportation	  infrastructure	  
under	  this	  approach	  because	  it	  enables	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
transport	  sector.	  Moore	  contends	  that	  evidence	  supports	  the	  virtues	  of	  deregulation	  
and	  that	  “the	  theoretical	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  free	  market	  works	  better	  
than	  regulation	  is	  unambiguous	  (Moore	  1993:	  11).40	  As	  the	  next	  section	  illustrates,	  
colonial-­‐era	  railways	  have	  suffered	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  “neoliberal	  turn”	  without	  
necessarily	  even	  delivering	  on	  the	  promises	  of	  a	  market-­‐oriented	  approach.41	  	  	  
	  
IV. Getting	  Government	  out	  of	  the	  Railway	  Business	  	  
Although	  railways	  had	  largely	  fallen	  out	  of	  favor	  decades	  earlier,	  neoliberal	  
theory	  made	  public	  railways	  an	  explicit	  target	  for	  closure.	  A	  Bank	  publication	  called	  
The	  Railways	  Problem	  provides	  an	  insightful	  look	  into	  how	  neoliberal	  concepts	  
advanced	  by	  IDIs	  targeted	  railways.	  In	  this	  report,	  the	  Bank	  took	  the	  position	  that	  
governments	  needed	  to	  take	  action	  on	  railways	  because	  they	  had	  “become	  a	  
bottleneck	  to	  development	  as	  well	  as	  a	  growing	  drain	  on	  Government	  financial	  
resources”	  (World	  Bank	  1983:	  executive	  summary).	  It	  criticized	  the	  use	  of	  public	  
subsidies	  for	  unprofitable	  lines	  and	  encouraged	  strong	  measures	  to	  avoid	  them	  
because	  “economic	  efficiency,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  railways’	  ability	  to	  attract	  traffic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Italics	  added.	  
41	  David	  Harvey	  seems	  to	  have	  come	  up	  with	  the	  term	  “neoliberal	  turn”	  in	  his	  book	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  
Neoliberalism	  (2005).	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at	  prices	  related	  to	  costs,	  is	  what	  is	  sought”	  (ibid.:	  32-­‐33,	  39-­‐40).	  Essentially,	  they	  
had	  reframed	  the	  problem	  so	  that	  government	  was	  not	  only	  the	  victim	  of	  
unprofitable	  railway	  service,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  
Adherents	  of	  neoliberal	  theory	  have	  advanced	  two	  main	  solutions	  to	  the	  
“railway	  problem.”	  First,	  they	  have	  suggested	  replacing	  uneconomic	  railways	  with	  a	  
derestricted	  roadways	  sector	  (ibid.:	  121).42	  For	  decades,	  IDIs	  have	  repeatedly	  
assumed	  that	  roads	  could	  substitute	  for	  railways	  –	  if	  not	  perfectly,	  at	  least	  very	  
well.43	  LDCs	  have	  generally	  added	  thousands	  of	  kilometers	  of	  roads	  to	  their	  
infrastructure,	  which	  makes	  motor	  vehicle	  travel	  more	  attractive.	  In	  many	  cases,	  
new	  roadways	  paralleled	  existing	  railways,	  which	  made	  them	  direct	  competitors	  
(Griffiths	  1995:	  186).	  Derestricting	  the	  trucking	  industry	  while	  not	  adequately	  
taxing	  it	  or	  policing	  overloading—thereby	  giving	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  to	  
transporting	  goods	  by	  road—accelerated	  railways’	  decline	  (Hilling	  1996:	  110;	  cf.	  
Gwilliam	  2011:	  105-­‐106).	  The	  push	  to	  liberalize	  LDCs’	  economies	  and	  privatize	  
parastatal	  organizations	  led	  to	  the	  closure	  of	  branch	  lines	  and	  even	  some	  main	  trunk	  
lines	  (Simon	  1996:	  17).	  	  
The	  second	  and	  generally	  more	  palatable	  strategy	  pushed	  by	  proponents	  of	  a	  
market-­‐oriented	  approach	  has	  aimed	  to	  privatize	  railways,	  which	  many	  national	  
governments	  have	  consented	  (or	  relented)	  to	  do	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Bullock	  and	  
Gwilliam	  2010:	  229).	  This	  has	  most	  often	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  concessioning,	  where	  
the	  state	  retains	  ownership	  of	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  and	  fixed	  infrastructure	  while	  
private	  operators	  accept	  ownership	  of	  the	  rolling	  stock	  and	  operations.	  
Concessionaires	  can	  then	  reduce	  the	  railway’s	  labor	  force,	  which	  experts	  usually	  
label	  as	  overly	  large	  or	  overpaid	  (World	  Bank	  1983:	  18-­‐19;	  Rebelo	  1992:	  3;	  
Gwilliam	  2011:	  115-­‐118).	  Advocates	  also	  aim	  to	  introduce	  private	  financing.	  The	  
argument	  that	  private	  operators	  can	  reduce	  operating	  expenses	  and	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  The	  Bank	  pushed	  a	  substitution	  approach	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  railway’s	  closure	  but	  
left	  many	  areas	  with	  no	  railway	  and	  no	  roads.	  
43	  While	  IDI	  staff	  have	  always	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  roads,	  including	  to	  complement	  railways,	  
IDIs	  increasingly	  came	  to	  view	  roads	  as	  near	  perfect	  substitutes	  for	  railways.	  The	  discussion	  about	  
the	  FCE	  below	  will	  show	  this	  attitude.	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effectively	  compete	  with	  other	  modes	  is	  true	  to	  a	  point.	  More	  sophisticated	  
marketing	  could	  increase	  revenue	  while	  privatization	  agreements	  could	  permit	  the	  
cutting	  of	  both	  unprofitable	  service	  as	  well	  as	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  railway’s	  labor	  
force	  (Rebelo	  1992:	  4,	  14;	  Galenson	  and	  Thompson	  1994:	  29-­‐30).	  Private	  
companies,	  particularly	  when	  backed	  IDIs,	  have	  more	  freedom	  to	  make	  such	  
economically	  “rational”	  decisions	  that	  are	  often	  politically	  unpopular.	  Another	  goal	  
of	  privatizing	  a	  railway	  is	  to	  remove	  political	  influences	  from	  “rational”	  forms	  of	  
decision-­‐making.	  Traditionally,	  concession	  deals	  have	  allowed	  private	  operators	  to	  
be	  insulated	  from	  pressures	  felt	  by	  public	  railways.	  Unsurprisingly,	  IDI	  pressure	  has	  
led	  the	  majority	  of	  African	  countries	  to	  pursue	  privatization	  of	  their	  railways	  
(Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam:	  2010:	  238).	  	  
Whether	  or	  not	  privatization	  delivers	  on	  its	  promises	  is	  open	  to	  debate.	  Although	  
neoliberal	  proponents	  claim	  that	  eliminating	  public	  subsidies	  for	  a	  railway	  will	  have	  
a	  net-­‐positive	  effect	  on	  the	  larger	  economic	  picture	  of	  the	  country,	  these	  gains	  could	  
be	  offset	  by	  costs	  in	  other	  areas	  such	  as	  healthcare,	  public	  safety,	  and	  the	  
environment	  (Béranger	  2006;	  Kolozsvari	  2012a).	  Even	  supporters	  of	  railway	  
concessions	  admit	  that	  privatization	  efforts	  have	  met	  with	  mixed	  results	  based	  on	  
their	  IDI	  standards	  (Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam	  2010:	  229-­‐230).	  Evaluations	  show	  that	  
privatized	  railways	  only	  show	  a	  significant	  difference	  from	  their	  government-­‐
operated	  lines	  in	  terms	  of	  rolling	  stock	  availability	  and	  productivity	  (Vagliasindi	  and	  
Nellis	  2010:	  113).	  Although	  privatized	  lines	  may	  be	  more	  reliable,	  these	  gains	  may	  
be	  linked	  to	  renewal	  investment	  packages	  offered	  by	  IDIs	  and	  governments	  in	  
tendering	  the	  offer	  (Gwilliam	  2011:	  112).	  In	  fact,	  Gwilliam	  (2011)	  notes	  that	  railway	  
traffic	  performance	  was	  “determined	  more	  by	  supply	  factors	  than	  by	  underlying	  
demand”	  (ibid.:	  95).	  
Despite	  their	  failure	  to	  prove	  that	  their	  approach	  alone	  results	  in	  overall	  reduced	  
costs	  to	  society	  and	  improved	  performance	  that	  is	  sustainable,	  proponents	  of	  a	  
market-­‐oriented	  approach	  often	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  other	  important	  factors	  
that	  make	  operating	  a	  railway	  worthwhile.	  Supporters	  of	  lines	  can	  present	  
arguments	  that	  open	  up	  the	  rationale	  for	  operating	  a	  railway	  from	  one	  focused	  on	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just	  EIRR	  to	  one	  that	  considers	  a	  broader	  picture.	  The	  next	  section	  presents	  the	  case	  
of	  Madagascar’s	  FCE,	  which	  is	  illustrative	  of	  how	  colonial	  SSA	  railways	  have	  
experienced	  the	  gamut	  of	  rationalities	  affecting	  them.	  It	  also	  shows	  how	  supporters	  
have	  successfully	  challenged	  a	  narrow	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  purportedly	  rational	  in	  
terms	  of	  transportation	  investment.	  In	  addition,	  it	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  IDI	  can	  be	  
amenable	  to	  these	  other	  actors’	  points	  of	  view	  when	  presented	  with	  them.	  
	  
V. Madagascar’s	  FCE:	  Shifting	  Rationalities	  
The	  FCE	  epitomizes	  much	  about	  colonial	  railways.	  As	  with	  other	  populations	  
forced	  to	  build	  colonial	  railways	  elsewhere	  in	  SSA,	  the	  Malagasy	  suffered	  and	  died	  in	  
great	  numbers	  building	  this	  line	  (Wiersema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  27;	  cf.	  Kolozsvari	  2012b).	  In	  
justifying	  the	  line’s	  construction,	  one	  colonial	  official	  affirmed	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  
“rational”	  investment	  because	  it	  would	  “unlock”	  the	  rich	  agricultural	  area	  it	  would	  
traverse	  (Roques	  1900:	  21-­‐22).	  Built	  at	  great	  financial	  expense	  to	  the	  French	  
(Frémigacci	  2006:	  179),	  the	  FCE	  never	  lived	  up	  to	  the	  lofty	  projections	  with	  even	  
some	  colonial	  officials	  acknowledging	  shortly	  after	  its	  opening	  that	  the	  line	  would	  
probably	  remain	  unprofitable	  for	  some	  time	  (Pruvost	  1938:	  17).	  Still,	  the	  French	  
continued	  to	  subsidize	  it	  and	  other	  railways	  that	  they	  considered	  a	  “public	  service”	  
(Thomas	  1937:	  16).	  Of	  course,	  the	  public	  service	  aspects	  from	  a	  colonial	  perspective	  
included	  supporting	  colonial	  plantations	  along	  the	  line	  and	  facilitating	  the	  
importation	  of	  French-­‐made	  goods	  (Lackard	  undated:	  1),	  and	  lastly	  providing	  public	  
transportation	  to	  the	  Malagasy	  population.	  	  
It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  after	  the	  French	  pulled	  up	  their	  colonial	  stakes	  with	  
Madagascar’s	  independence	  in	  1960	  that	  the	  viability	  and	  utility	  of	  the	  FCE	  came	  
under	  increasing	  scrutiny.	  Declining	  revenues	  coincided	  with	  IDI	  evaluations	  
recommending	  that	  other	  African	  countries	  close	  their	  railways	  (Richards	  1996:	  42;	  
Heggie	  1988:	  Annex	  C).	  A	  study	  written	  after	  independence	  by	  Sorca-­‐Beceka	  
consultancy	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  (UNDP)	  states	  that	  
replacing	  the	  FCE	  with	  a	  roadway	  would	  be	  preferable	  from	  the	  “user’s	  stand-­‐point”	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(Sorca-­‐Beceka	  1966:	  163).	  The	  study	  also	  notes	  that	  from	  the	  railway	  network’s	  
perspective,	  operating	  the	  stand-­‐alone	  FCE	  “hardly	  pays”	  (ibid.).	  The	  study	  
concludes,	  however,	  “reckoning	  with	  its	  public	  utility	  aspect,	  it	  would	  thus	  be	  
unwise	  to	  discontinue	  its	  operation,	  more	  especially	  as,	  from	  the	  view-­‐point	  of	  
general	  economy,	  replacing	  the	  railway	  with	  a	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Manakara	  road	  link	  
would	  cost	  the	  public	  more	  money”	  (ibid.).	  The	  public	  utility	  rationale	  initially	  
spared	  the	  railway	  from	  closure,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  solve	  the	  issue	  of	  this	  
line’s	  poor	  financial	  performance	  and	  its	  dependence	  on	  subsidies	  for	  maintenance	  
and	  renewal.	  	  
Like	  many	  SSA	  countries,	  Madagascar	  faced	  a	  severe	  economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  
1970s	  that	  limited	  its	  ability	  to	  maintain	  its	  transportation	  infrastructure	  (Pryor	  
2001:	  197,	  265).	  The	  problems	  facing	  the	  Malagasy	  railways,	  known	  as	  the	  Réseau	  
National	  des	  Chemins	  de	  Fer	  Malagasy	  (RNCFM),	  and	  the	  FCE	  in	  particular,	  
continued	  to	  draw	  the	  attention	  of	  IDIs.	  Yet	  the	  problem	  began	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  
one	  where	  government	  ownership	  and	  operation	  resulted	  in	  the	  irrational	  provision	  
of	  transportation	  service.	  In	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  perceived	  problem,	  the	  Bank	  
launched	  its	  First	  Railway	  Project	  in	  1974,	  which	  focused	  on	  replacing	  rolling	  stock,	  
but	  which	  also	  funded	  a	  “railway	  modernization	  and	  rationalization	  study”	  to	  guide	  
future	  major	  railway	  investments	  in	  Madagascar	  (World	  Bank	  1974:	  1).	  	  
Bank	  staff	  working	  on	  this	  project	  repeatedly	  recommended	  closing	  the	  FCE	  so	  
as	  to	  increase	  the	  overall	  profitability	  of	  the	  RNCFM.	  Although	  the	  FCE’s	  passenger	  
traffic	  increased	  from	  334,000	  passengers	  to	  787,000	  passengers	  from	  1967	  to	  
1975,	  its	  freight	  traffic	  decreased	  from	  51,500	  tons	  to	  43,000	  tons	  during	  the	  same	  
period	  (Cheryn	  and	  Vick	  1978:	  5).	  While	  many	  transit	  agencies	  would	  proudly	  tout	  
doubling	  their	  ridership	  in	  less	  than	  a	  decade,	  revenue-­‐generating	  freight	  activity	  
was	  the	  only	  measure	  that	  mattered	  to	  many	  at	  the	  Bank.44	  One	  Bank	  staff	  member	  
wrote	  that	  the	  FCE	  “is	  clearly	  uneconomic.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  any	  future	  for	  this	  line.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  This	  view	  is	  exemplified	  in	  a	  consultant’s	  report	  that	  states	  passenger	  service	  would	  be	  a	  “burden”	  
to	  the	  Malagasy	  railways	  (SOFERAIL	  1977:	  22-­‐23).	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Investments	  in	  infrastructure	  (such	  as	  ballast,	  sleepers,	  etc…)	  are	  hardly	  justified	  
here.	  Probably	  this	  line	  should	  be	  abandoned	  and	  the	  right	  of	  way	  used	  for	  a	  road	  if	  
necessary”	  (Nanjundiah	  1977:	  1).45	  Recognizing	  the	  highly	  political	  nature	  of	  
transportation	  decision	  making	  in	  Madagascar	  and	  specifically	  for	  a	  line	  closure,	  the	  
project	  deferred	  any	  recommendation	  on	  the	  FCE’s	  future	  until	  after	  the	  completion	  
of	  a	  study	  evaluating	  the	  line’s	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  (Roulet	  1978a:	  2).	  	  
Like	  Sorca-­‐Beceka,	  CANAC	  consultancy	  labeled	  the	  FCE	  as	  uneconomical	  and	  
concluded	  the	  line	  was	  unlikely	  to	  recover	  its	  “full	  cost”	  from	  users	  (Capoluongo	  et	  
al.	  1985:	  10).	  Their	  study	  identified	  two	  possible	  alternatives:	  1)	  subsidizing	  FCE	  
service	  or	  2)	  closing	  the	  line	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  road	  –	  with	  the	  latter	  being	  the	  
“more	  economical	  long-­‐term	  solution”	  (Pouliquen	  1985:	  12;	  Graves	  1985:	  7).	  Yet	  
this	  study	  also	  acknowledged	  the	  FCE’s	  public	  service	  aspect	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  
railway	  must	  remain	  operational	  in	  the	  short	  term	  until	  adequate	  road	  service	  could	  
be	  provided	  (Pouliquen	  1985:	  12).	  Moreover,	  replacing	  the	  FCE	  with	  a	  road	  was	  not	  
a	  perfect	  solution.	  Bank	  staff	  recognized	  the	  primary	  national	  roadway	  connecting	  
the	  high	  plateau	  with	  Manakara	  needed	  rehabilitation,	  was	  100	  km	  longer	  and	  did	  
not	  exactly	  parallel	  the	  railway	  (ibid.).	  	  
Even	  with	  doubts	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  replacement	  road,	  the	  Bank	  
continued	  their	  push	  to	  have	  the	  Government	  of	  Madagascar	  (GOM)	  “rationalize”	  the	  
Malagasy	  railways.	  The	  Bank	  had	  been	  assisting	  with	  the	  “evolution	  of	  the	  RNCFM	  
towards	  a	  commercially	  oriented	  institution”	  by	  pushing	  for	  a	  structural	  reform	  
changing	  the	  RNCFM	  from	  a	  government	  department	  to	  a	  “Public	  Industrial	  and	  
Commercial	  enterprise”	  (Brown	  1985a:	  1;	  Alston	  1984b:	  4).	  The	  goal	  of	  profitability	  
became	  so	  strong	  that	  the	  Bank	  repeatedly	  pushed	  RNCFM	  to	  increase	  their	  railway	  
tariffs	  despite	  government	  resistance	  (Crochet	  et	  al.	  1981:	  3;	  World	  Bank	  1979:	  13;	  
Roulet	  1978b:	  1).	  Implementing	  additional	  tariffs	  in	  1982	  became	  a	  key	  part	  of	  
lifting	  a	  suspension	  on	  Bank-­‐backed	  railway	  financing	  (Gyamfi	  1982:	  1).	  Only	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Underline	  in	  original.	  Anyone	  who	  has	  actually	  seen	  the	  FCE,	  though,	  would	  quickly	  realize	  that	  the	  
tunnels	  are	  too	  small	  to	  permit	  large	  trucks	  to	  pass	  safely	  and	  would	  therefore	  limit	  the	  utility	  of	  any	  
such	  replacement	  road	  for	  existing	  users.	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retrospect	  did	  Bank	  staff	  admit	  a	  “misjudgment	  when	  it	  let	  the	  Government	  
implement	  unduly	  high	  tariff	  increases	  in	  1982-­‐83.	  Tariffs	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1984	  may	  
actually	  have	  been	  so	  high	  that	  some	  customers	  switched	  from	  rail	  to	  road	  
transport”	  (World	  Bank	  1987:	  23).46	  Ironically,	  Bank	  staff	  also	  admitted	  that	  it	  had	  
failed	  to	  meet	  its	  “institutional	  objectives	  (financial	  responsibility)…	  [and	  this]	  
raises	  a	  basic	  question	  over	  the	  adaptability	  of	  the	  proposed	  measures	  to	  the	  local	  
environment;	  the	  Bank	  tried,	  in	  fact	  to	  impose	  a	  concept	  of	  a	  commercially	  oriented	  
enterprise	  in	  a	  sector	  usually	  regarded	  as	  public	  service	  in	  African	  and	  European	  
countries”	  (World	  Bank	  1981:	  25-­‐26).	  
Rather	  than	  concede	  that	  their	  policy	  objectives	  were	  flawed,	  the	  Bank	  viewed	  
the	  Malagasy	  as	  needing	  more	  time	  to	  implement	  the	  desired	  reforms.	  The	  Bank	  
noted	  that	  the	  CANAC	  study	  could	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  “test	  issue”	  for	  the	  commitment	  of	  
the	  GOM	  to	  these	  structural	  reforms	  (Alston	  1984b:	  4).	  Internal	  discussions	  focused	  
on	  how	  the	  Bank	  would	  persuade	  the	  GOM	  to	  create	  “an	  action	  plan	  for	  the	  FCE”	  
based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  CANAC	  study	  by	  making	  it	  a	  condition	  of	  bringing	  a	  new	  
loan	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  board	  of	  directors	  (Brown	  1985b:	  14).	  That	  action	  plan	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  “satisfactory”	  to	  Bank	  staff	  who	  reiterated	  in	  the	  same	  sentence	  that	  the	  
FCE	  was	  “uneconomic	  and	  should	  be	  closed”	  (Alston	  1985:	  1).	  So	  even	  though	  the	  
study	  had	  not	  been	  completed	  and	  vetted	  by	  the	  GOM,	  the	  Bank’s	  preferred	  course	  
of	  action	  had	  already	  been	  determined,	  as	  had	  the	  coercive	  tools	  they’d	  use	  to	  
realize	  it.	  
According	  to	  members	  of	  the	  GOM	  delegation	  sent	  to	  Washington	  D.C.,	  the	  FCE’s	  
closure	  was	  a	  sticking	  point	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Bank	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  2,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  24	  Jun	  2008;	  SSI	  with	  Informant	  11,	  Antananarivo,	  18	  Jul	  2008).	  A	  
former	  Malagasy	  official	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  discussion	  stated	  that	  the	  
discussions	  with	  Bank	  staff	  became	  quite	  heated	  –	  particularly	  when	  the	  Bank	  
recommended	  closing	  the	  FCE	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  11,	  Antananarivo,	  18	  Jul	  2008).	  
From	  the	  GOM’s	  perspective,	  closing	  the	  FCE	  was	  unrealistic	  because	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Italics	  added.	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Fianarantsoa	  province	  completely	  encompassed	  the	  line,	  and	  its	  elimination	  would	  
cut	  the	  only	  existing	  all-­‐weather	  regional	  transport	  link	  connecting	  Fianarantsoa	  
with	  the	  Port	  of	  Manakara.	  Moreover,	  the	  cash-­‐poor	  population	  living	  along	  the	  FCE	  
had	  few	  affordable	  transportation	  options.	  The	  implications	  of	  appearing	  to	  target	  
and	  perhaps	  further	  impoverish	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  provinces	  in	  the	  country,	  that	  
happened	  to	  contain	  the	  large	  city	  of	  Fianarantsoa,	  made	  the	  proposed	  closure	  
politically	  untenable.47	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  a	  series	  of	  negotiations,	  though,	  both	  sides	  agreed	  the	  GOM	  would	  
submit	  an	  action	  plan	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  FCE.	  This	  secured	  the	  Bank’s	  agreement	  to	  
give	  the	  FCE	  time	  to	  reduce	  its	  deficits	  and	  become	  profitable	  (Elmendorf	  1986:	  1).	  
The	  Bank	  stated	  that	  road-­‐based	  alternatives	  to	  the	  FCE	  would	  be	  investigated	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  action	  plan	  and	  that	  in	  the	  meanwhile,	  the	  GOM	  could	  only	  conduct	  basic	  
maintenance	  and	  must	  also	  reimburse	  the	  RNCFM	  for	  operating	  losses	  (Brown	  
1985a:	  2).	  While	  the	  FCE	  did	  not	  return	  to	  profitability	  by	  1987,	  they	  had	  reduced	  
its	  deficit	  to	  a	  quarter	  of	  its	  1985	  level	  and	  all	  its	  performance	  indicators	  had	  
increased	  (RNCFM	  1987:	  8).	  By	  1989,	  the	  FCE’s	  annual	  deficit	  had	  dropped	  to	  just	  
$65,000	  from	  a	  loss	  of	  $405,000	  in	  1984	  (Bostom	  1990;	  Wiehen	  1986:	  2).	  This	  was	  
in	  part	  due	  to	  tariff	  increases,	  as	  well	  as	  increases	  in	  passenger	  and	  freight	  traffic	  
that	  a	  more	  reliable	  railway	  spurred.	  Yet	  as	  Bank	  staff	  surmised,	  the	  achievement	  of	  
reducing	  the	  deficit	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  by	  “under-­‐maintaining	  infrastructure	  
and	  equipment	  and	  that	  this	  situation	  could	  not	  persist	  into	  the	  mid-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term”	  
(World	  Bank	  1990:	  5).	  
The	  1990s,	  indeed,	  saw	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  hard-­‐won	  gains.	  The	  railway	  lost	  
revenue	  both	  from	  a	  nationwide	  strike	  in	  1991	  and	  increased	  road	  competition	  
(Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  29;	  Tiersonnier	  2004:	  54-­‐57).	  A	  cyclone	  in	  1994	  not	  only	  
damaged	  the	  railway,	  but	  also	  strengthened	  the	  trucking	  industry’s	  grip	  on	  regional	  
fuel	  shipments	  arriving	  at	  the	  port	  of	  Manakara	  even	  the	  FCE’s	  ability	  to	  transport	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Such	  a	  decision	  may	  have	  ethnic	  tensions	  at	  its	  roots.	  The	  Fianarantsoa	  area	  is	  home	  primarily	  to	  
the	  historically	  repressed	  Betsileo	  and	  Tanala	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  railroad	  may	  be	  
viewed	  by	  some	  as	  another	  slight	  by	  the	  dominant	  Merina	  ethnic	  group.	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fuel	  for	  less	  (Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  29).	  Another	  major	  blow	  to	  the	  line’s	  reliability	  
and	  service	  came	  in	  1995	  with	  the	  derailment	  and	  loss	  of	  one	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  three	  
locomotives	  (Rakotoarison	  1998:	  29).	  The	  precipitous	  decline	  in	  the	  FCE’s	  ridership	  
and	  merchandise	  traffic	  over	  this	  decade,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1,	  was	  both	  a	  cause	  
and	  symptom	  of	  the	  railway’s	  continuing	  problems.48	  According	  to	  one	  observer,	  
“the	  trains	  were	  basically	  falling	  apart	  on	  the	  tracks	  and	  the	  tracks	  themselves	  were	  
falling	  apart”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  12,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Nov	  2008).	  	  
	  
Figure	  9	  FCE	  Passenger	  and	  Merchandise	  Traffic	  (1990	  to	  2007)	  
Even	  though	  the	  FCE	  suffered	  from	  cash	  flow	  problems	  and	  major	  neglect	  of	  its	  
infrastructure,	  its	  worth	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed.	  The	  USAID-­‐funded	  program	  
Commercial	  Agricultural	  Promotion’s	  (CAP)	  primary	  mission	  of	  supporting	  the	  
development	  of	  agribusiness	  in	  the	  Fianarantsoa	  region	  included	  a	  high-­‐profile	  rural	  
infrastructure	  rehabilitation	  project	  that	  aimed	  to	  lower	  transportation	  costs	  in	  
order	  to	  promote	  agricultural	  commodities	  (CAP	  1998:	  3).	  The	  FCE	  director	  
approached	  CAP’s	  staff	  with	  a	  request	  for	  support,	  making	  the	  case	  that	  the	  railway	  
essentially	  served	  the	  same	  function	  as	  roads	  for	  the	  isolated	  villages	  along	  its	  
length	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  12,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Nov	  2008).	  Even	  studying	  the	  
line,	  though,	  was	  a	  professional	  risk	  because	  it	  had	  been	  studied	  so	  much	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  FCE	  Director	  Medard	  Rakotozafy	  provided	  the	  ridership	  statistics.	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Bank	  and	  its	  consultants	  for	  the	  previous	  decade	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  36,	  Phone	  
interview,	  19	  Jun	  2011).	  
Still,	  CAP	  staff	  agreed	  to	  consider	  the	  request	  after	  visiting	  the	  line	  and	  
commissioned	  an	  economist	  to	  visit	  the	  FCE	  and	  write	  a	  report	  on	  its	  importance	  
and	  viability.	  The	  study,	  which	  also	  used	  hard	  numbers,	  affirmed	  that	  the	  FCE	  
enabled	  local	  farmers	  to	  export	  their	  agricultural	  goods	  and	  obtain	  essential	  
household	  goods	  for	  less	  than	  if	  shipped	  by	  road	  (see	  Table	  1).	  The	  report	  warned	  
against	  looking	  at	  just	  short-­‐term	  profitability	  and	  encouraged	  adopting	  a	  more	  
global	  perspective	  that	  recognized	  the	  FCE’s	  synergistic	  and	  external	  benefits	  
(Godeau	  1996:	  27).	  It	  recommended	  an	  “aggressive	  intermediate	  strategy	  to	  give	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  those	  most	  committed	  to	  the	  railroad’s	  future	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  
capacity	  to	  succeed”	  (CAP	  1997:	  1).	  This	  recommendation	  contrasted	  sharply	  with	  
previous	  studies	  calling	  for	  its	  eventual	  closure	  and	  became	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  CAP	  
included	  the	  FCE	  in	  its	  rural	  infrastructure	  program	  (CAP	  1999:	  5).	  CAP	  provided	  
equipment	  and	  management	  training,	  which	  in	  turn	  helped	  reduce	  the	  FCE’s	  
operating	  costs.	  CAP	  also	  worked	  with	  other	  organizations	  to	  leverage	  funding	  –	  
ultimately	  channeling	  roughly	  $2.9	  million	  in	  donated	  railway	  equipment	  to	  the	  FCE	  
as	  well	  as	  funding	  for	  its	  staff	  (Freudenberger	  2000:	  3).	  This	  infusion	  of	  capital	  kept	  
the	  railway	  alive	  in	  the	  face	  of	  imminent	  closure	  while	  supporters	  worked	  on	  a	  
strategy	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  line.	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Table	  1	  Comparison	  of	  transport	  costs	  in	  FCE	  corridor	  
	  
Despite	  CAP	  breathing	  some	  new	  life	  into	  the	  line,	  a	  pair	  of	  cyclones	  struck	  the	  
island	  in	  2000	  that	  severely	  damaged	  the	  FCE.	  A	  combination	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  
functioning	  drainage	  systems	  (i.e.,	  culverts)	  and	  farmers	  practicing	  tavy	  (slash-­‐and-­‐
burn	  agriculture)	  too	  close	  to	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  contributed	  to	  the	  soil	  instability	  
around	  the	  FCE’s	  tracks	  that	  led	  to	  four	  major	  washouts	  and	  280	  landslides	  that	  
dumped	  approximately	  150,000	  cubic	  meters	  of	  soil	  on	  the	  tracks	  (Freudenberger	  
and	  Freudenberger	  2002:	  189).	  An	  investigative	  team	  set	  out	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  
storms	  and	  found	  that	  the	  closure	  had	  immediate	  and	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  
population	  who	  depended	  upon	  the	  railway.	  The	  prices	  of	  products	  of	  primary	  
necessity	  (PPN)	  that	  reached	  midline	  stations	  by	  train	  (e.g.,	  salt,	  kerosene	  and	  rice)	  
went	  up	  drastically.	  For	  example,	  the	  price	  of	  rice	  in	  village	  shops	  increased	  
overnight	  by	  30	  to	  50	  percent	  (ibid.).	  Still	  worse,	  the	  price	  increases	  occurred	  as	  
these	  villages	  lost	  their	  primary	  means	  of	  transporting	  agricultural	  goods	  that	  
brought	  revenue	  to	  these	  communities	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  6,	  Manampatrana,	  12	  
June	  2008).	  At	  one	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  highland	  stations,	  the	  team	  “found	  54	  tons	  of	  rotting	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bananas	  waiting	  for	  a	  train	  that	  never	  came”	  (Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  
2002:	  189).	  In	  addition,	  the	  always-­‐serious	  issues	  of	  contaminated	  water	  and	  
disease	  in	  these	  remote	  villages	  became	  a	  graver	  threat	  with	  no	  means	  to	  evacuate	  
the	  seriously	  ill	  to	  Fianarantsoa	  for	  the	  two	  months	  that	  train	  service	  was	  
suspended.49	  	  
Coincidentally,	  the	  cyclones	  hit	  just	  as	  a	  study	  called	  Projet	  d’Appui	  à	  la	  Gestion	  
de	  l’Environnement	  (PAGE)	  began	  examining	  broader	  environmental	  policy	  in	  the	  
province’s	  forest	  corridor	  –	  home	  to	  a	  tropical	  forest	  that	  holds	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
unique	  biodiversity	  in	  the	  world	  and	  which	  the	  FCE	  traversed	  (Freudenberger	  2003:	  
141).50	  The	  PAGE	  study	  ultimately	  concluded	  that	  without	  regular	  train	  service,	  
farmers	  would	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  switch	  from	  producing	  tree-­‐based	  cash	  crops	  
to	  a	  self-­‐sufficiency	  lifestyle	  based	  on	  tavy	  aimed	  at	  growing	  rice	  and	  manioc	  for	  
their	  own	  consumption	  (Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  2002:	  189-­‐190).	  In	  
addition	  to	  preventing	  serious	  food-­‐insecurity	  in	  these	  communities,	  the	  study	  
estimated	  that	  95,000	  hectares	  of	  deforestation	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	  keeping	  the	  
FCE	  running	  (ibid.:	  190).	  This	  savings	  stemmed	  from	  the	  FCE’s	  ability	  to	  concentrate	  
transportation	  use	  and	  natural	  resource	  exploitation	  more	  than	  if	  the	  rural	  
population	  relied	  on	  a	  more	  dispersed	  road	  network	  (Freudenberger	  2003:	  141).	  
FCE	  proponents	  used	  this	  study	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  avert	  environmental	  
and	  social	  devastation	  was	  to	  keep	  infrastructure	  that	  already	  existed.	  
Conveying	  the	  FCE’s	  importance	  to	  external	  actors,	  particularly	  the	  Bank,	  
required	  more	  than	  just	  qualitative	  claims	  of	  avoided	  deforestation	  and	  improved	  
livelihood.	  Expatriate	  development	  staff	  recognized	  they	  needed	  to	  articulate	  the	  
railway’s	  importance	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  other	  IDIs.	  These	  FCE	  
supporters	  began	  an	  effort	  to	  sell	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  benefits	  to	  the	  Bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Although	  statistics	  on	  emergency	  medical	  evacuations	  are	  not	  kept,	  FCE	  director	  Medard	  
Rakotozafy	  notes	  that	  two	  such	  cases	  occurred	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2008.	  	  
50	  Given	  the	  political	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  and	  forest-­‐related	  environmental	  issues,	  the	  PAGE	  
study	  was	  commissioned	  to	  provide	  an	  impartial	  evaluation	  of	  the	  questions	  being	  raised.	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in	  their	  language	  (i.e.,	  using	  economic	  and	  quantitative	  analyses).51	  These	  actors	  
ensured	  the	  PAGE	  study	  included	  a	  CBA	  that	  included	  the	  traditional	  metrics	  
consistent	  with	  Bank	  methodologies,	  but	  that	  it	  also	  looked	  at	  how	  the	  natural	  
environment,	  local	  market	  and	  individual	  producers	  would	  be	  affected	  under	  both	  
normal	  operations	  and	  a	  “no-­‐train”	  scenario.	  For	  example,	  placing	  a	  monetary	  value	  
on	  every	  hectare	  of	  avoided	  deforestation	  brought	  in	  a	  variable	  often	  not	  considered	  
and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  Bank	  staff	  to	  ignore.	  The	  PAGE	  study	  
concluded	  that	  the	  FCE’s	  EIRR	  was	  between	  15	  and	  16%	  (Freudenberger	  et	  al.	  2000:	  
12,	  14).	  This	  rate	  slightly	  exceeded	  the	  Bank’s	  minimum	  investment	  threshold	  and	  
made	  the	  FCE	  a	  viable	  project	  that	  supporters	  could	  defend	  in	  meetings	  with	  IDI	  
experts,	  their	  colleagues	  and	  their	  superiors.	  	  
The	  “environmental	  argument,”	  with	  its	  food	  security	  implications	  and	  the	  hard	  
statistics	  to	  support	  it,	  clearly	  grabbed	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Bank	  more	  than	  a	  
straightforward	  poverty	  alleviation	  argument.	  The	  institutional	  environment	  of	  the	  
Bank	  in	  the	  1980s,	  when	  it	  had	  originally	  tried	  to	  close	  the	  FCE,	  was	  markedly	  
different.	  	  In	  fact,	  campaigns	  mounted	  by	  civil	  society	  organizations	  (CSOs)	  and	  
other	  nongovernmental	  actors	  since	  the	  1980s	  successfully	  pressured	  the	  Bank	  to	  
consider	  the	  adverse	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts	  caused	  by	  their	  operations	  
(Fox	  and	  Brown	  1998:	  2;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998;	  Ebrahim	  and	  Herz	  2007:	  9-­‐10).52	  
So	  while	  the	  EIRR	  for	  the	  FCE	  was	  lower	  than	  some	  potential	  Malagasy	  projects,	  the	  
external	  benefits	  notably	  softened	  the	  Bank’s	  previous	  stance	  of	  insisting	  on	  the	  
line’s	  closure.	  Bank	  staff	  even	  noted,	  “the	  economic	  rationale	  for	  a	  minimum	  
investment	  program	  will	  have	  to	  be	  built	  upon	  the	  substantial	  positive	  externalities	  
in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  preservation”	  (World	  Bank	  2000:	  19).	  
The	  PAGE	  study	  gave	  railway	  supporters	  a	  key	  tool	  with	  which	  to	  directly	  argue	  
against	  closing	  the	  railway,	  but	  it	  also	  became	  a	  proactive	  way	  to	  raise	  money	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Vetterlein	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  “selling	  the	  ‘social’	  to	  the	  economists”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  poverty	  
reduction	  (Vetterlein	  2012:	  53).	  
52	  The	  Bank	  was	  highly	  affected	  by	  criticism	  for	  its	  poor	  environmental	  and	  social	  record	  for	  projects	  
like	  the	  Carajas	  Iron	  Ore	  Project	  and	  the	  Western	  Amazonia	  highway	  and	  rural	  development	  program	  
known	  as POLONOROESTE	  in	  Brazil	  (see	  Redwood	  1992).	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the	  line’s	  rehabilitation.	  CAP’s	  successor	  project,	  USAID-­‐financed	  Landscape	  
Development	  Interventions	  (LDI),	  had	  been	  tasked	  with	  finding	  interventions	  that	  
protected	  the	  forest	  corridor	  that	  the	  FCE	  traversed.	  With	  the	  PAGE	  study’s	  findings	  
circulating,	  and	  the	  devastating	  economic	  and	  social	  impact	  of	  the	  two	  cyclones	  so	  
visible	  to	  regional	  actors,	  LDI	  staff	  successfully	  advocated	  to	  USAID	  to	  design	  a	  
stand-­‐alone	  FCE-­‐Rehabilitation	  project	  (FCER)	  that	  would	  also	  be	  charged	  to	  raise	  
and	  spend	  funds	  from	  donors	  for	  line	  rehabilitation.	  Staff	  from	  FCER	  took	  a	  leading	  
role	  in	  both	  conveying	  the	  FCE’s	  benefits	  to	  IDI	  staff	  and	  seeking	  to	  find	  financial	  
support	  from	  donor	  agencies	  to	  repair	  the	  line	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  attractive	  to	  
potential	  concessionaires.	  FCER	  ultimately	  helped	  channel	  approximately	  $4.7	  
million	  of	  USAID	  cyclone	  relief	  money	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  line	  as	  well	  as	  secured	  
financial	  or	  in-­‐kind	  donations	  from	  partners	  such	  as	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  
the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Swiss	  Railways	  among	  others	  (FCER	  2003:	  24).	  These	  
efforts	  resulted	  in	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  over	  a	  third	  of	  the	  line’s	  rails,	  restoration	  and	  
acquisition	  of	  rolling	  stock,	  construction	  of	  new	  drainage	  infrastructure,	  
stabilization	  of	  embankments,	  and	  rehabilitation	  of	  tunnels	  and	  bridges	  (ibid:	  11,	  
33).	  It	  also	  paid	  for	  an	  expansive	  marketing	  campaign	  that,	  enacted	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  their	  partners,	  sought	  to	  build	  support	  for	  the	  FCE	  from	  the	  grassroots	  for	  the	  
line’s	  privatization	  and	  to	  convince	  Malagasy	  farmers	  to	  better	  protect	  the	  
infrastructure	  and	  surrounding	  forest.	  
FCE	  supporters	  saw	  privatization	  as	  their	  main	  goal	  and	  only	  long-­‐term	  solution	  
available	  to	  them.	  So	  while	  modest	  bilateral	  funding	  and	  donated	  equipment	  were	  
kept	  the	  trains	  running,	  they	  also	  helped	  improve	  the	  FCE’s	  financial	  and	  technical	  
performance	  that	  would	  in	  turn	  build	  the	  case	  that	  the	  line	  was	  valuable	  enough	  to	  
privatize.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Transport,	  the	  FCE	  administration	  and	  FCE	  advocates	  took	  
steps	  to	  market	  the	  line	  to	  potential	  concessionaires	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  
passenger	  traffic	  and	  tourism.	  In	  fact,	  raising	  the	  fares	  on	  the	  first-­‐class	  passengers	  
(mainly	  tourists)	  greatly	  improved	  the	  financial	  performance	  of	  the	  line.	  The	  
increased	  reliability	  of	  the	  line	  once	  rehabilitation	  got	  underway	  in	  2000	  led	  to	  even	  
better	  performance,	  as	  seen	  in	  Table	  1.	  Between	  2000	  and	  2005,	  the	  FCE	  generated	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a	  profit	  each	  year	  (Allix	  and	  Rigaud	  2007:	  19).	  Despite	  initial	  gains,	  though,	  many	  
actors	  needed	  persuading.	  
Convincing	  IDI	  staff	  and	  other	  external	  actors	  occasionally	  required	  more	  effort	  
than	  the	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  arguments	  that	  were	  now	  circulating.	  Despite	  
the	  PAGE	  study	  findings,	  skepticism	  that	  the	  railway	  was	  worth	  preserving	  ran	  high	  
among	  experts	  at	  both	  USAID	  and	  the	  Bank	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).53	  This	  skepticism	  was	  understandable	  because	  so	  many	  
past	  studies	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  FCE	  should	  be	  closed.	  Supporters	  of	  the	  FCE	  
came	  to	  realize	  that	  people’s	  opinions	  were	  shaped	  in	  part	  by	  whether	  they	  saw	  the	  
railway	  in	  action.	  According	  to	  CAP’s	  chief	  of	  party,	  for	  example,	  the	  Bank	  consultant	  
who	  recommended	  closing	  the	  railway	  as	  part	  of	  the	  CANAC	  study	  said	  he	  had	  never	  
visited	  the	  railway	  and	  that	  he	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  do	  so	  because	  he	  had	  all	  the	  line’s	  
performance	  data	  and	  financial	  reports	  (SSI,	  Phone	  interview,	  Jun	  2011).	  One	  IDI	  
informant	  noted	  that	  the	  Bank	  suffered	  from	  an	  internal	  fight	  over	  the	  FCE	  because	  
most	  staff	  who	  saw	  the	  train	  supported	  it	  while	  those	  who	  had	  only	  read	  reports	  
held	  a	  negative	  view	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  10,	  Antananarivo,	  16	  Jul	  2008).	  
FCE	  supporters	  based	  a	  key	  intervention	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  seeing	  the	  railway	  held	  
tremendous	  opportunity	  to	  shape	  people’s	  opinions	  about	  the	  line.	  Recognizing	  the	  
problem	  of	  conveying	  the	  line’s	  importance	  to	  those	  who	  might	  need	  convincing,	  
railway	  supporters	  repeatedly	  organized	  overhead	  flights	  and	  field	  visits	  for	  IDI	  
staff,	  government	  officials	  and	  potential	  concessionaires.	  These	  visitors	  then	  rode	  
the	  FCE	  to	  see	  the	  area	  it	  traversed	  and	  met	  with	  railway	  staff	  and	  members	  of	  civil	  
society	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  protect	  the	  railway’s	  future.	  LDI’s	  regional	  
project	  manager	  noted	  that	  these	  well-­‐planned	  field	  visits	  created	  a	  “learning	  
environment	  to	  bring	  policy	  makers	  from	  Washington	  and	  [Antananarivo]	  down	  to	  
the	  field	  to	  have	  a	  safe,	  educational	  learning	  experience	  that	  would	  then	  profoundly	  
change	  their	  perspectives	  on	  the	  FCE.	  Every	  time	  we	  did	  it,	  except	  for	  one	  or	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Even	  the	  eventual	  director	  of	  the	  FCE	  rehabilitation	  project	  was	  “highly	  dubious”	  when	  initially	  
asked	  by	  USAID	  to	  evaluate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  line	  prior	  to	  FCER’s	  creation	  (SSI,	  Fianarantsoa,	  
July	  2008).	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times	  it	  worked	  very,	  very	  effectively.	  So	  that	  was	  our	  mechanism	  of	  making	  change	  
happen”	  (SSI,	  Fianarantsoa,	  July	  2008).	  	  
IDI	  staff	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  confirm	  that	  riding	  the	  FCE	  influenced	  
their	  perspective	  on	  the	  railway.	  For	  example,	  FCE	  supporters	  argued	  that	  the	  FCE	  
helped	  to	  reduce	  poverty.	  The	  FCE	  has	  consistently	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  
providing	  basic	  access	  to	  villages	  along	  the	  line,	  but	  visiting	  the	  communities	  and	  
seeing	  the	  bustling	  activity	  at	  the	  stations	  reinforced	  this	  fact	  for	  IDI	  staff	  (SSIs	  with	  
Informants	  30,	  32,	  35;	  Phone	  interviews;	  19	  Dec	  2010,	  22	  Apr	  2011,	  05	  Jun	  2011).	  
These	  IDI	  staff	  developed	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  isolated	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  these	  
rural	  communities	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  30	  and	  32,	  Phone	  interviews,	  19	  Dec	  2010	  
and	  22	  Apr	  2011).	  This	  would	  make	  seeing	  the	  act	  of	  loading	  and	  unloading	  
products	  onto	  the	  train	  more	  meaningful.	  It	  was	  also	  an	  opportunity	  to	  hear	  directly	  
from	  members	  of	  the	  community	  about	  how	  the	  FCE	  supported	  their	  livelihood	  (SSI	  
with	  Informant	  30,	  Phone	  interview,	  19	  Dec	  2010).	  	  
Seeing	  the	  line	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  conveyed	  information	  that	  photos	  or	  reports	  
never	  could.	  According	  to	  IDI	  staff,	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  environmental	  
importance	  of	  the	  FCE	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  person	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  10,	  
Antananarivo,	  16	  Jul	  2008).	  They	  mentioned	  being	  impressed	  by	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  
unique	  natural	  landscape	  surrounding	  the	  railway	  and	  the	  line’s	  dramatic	  descent	  
down	  from	  the	  high	  plateau	  to	  the	  coast	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  32	  and	  35,	  Phone	  
interviews,	  22	  Apr	  2011	  and	  05	  Jun	  2011).	  Photos	  of	  the	  dense	  forest	  could	  not	  
adequately	  capture	  its	  scope	  and	  beauty	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  In	  fact,	  seeing	  the	  railway	  
in	  person	  gave	  these	  actors	  a	  deeper	  appreciation	  for	  the	  feat	  of	  constructing	  a	  line	  
with	  such	  a	  steep	  grade	  and	  so	  many	  tunnels	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  32	  and	  35,	  
Phone	  interviews,	  22	  Apr	  2011	  and	  05	  Jun	  2011).	  Hearing	  stories	  directly	  from	  
descendents	  of	  those	  Malagasy	  men	  who	  suffered	  and	  died	  building	  the	  line	  
reinforced	  the	  appreciation	  of	  their	  toil	  and	  sacrifice.	  In	  fact,	  the	  FCE	  became	  known	  
as	  the	  ‘Heritage	  Railway’	  and	  many	  villagers	  expressed	  their	  disquiet	  about	  its	  
potential	  closure,	  which	  they	  consider	  as	  sacrilegious.	  These	  vivid	  emotions	  were	  
captured	  during	  this	  period	  by	  several	  independent	  filmmakers	  with	  one	  film	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showed	  widely	  on	  European	  television.	  One	  USAID	  assistant	  director,	  who	  visited	  
the	  line	  and	  had	  requested	  to	  have	  a	  cultural	  experience	  during	  his	  stay,	  ended	  up	  
enjoying	  the	  experience	  so	  much	  he	  walked	  away	  with	  tears	  in	  his	  eyes	  (SSI	  with	  
Informant	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).	  While	  the	  heritage	  argument	  perhaps	  
appealed	  less	  strongly	  to	  other	  IDI	  staff,	  it	  generated	  tremendous	  community	  
support	  and	  this	  was	  palpable	  for	  those	  who	  visited	  the	  line.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  support	  and	  passion	  shown	  by	  advocates	  of	  the	  railway	  also	  
influenced	  outsiders’	  view	  of	  the	  railway.	  One	  IDI	  staff	  member	  noted	  that	  the	  
commitment	  of	  FCER	  staff	  made	  a	  strong	  initial	  impression	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  30,	  
Phone	  interview,	  19	  Dec	  2010).	  Another	  IDI	  staffer	  echoed	  this	  observation	  and	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  passion	  of	  those	  handful	  of	  people	  leading	  the	  effort	  to	  
rehabilitate	  and	  privatize	  the	  line	  was	  something	  that	  made	  the	  FCE	  standout	  (SSI	  
with	  Informant	  35,	  Phone	  interview,	  05	  Jun	  2011).	  One	  expatriate	  volunteered	  
copious	  amounts	  of	  time	  securing	  donations	  of	  used	  rolling	  stock	  and	  dozens	  of	  
kilometers	  of	  rail	  and	  bolts	  from	  Swiss	  railways	  that	  also	  had	  the	  same	  narrow-­‐
gauge.	  The	  commitment	  of	  these	  actors	  might	  have	  been	  more	  noticeable	  because	  
many	  Malagasy	  people	  tend	  not	  to	  speak	  out,	  or	  as	  one	  informant	  said,	  they	  
practiced	  “rational	  risk	  taking”	  (SSI	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  
2008).54	  	  
A	  notable	  exception	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  Malagasy	  to	  avoid	  conflict	  and	  risk-­‐taking	  
was	  the	  Mayor	  of	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  President	  of	  the	  Organisme	  Public	  de	  
Coopération	  Inter-­‐communale	  (OPCI)	  during	  the	  FCE’s	  rehabilitation	  phase:	  Pety	  
Rakotoniaina.	  The	  mayor	  made	  the	  FCE	  rehabilitation	  a	  high	  political	  priority.	  
Rakotoniaina	  organized	  a	  meeting	  in	  the	  capital	  to	  rally	  support	  for	  the	  FCE	  railway.	  
This	  meeting	  occurred	  (perhaps	  not	  by	  coincidence)	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  hotel	  as	  a	  
meeting	  of	  international	  donors	  in	  the	  same	  hotel.	  It	  led	  the	  donors	  to	  be	  relegated	  
from	  the	  ball	  room	  to	  a	  smaller	  venue	  within	  the	  hotel.	  Some	  informants	  saw	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Malagasy,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  culture,	  are	  generally	  known	  to	  be	  relatively	  conflict-­‐adverse	  (SSI	  with	  
Informant	  35;	  phone	  interview;	  05	  Jun	  2011).	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meeting	  as	  a	  provocative	  move	  against	  then-­‐President	  Ravalomanana	  who	  had	  
originally	  installed	  the	  mayor	  as	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  Fianarantsoa	  province	  following	  the	  
2002	  crisis,	  but	  who	  then	  had	  a	  falling-­‐out	  after	  the	  latter	  became	  the	  mayor	  (SSI	  
with	  Informants	  7,	  8,	  25,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008	  and	  6	  Oct	  2009).	  Indeed,	  some	  
informants	  believed	  that	  the	  president	  viewed	  the	  Rakotoniaina	  as	  a	  political	  threat.	  
This	  is	  possible	  given	  that	  the	  mayor	  was	  eventually	  imprisoned	  for	  years	  on	  
corruption	  charges,	  but	  which	  many	  people	  believed	  was	  motivated	  more	  out	  of	  fear	  
that	  the	  outspoken	  mayor	  would	  eventually	  challenge	  Ravalomanana.	  Informants	  
had	  mixed	  feelings	  about	  the	  meeting	  because	  while	  they	  thought	  it	  would	  do	  little	  
except	  anger	  the	  president,	  it	  was	  an	  rare	  example	  of	  a	  Malagasy	  leader	  speaking	  up	  
for	  an	  uncertain	  cause	  (SSI	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).	  
USAID-­‐funded	  project	  personnel	  could	  take	  the	  risks	  that	  their	  Malagasy	  
counterparts	  were	  initially	  unwilling	  to	  take.	  In	  one	  example,	  FCE	  supporters	  took	  a	  
group	  of	  USAID	  staff	  on	  a	  study	  tour	  of	  the	  line	  just	  after	  the	  line	  had	  been	  reopened	  
following	  the	  2000	  cyclones.	  USAID	  representatives	  still	  were	  not	  entirely	  
convinced,	  but	  invited	  LDI’s	  regional	  team	  to	  Antananarivo	  to	  give	  a	  final	  wrap-­‐up	  
presentation	  about	  the	  FCE’s	  importance	  to	  the	  region	  and	  ecological	  corridor.	  At	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  presentation,	  USAID	  officials	  put	  LDI’s	  regional	  manager	  Mark	  
Freudenberger	  on	  the	  spot:	  	  
It	  was	  a	  round	  table	  and	  they	  said	  ‘Mark,	  would	  you	  stake	  all	  your	  money	  of	  
LDI	   on	   the	   railway?’	   and	   I	   said	   ‘yes.’	   [They	   said]	   ‘are	   you	   serious?	   You	  
would	  do	  nothing	  but	  the	  railway?’	  And	  I	  said	  we	  have	  to	  do	  that	  in	  order	  to	  
save	  the	  corridor.	  It	  was	  a	  very	  emotional	  meeting	  and	  very	  scary	  to	  go	  on	  
record	   like	   that.	   And	   that’s	   when	   they	   said	   ‘okay,	   we’re	   going	   to	   start	  
looking	  for	  pots	  of	  emergency	  monies,’	  and	  they	  came	  up	  with	  $500,000	  of	  
internal	  USAID/Madagascar	  funding	  as	  a	  stop-­‐gap	  measure	  (SSI	  with	  Mark	  
Freudenberger,	  Fianarantsoa,	  July	  2008).	  
	  
In	  a	  field	  where	  experts	  imply	  or	  even	  explicitly	  claim	  that	  decisions	  can	  be	  made	  on	  
an	  entirely	  objective	  basis,	  even	  though	  they	  cannot,	  such	  a	  bold	  declaration	  carried	  
the	  risk	  of	  making	  him	  appear	  irrationally	  attached	  to	  the	  railway.	  Yet	  the	  people	  
who	  witnessed	  such	  an	  unwavering	  determination	  to	  save	  the	  railway	  judged	  his	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statement	  credible	  and	  the	  motivation	  behind	  it	  as	  a	  vote	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  line’s	  
importance	  –	  as	  evidenced	  by	  USAID’s	  decision	  at	  that	  meeting	  to	  help	  secure	  
funding	  for	  the	  line.	  
Civil	  society	  also	  helped	  influence	  opinions	  about	  the	  FCE.	  CSOs	  can,	  for	  example,	  
raise	  public	  awareness	  and	  bring	  that	  awareness	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  IDIs	  and	  the	  
government	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  30,	  Phone	  interview,	  19	  Dec	  2010).	  Some	  of	  their	  
activities	  targeted	  local	  villagers	  to	  increase	  their	  ownership	  of	  the	  line.	  Evidence	  of	  
their	  interest	  in	  the	  railway	  also	  was	  demonstrated	  to	  IDI	  staff	  through	  discussions	  
with	  villagers	  on	  the	  field	  visits	  as	  well	  as	  materials	  demonstrating	  their	  
commitment.	  For	  example,	  farmers	  living	  along	  the	  line	  erected	  signs	  stating	  that	  
the	  railway	  was	  their	  heritage	  and	  that	  it	  needed	  protection	  (see	  Figures	  3	  and	  4).	  
IDI	  staff	  believed	  this	  dedication	  would	  help	  ensure	  the	  sustainability	  of	  investment	  
in	  the	  line	  (ibid.).	  Photos	  also	  showed	  to	  IDI	  staff	  how	  community	  members	  were	  
helping	  to	  clean	  the	  line’s	  tracks	  and	  stations	  as	  well	  as	  sow	  the	  deep-­‐rooting	  vetiver	  
plant	  (Chrysopogon	  zizanioides)	  on	  the	  hillsides	  to	  halt	  erosion	  (see	  Figures	  5	  and	  6).	  
Rehabilitation	  and	  maintenance	  conducted	  by	  community	  members	  along	  the	  line	  
demonstrated	  these	  villagers’	  commitment	  to	  the	  railway	  and	  also	  showed	  their	  
willingness	  to	  prevent	  sabotage	  and	  theft	  that	  plagued	  the	  Northern	  railway	  (SSI	  
with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  and	  Informant	  30,	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  phone	  interview,	  13	  
Jul	  2008	  and	  19	  Dec	  2010).	  
	  	   	  
	   Figure	  10	  Sign	  of	  solidarity	  next	  to	  vetiver	  plants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  11	  “The	  train	  is	  our	  heritage	  so	  save	  it”	  
Source:	  K.	  Freudenberger	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   Figure	  12	  Community	  clean-­‐up	  in	  Tolongoina	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Figure	  13	  Local	  farmers	  planting	  vetiver	  
	  
Having	  an	  engaged	  civil	  society	  willing	  to	  protect	  the	  line’s	  infrastructure	  also	  
appealed	  to	  potential	  concessionaires	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  31,	  Phone	  interview,	  15	  
Apr	  2011).	  Attracting	  potential	  bidders	  with	  this	  positive	  aspect	  and	  ensuring	  a	  
smooth	  transition	  to	  privatization	  strongly	  appealed	  to	  IDI	  staff	  seeking	  to	  privatize	  
the	  railway.	  Concession	  deals	  have	  sometimes	  been	  complicated	  by	  resistance	  from	  
public	  officials,	  government	  staff,	  railway	  employees/unions	  or	  communities.	  The	  
Bank	  saw	  how	  railway	  supporters	  were	  building	  support	  for	  the	  concession	  and	  the	  
rehabilitation	  project	  from	  communities	  and	  railway	  workers.	  The	  Bank	  even	  
programmed	  over	  $7	  million	  of	  badly	  needed	  renewal	  funds	  for	  the	  FCE	  on	  the	  
condition	  that	  it	  be	  privatized	  (FCER	  2003:	  24).	  Bolstered	  by	  this	  sign	  of	  support	  by	  
a	  potential	  adversary,	  optimism	  among	  the	  FCE’s	  supporters	  ran	  high.	  As	  one	  FCER	  
staff	  member	  noted,	  they	  were	  just	  trying	  to	  neutralize	  Bank	  opposition	  and	  “we	  
never	  dreamed	  we’d	  get	  them	  to	  come	  around	  to	  our	  side”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  7,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).	  	  
The	  FCE	  supporters	  were	  soon	  confronted	  by	  the	  unpleasant	  reality	  of	  political	  
power	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  though.	  Despite	  receiving	  a	  bid	  that	  Bank	  experts	  
deemed	  credible	  (FCER	  2005:	  3),	  then-­‐president	  of	  Madagascar	  Marc	  Ravalomanana	  
Source:	  K.	  Freudenberger	  
Source:	  J.P.	  Rajaona	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scuttled	  the	  concession,	  much	  to	  the	  dismay	  of	  those	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  line’s	  
privatization.55	  Although	  the	  GOM	  officially	  cited	  technical	  and	  financial	  reasons	  to	  
reject	  the	  bid,	  Bank	  staff	  who	  reviewed	  the	  offer	  noted	  that	  these	  points	  could	  be	  
negotiated	  (ibid.).	  Informants	  from	  IDIs	  and	  development	  project	  staff	  involved	  in	  
the	  process	  stated	  that	  having	  French	  companies	  offer	  to	  take	  over	  the	  line	  raised	  
the	  hackles	  of	  Ravalomanana	  whose	  opponent	  during	  the	  2001	  elections	  was	  closely	  
aligned	  with	  French	  interests.	  During	  the	  resulting	  2002	  political	  crisis,	  the	  FCE	  
served	  as	  a	  strategic	  corridor	  that	  helped	  essential	  goods	  and	  supplies	  from	  the	  
coast	  reach	  the	  blockaded	  capital	  and	  helped	  Ravalomanana	  win	  the	  stalemate.	  Yet	  
despite	  the	  maneuvering	  by	  those	  pushing	  for	  privatization,	  including	  having	  the	  
potential	  concessionaire	  offer	  to	  diversify	  their	  holdings	  to	  non-­‐French	  companies	  
and	  USAID	  offering	  to	  finance	  a	  second	  privatization	  attempt,	  the	  president	  declined	  
to	  move	  forward.	  This	  incensed	  FCE	  supporters	  who	  did	  not	  view	  the	  railway	  in	  this	  
way	  and	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador,	  would	  have	  
resulted	  in	  the	  expulsion	  of	  one	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  the	  president’s	  actions	  (SSIs	  with	  
Informants	  8	  and	  33,	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  phone	  interview,	  13	  Jul	  2008	  and	  26	  Apr	  
2011).	  
The	  failure	  to	  privatize	  the	  FCE	  meant	  that	  it	  never	  became	  eligible	  for	  Bank	  
funding,	  but	  it	  also	  led	  to	  a	  return	  to	  a	  strictly	  economic	  view	  of	  the	  line	  –	  a	  major	  
shift	  in	  the	  Bank’s	  policies	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  33,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Apr	  2011).	  
Bank	  staff	  viewed	  this	  act	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  the	  FCE.	  Moreover,	  this	  
seemingly	  arbitrary	  and	  capricious	  act	  by	  Ravalomanana	  clearly	  was	  consistent	  with	  
neoliberal	  advocates’	  view	  that	  government	  does	  not	  act	  in	  a	  rational	  way.	  Without	  
any	  major	  investment	  since	  2005,	  the	  FCE’s	  hard-­‐won	  gains	  have	  largely	  dissipated	  
and	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  experience	  service	  disruptions	  from	  cyclones,	  derailments,	  
and	  rolling	  stock	  breakdowns.	  The	  railway’s	  prospects	  do	  not	  look	  good.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  This	  assertion	  was	  made	  in	  multiple	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  FCE	  supporters,	  Malagasy	  
government	  officials	  and	  IDI	  staff.	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VI. Moving	  towards	  a	  Balanced	  Rationality	  
The	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  shows	  how	  certain	  dominant	  forms	  of	  rationality	  still	  impact	  
decisions	  about	  colonial	  railways.	  The	  transportation	  field	  continues	  to	  emphasize	  
the	  importance	  of	  analyses	  with	  a	  particular	  economic	  rationality	  focused	  on	  
profitability	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  performance	  measures.	  Despite	  waning	  in	  its	  
fundamentalism,	  the	  market-­‐oriented	  approach	  continues	  to	  adversely	  impact	  SSA	  
railways	  that	  provide	  many	  significant	  benefits	  extending	  beyond	  a	  narrowly	  
defined	  economic	  framework.	  	  
Yet	  as	  the	  FCE	  case	  also	  shows,	  various	  forms	  of	  rationality	  compete	  and	  coexist	  
with	  one	  another	  as	  different	  actors	  interact	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  
surrounding	  a	  railway.	  The	  rationalities	  used	  over	  time	  to	  justify	  transportation	  
investment	  have	  appealed	  mostly	  to	  colonial	  administrators,	  public	  officials	  and	  
now	  to	  IDI	  staff	  because	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  fund	  railway	  
rehabilitation	  or	  even	  simply	  block	  it.	  The	  investment	  decision-­‐making	  process	  for	  
the	  FCE,	  though,	  shows	  that	  IDIs’	  perspectives	  are	  neither	  as	  omnipotent	  nor	  
inflexible	  as	  they	  initially	  appear.	  The	  rationalities	  and	  perspectives	  of	  IDI	  staff	  can	  
be	  shifted	  by	  railway	  supporters’	  arguments	  and	  strategies.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  GOM	  
resist	  closing	  the	  FCE	  for	  more	  than	  30	  years,	  railway	  supporters	  managed	  to	  
reverse	  the	  Bank’s	  position	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  latter	  promised	  substantial	  
rehabilitation	  funding	  for	  the	  line’s	  infrastructure	  provided	  that	  the	  GOM	  privatize	  
it.	  	  
Having	  key	  advocates,	  or	  “champions,”	  is	  critical	  to	  shifting	  the	  balance	  of	  
rationality	  that	  can	  help	  preserve	  train	  service.	  Researchers	  have	  recommended	  
having	  governmental	  entities—such	  as	  a	  local	  transportation	  authority	  or	  central	  
ministry—champion	  a	  transportation	  program	  (Fouracre	  et	  al.	  2006:	  328).	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  Madagascar,	  these	  entities	  certainly	  played	  an	  important	  role	  resisting	  
earlier	  calls	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  close	  the	  FCE.	  Yet	  these	  agencies	  and	  their	  delegates	  can	  
be	  subjugated	  both	  by	  political	  pressures	  from	  within	  the	  country	  and	  also	  from	  
outside	  its	  borders.	  If	  this	  happens,	  these	  interests	  do	  not	  necessarily	  serve	  anything	  
remotely	  representing	  the	  public	  interest,	  especially	  the	  portion	  most	  dependent	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upon	  the	  railway.	  Alternatively,	  champions	  who	  have	  more	  freedom	  from	  these	  
pressures	  can	  often	  be	  found	  outside	  of	  government.	  Members	  of	  civil	  society	  could,	  
depending	  on	  their	  skills,	  fill	  this	  role.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  though,	  key	  advocates	  
stepped	  forward	  at	  critical	  junctures	  to	  help	  organize	  other	  railway	  supporters	  
(including	  civil	  society)	  and	  that	  helped	  frame	  the	  line’s	  importance	  in	  ways	  that	  
affected	  those	  people	  who	  had	  the	  power	  to	  help	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  11,	  
Antananarivo,	  18	  Jul	  2008).	  These	  champions	  tended	  to	  be	  expatriate	  development	  
experts.	  
A	  defining	  quality	  of	  these	  champions	  has	  been	  their	  ability	  to	  communicate	  
effectively	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors.	  Railway	  advocates	  who	  have	  strong	  
communication	  skills	  can	  bring	  in	  arguments	  that	  standard	  CBAs	  overlook.	  This	  
requires	  being	  able	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  language	  of	  transportation	  decision-­‐making,	  
which	  means	  being	  conversant	  in	  positivistic	  measures	  and	  utilitarian	  rationality.	  
By	  virtue	  of	  their	  status	  or	  professional	  role,	  champions	  could	  gain	  access	  to	  key	  
international	  and	  national	  actors	  and	  review	  documents	  related	  to	  the	  FCE.	  The	  
resulting	  interaction	  helped	  determine	  if	  the	  line	  was	  worth	  saving	  because	  they	  
had	  access	  to	  challenge	  assumptions,	  arguments,	  and	  statistics	  while	  simultaneously	  
offering	  their	  own.	  Their	  ability	  to	  secure	  funding	  and	  donated	  equipment	  from	  both	  
IDIs	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  sources	  helped	  keep	  the	  FCE	  alive.	  Moreover,	  their	  
effectiveness	  was	  also	  determined	  by	  how	  they	  communicated.	  Showing	  passion	  
helped	  convey	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  line.	  Backed	  by	  evidence	  and	  arguments,	  
persuasive	  champions	  could	  also	  take	  risks	  that	  others	  are	  unwilling	  to	  take	  and	  
show	  a	  level	  of	  dedication	  others	  do	  not	  exhibit.	  	  	  	  
Although	  important,	  passion	  and	  conviction	  only	  takes	  one’s	  arguments	  so	  far	  in	  
the	  transportation	  sector.	  Understanding	  CBA	  and	  providing	  feedback	  on	  how	  to	  
modify	  it	  was	  important	  because	  bringing	  in	  measures	  like	  avoided	  deforestation	  
completely	  changed	  the	  calculation	  and	  many	  experts’	  view	  of	  the	  FCE.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  FCE,	  its	  supporters	  effectively	  sold	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  benefits	  to	  
Bank	  staff	  using	  language	  and	  methods	  consistent	  with	  their	  values.	  Eschewing	  
traditional	  metrics	  and	  performance	  measures	  when	  evaluating	  railways	  arguably	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takes	  decision-­‐making	  to	  the	  other	  undesirable	  extreme	  –	  much	  as	  fundamentalist	  
neoliberal	  theory	  insists	  on	  divorcing	  government	  from	  transportation	  service	  
provision	  regardless	  of	  performance.	  Criticism	  should	  therefore	  be	  directed	  at	  
limiting	  rationality	  to	  a	  very	  specific	  definition	  grounded	  so	  heavily	  in	  economic	  
terms	  that	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  other	  values	  that	  make	  a	  railway	  worth	  operating.	  
Correcting	  the	  rational	  fallacy	  requires	  all	  actors	  involved—especially	  
transportation	  experts—to	  carefully	  scrutinize	  the	  criteria,	  metrics	  and	  values	  they	  
rely	  on	  to	  make	  decisions.	  	  
A	  key	  strategy	  that	  conveyed	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  FCE	  and	  balanced	  the	  
overreliance	  on	  traditional	  CBA	  was	  the	  use	  of	  well-­‐planned	  study	  tours	  organized	  
by	  railway	  supporters.	  Those	  field	  visits	  were	  not	  passive	  viewing	  experiences	  like	  
seeing	  photos	  or	  even	  videos.	  Rather,	  they	  provided	  outsiders	  with	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  immerse	  themselves	  in	  the	  world	  of	  those	  people	  living	  along	  the	  railway.	  During	  
these	  visits,	  staff	  from	  IDIs	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  speak	  with	  villagers	  who	  actually	  
used	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  this	  influenced	  their	  perspectives	  about	  the	  line.	  After	  
all,	  discussing	  a	  report	  among	  one’s	  professional	  peers	  in	  a	  conference	  room	  
thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  is	  a	  very	  different	  experience	  than	  discussing	  the	  same	  
content	  in	  the	  communities	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  line.	  Certainly	  a	  process	  like	  CBA,	  
with	  its	  ability	  to	  turn	  complex	  realities	  into	  understandable	  factors	  exemplifies	  
instrumental	  rationality	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  efficient	  for	  staff	  to	  work	  in	  a	  rarified	  office	  
environment	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  subject	  of	  their	  analysis.	  Yet	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  their	  findings	  will	  be	  rational	  using	  a	  substantive	  rationality.	  As	  Chambers	  
notes,	  “it	  is	  difficult	  for	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  get	  things	  right,	  combining	  as	  they	  do	  
awesome	  responsibility	  and	  power	  with	  physical,	  cultural	  and	  cognitive	  distance	  
from	  the	  peripheries	  and	  poor	  people	  of	  the	  South”	  (Chambers	  1996:	  99).	  Yet	  in	  this	  
case,	  Bank	  and	  other	  IDI	  experts	  who	  saw	  the	  FCE	  gained	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
railways’	  context	  and	  importance	  than	  could	  ever	  have	  been	  gained	  by	  looking	  
solely	  at	  balance	  sheets	  and	  reports.	  This	  helped	  IDI	  staff	  balance	  the	  dominant	  
rationalities	  found	  within	  their	  professional	  settings	  (i.e.,	  utilitarian,	  neoliberal)	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with	  the	  “substantive	  rationality,”	  or	  value-­‐based	  rationality	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  
field.	  	  
Maintaining	  railway	  service	  on	  these	  lines	  is	  usually	  “rational”	  for	  those	  actors	  
who	  derive	  value	  from	  them,	  but	  also	  for	  society	  at	  large	  when	  considering	  the	  many	  
secondary	  effects	  tied	  to	  these	  lines.	  The	  loss	  of	  benefits	  to	  some	  of	  the	  poorest	  
populations	  is	  potentially	  shortsighted	  from	  a	  public	  investment	  perspective.	  As	  a	  
former	  Malagasy	  government	  official	  so	  succinctly	  put	  it,	  you	  get	  “nothing	  but	  
trouble	  when	  you	  close	  a	  railway	  in	  Africa”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  11,	  Antananarivo,	  
18	  Jul	  2008).	  It	  is	  a	  future	  that	  many	  people	  who	  use	  colonial	  railways	  like	  the	  FCE	  
hope	  to	  never	  see,	  but	  have	  befallen	  lines	  like	  the	  Sierra	  Leone	  Government	  Railway	  
(SLGR)	  with	  significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  population.56	  	  
However,	  since	  the	  years	  of	  dogmatically	  pushing	  the	  most	  fundamentalist	  forms	  
of	  neoliberal	  theory,	  including	  structural	  adjustment	  policies,	  IDIs	  like	  the	  Bank	  
have	  increasingly	  worked	  with	  civil	  society	  and	  other	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  in	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (Chambers	  1996:	  99;	  Ebrahim	  and	  Herz	  2007;	  World	  
Bank	  2009:	  3,	  18;	  Vetterlein	  2012).	  This	  has	  occurred	  primarily	  on	  the	  policy	  level	  
and	  the	  effect	  nongovernmental	  actors	  have	  on	  individual	  staff	  is	  still	  rather	  poorly	  
understood	  is.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  though,	  Bank	  staff	  working	  in	  Madagascar	  after	  
the	  cyclones	  of	  2000	  showed	  remarkable	  openness	  to	  listening	  to	  other	  perspectives	  
and	  revisiting	  long-­‐standing	  decisions	  that	  unequivocally	  labeled	  the	  railway	  as	  not	  
worth	  operating.	  It	  is	  questionable	  if	  this	  shift	  would	  have	  ever	  happened	  had	  Bank	  
staff	  never	  visited	  the	  line	  to	  see	  its	  importance	  with	  their	  own	  eyes.	  The	  steps	  taken	  
by	  all	  actors	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  were	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  for	  reducing	  the	  
rational	  fallacy	  into	  which	  transportation	  planning	  and	  decision-­‐making	  has	  fallen	  
where	  standard	  evaluations	  consider	  only	  narrow	  economic	  considerations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Although	  a	  highway	  was	  supposed	  to	  serve	  the	  same	  area	  as	  the	  SLGR,	  it	  never	  reached	  some	  
communities	  that	  traditionally	  opposed	  sitting	  President	  Siaka	  Stevens	  and	  it	  took	  decades	  to	  reach	  
others	  (Abraham	  and	  Sesay	  1993:	  120).	  Richards	  asserts	  that	  cutting	  off	  railway	  service	  only	  served	  
to	  alienate	  the	  area	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  and	  enable	  the	  Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  to	  build	  
an	  alternative	  regime	  ‘from	  below’	  (Richards	  1996:	  140).	  This	  potentially	  exacerbated	  the	  civil	  war	  
there.	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Although	  FCE	  supporters	  challenged	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  financial	  returns	  and	  
other	  performance	  measures,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  actors	  
supported	  the	  IDIs’	  position	  that	  management	  of	  the	  line	  ultimately	  should	  be	  in	  
private	  hands.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  this	  traditionally	  neoliberal	  goal	  was	  the	  bitter	  pill	  
that	  needed	  to	  be	  swallowed	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  substantial	  rehabilitation	  funding	  
the	  Bank	  and	  other	  IDIs	  were	  promising	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  privatization.	  One	  can	  also	  
imagine	  how	  IDIs	  and	  governments	  could	  use	  civil	  society	  to	  justify	  their	  own	  
positions	  if	  motivated	  to	  do	  so.	  Yet	  as	  the	  FCER	  staff	  wrote	  just	  as	  the	  privatization	  
process	  started	  to	  implode,	  “the	  danger	  that	  the	  FCE	  will	  go	  out	  of	  service	  if	  it	  
remains	  under	  parastatal	  management	  (or	  if	  some	  other	  long	  term	  form	  of	  private	  
management	  is	  not	  rapidly	  put	  into	  place)	  is	  far	  greater	  than	  any	  risk	  posed	  by	  going	  
ahead	  with	  the	  currently	  proposed	  concession”	  (FCER	  2005:	  5).	  Given	  the	  limited	  
options	  available	  to	  railway	  supporters	  in	  SSA,	  the	  ability	  for	  potential	  opponents	  to	  
work	  together	  to	  find	  the	  most	  feasible	  solutions	  for	  a	  given	  context	  surely	  beats	  the	  
alternative	  of	  watching	  the	  railways	  close	  with	  no	  attempt	  to	  save	  them.	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Chapter	  4	  	  
Engaging	  Civil	  Society	  to	  Protect	  Transportation	  Infrastructure	  and	  
Services	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  
I. Introduction	  
Ask	  someone	  how	  to	  improve	  their	  daily	  commute	  and	  they	  will	  likely	  offer	  a	  
detailed	  description	  of	  what	  they	  need	  and	  want	  from	  the	  transportation	  system.	  In	  
other	  areas	  of	  life	  in	  less	  developed	  countries	  (LDCs),	  including	  agriculture,	  
education,	  healthcare,	  sanitation,	  governance,	  agriculture	  and	  environmental	  
protection,	  civil	  society	  has	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  confronting	  the	  development	  
challenges	  they	  face.	  Whether	  muted	  or	  resounding,	  harmonic	  or	  cacophonic,	  civil	  
society	  plays	  a	  progressively	  important	  role	  in	  the	  decisions	  that	  will	  affect	  them.	  
Yet	  in	  places	  like	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA),	  where	  transportation	  opportunities	  are	  
scarce,	  expensive,	  unreliable,	  or	  downright	  dangerous,	  the	  silence	  is	  striking.	  
Instead,	  the	  state,	  public	  officials,	  private	  enterprise	  and	  even	  international	  
development	  institutions	  (IDIs)	  like	  the	  World	  Bank	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  
Bank”)	  have	  dominated	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  SSA.	  	  
The	  model	  of	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  SSA	  pushed	  by	  the	  dominant	  
stakeholders	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  cost-­‐recovery	  and	  macroeconomic	  measures	  (i.e.,	  
GDP	  or	  GNP).	  Although	  important,	  myopically	  focusing	  on	  these	  transportation	  
measures	  have	  sometimes	  harmed	  the	  larger	  populace	  that	  depends	  so	  heavily	  on	  
transportation	  services	  for	  their	  livelihood.	  Passenger	  service,	  for	  example,	  tends	  to	  
be	  viewed	  as	  a	  liability	  because	  it	  cannot	  generate	  profits	  like	  goods	  movement	  
(Gwilliam	  2011:	  95;	  Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam:	  234).	  Civil	  society	  stakeholders	  can	  
emphasize	  a	  more	  holistic	  view	  that	  better	  captures	  transportation	  benefits	  that	  are	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difficult	  to	  identify	  or	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  well	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  (CBA).	  
Actively	  involving	  civil	  society	  in	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  can	  also	  translate	  
into	  having	  a	  more	  transparent	  discussion	  about	  the	  weighting	  of	  these	  benefits	  and	  
opens	  the	  possibility	  for	  identifying	  feasible	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems	  (e.g.,	  
project	  alternatives).	  
Who	  participates	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  affects	  how	  different	  modes	  are	  
viewed	  and	  evaluated,	  thereby	  impacting	  spending	  on	  infrastructure	  and	  services.	  
For	  example,	  some	  transportation	  experts	  and	  public	  officials	  even	  explicitly	  stated	  
that	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  SSA	  are	  anachronisms	  that	  need	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  
modern	  forms	  of	  transportation	  (Bickers	  1976:	  1).	  Yet	  these	  lines	  continue	  to	  play	  
an	  influential	  role	  in	  this	  infrastructure-­‐poor	  region.	  Dozens	  of	  lines	  across	  SSA	  
continue	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  backbone	  of	  national	  or	  regional	  transportation	  systems	  
where	  they	  support	  the	  functioning	  of	  regional	  economies	  and	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  
millions	  of	  people.	  Yet	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  media	  reports	  that	  
conditions	  and	  service	  quality	  on	  even	  some	  of	  the	  most	  heavily	  trafficked	  African	  
railways	  can	  be	  extremely	  poor	  (Hilling	  1996:	  104-­‐105;	  Gwilliam	  2011:	  124).	  Many	  
lines	  have	  deteriorated	  significantly	  or	  closed	  altogether	  due	  to	  benign	  neglect,	  
while	  others	  have	  ceased	  operations	  because	  politicians	  or	  IDIs	  have	  directly	  sought	  
their	  closure.	  Decisions	  to	  suspend	  service	  on	  these	  lines,	  made	  with	  little	  to	  no	  
input	  from	  local	  communities,	  can	  have	  significant	  and	  unintended	  effects.	  It	  is	  
reasonable	  to	  ask	  whether	  active	  participation	  by	  civil	  society	  could	  have	  somehow	  
prevented	  some	  of	  these	  colonial	  railways	  from	  closing.	  	  
Civil	  society’s	  impact	  on	  transportation	  systems	  in	  LDCs	  is	  understudied,	  and	  
almost	  no	  references	  exist	  mentioning	  organized	  efforts	  by	  civil	  society	  to	  affect	  
transportation	  outcomes.	  This	  dearth	  of	  information	  contrasts	  with	  the	  myriad	  
examples	  of	  civil	  society	  actively	  working	  in	  other	  key	  sectors.	  Researchers	  have	  
even	  made	  civil	  society	  organizations	  (CSOs)	  in	  other	  sectors	  the	  subject	  of	  research	  
(Uphoff	  2003;	  Lehman	  2008;	  Roy	  2008).	  Yet	  the	  transportation	  sector	  is	  unique	  and	  
the	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  civil	  society	  in	  LDCs	  affects	  
transportation	  investments—and	  railways	  in	  particular—is	  a	  glaring	  gap	  in	  the	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literature	  because	  they	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  other	  sectors.	  Looking	  at	  the	  case	  
where	  a	  civil	  society	  organization	  (CSO)	  worked	  specifically	  to	  protect	  Madagascar’s	  
Fianarantsoa-­‐Côte	  Est	  Railway	  (FCE)	  can	  give	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  how	  civil	  society	  
can	  affect	  a	  railway’s	  future.	  Thus,	  this	  article	  focuses	  on	  the	  CSO	  to	  shine	  a	  spotlight	  
onto	  the	  reasons	  for	  their	  creation	  and	  by	  what	  means	  they	  have	  impacted	  the	  
railway’s	  future.	  Unlike	  other	  CSOs	  that	  may	  become	  involved	  in	  transportation	  
issues	  as	  part	  of	  fulfilling	  their	  primary	  mission	  (e.g.,	  healthcare,	  education,	  
environmental	  preservation),	  the	  CSO	  under	  study	  sought	  primarily	  to	  affect	  
outcomes	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  and	  would	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  
transportation-­‐CSO	  (TCSO).	  	  
The	  presence	  of	  a	  TCSO	  dedicated	  to	  the	  FCE’s	  preservation	  sets	  it	  apart	  from	  
most	  transportation	  infrastructure	  and	  lets	  it	  serve	  as	  a	  “critical”	  case.	  The	  fact	  that	  
most	  people	  view	  railways	  as	  the	  responsibility	  of	  either	  the	  government	  or	  a	  
private	  entity	  makes	  it	  all	  the	  more	  interesting	  that	  civil	  society	  became	  actively	  
involved.	  In	  addition,	  the	  FCE	  is	  a	  stand-­‐alone,	  narrow-­‐gauge	  railway	  transporting	  
primarily	  passengers	  and	  agricultural	  goods.	  This	  makes	  the	  FCE	  a	  “most-­‐likely”	  
case	  where	  we	  would	  have	  very	  much	  expected	  a	  line	  with	  such	  a	  limited	  resource	  
base	  to	  have	  closed	  like	  so	  many	  of	  its	  sister	  railways.	  Its	  weak	  financial	  
performance	  even	  made	  it	  a	  target	  for	  closure	  by	  the	  Bank.	  Yet	  the	  FCE	  continues	  to	  
operate,	  albeit	  with	  ever-­‐increasing	  unsoundness.	  Using	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  and	  its	  
TCSO	  allows	  us	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  what	  effect	  can	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  
CSO	  have	  on	  preventing	  railway	  closures?	  In	  addition,	  what	  makes	  a	  CSO	  effective	  or	  
ineffective?	  Finally,	  what	  strategies	  have	  CSOs	  successfully	  used	  to	  motivate	  their	  
prospective	  members	  and	  galvanize	  broad	  support	  for	  an	  unprofitable	  railway	  
facing	  a	  permanent	  closure?	  There	  are	  many	  actors	  who	  could	  prevent	  a	  railway	  
closure	  that	  it	  would	  be	  naïve	  to	  think	  a	  CSO	  could	  single-­‐handedly	  explain	  why	  the	  
FCE	  continues	  to	  run	  when	  so	  many	  other	  colonial	  railways	  have	  closed.	  Still,	  this	  
paper	  will	  argue	  the	  active	  involvement	  of	  a	  CSO	  was	  central	  to	  the	  effort	  to	  keep	  the	  
FCE	  running	  and	  in	  ways	  that	  its	  initiators	  had	  not	  anticipated	  when	  they	  launched	  
it.	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This	  paper	  draws	  upon	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  to	  answer	  these	  research	  questions,	  
including	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  archival	  documents,	  a	  review	  of	  published	  literature,	  
semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (SSIs)	  with	  key	  actors	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  FCE’s	  
rehabilitation,	  and	  focus	  group	  interviews	  with	  railway	  beneficiaries.	  The	  next	  
section	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  and	  the	  
presence	  of	  TCSOs	  in	  LDCs.	  The	  subsequent	  section	  provides	  a	  background	  on	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  formation	  and	  actions	  of	  its	  main	  
CSO.	  Following	  this	  discussion,	  I	  examine	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  second	  CSO	  focused	  on	  
security	  along	  the	  line.	  Examining	  the	  effects	  of	  two	  CSOs	  in	  this	  case,	  both	  designed	  
and	  unintended,	  helps	  identify	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  
model	  to	  other	  communities	  who	  want	  to	  protect	  the	  transportation	  infrastructure	  
and	  services	  that	  affect	  their	  lives.	  	  
	  
II. Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Transportation	  Sector	  
Whether	  in	  developed	  countries	  or	  LDCs,	  certain	  actors	  and	  interest	  groups	  have	  
long	  affected	  transportation	  decisions,	  including	  public	  officials,	  political	  parties,	  
government	  agencies,	  unions,	  chambers	  of	  commerce	  and	  business	  lobbies.	  
Researchers	  have	  also	  recognized	  that	  civil	  society	  activity	  has	  influenced	  
transportation	  decisions	  in	  LDCs	  (Evans	  1996;	  Kerr	  2006;	  Monson	  2006).	  Yet	  when	  
civil	  society	  becomes	  more	  actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  transport	  sector,	  it	  is	  usually	  
through	  ephemeral,	  ad	  hoc	  movements	  arising	  in	  reaction	  to	  perceived	  threats	  or	  
opportunities.	  Interventions	  using	  letter-­‐writing	  campaigns,	  protests	  or	  direct	  
lobbying,	  etc.	  have	  sometimes	  succeeded,	  but	  these	  usually	  come	  after	  the	  process	  is	  
already	  far	  along	  and	  perhaps	  too	  difficult	  to	  modify.	  This	  has	  led	  observers	  to	  call	  
for	  more	  public	  participation	  by	  civil	  society	  in	  policymaking	  and	  also	  early	  in	  the	  
transportation	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (World	  Bank	  2009:	  3,	  18).	  This	  appeal	  has	  
mostly	  been	  addressed	  by	  holding	  a	  fixed	  number	  of	  public	  meetings	  conducted	  as	  a	  
perfunctory	  step	  in	  the	  planning	  process,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  participants	  
continue	  to	  follow	  or	  influence	  the	  proceedings	  after	  that.	  Continued	  involvement	  in	  
solving	  development	  challenges	  is	  usually	  the	  product	  of	  a	  concerted,	  organized	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effort	  and	  is	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  increasingly	  encouraged	  its	  staff	  
and	  borrowing	  countries	  to	  involve	  civil	  society	  early	  in	  the	  process	  (ibid.:	  15-­‐19).	  
Distinguishing	  organized	  civil	  society	  from	  ad	  hoc	  social	  movements	  as	  well	  as	  
those	  actors	  or	  groups	  simply	  acting	  as	  proxies	  on	  behalf	  of	  state,	  political	  or	  
business	  interests	  helps	  us	  gauge	  the	  potential	  of	  TCSOs	  to	  affect	  transportation	  
decisions.	  The	  TCSOs	  will	  be	  voluntary	  organizations	  focused	  on	  transportation	  
issues	  (e.g.,	  safety,	  infrastructure	  or	  service	  of	  a	  single	  mode	  or	  system,	  etc.).	  
Whether	  these	  organizations	  are	  formal	  or	  informal,	  members	  should	  recognize	  
themselves	  as	  forming	  a	  group	  with	  the	  central	  intention	  of	  impacting	  outcomes	  in	  
the	  transport	  sector.	  If	  only	  outsiders	  recognize	  these	  people	  as	  a	  group,	  then	  it	  is	  
more	  appropriate	  to	  label	  it	  a	  social	  movement.	  Self-­‐recognition	  is	  also	  important	  
because	  a	  TCSO	  should	  be	  both	  public-­‐serving	  and	  member-­‐serving.57	  The	  members	  
of	  a	  TCSO	  will	  be	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  larger	  population,	  but	  they	  would	  also	  be	  striving	  to	  
serve	  the	  transportation	  interests	  of	  more	  than	  just	  the	  people	  who	  are	  considered	  
formal	  members.	  A	  respectable	  amount	  of	  leeway	  should	  be	  given	  as	  to	  how	  one	  
defines	  “public.”	  After	  all,	  there	  are	  competing	  interests	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  so	  it	  is	  
not	  only	  conceivable,	  but	  expected,	  that	  forces	  well	  within	  the	  classification	  of	  civil	  
society	  will	  clash.	  	  
Some	  groups	  that	  are	  often	  active	  and	  influential	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  
could	  mistakenly	  be	  labeled	  as	  TCSOs.	  Using	  the	  standard	  where	  groups	  serve	  both	  
their	  members	  and	  the	  public,	  though,	  helps	  filter	  out	  some	  groups.	  For	  example,	  
although	  transportation	  unions	  have	  repeatedly	  taken	  action	  that	  benefitted	  the	  
general	  public,	  their	  primary	  mission	  is	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  members’	  interests.	  
Trade	  groups	  lobbying	  for	  transportation	  investments	  have	  also	  served	  the	  public	  
interest,	  but	  their	  primary	  objective	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  financial	  wellbeing	  of	  
their	  member	  companies	  and	  entrepreneurs.	  IDIs	  and	  even	  many	  international	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  In	  a	  USAID	  report,	  they	  rely	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  CSOs	  where	  they	  may	  be	  either	  public-­‐serving	  or	  
member	  serving	  (USAID	  2011:	  171).	  This	  definition	  was	  taken	  from	  Toward an Enabling Legal Environment 
for Civil Society, Statement of the 16th Annual Johns Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, Nairobi, 
Kenya. The International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law 8(1), November 2005. 
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol8iss1/special_1.htm#_ftn1  
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governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs)	  also	  do	  not	  necessarily	  meet	  the	  definition	  of	  
being	  a	  CSO	  because	  they	  can	  largely	  lack	  any	  members	  of	  a	  target	  population	  
working	  for	  them	  as	  staff	  or	  serving	  on	  their	  board.58	  NGOs	  focused	  on	  
transportation	  interventions	  may	  primarily	  aim	  to	  do	  public-­‐serving	  work,	  but	  the	  
staff	  and	  board	  who	  make	  decisions	  and	  run	  the	  NGOs	  may	  consider	  the	  public	  they	  
serve	  more	  like	  customers	  than	  like	  members.	  Likewise,	  the	  public	  may	  not	  consider	  
themselves	  as	  members	  and	  view	  the	  NGOs	  as	  outsiders	  and	  charities	  rather	  than	  as	  
a	  group	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  which	  groups	  are	  in	  fact	  a	  TCSO	  and	  which	  are	  not,	  
it	  is	  worthwhile	  taking	  a	  moment	  to	  discuss	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  “civil	  society”	  –	  a	  
term	  that	  has	  varied	  broadly	  over	  time	  and	  which	  theorists	  continue	  to	  debate	  
(Keane	  1988;	  Friedmann	  1992).	  Although	  individuals	  form	  the	  building	  block	  of	  civil	  
society,	  to	  label	  any	  group	  of	  individuals	  as	  “civil	  society”	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  
can	  include	  those	  persons	  who	  are	  acting	  directly	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state,	  politicians	  
or	  narrow	  economic	  interests.	  Theorists	  have,	  therefore,	  often	  sought	  to	  distinguish	  
civil	  society	  based	  on	  its	  raison	  d’être	  (e.g.,	  development-­‐oriented,	  religious,	  
philanthropic,	  etc.	  as	  opposed	  to	  promoting	  a	  specific	  business,	  political	  party	  or	  
sitting	  government),	  its	  membership	  or	  composition	  (e.g.,	  geographical	  scope;	  the	  
inclusion	  or	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  groups	  or	  people,	  etc.),	  and	  most	  often	  its	  
relationship	  to	  the	  state	  (e.g.,	  supportive	  vs.	  adversarial).	  These	  various	  distinctions	  
still	  lead	  to	  conflicting	  and	  often	  confusing	  identification	  as	  to	  who	  is	  and	  is	  not	  part	  
of	  civil	  society.	  
Friedmann	  proposes	  a	  view	  where	  civil	  society	  is	  “one	  of	  four	  partially	  
autonomous	  and	  overlapping	  spheres	  of	  action	  and	  valued	  social	  practices”	  –	  the	  
others	  being	  the	  state,	  the	  corporate	  economy,	  and	  political	  community	  (Friedmann	  
1998:	  22).	  Carving	  out	  a	  fifth	  sphere	  called	  the	  “transnational	  nonprofit”	  sphere,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  sphere	  of	  activity	  because	  IDIs	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  state	  given	  their	  ability	  to	  
wield	  power	  over	  governments	  and	  their	  population.	  Some	  researchers	  have	  critiqued	  NGOs,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  for	  promoting	  their	  own	  interests	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  civil	  society	  (Mercer	  
2002).	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which	  includes	  IDIs,	  NGOs	  and	  their	  designees	  (i.e.,	  consultants	  and	  projects),	  is	  an	  
important	  distinction	  because,	  as	  noted	  above,	  these	  organizations	  and	  their	  staff	  
often	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  definition	  of	  being	  both	  member-­‐serving	  and	  public-­‐serving.	  
Essentially,	  civil	  society	  may	  share	  similar	  goals	  as	  the	  other	  spheres	  that	  are	  easier	  
to	  define,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state,	  a	  business,	  a	  political	  group,	  or	  a	  
transnational	  entity.	  	  
Civil	  society’s	  autonomy	  from	  the	  other	  spheres	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  crucial	  defining	  
property.	  Given	  its	  interdependent	  nature,	  civil	  society	  will	  be	  independent	  enough	  
so	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  readily	  distinguishable	  from	  other	  societal	  spheres.	  This	  is	  
consistent	  with	  Friedmann’s	  assertion	  of	  civil	  society’s	  “core	  meaning”	  that	  includes	  
“those	  social	  organizations,	  associations,	  and	  institutions	  that	  exist	  beyond	  the	  
sphere	  of	  direct	  supervision	  and	  control	  by	  the	  state”	  (Friedmann	  1998:	  21).	  
Obviously	  civil	  society	  would	  need	  to	  have	  the	  same	  autonomy	  from	  the	  other	  
spheres	  and	  not	  just	  the	  state.	  Civil	  society’s	  autonomy	  need	  not	  be	  perfect.	  How	  a	  
CSO	  operates,	  though,	  would	  not	  be	  dictated	  by	  a	  government,	  political	  
party/politician	  or	  business	  entity	  if	  we	  are	  to	  consider	  it	  an	  independent	  sphere.	  
Some	  CSOs	  will,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  political	  context	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  have	  much	  
greater	  separation	  from	  other	  spheres.	  Determining	  this	  autonomy,	  therefore,	  
requires	  a	  qualitative	  examination	  and	  reflection	  both	  by	  members	  and	  outsiders.	  
The	  issue	  of	  autonomy	  does	  not	  mean	  actors	  from	  the	  other	  sectors	  cannot	  assist	  
civil	  society,	  including	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  CSOs.	  Spontaneous	  popular	  action	  that	  
forms	  within	  a	  community,	  even	  ones	  relatively	  better	  off,	  is	  not	  common	  and	  is	  
often	  limited	  in	  scope	  (Friedmann	  1992:	  71,	  144,	  158).	  Friedmann	  argues	  that	  “the	  
rhetoric	  of	  spontaneity”	  should	  be	  abandoned	  and	  that	  theorists	  should	  accept	  that	  
“external	  agents,”	  or	  animateurs,	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  blowing	  “the	  breath	  of	  life	  into	  
the	  soul	  of	  the	  community	  and	  move	  it	  to	  appropriate	  action”	  (ibid.:	  144).	  These	  
animateurs	  “are	  meant	  to	  ‘spark’	  endogenous	  change	  ‘from	  within,’	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  
the	  change	  program;	  this	  is	  a	  responsibility	  of	  the	  organized	  community”	  (ibid.).	  We	  
should	  not	  underestimate	  the	  role	  that	  these	  individuals	  play	  in	  framing	  arguments	  
so	  central	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  these	  groups	  in	  their	  efforts.	  Careful	  and	  critical	  attention	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must	  be	  paid	  to	  whether	  these	  actors	  are	  furthering	  the	  communities’	  causes	  or,	  as	  
could	  happen,	  imposing	  their	  own	  perspectives	  onto	  a	  community	  desperate	  for	  
development	  to	  occur.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  for	  these	  external	  actors	  to	  ask	  
themselves	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  they	  disengage	  and,	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  at	  all,	  at	  which	  
point.	  	  
The	  need	  for	  civil	  society	  to	  be	  autonomous	  is	  implied	  for	  theorists	  who	  see	  its	  
role	  as	  standing	  in	  opposition	  to	  other	  spheres	  –	  particularly	  the	  state	  or	  corporate	  
economy	  (Keane	  1988;	  Friedmann	  1998:	  21-­‐22).	  Of	  course,	  civil	  society	  need	  not	  
simply	  be	  a	  force	  of	  resistance	  constantly	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  other	  spheres,	  though.	  
Forming	  cooperative	  links	  between	  government	  agencies	  and	  the	  public	  is	  a	  
potentially	  powerful	  development	  tool.	  Civil	  society	  and	  the	  state	  can	  work	  
cooperatively	  towards	  development	  goals	  in	  what	  Evans	  calls	  ‘synergistic	  relations’	  
(Evans	  1996:	  1119).	  One	  example	  of	  this	  synergy	  is	  how	  local	  citizens	  contribute	  
knowledge	  and	  experience	  that	  would	  be	  costly	  for	  outsiders	  (including	  the	  state)	  to	  
acquire	  (ibid.:	  1130).	  Civil	  society	  benefits	  from	  receiving	  more	  goods	  and	  services	  
as	  well	  as	  social	  capital	  (ibid).	  Yet	  while	  leaders	  from	  government,	  politics	  or	  
industry	  can	  make	  valuable	  contributions	  as	  members	  of	  TCSOs,	  having	  them	  play	  a	  
prominent	  role	  in	  the	  CSO	  would	  lead	  many	  observers	  to	  ask	  whether	  a	  conflict	  of	  
interest	  exists.	  
	  So	  while	  researchers	  have	  not	  studied	  TCSOs,	  they	  have	  sometimes	  mentioned	  
the	  existence	  of	  road	  user	  associations	  (Therkildsen	  and	  Semboja	  1992:	  1105;	  
Robinson	  and	  Stiedl	  2001:	  58;	  Porter	  2002:	  295-­‐296;	  Njenga	  and	  Davis	  2003:	  229).	  
These	  self-­‐help,	  voluntary	  associations	  carry	  out	  basic	  maintenance	  work	  on	  rural	  
roads	  –	  often	  through	  voluntary	  means	  and	  donated	  resources	  for	  a	  specific	  road	  
segment	  serving	  the	  workers’	  community.	  Yet	  no	  articles	  have	  examined	  how	  they	  
operate.59	  There	  are	  no	  studies	  on	  TCSOs	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  A	  literature	  review	  using	  combinations	  of	  the	  key	  words	  ‘civil	  society,’	  ‘CSO,’	  ‘NGO,’	  
‘transportation,’	  ‘transportation	  planning,’	  ‘transportation	  decision-­‐making,’	  ‘developing	  countries,’	  
‘Africa,’	  did	  not	  yield	  any	  results	  referring	  to	  TCSOs.	  One	  article	  mentions	  a	  TCSO	  engaged	  in	  
	   	  125	  
demonstrate	  civil	  society’s	  potential	  to	  significantly	  influence	  policy,	  investment	  
decisions	  or	  the	  long-­‐term	  operations	  of	  a	  given	  service	  in	  LDCs.	  Besides	  the	  lack	  of	  
information	  about	  how	  many	  even	  exist,	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  role,	  
strategies	  and	  efficacy	  of	  TCSOs	  in	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  LDCs.	  	  Unlike	  
examples	  of	  CSOs	  from	  other	  sectors,	  the	  literature	  does	  not	  investigate	  how,	  if	  at	  
all,	  these	  groups	  engage	  in	  the	  broader	  transportation	  planning	  process	  or	  conduct	  
their	  lobbying	  efforts.	  	  
Just	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  evaluate	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  abstract,	  so	  it	  is	  true	  of	  TCSOs.	  
The	  next	  section	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  the	  principal	  TCSO	  for	  Madagascar’s	  FCE	  line	  
to	  better	  understand	  the	  conditions	  and	  steps	  that	  led	  to	  its	  formation.	  	  
	  
III. The	  Case	  of	  the	  FCE	  Railway	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  FCE	  initially	  followed	  the	  pattern	  of	  many	  other	  
colonial	  railways	  in	  SSA.	  The	  FCE’s	  layout	  from	  the	  port-­‐city	  of	  Manakara	  to	  the	  
central	  highland	  city	  of	  Fianarantsoa	  reflects	  the	  primary	  motivation	  of	  railway	  
building	  across	  the	  continent:	  furthering	  the	  colonial	  objectives	  of	  facilitating	  the	  
export	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  the	  import	  of	  finished	  products	  from	  the	  
metropolitan	  countries.	  Colonial	  officials	  sought	  to	  link	  the	  island’s	  second	  largest	  
populated	  city	  Fianarantsoa	  directly	  with	  Madagascar’s	  east	  coast	  so	  as	  to	  “unlock”	  
the	  rich	  agricultural	  area	  along	  its	  length	  (Roques	  1900:	  21-­‐22).	  While	  it	  has	  served	  
military	  purposes	  and	  transported	  key	  products	  like	  fuel	  and	  salt,	  the	  railway’s	  core	  
function	  was	  and	  remains	  to	  transport	  agricultural	  goods	  such	  as	  bananas,	  coffee,	  
and	  cloves	  (Freudenberger	  2003:	  139).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
promoting	  development	  along	  a	  Chilean	  railway	  line	  (Ionascu	  2009:	  11),	  but	  since	  the	  object	  of	  the	  
article	  is	  the	  railway,	  the	  author	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	  the	  role	  of	  this	  group.	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Figure	  14	  FCE	  Railway	  and	  studied	  villages	  
Even	  before	  independence,	  improvements	  in	  the	  island’s	  road	  system	  and	  air	  
services	  in	  the	  1950s	  caused	  a	  precipitous	  decline	  in	  the	  Malagasy	  railways’	  
revenues	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  290).	  It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  after	  the	  French	  
pulled	  up	  their	  colonial	  stakes	  in	  1960	  before	  the	  viability	  and	  utility	  of	  the	  FCE	  
came	  under	  increasing	  scrutiny.	  A	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  study	  
written	  after	  independence	  stated	  that	  replacing	  the	  FCE	  with	  a	  roadway	  would	  be	  
preferable	  from	  the	  “user’s	  stand-­‐point”	  (Sorca-­‐Beceka	  1966:	  163).60	  The	  report	  also	  
noted	  that	  from	  the	  Malagasy	  railway’s	  perspective,	  operating	  the	  FCE	  “hardly	  pays,	  
especially	  due	  to	  the	  detached	  position	  of	  this	  line”	  (ibid.).	  The	  study	  concluded,	  
however,	  “reckoning	  with	  its	  public	  utility	  aspect,	  it	  would	  thus	  be	  unwise	  to	  
discontinue	  its	  operation,	  more	  especially	  as,	  from	  the	  view-­‐point	  of	  general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  It	  is	  unclear	  if	  “the	  user”	  refers	  to	  individual	  riders	  or	  larger	  commercial	  customers.	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economy,	  replacing	  the	  railway	  with	  a	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Manakara	  road	  link	  would	  cost	  
the	  public	  more	  money”	  (ibid.).	  This	  recommendation	  might	  have	  spared	  the	  
railway	  from	  imminent	  closure,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  solve	  the	  issue	  of	  this	  line’s	  
poor	  financial	  performance	  and	  the	  dependence	  it	  had	  on	  subsidies	  for	  
maintenance.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  problems	  in	  the	  larger	  economy	  caused	  by	  its	  failed	  economic	  
policies,	  the	  Malagasy	  government	  followed	  the	  trend	  of	  African	  liberalization	  in	  the	  
1980s	  and	  engaged	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Bank	  to	  obtain	  monetary	  assistance	  
through	  structural	  adjustment	  loans	  (Pryor	  1990:	  287).	  The	  Bank	  saw	  the	  FCE’s	  
financial	  losses	  as	  a	  significant	  threat	  to	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  Malagasy	  Railway	  or	  
RNCFM	  (Réseau	  National	  des	  Chemins	  de	  Fer	  Malagasy),	  which	  threatened	  to	  
increase	  the	  government’s	  deficits	  (Word	  Bank	  1979:	  13).	  According	  to	  members	  of	  
the	  Malagasy	  delegation,	  discussions	  with	  the	  Bank	  became	  quite	  heated	  when	  the	  
Bank	  recommended	  closing	  the	  FCE	  and	  it	  became	  a	  sticking	  point	  in	  developing	  a	  
support	  package	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  2,	  Fianarantsoa,	  24	  Jun	  2008;	  SSI	  with	  
Informant	  11,	  Antananarivo,	  18	  Jul	  2008).	  Although	  the	  Malagasy	  government	  
successfully	  resisted	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  push	  to	  close	  the	  railway,	  it	  ultimately	  agreed	  
to	  a	  loan	  condition	  that	  ensured	  the	  government	  made	  no	  further	  capital	  
investments	  in	  the	  FCE	  (Freudenberger	  2003:	  140).	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  disinvestment,	  the	  railway	  continued	  to	  deteriorate	  and	  lose	  
market	  share	  in	  the	  1990s,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  low-­‐point	  in	  the	  FCE’s	  history.	  New	  
road	  investments	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  those	  highways	  to	  large	  trucks	  further	  eroded	  
the	  railway’s	  market	  (Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  29).	  The	  FCE	  became	  more	  unreliable,	  
unsafe	  and	  susceptible	  to	  service	  disruptions	  from	  weather.	  A	  strengthening	  
trucking	  industry	  ensured	  that	  fuel	  shipments	  arriving	  at	  the	  port	  of	  Manakara	  were	  
shipped	  to	  Fianarantsoa	  by	  road	  even	  though	  transporting	  fuel	  cost	  less	  on	  the	  FCE	  
(Godeau	  1996:	  37;	  Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  29).	  The	  loss	  of	  one	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  three	  
locomotives	  due	  to	  a	  1995	  derailment	  only	  added	  to	  the	  line’s	  woes	  (Rakotoarison	  
1998:	  29).	  The	  precipitous	  decline	  in	  the	  FCE’s	  ridership	  and	  merchandise	  traffic	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over	  this	  decade,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  17,	  was	  both	  a	  cause	  and	  symptom	  of	  the	  
railway’s	  continuing	  problems.61	  
	  
	  
Figure	  15	  FCE	  passenger	  and	  merchandise	  traffic	  (1990	  to	  2007)	  
Even	  though	  the	  FCE	  suffered	  from	  cash	  flow	  problems	  and	  major	  neglect	  of	  its	  
infrastructure,	  its	  worth	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed.	  The	  USAID-­‐funded	  program	  
Commercial	  Agricultural	  Promotion’s	  (CAP)	  primary	  mission	  of	  supporting	  the	  
development	  of	  agribusiness	  in	  the	  Fianarantsoa	  region	  included	  a	  high-­‐profile	  rural	  
infrastructure	  rehabilitation	  project	  that	  aimed	  to	  lower	  transportation	  costs	  in	  
order	  to	  promote	  agricultural	  commodities	  (CAP	  1998:	  3).	  The	  FCE	  director	  
approached	  CAP’s	  regional	  director	  with	  a	  request	  for	  support,	  making	  the	  case	  that	  
the	  railway	  essentially	  served	  the	  same	  function	  as	  roads	  for	  the	  isolated	  villages	  
along	  its	  length.	  This	  appeal	  came	  at	  a	  critical	  time	  for	  the	  railway.	  According	  to	  the	  
CAP’s	  regional	  director,	  “the	  trains	  were	  basically	  falling	  apart	  on	  the	  tracks	  and	  the	  
tracks	  themselves	  were	  falling	  apart”	  (SSI	  with	  HS,	  Phone	  interview,	  2008).	  The	  
program	  agreed	  to	  consider	  the	  request	  and	  commissioned	  a	  study	  of	  the	  line,	  which	  
was	  the	  first	  examination	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  FCE’s	  fiscal	  performance	  and	  seriously	  
consider	  the	  other	  benefits	  the	  railway	  provided	  to	  communities	  along	  its	  length.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ridership	  statistics	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  FCE	  administration.	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The	  study	  affirmed	  what	  the	  FCE	  director	  had	  asserted	  (Godeau	  1996).	  The	  railway	  
provided	  essential	  service	  in	  shipping	  agricultural	  and	  essential	  household	  goods,	  
leading	  CAP	  to	  include	  the	  FCE	  in	  its	  rural	  infrastructure	  program	  (CAP	  1999:	  5).	  
	  
IV. Uniting	  Civil	  Society:	  ADIFCE	  	  
Malagasy	  public	  officials	  and	  FCE	  staff	  had	  done	  a	  noteworthy	  job	  of	  keeping	  the	  
trains	  operating	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  pressure	  as	  well	  as	  unremitting	  technical	  and	  
financial	  problems,	  but	  CAP	  recognized	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  financial	  resources	  
outweighed	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  line’s	  existing	  supporters.	  Development	  project	  
staff,	  local	  public	  officials	  and	  business	  leaders	  who	  had	  actively	  worked	  with	  each	  
other	  and	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  FCE	  to	  keep	  the	  line	  running	  reached	  a	  consensus	  that	  the	  
long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  the	  railway	  required	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Madagascar	  
privatize	  it.	  Railway	  staff	  and	  many	  people	  living	  along	  the	  line	  were	  cool	  to	  this	  idea	  
(SSI	  with	  Informant	  1,	  Fianarantsoa,	  23	  Jun	  2008).	  Critics	  raised	  the	  concern	  that	  
passenger	  service	  was	  not	  the	  primary	  concern	  for	  most	  concessionaires	  (SSI	  with	  
Informant	  2,	  Fianarantsoa,	  24	  Jun	  2008).	  As	  evidence,	  they	  pointed	  to	  the	  Northern	  
Railway’s	  long	  lapse	  in	  passenger	  service	  despite	  concession	  stipulations	  that	  it	  
would	  be	  maintained.	  Recognizing	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  concerns,	  the	  key	  actors	  
decided	  to	  task	  the	  TCSO	  called	  the	  Association	  des	  Détenteurs	  d’Intérêts	  de	  la	  FCE	  
(ADIFCE)62	  with	  ensuring	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  users	  and	  communities	  would	  be	  
respected	  under	  a	  privatization	  scheme,	  making	  the	  line	  more	  attractive	  to	  potential	  
concessionaires,	  and	  stemming	  false	  rumors	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  privatization.	  	  	  
Even	  though	  members	  of	  the	  public	  (mostly	  shop	  owners,	  produce	  collectors,	  
traditional	  leaders,	  and	  village	  elders)	  were	  already	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  protect	  the	  
FCE,	  expatriate	  development	  workers	  believed	  having	  a	  formal	  charter	  and	  
structure	  gave	  these	  stakeholders	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  other	  actors	  involved	  
in	  the	  privatization	  process	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  
2008).	  In	  April	  1998,	  CAP	  organized	  a	  public	  meeting	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Translated	  into	  English,	  ADIFCE	  means	  “The	  Association	  of	  Protectors	  of	  the	  Interests	  of	  the	  FCE.”	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discuss	  the	  privatization	  process	  that	  had	  been	  discussed	  for	  some	  years	  and	  was	  
underway	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  12,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Nov	  2008).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
meeting,	  CAP	  staff	  proposed	  creating	  ADIFCE	  –	  a	  formal	  CSO	  with	  articles	  of	  
incorporation	  filed	  with	  the	  Malagasy	  government	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  23,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  25	  Sep	  2009).	  Having	  a	  formal	  CSO	  provided	  a	  structure	  to	  which	  IDIs	  
could	  channel	  funding	  that	  would	  help	  pay	  for	  a	  full-­‐time	  coordinator,	  community	  
organizer,	  outreach	  materials	  as	  well	  as	  meetings.	  Initial	  funding	  for	  ADIFCE	  also	  
came	  primarily	  from	  USAID	  projects,	  although	  efforts	  were	  later	  made	  to	  create	  
sustainable	  funding	  mechanisms	  through	  membership	  dues	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  a	  tourist	  
guide	  about	  the	  FCE.	  	  
External	  actors	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  establishing	  ADIFCE,	  which	  affected	  the	  
form	  it	  took.	  Although	  the	  actual	  formation	  of	  ADIFCE	  occurred	  under	  CAP’s	  
successor	  program,	  Landscape	  Development	  Interventions	  (LDI),	  the	  organization’s	  
essential	  structure	  derived	  from	  the	  road-­‐user	  associations	  model	  that	  CAP	  used	  to	  
ensure	  the	  sustainability	  of	  its	  rural	  infrastructure	  investments.	  CAP	  staff	  derived	  
the	  model	  for	  the	  road	  users	  associations	  by	  looking	  at	  local	  water	  user	  associations	  
in	  Madagascar	  as	  well	  as	  rural	  conservation	  districts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (SSI	  with	  
Informant	  12,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Nov	  2008).	  Clearly	  ADIFCE	  was	  a	  more	  ambitious	  
effort	  than	  road-­‐users	  associations	  that	  usually	  comprised	  one	  or	  two	  villages	  
serving	  population	  bases	  in	  the	  hundreds.	  ADIFCE	  aimed	  to	  represent	  hundreds	  of	  
thousands	  of	  people	  from	  the	  three	  ethnicities	  who	  lived	  in	  dozens	  of	  villages	  along	  
the	  line’s	  length,	  plus	  the	  populous	  cities	  on	  both	  ends.	  While	  the	  scope	  was	  greater,	  
the	  intention	  of	  CAP’s	  model	  was	  an	  “absolute	  precondition”	  to	  provide	  funding	  for	  
its	  transportation	  rehabilitation	  projects,	  a	  commitment	  by	  beneficiaries	  and	  local	  
government	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  responsibility	  of	  maintaining	  the	  infrastructure	  (CAP	  
1998:	  3).	  Given	  that	  CAP	  was	  financing	  its	  creation,	  it	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  
ADIFCE’s	  structure.	  CAP’s	  creation	  of	  local	  road	  users	  associations	  reflected	  an	  
adherence	  to	  “principles	  of	  local	  responsibility	  and	  empowerment”	  that	  they	  viewed	  
as	  essential	  to	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  their	  resources	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  
the	  infrastructure	  projects	  (CAP	  1998:	  3).	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ADIFCE’s	  articles	  of	  incorporation	  clearly	  sought	  to	  empower	  the	  local	  
population	  and	  endow	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  line’s	  soundness.	  
The	  articles	  state	  that	  a	  primary	  objective	  of	  ADIFCE	  includes	  improving	  the	  general	  
quality	  of	  service	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  “users	  and	  beneficiaries”	  –	  those	  individuals	  
receiving	  direct	  or	  indirect	  benefits	  from	  the	  railway	  including	  farmers,	  collectors,	  
Mpanjaka	  (traditional	  leaders	  or	  local	  kings),	  railway	  workers,	  elected	  officials	  and	  
veterans	  from	  the	  1947	  rebellion	  (Focus	  group	  with	  ADIFCE/OPCI	  representatives,	  
Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).63	  Their	  charter	  also	  included	  three	  specific	  objectives	  
organized	  by	  time	  with	  the	  most	  immediate	  task	  focusing	  on	  supporting	  the	  
privatization	  process.	  In	  the	  medium	  term,	  they	  would	  seek	  to	  “defend	  the	  interests,	  
develop	  and	  influence	  the	  path	  of	  the	  FCE.”	  In	  the	  long	  term,	  they	  would	  seek	  “to	  
establish	  a	  participatory	  system	  (for	  ‘informing-­‐sensitizing-­‐conscientisation’)	  to	  
ensure	  the	  good	  use	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  what	  the	  FCE	  line	  has	  already	  acquired.”xix	  
Protecting	  what	  has	  already	  been	  built	  and	  then	  “acquired”	  also	  connotes	  a	  sense	  of	  
ownership.	  ADIFCE’s	  language	  subtly	  seeks	  to	  remind	  people	  that	  even	  though	  the	  
French	  may	  have	  ordered	  the	  railway’s	  construction	  and	  used	  it	  for	  their	  own	  
colonial	  interests,	  the	  line	  and	  its	  social	  significance	  had	  since	  passed	  into	  the	  hands	  
of	  the	  Malagasy	  people.	  This	  transfer	  of	  the	  physical	  infrastructure,	  but	  also	  the	  
appropriation	  of	  the	  railway’s	  history,	  unites	  both	  financial	  and	  cultural	  appeals.	  	  
Even	  though	  ADIFCE’s	  initial	  task	  was	  to	  calm	  local	  concerns	  about	  privatization,	  
they	  soon	  took	  a	  more	  proactive	  approach	  to	  protecting	  the	  line.	  In	  early	  2000,	  
back-­‐to-­‐back	  cyclones	  struck	  Madagascar	  and	  caused	  serious	  damage	  to	  the	  railway	  
–	  including	  280	  landslides	  along	  the	  line	  that	  left	  approximately	  150,000	  cubic	  
meters	  of	  soil	  on	  the	  tracks	  (Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  2002:	  189).	  
Moreover,	  four	  major	  washouts	  left	  long	  sections	  of	  track	  suspended	  in	  midair	  
(Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  2002:	  189).	  ADIFCE	  members	  were	  able	  to	  send	  
word	  to	  LDI	  and	  the	  FCE	  administration	  of	  the	  washouts	  and	  landslides	  that	  cut	  the	  
line.	  Individual	  ADIFCE	  members	  also	  took	  the	  initiative	  of	  clearing	  some	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  ADIFCE’s	  articles	  of	  incorporation	  were	  filed	  on	  07	  June	  1999	  with	  the	  Malagasy	  government.	  Any	  
supporter	  of	  the	  FCE	  could	  join	  ADIFCE,	  but	  in	  fact,	  most	  members	  lived	  along	  the	  line.	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landslides	  themselves	  voluntarily	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  helped	  find	  fellow	  villagers	  
willing	  to	  clear	  it	  for	  pay	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  12,	  Phone	  interview,	  26	  Nov	  2008;	  
Women’s	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  01	  Sep	  2009;	  ANP	  focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  
Sep	  2009).	  Finding	  help	  did	  not	  likely	  prove	  too	  difficult	  because	  local	  ADIFCE	  
representatives	  in	  the	  villages	  tended	  to	  be	  people	  who	  held	  some	  sway	  in	  the	  
community,	  such	  as	  merchants,	  collectors	  and	  Mpanjaka.	  Still,	  the	  FCE	  remained	  
closed	  for	  two	  months	  from	  the	  cyclonic	  damage,	  which	  raised	  the	  price	  of	  essential	  
household	  goods	  while	  simultaneously	  cutting	  off	  their	  usual	  sources	  of	  income.	  
	  
Figure	  16	  	  Washout	  along	  FCE	  in	  2000	  	  
Although	  the	  cyclones’	  wind	  and	  rain	  set	  the	  soil	  in	  motion,	  lack	  of	  maintenance	  
and	  human	  activity	  greatly	  increased	  the	  line’s	  susceptibility.	  Specifically,	  the	  lack	  of	  
functioning	  drainage	  systems	  (i.e.,	  culverts)	  and	  farmers	  planting	  crops	  too	  close	  to	  
the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  contributed	  to	  the	  soil	  instability	  around	  the	  FCE’s	  tracks.	  
Coincidentally,	  the	  2000	  calamity	  and	  resulting	  halt	  in	  train	  service	  occurred	  just	  as	  
a	  study	  began	  examining	  broader	  environmental	  policy	  in	  the	  forest	  corridor.64	  The	  
Projet	  d’Appui	  à	  la	  Gestion	  de	  l’Environnement	  (PAGE)	  study	  ultimately	  concluded	  
that	  without	  regular	  train	  service,	  farmers	  would	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  switch	  from	  
producing	  tree-­‐based	  cash	  crops	  to	  a	  self-­‐sufficiency	  lifestyle	  based	  on	  tavy	  (slash-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Given	  the	  political	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  and	  forest-­‐related	  environmental	  issues,	  LDI	  and	  
its	  partners	  commissioned	  the	  PAGE	  study	  to	  provide	  an	  impartial	  evaluation	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  
were	  being	  raised.	  
Source:	  K.	  Freudenberger	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and-­‐burn	  agriculture)	  that	  produced	  rice	  and	  manioc	  for	  their	  families	  
(Freudenberger	  and	  Freudenberger	  2002:	  189-­‐190).	  It	  projected	  that	  95,000	  
hectares	  of	  deforestation	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	  keeping	  the	  FCE	  running	  (ibid.:	  190).	  
The	  food-­‐security	  issues	  combined	  with	  the	  environmental	  implications	  of	  
deforesting	  an	  area	  with	  some	  of	  the	  most	  threatened	  fauna	  and	  flora	  species	  in	  the	  
world	  reinforced	  the	  importance	  of	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  FCE’s	  condition.	  The	  
Bank’s	  position	  on	  considering	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts	  had	  evolved	  
substantially	  since	  the	  1980s	  when	  it	  had	  originally	  called	  for	  the	  line’s	  closure	  (Fox	  
and	  Brown	  1998:	  2;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998;	  Ebrahim	  and	  Herz	  2007:	  9-­‐10).	  While	  
many	  populations	  need	  help	  with	  development	  or	  environmental	  issues	  with	  the	  
addition	  of	  new	  infrastructure	  and	  services,	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  FCE	  argued	  that	  
the	  best	  way	  to	  avert	  an	  environmental	  and	  social	  disaster	  was	  as	  clear	  as	  keeping	  
what	  already	  existed.	  Armed	  with	  the	  PAGE	  study’s	  findings	  that	  justified	  
rehabilitation	  funding	  for	  the	  FCE,	  LDI	  staff	  and	  their	  consultants	  approached	  donor	  
agencies	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FCE-­‐Rehabilitation	  project	  (FCER).	  	  
The	  FCER	  became	  a	  large	  supporter	  of	  ADIFCE	  and	  vice	  versa.	  FCER	  provided	  
ADIFCE	  with	  funding	  to	  support	  administrative	  and	  outreach	  activities	  while	  they	  
both	  worked	  to	  develop	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  funding	  source	  for	  the	  TCSO.	  ADIFCE	  in	  
turn	  supported	  FCER	  activities	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  liaison	  to	  local	  communities.	  ADIFCE	  
served	  as	  the	  intermediary	  with	  villages	  to	  implement	  strategies	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  
the	  line	  and	  to	  resolve	  issues	  related	  to	  land	  tenure	  next	  to	  the	  line.	  In	  November	  
2000,	  FCER	  staff	  and	  ADIFCE	  leaders	  also	  helped	  launch	  an	  organization	  called	  the	  
Organisme	  Public	  de	  Coopération	  Inter-­‐communale	  (OPCI)	  that	  consisted	  of	  mayors	  
from	  the	  communities	  along	  the	  FCE	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  The	  intention	  of	  this	  
inter-­‐jurisdictional	  entity	  was	  to	  build	  political	  support	  at	  the	  local,	  regional	  and	  
national	  level	  by	  fostering	  a	  spirit	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  mayors	  to	  support	  the	  
FCE.	  These	  mayors,	  collectively,	  had	  more	  power	  than	  the	  individuals	  who	  made	  up	  
ADIFCE,	  which	  is	  why	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  OPCI	  could	  more	  effectively	  advocate	  to	  
national	  public	  officials	  and	  IDI	  staff	  during	  the	  rehabilitation	  and	  privatization	  
process	  (ibid.).	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In	  fact,	  the	  overall	  strategy	  conceived	  by	  FCER	  was	  to	  put	  up	  a	  united	  front	  to	  
those	  who	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  affect	  the	  line’s	  future,	  whether	  it	  was	  Bank	  staff	  or	  
Malagasy	  ministry	  officials.	  This	  strategy	  aimed	  to	  produce	  a	  synergistic	  effect	  
where	  each	  stakeholder	  would	  be	  stronger	  than	  if	  they	  acted	  alone.	  ADIFCE	  
therefore	  worked	  with	  all	  of	  the	  partners	  involved	  in	  the	  rehabilitation	  effort	  and	  by	  
design	  there	  was	  great	  overlap	  among	  these	  stakeholders.	  Interestingly,	  although	  
ADIFCE	  occasionally	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  national	  government	  and	  participated	  in	  
joint	  meetings,	  they	  conducted	  relatively	  little	  lobbying	  of	  national	  officials	  and	  their	  
contact	  with	  IDIs	  was	  restricted	  to	  FCER-­‐facilitated	  meetings.65	  One	  Bank	  document	  
notes	  community	  organization	  around	  the	  effort	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  FCE	  included	  
OPCI	  and	  agricultural	  CSOs,	  but	  no	  reference	  was	  made	  to	  ADIFCE’s	  existence	  
(World	  Bank	  2002:	  43).	  The	  ADIFCE’s	  role	  in	  this	  consortium,	  therefore,	  was	  
primarily	  to	  validate	  and	  build	  support	  among	  the	  local	  population	  for	  the	  
rehabilitation	  efforts	  occurring	  along	  the	  line.	  ADIFCE	  worked	  on	  the	  front	  lines	  and	  
with	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  communities	  along	  the	  railway	  to	  unify	  the	  population	  behind	  
a	  common	  vision	  of	  the	  FCE	  that	  would	  increase	  its	  reliability	  for	  all	  users.	  
Empowering	  Malagasy	  populations	  most	  affected	  by	  a	  potential	  FCE	  closure	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  rehabilitation	  process	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  sensitize	  
them	  to	  the	  environmental	  ramifications.	  The	  next	  section	  discusses	  the	  
interventions	  in	  which	  ADIFCE	  played	  a	  role	  to	  prevent	  the	  railway	  from	  closing.	  	  
	  
V. Interventions	  with,	  by	  and	  for	  Civil	  Society	  
Rehabilitating	  the	  FCE	  was	  more	  complicated	  than	  simply	  finding	  the	  money	  to	  
renew	  the	  existing	  physical	  infrastructure.	  The	  participation	  and	  support	  of	  villagers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Samuel	  Razanamapisa	  wrote	  to	  the	  minister	  of	  public	  works,	  transportation	  and	  meteorology	  on	  
03	  October	  2006	  to	  express	  their	  organization’s	  concerns	  over	  the	  delay	  in	  privatizing	  the	  railway,	  
which	  would	  have	  led	  to	  investment	  in	  the	  FCE.	  He	  requested	  support	  from	  the	  government	  for	  
maintaining	  the	  railway	  in	  the	  meanwhile.	  He	  wrote	  another	  letter	  to	  the	  new	  minister	  of	  
transportation	  and	  tourism	  on	  21	  March	  2007	  introducing	  ADIFCE	  and	  other	  actors	  while	  also	  asking	  
for	  continued	  government	  support	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  rolling	  stock.	  The	  lobbying	  of	  government	  officials	  at	  
the	  national	  level	  was	  essentially	  left	  to	  OPCI	  because,	  according	  to	  ADIFCE’s	  president,	  it	  was	  better	  
if	  the	  mayors	  who	  represented	  the	  population	  wrote	  the	  letters	  (SSI,	  Fianarantsoa,	  Jun	  2008).	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was	  essential	  to	  protect	  the	  physical	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  line	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
efficient	  but	  highly	  damaging	  practice	  of	  tavy	  that	  was	  occurring	  too	  close	  to	  the	  
right-­‐of-­‐way.	  Simply	  prohibiting	  this	  activity	  would	  not	  have	  been	  enough	  and	  
would	  have	  created	  major	  problems	  with	  enforcement	  (if	  it	  occurred	  at	  all).	  Making	  
inroads	  into	  these	  dispersed	  communities	  and	  changing	  ingrained	  cultural	  practices	  
that	  were	  harming	  the	  railway	  was	  a	  demanding	  task.	  Having	  local	  leaders	  advocate	  
on	  behalf	  of	  the	  interventions	  gave	  these	  changes	  more	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  
population	  and	  created	  support	  that	  had	  surprising	  results.	  	  
	  
1. The	  Heritage	  Campaign	  	  
ADIFCE	  was	  most	  actively	  involved	  in	  a	  major	  outreach	  effort	  called	  the	  
“Heritage	  Campaign,”	  which	  aimed	  to	  protect	  the	  railway.	  When	  FCER	  staff	  initiated	  
a	  participatory	  research	  process	  with	  communities	  along	  the	  railway	  to	  better	  
understand	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  railway	  closure,	  their	  Malagasy	  and	  expatriate	  staff	  
began	  to	  realize	  that	  heritage	  was	  a	  key	  motivation	  for	  rural	  people	  to	  protect	  the	  
railway	  because	  it	  conferred	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership.	  Portraying	  the	  FCE	  as	  a	  heritage	  
started	  after	  a	  mayor	  along	  the	  line	  made	  the	  observation	  during	  a	  post-­‐cyclone	  
meeting	  that	  the	  FCE	  needed	  to	  be	  cared	  for	  as	  a	  heritage	  because	  their	  ancestors	  
had	  sacrificed	  so	  much	  to	  build	  it	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  26,	  Fianarantsoa,	  10	  Oct	  
2009).	  This	  sentiment	  evolved	  into	  an	  oft-­‐repeated	  slogan,	  Harovy	  ny	  Lalamby	  fa	  
Lovantsika	  (“Save	  the	  train	  because	  it’s	  our	  heritage”),	  which	  ADIFCE	  placed	  at	  the	  
center	  of	  their	  communications	  campaign	  to	  unite	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  train	  
service	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).66	  	  
The	  FCE’s	  strong	  sense	  of	  heritage	  is	  inseparable	  from	  its	  history	  –	  particularly	  
the	  forced	  labor	  program	  that	  facilitated	  its	  creation:	  the	  Service	  de	  la	  Main	  d’Oeuvre	  
des	  Travaux	  d’Intérêt	  Général	  (SMOTIG).	  Given	  the	  difficulty	  in	  recruiting	  voluntary	  
labor	  for	  large	  public	  works	  projects,	  the	  colonial	  administration	  passed	  a	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Variants	  of	  this	  slogan	  exist,	  such	  as	  Lovantsika	  ny	  Lalamby	  ka	  Arovy	  (“The	  train	  is	  our	  heritage	  so	  
save	  it”).	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allowing	  it	  to	  requisition	  Malagasy	  men	  who	  were	  liable	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  French	  
military	  but	  who	  were	  never	  actually	  drafted	  (Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  446).	  
Rather	  than	  accept	  the	  label	  of	  forced	  labor	  subsequently	  raised	  by	  critics	  upon	  
SMOTIG’s	  creation,	  Madagascar’s	  Governor	  General	  sought	  to	  reframe	  it	  as	  
“obligatory	  labor”	  just	  like	  military	  service	  (Olivier	  1931:	  103).	  Colonial	  officials	  
sought	  to	  reinforce	  this	  portrayal	  of	  the	  program	  as	  military	  service	  by	  requiring	  
these	  “pioneers”	  to	  wear	  standard-­‐issue	  clothing,	  undergo	  military	  training,	  and	  
conduct	  drills	  during	  their	  two	  to	  three	  years	  of	  service	  to	  the	  colony.	  Their	  primary	  
activity,	  though,	  was	  manual	  labor.	  	  
The	  French	  would	  most	  likely	  never	  have	  built	  the	  FCE	  without	  SMOTIG	  
(Thompson	  and	  Adloff	  1965:	  446),	  but	  the	  FCE’s	  construction	  came	  at	  a	  high	  cost	  to	  
the	  local	  population	  and	  this	  made	  it	  such	  a	  memorable	  program	  –	  even	  among	  
younger	  members	  of	  Malagasy	  society	  (Sharp	  2003:	  82).	  French	  efforts	  to	  allay	  
international	  concerns	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  using	  this	  forced	  labor	  program	  actually	  
increased	  Malagasy	  dislike	  by	  extending	  the	  period	  of	  service	  to	  at	  least	  two	  years	  in	  
an	  atmosphere	  of	  intense	  surveillance,	  abuse	  and	  discipline	  (Sharp	  2003:	  80;	  
Sodikoff	  2005:	  419).	  Deaths	  during	  service	  were	  not	  uncommon	  and	  the	  FCE	  had	  the	  
highest	  of	  any	  of	  the	  public	  works	  projects	  (Olivier	  1928:	  2;	  SMOTIG	  1930:	  41;	  
Coursin	  1930:	  61	  in	  Sodikoff	  2005:	  419).	  The	  absence	  of	  any	  references	  to	  
repatriation	  and	  the	  significant	  costs	  it	  would	  have	  incurred	  suggest	  that	  the	  French	  
did	  not	  return	  the	  bodies	  of	  fallen	  workers	  to	  their	  home	  villages	  where	  they	  could	  
be	  put	  to	  rest	  in	  family	  tombs	  (Kolozsvari	  2012:	  16).	  SMOTIG	  effectively	  made	  the	  
FCE	  into	  both	  a	  symbol	  of	  workers’	  suffering	  and	  a	  makeshift	  tomb	  for	  those	  
workers	  whose	  bodies	  were	  not	  recovered	  (ibid.:	  4).	  
So	  while	  SMOTIG	  workers	  built	  a	  tangible	  structure	  that	  has	  endured	  many	  
decades	  of	  use	  and	  connected	  people	  physically,	  key	  stakeholders	  recognized	  that	  
these	  men’s	  personal	  sacrifice	  also	  left	  behind	  an	  intangible	  heritage	  that	  could	  
unite	  the	  population	  behind	  the	  FCE.	  Both	  project	  staff	  and	  villagers	  stated	  that	  the	  
sentiment	  had	  already	  existed	  along	  the	  line	  before	  FCER	  helped	  improve	  it	  (SSI	  
with:	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008;	  SSI	  with	  Informant	  23,	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Fianarantsoa,	  25	  Sep	  2009;	  SSI	  with	  Informant	  26,	  Fianarantsoa,	  10	  Oct	  2009;	  
Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  30	  Aug	  2009;	  SMOTIG	  sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  
Sep	  2009).	  Railway	  supporters	  believed	  that	  strengthening	  people’s	  sense	  of	  
ownership	  over	  the	  line	  would	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  would	  protect	  it	  for	  
themselves	  and	  future	  generations.	  FCE	  supporters	  invoked	  the	  memory	  of	  these	  
workers	  to	  unite	  villagers	  behind	  efforts	  to	  protect	  and	  rehabilitate	  the	  railway	  by	  
asserting	  that	  the	  railway	  was	  everyone’s	  heritage.	  	  
The	  heritage	  campaign	  proved	  critical	  to	  building	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  and	  
solidarity	  along	  the	  line	  –	  even	  leading	  to	  the	  local	  christening	  of	  the	  FCE	  as	  the	  
“Heritage	  Railway.”	  This	  “sensibilisation”	  or	  sensitizing	  effort	  was	  designed	  to	  incite	  
the	  population	  to	  maintain	  and	  protect	  the	  railway	  because	  they	  were	  the	  ones	  who	  
benefited	  from	  it.67	  FCER	  director	  Karen	  Freudenberger	  noted,	  “we	  did	  not	  create	  
that	  ownership,	  but	  we	  identified	  that	  it	  existed,	  figured	  out	  how	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  
amorphous,	  disparate	  sentiment	  that	  was	  floating	  around	  out	  there,	  and	  then	  
packaged	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  it	  a	  positive	  ‘usable’	  force	  in	  the	  community”	  
(Correspondence	  with	  Karen	  Freudenberger,	  28	  Jul	  2009).	  ADIFCE’s	  article	  of	  
incorporation	  referring	  to	  the	  “acquired”	  nature	  of	  the	  FCE	  seems	  to	  confirm	  this.	  
ADIFCE	  participated	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  inform	  the	  population	  about	  the	  meaning	  
behind	  the	  Heritage	  Campaign	  and	  slogan	  that	  encapsulated	  the	  railway’s	  cultural	  
significance	  and	  value.	  
ADIFCE	  validated	  the	  idea	  the	  railway	  was	  a	  heritage	  in	  its	  communications	  and	  
participation	  in	  public	  meetings.	  They	  also	  helped	  propagate	  this	  message	  through	  
its	  outreach	  (e.g.,	  newsletters,	  meetings,	  individual	  contacts,	  etc.).	  They	  even	  
adopted	  this	  slogan	  as	  their	  own	  to	  place	  on	  their	  letterhead	  and	  newsletters.	  The	  
slogan	  was	  also	  written	  on	  wood	  signs	  along	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  and	  posted	  at	  some	  
stations’	  notice	  boards.	  This	  message	  was	  carried	  in	  various	  mediums,	  including	  by	  
a	  theatrical	  group	  that	  was	  hired	  by	  FCER	  to	  perform	  a	  puppet	  show	  at	  each	  station	  
that	  explained	  why	  “the	  FCE	  is	  ours”	  (Freudenberger	  2000:	  7).	  Every	  year,	  the	  FCE	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Sensibilisation	  is	  a	  French	  word	  that	  most	  closely	  translates	  into	  “to	  sensitize.”	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staff,	  ADIFCE	  and	  local	  Malagasy	  hold	  a	  ceremony	  at	  a	  monument	  at	  a	  famous	  point	  
on	  the	  railway	  recognizing	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  SMOTIG	  workers	  and	  the	  victims	  of	  1947	  
(SSI	  with	  Informant	  1,	  Fianarantsoa,	  27	  Aug	  2009).	  Informants	  consistently	  link	  
ADIFCE	  with	  the	  Heritage	  Campaign	  because	  its	  local	  leaders	  and	  general	  members	  
were	  on	  the	  front	  lines	  of	  the	  effort.	  	  
When	  asked	  about	  ADIFCE,	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  FCE,	  or	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
railway	  line,	  informants	  readily	  recalled	  variations	  of	  the	  heritage	  slogan.	  Even	  some	  
IDI	  staff	  recalled	  the	  Heritage	  Campaign’s	  slogan	  or	  used	  the	  key	  word	  heritage	  
when	  discussing	  the	  railway	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  10,	  Antananarivo,	  16	  Jul	  2008;	  SSI	  
with	  Informant	  32,	  Phone	  interview,	  22	  Apr	  2011).	  This	  idea	  of	  the	  line	  being	  a	  
heritage	  also	  made	  it	  into	  official	  reports	  about	  the	  FCE	  intended	  for	  national	  and	  
international	  audiences	  (Weisema	  et	  al.	  2001:	  26).	  The	  broad	  appeal	  of	  the	  slogan,	  
and	  the	  abstention	  of	  specifying	  from	  whom	  it	  is	  a	  heritage,	  arguably	  makes	  it	  more	  
effective.	  Some	  Malagasy	  villagers	  believed	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  heritage	  from	  the	  
French	  who	  ordered	  it	  built,	  while	  other	  members	  of	  the	  general	  public	  said	  it	  was	  
from	  the	  pioneers	  who	  actually	  built	  it.	  Some	  informants	  from	  the	  general	  public	  
thought	  it	  was	  a	  heritage	  from	  both	  (SMOTIG	  Sons	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  
2009).	  	  
Today,	  descendants	  of	  SMOTIG	  workers	  continue	  to	  state	  that	  letting	  the	  railway	  
close	  would	  be	  disrespectful	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  their	  ancestors	  who	  reportedly	  
suffered	  and	  sacrificed	  so	  much.	  The	  concept	  of	  “sacrifice”	  often	  surfaces	  in	  
discussions	  about	  SMOTIG	  and	  the	  FCE	  and	  workers’	  suffering	  has	  proved	  
memorable	  for	  subsequent	  generations	  born	  long	  after	  the	  FCE	  was	  finished.	  FCER	  
Director	  Karen	  Freudenberger	  noted,	  “what	  villagers	  told	  us	  during	  the	  
[participatory	  research	  process]	  was	  in	  so	  many	  cases	  that	  their	  ancestors	  had	  died	  
building	  the	  railway	  and	  that	  to	  let	  the	  railway	  die	  would	  be	  sacrilegious	  to	  the	  
memory	  of	  those	  who	  had	  died	  in	  its	  construction”	  (Correspondence	  with	  Karen	  
Freudenberger,	  28	  Jul	  2009).	  Ancestors	  in	  Malagasy	  culture	  are	  viewed	  as	  always	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ever-­‐present	  (Dahl	  1999:	  26-­‐27).68	  Informants	  were	  united	  in	  their	  belief	  that	  they	  
had	  a	  duty	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  this	  inheritance	  or	  national	  patrimony	  would	  not	  close.	  	  
Whereas	  ownership	  questions	  for	  roads	  and	  who	  should	  maintain	  them	  often	  
arise	  (Porter	  2002:	  293-­‐297),	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  manifested	  itself	  not	  only	  in	  
planned	  interventions,	  but	  also	  through	  more	  spontaneous	  efforts	  such	  as	  the	  
clearing	  tracks	  of	  dirt	  and	  branches	  after	  storms	  or	  by	  pushing	  the	  broken-­‐down	  
locomotive	  over	  100	  kilometers	  back	  to	  Fianarantsoa	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  1,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  23	  Jun	  2008	  and	  27	  Aug	  2009;	  Elders	  focus	  group,	  Ambila,	  12	  Sep	  
2009;	  ADIFCE	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  slogan	  and	  outreach	  effort	  brought	  the	  significance	  of	  FCE’s	  history	  to	  the	  
attention	  of	  many	  younger	  Malagasy	  and	  rekindled	  the	  memory	  of	  village	  elders.	  As	  
Simon	  and	  Ashley	  have	  proposed,	  “reduced	  to	  its	  simplest	  form,	  heritage	  refers	  to	  
the	  contemporary	  activities	  through	  which	  the	  past	  comes	  to	  matter	  in	  the	  
present…Within	  such	  activities,	  judgments	  are	  made	  as	  to	  which	  particular	  aspects	  
of	  the	  past	  are	  worthy	  of	  preservation	  and	  are	  of	  potential	  significance	  for	  social	  
memory”	  (Simon	  and	  Ashley	  2010:	  247).	  The	  FCE	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  CSOs	  can	  use	  
this	  sense	  of	  heritage	  to	  help	  spur	  even	  younger	  generations	  to	  support	  
development	  and	  maintenance	  efforts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Also	  see	  chapter	  7	  in	  Kottak	  1980	  for	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  enduring	  role	  afforded	  to	  deceased	  
ancestors	  in	  the	  Betsileo	  culture,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  principal	  ethnicities	  along	  the	  FCE.	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Figure	  17	  Pushing	  the	  FCE’s	  broken-­‐down	  locomotive	  	  
2. Effective	  Laws	  in	  a	  Rural	  Setting:	  The	  Dinabe	  and	  Dina-­‐Paritra	  
Building	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  and	  solidarity	  along	  the	  railway	  corridor	  set	  the	  
stage	  for	  an	  important	  intervention	  affecting	  all	  of	  the	  communities.	  Whereas	  some	  
villagers	  expended	  enormous	  energy	  to	  keep	  the	  FCE	  running,	  others	  needed	  more	  
encouragement	  to	  respect	  the	  railway.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  some	  farmers	  used	  
tavy	  and	  planted	  annual	  crops	  too	  close	  to	  the	  railway,	  which	  increased	  the	  chances	  
that	  landslides	  and	  washouts	  would	  cut	  the	  line.	  The	  FCE	  owns	  approximately	  50	  
meters	  of	  land	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  tracks.	  Some	  of	  this	  land	  was	  rented	  out	  to	  
farmers,	  but	  some	  of	  the	  land	  was	  being	  cultivated	  by	  squatters	  (Hengchaovanich	  
and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  5).	  Unité	  FCE,	  a	  consultancy	  team	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  
technical	  experts	  worked	  with	  ADIFCE	  to	  identify	  85	  families	  along	  the	  line	  who	  
were	  causing	  damage	  to	  the	  railway	  tracks	  from	  their	  agricultural	  production	  
(Freudenberger	  2000:	  7).	  For	  both	  practical	  and	  ethical	  reasons,	  though,	  the	  FCE	  
administration	  could	  not	  prohibit	  farmers	  from	  cultivating	  on	  this	  land	  and	  in	  ways	  
that	  met	  their	  immediate	  food	  security	  needs	  (Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  
2003:	  5).	  
(Source:	  Dauphin	  Ramonjarisoa)	  
	   	  141	  
The	  people	  trying	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  FCE	  needed	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  halt	  tavy	  in	  
rural	  areas	  where	  the	  central	  governments’	  police	  powers	  were	  relatively	  weak.	  
ADIFCE	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  getting	  these	  farmers	  to	  change	  land	  use	  practices	  by	  
helping	  institute	  a	  traditional	  Malagasy	  law	  known	  as	  a	  dina.	  In	  a	  country	  that	  is	  
known	  for	  the	  difficulty	  of	  enforcing	  laws	  handed	  down	  from	  the	  national	  
government,	  one	  author	  states,	  “in	  practice,	  a	  social	  pact	  [like	  the	  dina]	  is	  a	  force	  of	  
regulation	  between	  its	  members”	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  The	  dinabe,	  which	  was	  the	  
overarching	  dina	  for	  the	  entire	  FCE	  corridor,	  had	  various	  articles	  dictating	  that	  
users	  respect	  the	  line	  such	  as	  by	  cleaning	  around	  the	  stations,	  keeping	  ditches	  free	  
from	  weeds	  and	  mud,	  and	  clearing	  drainage	  structures	  of	  debris	  when	  full	  
(Dennison	  et	  al.	  2002:	  25;	  SSI	  with	  Informant	  17,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	  
However,	  the	  dinabe	  had	  the	  “central	  intention	  of	  halting	  all	  crop	  production	  within	  
two	  meters	  of	  the	  tracks	  and	  bridges”	  to	  protect	  the	  drainage	  infrastructure	  
(Freudenberger	  2000:	  7).	  The	  dinabe	  also	  had	  the	  goal	  of	  stopping	  all	  tavy	  in	  the	  50-­‐
meter	  band	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  tracks	  to	  halt	  erosion	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  25).	  
Implementing	  the	  dinabe	  necessitated	  adopting	  more	  specific	  dina-­‐paritra	  in	  the	  
three	  geographical	  zones	  along	  the	  line.	  The	  dina-­‐paritra	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  
larger	  dinabe,	  but	  customized	  it	  to	  the	  particular	  area	  to	  make	  its	  implementation	  
more	  effective.	  
Key	  FCE	  supporters,	  including	  ADIFCE	  leaders,	  drew	  upon	  and	  reinforced	  the	  
idea	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  heritage	  in	  their	  effort	  to	  institute	  the	  dinabe.	  In	  order	  to	  
implement	  the	  dinabe,	  they	  organized	  a	  traditional	  ritual	  sacrifice	  called	  joro	  (FCER	  
2001:	  2,	  4).	  Joro	  is	  a	  “ceremony	  that	  is	  held	  to	  honor	  the	  ancestors	  and	  give	  thanks	  
for	  their	  blessing	  and	  assistance”	  (Sharp	  1993:	  167).	  According	  to	  Dahl,	  
If	  a	  project…is	  to	  succeed,	  the	  fady	  [taboo]	  has	  to	  be	  lifted	  before	  the	  enterprise	  
starts.	  This	  is	  often	  done	  with	  the	  help	  of	  joro	  (invocation	  and	  eventually	  
sacrifice).	  A	  cow	  or	  calf	  is	  slaughtered,	  and	  the	  traditional	  healer	  performs	  rites	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and	  offers	  prayers	  to	  the	  ancestors	  to	  take	  away	  all	  sorts	  of	  fady.	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  
contractual	  agreement	  with	  the	  ancestors.	  (Dahl	  1999:	  65).69	  
Important	  elders	  performed	  the	  joro	  for	  the	  dinabe	  and	  this	  was	  a	  very	  public	  act	  
recognizing	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  FCE	  and	  Malagasy	  ancestors.	  Practicing	  
tavy,	  thereby,	  became	  synonymous	  with	  dishonoring	  the	  ancestors	  and	  risked	  the	  
condemnation	  by	  local	  officials,	  respected	  elders	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  
community.	  	  
ADIFCE	  maintained	  open	  communications	  with	  the	  communities	  about	  the	  
progress	  of	  the	  rehabilitation	  and	  helped	  formalize	  the	  overarching	  dinabe	  for	  the	  
corridor	  by	  organizing	  the	  appropriate	  cultural	  rituals	  and	  sacrifices.	  Specifically,	  
ADIFCE	  participated	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  implement	  the	  dinabe	  by	  getting	  local	  leaders	  
and	  elected	  officials	  to	  back	  the	  dina-­‐paritra	  and	  ensure	  farmers	  abided	  by	  the	  
terms.	  One	  Mpanjaka	  described	  the	  dinabe	  as	  the	  “tool	  of	  the	  ADIFCE’s	  objective	  to	  
protect	  the	  railway”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  17,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	  They	  
also	  participated	  in	  formalizing	  the	  agreement	  with	  the	  joro.	  	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  dinabe	  when	  measured	  in	  reducing	  tavy	  is	  mixed	  as	  
results	  varied	  by	  location	  and	  as	  slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture	  increases.	  Some	  
communes	  applied	  it	  more	  stringently	  than	  others,	  with	  a	  few	  viewing	  the	  dina-­‐
paritra	  as	  really	  fitting	  the	  situation	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  1,	  Fianarantsoa,	  03	  Sep	  
2009).	  ADIFCE	  members	  would	  also	  report	  instances	  of	  tavy	  to	  OPCI,	  which	  would	  
then	  take	  action.	  Yet	  a	  key	  impact	  of	  instituting	  the	  dinabe	  was	  sensitizing	  Malagasy	  
to	  the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  tavy.	  During	  conversations	  about	  the	  dinabe	  and	  
other	  environmental	  efforts,	  Malagasy	  villagers	  volunteered	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
environmental	  ramifications	  rampant	  deforestation	  would	  have	  on	  their	  
community,	  including	  on	  the	  forest’s	  hydrology	  so	  important	  for	  their	  long-­‐term	  
cultivation	  needs	  (Women’s	  Focus	  Group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009;	  Young	  Men’s	  
Focus	  Group,	  Tolongoina,	  23	  Sep	  2009).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Feeley-­‐Harnik	  notes,	  “the	  elder	  male	  members	  of	  lineages	  are	  formally	  charged	  with	  interceding	  
between	  the	  living	  and	  their	  dead	  ancestors	  by	  means	  of	  the	  ritual	  known	  as	  joro”	  (Feeley-­‐Harnik	  
1984:	  3).	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3. Vetiver	  Planting	  Program	  	  
Halting	  the	  practice	  of	  tavy	  next	  to	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  by	  having	  them	  respect	  the	  
dina	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  thwart	  the	  immediate	  threat	  future	  storms	  posed	  to	  the	  line.	  
Even	  if	  farmers	  immediately	  halted	  production	  on	  existing	  fields	  next	  to	  the	  railway,	  
the	  lack	  of	  deep-­‐rooted	  vegetation	  and	  poor	  drainage	  meant	  the	  hillsides	  adjacent	  to	  
the	  railway	  remained	  vulnerable	  to	  erosion.	  Development	  experts	  found	  a	  solution	  
to	  reinforce	  the	  hillsides	  in	  the	  plant	  called	  vetiver	  (Chrysopogon	  zizanioides)	  –	  a	  
deep-­‐rooted,	  non-­‐invasive	  plant	  that	  can	  stabilize	  even	  steep	  hillsides.	  CAP	  had	  
already	  used	  vetiver	  in	  its	  rural	  roads	  projects	  and	  a	  former	  director	  proposed	  this	  
solution	  to	  FCER	  staff	  for	  its	  ability	  to	  prevent	  erosion	  along	  an	  already	  tenuous	  line	  
(CAP	  1999:	  8;	  Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  3).	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  dina,	  changing	  agricultural	  practices	  along	  
the	  line	  was	  as	  difficult	  as	  it	  was	  essential.	  Many	  rural	  families	  were	  living	  in	  a	  state	  
of	  food	  insecurity	  and	  were	  producing	  annual	  food	  crops	  on	  the	  land	  next	  to	  the	  FCE	  
both	  for	  their	  own	  consumption	  and	  to	  generate	  revenue.	  Getting	  farmers	  to	  plant	  
vetiver	  seemingly	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  food	  security	  realities	  facing	  
households	  practicing	  tavy	  on	  the	  line.	  FCER	  devised	  a	  farmland	  stabilization	  model,	  
though,	  that	  would	  allow	  smallholders	  to	  use	  intercropping	  techniques	  that	  
incorporated	  vetiver	  on	  some	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  hillsides	  (Hengchaovanich	  and	  
Freudenberger	  2003:	  9-­‐10).	  Rows	  of	  vetiver	  could	  stabilize	  the	  hillsides	  while	  still	  
providing	  farmers	  with	  space	  to	  grow	  annual	  crops	  for	  their	  immediate	  needs	  and	  
perennial	  tree-­‐based	  crops	  for	  long-­‐term	  economic	  security	  (ibid.:	  6).	  This	  provided	  
farmers	  with	  security	  in	  two	  ways.	  It	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  they	  would	  lose	  their	  
crops	  due	  to	  erosion	  on	  their	  own	  plot.	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  they	  would	  have	  more	  
confidence	  that	  others’	  practices	  would	  not	  cause	  a	  line-­‐closing	  landslide.	  	  
Finding	  an	  adequate	  amount	  of	  vetiver	  for	  a	  reasonable	  price	  posed	  a	  challenge	  
because	  availability	  was	  so	  low	  at	  local	  nurseries	  (ibid.:	  11).	  As	  a	  way	  to	  bring	  down	  
the	  costs	  and	  increase	  supply,	  FCER	  devised	  a	  plan	  to	  loan	  farmers	  vetiver	  slips,	  
which	  they	  would	  pay	  back	  with	  vetiver	  slips	  to	  the	  project	  –	  thereby	  allowing	  new	  
participating	  farmers	  access	  to	  reasonably	  priced	  vetiver	  (ibid.:	  10).	  Eventually,	  this	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model	  dropped	  the	  price	  per	  tuft	  of	  25	  slips	  from	  roughly	  $4	  down	  to	  $0.28,	  making	  
it	  affordable	  to	  farmers	  to	  finance	  themselves	  (ibid.:	  11).	  
Getting	  skeptical	  farmers	  interested	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  though,	  took	  some	  effort	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  Unité	  FCE.	  ADIFCE	  members	  set	  to	  work	  encouraging	  farmers	  along	  
the	  line	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  vetiver	  project	  by	  extolling	  the	  plant’s	  benefits	  and	  the	  
results	  seen	  in	  other	  areas	  (Women’s	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  01	  Sep	  2009;	  SSI	  with	  
Informant	  21,	  Sahasinaka,	  18	  Sep	  2009).	  This	  outreach	  dovetailed	  well	  with	  their	  
push	  to	  get	  these	  farmers	  to	  respect	  the	  dina.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  FCE	  administration	  
formalized	  the	  relationship	  with	  many	  of	  the	  farmers	  through	  permits	  that	  provided	  
some	  rent	  to	  the	  railway	  and	  long-­‐term	  tenure	  to	  the	  farmers	  –	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  
essentially	  squatting	  on	  the	  land	  (Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  10).	  
This	  agreement	  prohibited	  growing	  rice	  and	  manioc,	  but	  allowed	  smallholders	  to	  
benefit	  from	  trees	  that	  they	  planted.70	  FCER	  also	  provided	  perennial	  fruit	  trees	  for	  
free	  to	  the	  initial	  participants	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  partake	  in	  the	  project	  (ibid.:	  11).	  	  
Smallholders	  became	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  this	  intervention	  when	  they	  saw	  
their	  neighbors’	  fields	  stabilize	  and	  improve	  in	  fertility	  (ibid.).	  Some	  farmers	  were	  
even	  able	  to	  generate	  income	  by	  selling	  plants	  after	  meeting	  the	  commitments	  of	  
their	  loan	  (ibid.:	  10).	  Starting	  out	  with	  just	  90	  farmers,	  the	  program	  soon	  had	  a	  
waiting	  list.	  In	  just	  three	  years,	  over	  600	  peasants	  had	  participated	  in	  growing	  and	  
planting	  roughly	  three	  million	  vetiver	  plants	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  Unité	  FCE	  
(Madagascar-­‐Tribune	  2003).	  Farmers	  who	  planted	  vetiver	  on	  their	  lands	  also	  
erected	  a	  colorful	  panel	  facing	  the	  right-­‐of-­‐way	  that	  displayed	  their	  names	  and	  the	  
railway’s	  slogan	  to	  passing	  trains	  (Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  11).	  
These	  panels	  were	  a	  source	  of	  pride	  and	  a	  sign	  of	  solidarity	  with	  the	  rehabilitation	  
work	  happening	  all	  along	  the	  line.	  The	  results	  of	  these	  efforts	  were	  demonstrated	  in	  
2004	  when	  a	  major	  cyclone	  hit	  this	  area	  twice	  and	  closed	  the	  railway	  for	  only	  one	  
week	  due	  to	  landslides	  that	  deposited	  just	  300	  to	  400	  cubic	  meters	  –	  a	  major	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  The	  FCE	  had	  previously	  only	  tended	  to	  intervene	  in	  squatting	  cases	  on	  its	  land	  when	  villagers	  
planted	  trees	  because	  it	  had	  traditionally	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  way	  to	  transfer	  ownership	  
(Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  5).	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improvement	  over	  the	  150,000	  cubic	  meters	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  cleared	  over	  two	  
months	  in	  2000	  (Payet	  2008:	  5).	  	  
	  
Figure	  18	  Farmer’s	  vetiver	  sign	  with	  heritage	  slogan	  
These	  three	  strategies	  proved	  valuable	  to	  protecting	  the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure,	  
and	  they	  reinforced	  the	  sense	  of	  pride	  and	  shared	  ownership	  of	  the	  line	  that	  already	  
existed.	  In	  addition	  to	  halting	  the	  erosion	  that	  threatened	  the	  line	  during	  each	  storm,	  
the	  solidarity	  that	  ADIFCE	  and	  its	  partners	  helped	  foster	  had	  a	  very	  real	  effect	  that	  
potentially	  impacted	  the	  future	  of	  the	  line	  more	  than	  the	  other	  three	  actions.	  
Specifically,	  it	  facilitated	  the	  creation	  of	  another	  TCSO	  dedicated	  to	  protecting	  the	  
FCE’s	  physical	  infrastructure	  during	  a	  period	  of	  civil	  unrest	  –	  thereby	  ensuring	  that	  
train	  service	  would	  not	  be	  cut.	  
	  
VI. Unintended	  Response	  and	  Unpredictable	  Events:	  the	  Rise	  of	  Civil	  
Society	  
As	  progress	  continued	  in	  the	  post-­‐cyclone	  recovery	  effort,	  a	  political	  storm	  was	  
also	  gathering.	  The	  end	  of	  2001	  in	  Madagascar	  was	  a	  turbulent	  time	  that	  culminated	  
with	  a	  hotly	  contested	  presidential	  election	  between	  the	  mayor	  of	  the	  capital	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Antananarivo,	  Marc	  Ravalomanana,	  and	  incumbent	  president,	  Didier	  Ratsiraka.	  The	  
upheaval	  started	  with	  political	  rallies	  and	  strikes	  contesting	  the	  official	  voting	  
results	  awarding	  a	  run-­‐off	  election	  to	  Ratsiraka	  instead	  of	  an	  outright	  victory	  to	  
Ravalomanana.	  Political	  tensions	  escalated	  further	  when	  Ravalomanana	  declared	  
himself	  winner	  and	  his	  supporters	  swore	  him	  in	  as	  the	  new	  president	  in	  February	  
2002.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  undermine	  support	  in	  Ravalomanana’s	  power	  base,	  
Antananarivo,	  supporters	  of	  Ratsiraka	  blockaded	  the	  national	  routes	  to	  
Antananarivo	  and	  Fianarantsoa,	  and	  also	  halted	  service	  on	  the	  Northern	  Railway	  
connecting	  the	  capital	  and	  the	  main	  port	  in	  Toamasina.	  This	  blockade	  cut	  off	  the	  two	  
major	  cities	  of	  the	  Madagascar’s	  high	  plateau	  from	  the	  fuel	  normally	  imported	  from	  
Toamasina	  as	  well	  as	  the	  salt	  from	  the	  Port	  of	  Toliara	  that	  is	  so	  vital	  for	  human	  
health.	  This	  posed	  a	  grave	  threat	  to	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  central	  highlands’	  
populations.	  	  
	  
Figure	  19	  Roadblocks	  halted	  traffic	  from	  Antananarivo	  to	  the	  Port	  of	  Toamasina71	  
An	  electoral	  decision	  favoring	  Ravalomanana	  in	  April	  2002	  resulted	  in	  some	  
Ratsiraka	  supporters	  making	  a	  decision	  to	  declare	  a	  civil	  war	  (Tiersonnier	  2004:	  
93).	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  blockade	  of	  these	  two	  cities,	  non-­‐uniformed	  militants	  
loyal	  to	  Ratsiraka	  began	  to	  bomb	  the	  road	  bridges	  (ibid.:	  92)	  –	  ultimately	  sabotaging	  
13	  bridges	  (WGPCD	  2002).	  This	  included	  a	  bridge	  on	  the	  road	  from	  Manakara	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  This	  cartoon	  was	  clipped	  from	  an	  unknown	  newspaper	  and	  found	  in	  the	  Freudenberger’s	  archives.	  	  
	   	  147	  
	  
Figure	  20	  and	  Figure	  21	  Sabotaged	  bridges	  halted	  the	  transport	  of	  fuel	  and	  other	  essentials	  to	  
highland	  cities	  	  
Fianarantsoa	  that	  had	  been	  serving	  as	  the	  only	  link	  bringing	  fuel	  to	  the	  highland	  
(SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7,	  8	  and	  25,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008	  and	  06	  Oct	  2009).	  The	  
bombing	  of	  the	  Fatihita	  Bridge	  on	  the	  national	  road	  between	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  
Antananarivo,	  though,	  awoke	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  people	  living	  along	  the	  FCE	  (SSI	  
with	  Informant	  18,	  Manampatrana,	  07	  Sep	  2009;	  ANP	  focus	  groups,	  Ranomena,	  
Manampatrana	  and	  Sahasinaka,	  29	  Aug	  2009,	  09	  Sep	  2009	  and	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  One	  
observer	  commented	  on	  the	  crisis,	  “the	  comedy	  turned	  into	  a	  tragedy	  when	  the	  
bridges	  were	  destroyed	  and	  the	  roadblocks	  that	  asphyxiated	  the	  capital	  ruined	  the	  
economy	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  so	  many	  citizens”	  (Tiersonnier	  2004:	  105).	  	  
With	  all	  major	  roads	  serving	  Madagascar’s	  high	  plateau	  out	  of	  commission,	  the	  
FCE	  started	  playing	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  supplying	  Fianarantsoa	  with	  fuel	  and	  salt,	  much	  
of	  which	  then	  went	  to	  the	  capital	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  and	  25;	  
Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008	  and	  06	  Oct	  2009).	  This	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  railway	  
became	  a	  higher-­‐profile	  target	  for	  saboteurs	  seeking	  to	  cut	  off	  the	  only	  remaining	  
way	  to	  get	  fuel	  and	  other	  supplies	  to	  these	  cities.	  A	  mayor	  who	  was	  aligned	  with	  
Ratsirika’s	  party	  but	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  OPCI	  and	  the	  rehabilitation	  project	  
warned	  other	  actors	  along	  the	  line	  that	  some	  of	  his	  party’s	  militants	  planned	  to	  
attack	  the	  FCE	  next	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008;	  ANP	  
focus	  group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  Railways	  are	  soft	  targets,	  and	  one	  only	  need	  
look	  at	  the	  armed	  conflicts	  that	  have	  closed	  or	  interrupted	  railway	  links	  in	  Angola,	  
Côte	  d’Ivoire,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Mozambique	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  to	  see	  the	  
Source:	  K.	  Freudenberger	   Source:	  K.	  Freudenberger	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very	  real	  threat	  posed	  to	  the	  FCE	  (Bullock	  and	  Gwilliam	  2010:	  229,	  232).	  The	  FCE’s	  
56	  tunnels	  and	  40	  bridges	  spread	  out	  over	  163	  kilometers	  made	  these	  vital	  
infrastructure	  points	  especially	  vulnerable.	  	  
Realizing	  the	  danger	  posed	  to	  the	  FCE,	  key	  Malagasy	  actors	  within	  ADIFCE,	  OPCI	  
and	  the	  FCE	  encouraged	  the	  “raising”	  of	  the	  Andrimasom	  Pokonolona	  (ANP)—
meaning	  “the	  people	  who	  watch”—consisting	  of	  the	  population	  living	  along	  the	  
FCE.72	  They	  organized	  men	  from	  each	  village	  into	  ANP	  groups	  so	  they	  could	  protect	  
the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure	  from	  acts	  of	  sabotage	  (Rarivony	  2002:	  26).	  The	  number	  of	  
“community	  guards”	  on	  duty	  at	  any	  time	  ranged	  anywhere	  from	  a	  handful	  to	  a	  
dozen	  per	  station.	  These	  men	  camped	  out	  all	  night	  along	  the	  FCE’s	  right-­‐of-­‐way,	  
seven	  days	  a	  week	  for	  up	  to	  four	  months	  at	  some	  locations.	  Some	  of	  these	  villagers	  
participated	  voluntarily	  while	  others	  were	  paid	  small	  per	  diem	  amounts.73	  Village	  
leaders	  (mayors,	  Mpanjaka	  and	  elders)	  sometimes	  appointed	  men	  as	  it	  was	  
considered	  both	  a	  hardship	  and	  a	  duty	  to	  their	  community	  and	  the	  country	  (ANP	  
focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).74	  Although	  these	  groups	  received	  some	  
resources	  from	  foreign	  aid	  workers	  via	  ADIFCE	  and	  OPCI	  representatives,	  the	  
communities	  raised	  most	  of	  the	  resources	  on	  their	  own	  to	  support	  the	  men	  who	  
protected	  this	  vital	  infrastructure	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009;	  
ANP	  focus	  group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  
During	  the	  day,	  men	  from	  ANP	  would	  keep	  an	  eye	  out	  for	  any	  strangers	  and	  
would	  try	  to	  find	  out	  what	  business	  they	  had	  in	  their	  town	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  
Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	  At	  night,	  the	  tone	  became	  more	  menacing.	  Armed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Multiple	  informants	  stated	  that	  this	  group	  existed	  before	  the	  2002	  crisis	  and	  was	  not	  specific	  to	  the	  
FCE	  (ANP	  focus	  groups,	  Manampatrana	  and	  Tolongoina,	  09	  Sep	  2009	  and	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  It	  could	  be	  
argued	  that	  the	  ANP	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  neighborhood	  watch	  group	  or	  even	  militia	  rather	  than	  a	  
true	  TCSO.	  Yet	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  FCE,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  fit	  the	  classification	  of	  a	  TCSO	  because	  it	  
was	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  on	  the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure	  and	  was	  both	  member-­‐serving	  and	  in	  the	  public	  
interest.	  Some	  informants	  say	  that	  it	  still	  exists	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing	  theft	  of	  railway	  
materials.	  
73	  These	  men	  reportedly	  used	  this	  money,	  which	  was	  a	  few	  hundred	  Ariary,	  to	  pay	  for	  coffee	  to	  stay	  
up	  at	  night	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  
74	  Women	  in	  one	  village	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  played	  a	  supporting	  role	  in	  ANP	  by	  providing	  support	  
to	  the	  men	  (Women’s	  focus	  group,	  Ranomena,	  01	  Sep	  2009).	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only	  with	  spears,	  knives	  and	  locally	  made	  axes,	  these	  men	  recognized	  that	  this	  was	  a	  
dangerous	  duty	  because	  the	  saboteurs	  would	  likely	  come	  equipped	  with	  firearms	  
(ANP	  focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	  In	  Tolongoina,	  parents	  would	  tell	  
the	  young	  men	  there	  to	  be	  careful	  before	  taking	  up	  their	  watch	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  
Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  At	  the	  high	  profile	  Sahasinaka	  Viaduct,	  these	  men	  lit	  
campfires	  to	  watch	  the	  area,	  but	  stayed	  out	  of	  the	  light	  themselves	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  
shot	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  	  
The	  men	  who	  participated	  in	  ANP	  gave	  differing	  reasons	  for	  taking	  these	  risks.	  In	  
every	  ANP	  focus	  group	  I	  interviewed,	  the	  men	  broached	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  
heritage	  that	  needed	  protection.75	  When	  asked	  if	  they	  realized	  the	  danger	  that	  
awaited	  them	  if	  armed	  saboteurs	  came	  to	  blow	  up	  the	  key	  Sahasinaka	  Viaduct,	  one	  
informant	  stated,	  “it	  would	  be	  worth	  it	  to	  die	  for	  this	  patrimony”	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  
Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  Protecting	  national	  unity	  and	  their	  livelihoods	  also	  came	  
up	  in	  every	  ANP	  focus	  group.	  Mpanjaka	  in	  Sahasinaka	  also	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  
ANP	  near	  the	  viaduct	  to	  help	  prevent	  the	  crisis	  from	  turning	  into	  an	  ethnic	  conflict,	  
which	  they	  were	  told	  was	  a	  goal	  of	  those	  trying	  to	  attack	  the	  FCE	  (ANP	  focus	  group,	  
Sahasinaka,	  17	  Sep	  2009).	  	  
Although	  some	  informants	  downplayed	  the	  possibility	  of	  ethnic	  conflict	  by	  
claiming	  that	  they	  protected	  the	  FCE	  for	  the	  nation,	  other	  informants	  expressed	  
opinions	  that	  indicate	  differences	  could	  have	  become	  more	  pronounced.	  For	  
example,	  one	  member	  of	  ANP	  disagreed	  with	  a	  comrade’s	  claim	  that	  they	  had	  
protected	  the	  railway	  for	  the	  nation:	  “if	  it	  was	  for	  the	  nation,	  then	  the	  people	  who	  
come	  to	  bomb	  are	  also	  from	  the	  nation,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  specific	  enough”	  (ANP	  focus	  
group,	  Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  Although	  making	  a	  distinction	  based	  on	  politics	  or	  
even	  geography	  may	  have	  been	  possible,	  these	  differences	  in	  Madagascar	  tend	  to	  be	  
linked	  with	  ethnicity.	  In	  reference	  to	  geography	  and	  ethnicity,	  Covell	  describes	  
Madagascar	  “not	  an	  island,	  but	  an	  archipelago”	  (Covell	  1987:	  9).	  Evers	  states	  that	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  In	  the	  Manampatrana	  ANP,	  they	  even	  included	  heritage	  in	  the	  category	  of	  national	  unity	  (ANP	  
focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	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outsider	  would	  initially	  learn	  in	  casual	  conversation	  that	  everyone	  is	  “Malagasy”	  but	  
that	  there	  are	  also	  eighteen	  ethnic	  groups	  –	  identities	  that	  she	  suggests	  “owe	  their	  
distinguishing	  features	  more	  to	  the	  hand	  of	  bureaucrats	  than	  to	  that	  of	  nature”	  
(Evers	  2002:	  12).	  Regardless	  of	  how	  they	  developed,	  ethnicity	  is	  an	  issue	  for	  some	  
Malagasy.	  For	  example,	  a	  feeling	  exists	  among	  some	  Betsileo	  that	  the	  Merina	  who	  
hold	  power	  in	  Antananarivo	  (as	  well	  as	  many	  high-­‐level	  government	  positions)	  are	  
threatened	  by	  them	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  want	  to	  keep	  Fianarantsoa	  underdeveloped	  (SSI	  
with	  Informant	  25,	  Fianarantsoa,	  06	  Oct	  2009).	  	  
Fortunately,	  social	  solidarity	  was	  particularly	  high	  along	  the	  FCE	  at	  this	  time.	  A	  
village	  leader	  observed	  that	  the	  rehabilitation	  phase	  of	  the	  FCE	  was	  the	  first	  time	  
since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  colonial	  period	  that,	  in	  a	  region	  with	  three	  ethnicities	  that	  did	  
not	  always	  live	  harmoniously	  together,	  all	  the	  community	  leaders	  along	  the	  line	  
were	  working	  together	  (Madagascar-­‐Tribune	  2003).	  One	  expatriate	  development	  
expert	  noted	  that	  a	  general	  guiding	  principle	  for	  the	  rehabilitation	  process	  and	  
during	  the	  crisis	  was	  that	  one	  could	  be	  “as	  political	  as	  you	  want,	  but	  you	  have	  to	  
support	  the	  FCE”	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).	  This	  
demonstration	  of	  unity,	  especially	  during	  a	  political	  crisis,	  was	  no	  small	  feat.	  The	  
elevation	  of	  passions	  during	  this	  time	  among	  political	  leaders	  and	  activists	  
representing	  both	  major	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	  independent	  parties,	  would	  have	  
potentially	  provided	  fodder	  for	  partisans	  of	  either	  party	  to	  make	  the	  FCE	  a	  political	  
wedge	  to	  gain	  political	  support.	  	  
Ultimately,	  no	  confirmed	  confrontations	  or	  attacks	  occurred	  on	  the	  FCE	  before	  
the	  presidential	  election	  was	  settled	  and	  peace	  returned	  to	  Madagascar.	  Yet	  these	  
men	  emphasize	  the	  value	  of	  deterrence,	  by	  saying	  those	  saboteurs	  who	  might	  have	  
wanted	  to	  harm	  the	  FCE’s	  infrastructure	  were	  well	  informed	  about	  the	  ANP’s	  
presence	  through	  media	  and	  word-­‐of-­‐mouth	  communication	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  
18,	  Manampatrana,	  07	  Sep	  2009;	  ANP	  focus	  group,	  Manampatrana,	  09	  Sep	  2009).	  
Potential	  concessionaires	  bidding	  on	  the	  FCE	  eventually	  heard	  of	  this	  show	  of	  
solidarity.	  Already,	  they	  liked	  that	  the	  FCE	  was	  a	  short	  line	  that	  could	  be	  more	  
readily	  controlled	  given	  the	  difficulty	  in	  protecting	  infrastructure	  spread	  over	  large	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distances	  from	  theft	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  31,	  Phone	  interview,	  15	  Apr	  2011).	  Yet	  it	  
was	  the	  demonstration	  of	  community	  involvement	  that	  got	  their	  attention	  and	  the	  
commitment	  of	  people	  to	  put	  themselves	  in	  harm’s	  way	  that	  convinced	  the	  potential	  
concessionaires	  of	  the	  community’s	  commitment	  to	  protect	  the	  infrastructure	  (i.e.,	  
their	  investment).	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  surprising	  result	  of	  the	  crisis	  was	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
unreliable	  pieces	  of	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  country—almost	  written	  off	  a	  number	  of	  
times	  as	  not	  worth	  the	  cost	  of	  operating—averted	  a	  serious	  humanitarian	  crisis	  for	  
much	  of	  the	  population	  and	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  changing	  the	  country’s	  
political	  trajectory.	  Communities	  along	  the	  corridor,	  which	  had	  already	  been	  
working	  in	  solidarity	  to	  protect	  their	  livelihoods,	  met	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  the	  FCE	  
with	  resolve.	  It	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  all	  of	  the	  efforts	  invested	  by	  
the	  key	  stakeholders,	  including	  ADIFCE,	  in	  unifying	  the	  population	  behind	  the	  
railway.	  Informants	  observed	  that	  public	  support	  for	  the	  FCE	  had	  never	  been	  higher	  
than	  during	  the	  crisis	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  6,	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  July	  2008).	  The	  
crisis	  tested	  their	  mettle,	  and	  they	  found	  they	  persevered	  without	  almost	  any	  
assistance	  from	  expatriate	  development	  workers	  and	  donor	  institutions.	  	  
	  
VII. Conclusion	  and	  Critical	  Reflection	  	  
The	  interventions	  to	  which	  ADIFCE	  contributed	  were	  largely	  successful	  in	  the	  
short-­‐term	  and	  had	  some	  lasting	  effects.	  The	  Heritage	  Campaign	  fostered	  a	  sense	  of	  
ownership	  that	  has	  led	  villagers	  to	  safeguard	  the	  FCE	  when	  necessary.	  Informants	  
state	  that	  ADIFCE’s	  effectiveness	  also	  revealed	  itself	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  landslides,	  
number	  of	  farmers	  planting	  vetiver,	  the	  clearing	  of	  landslides	  after	  cyclones	  and	  the	  
raising	  of	  the	  ANP.	  	  
Despite	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  interventions	  in	  which	  ADIFCE	  participated,	  the	  role	  
of	  a	  TCSO	  like	  ADIFCE	  should	  not	  be	  overestimated.	  Without	  the	  financial	  assistance	  
of	  donors	  and	  the	  personal	  commitment	  of	  staff	  working	  at	  the	  various	  development	  
projects,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  FCE	  would	  not	  have	  reopened	  following	  the	  2000	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cyclones.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  periods	  where	  it	  has	  been	  closed	  would	  have	  been	  
longer	  without	  the	  interventions	  financed	  by	  FCER.	  In	  addition,	  the	  ability	  of	  LDI	  
and	  FCER	  to	  frame	  the	  FCE’s	  environmental	  benefits	  for	  IDIs	  like	  the	  Bank	  helped	  
neutralize	  what	  had	  been	  staunch	  resistance	  to	  intervention	  on	  the	  line’s	  behalf.	  
ADIFCE	  was	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  foreign	  aid	  organizations	  and	  their	  projects,	  
with	  many	  informants	  living	  along	  the	  line	  only	  becoming	  aware	  of	  the	  TCSO	  after	  
FCER’s	  creation.	  	  
A	  key	  player	  in	  the	  rehabilitation	  effort	  candidly	  stated	  that	  ADIFCE	  was	  
essentially	  a	  “front”	  for	  the	  key	  actors	  from	  civil	  society	  who	  were	  already	  backing	  
the	  railway.76	  This	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  harsh	  critique	  if	  ADIFCE	  had	  been	  
working	  against	  the	  interests	  and	  will	  of	  the	  communities	  it	  purported	  to	  represent.	  
Yet	  the	  key	  actors	  and	  informants	  from	  the	  general	  public	  who	  I	  spoke	  with	  along	  
the	  line	  said	  that	  ADIFCE	  represented	  the	  consensus	  along	  the	  line.	  So	  rather	  than	  it	  
being	  a	  weakness,	  organizing	  key	  players	  like	  merchants	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  an	  
organization	  presented	  advantages	  over	  more	  typical	  ad	  hoc	  movements.	  This	  
included	  lending	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  views	  of	  civil	  society	  so	  they	  could	  not	  be	  readily	  
dismissed	  as	  the	  opinions	  of	  a	  few	  individuals	  whose	  own	  self-­‐interest	  would	  be	  
served	  with	  little	  consideration	  of	  the	  public	  interest.	  It	  also	  created	  a	  structure	  to	  
channel	  external	  aid	  money	  to	  civil	  society	  so	  they	  could	  advocate	  for	  their	  position.	  
ADIFCE	  contributed	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  and	  ownership	  along	  the	  line	  through	  
its	  newsletters	  and	  outreach.	  This	  facilitated	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  general	  
population,	  who	  came	  to	  understand	  that	  it	  was,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  their	  responsibility	  
to	  keep	  the	  trains	  running.	  
The	  work	  by	  ADIFCE	  and	  the	  USAID-­‐funded	  development	  projects	  to	  build	  
ownership	  and	  solidarity	  for	  the	  FCE	  undoubtedly	  played	  a	  large	  part	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  
ANP	  during	  the	  2002	  crisis.	  The	  ability	  to	  keep	  the	  train	  running	  very	  likely	  affected	  
the	  outcome	  of	  Ravalomanana	  coming	  to	  power,	  or	  at	  least	  in	  reducing	  the	  duration	  
of	  the	  crisis	  because	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  ship	  essential	  products	  inland.	  Yet	  this	  effect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  I	  treat	  this	  comment	  as	  confidential.	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was	  not	  planned,	  nor	  could	  FCE	  supporters	  like	  ADIFCE	  have	  foreseen	  this	  impact.	  
As	  Ferguson	  notes,	  “if	  unintended	  effects	  of	  a	  project	  end	  up	  having	  political	  uses,	  
even	  seeming	  to	  be	  ‘instruments’	  of	  some	  larger	  political	  deployment,	  this	  is	  not	  any	  
kind	  of	  conspiracy;	  it	  really	  does	  just	  happen	  to	  be	  the	  way	  things	  work	  out”	  
(Ferguson	  1994:	  256).	  Certainly	  the	  political	  use	  of	  keeping	  the	  FCE	  operational	  was	  
quite	  high,	  but	  it	  is	  ironic	  that	  solidarity	  at	  the	  local	  level	  trumped	  the	  dangerous	  
political	  gamesmanship	  occurring	  at	  that	  time.	  Even	  today,	  ADIFCE	  and	  ANP	  
members	  are	  confident	  that	  the	  population	  would	  rally	  if	  necessary.	  	  
Despite	  the	  benefits	  it	  provided,	  the	  inactivity	  of	  ADIFCE	  since	  2007	  reveals	  
many	  of	  its	  weaknesses.	  Informants	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  ADIFCE	  is	  “sleeping”	  or	  
“on	  standby”	  since	  the	  failed	  privatization	  process	  and	  the	  rehabilitation	  efforts	  
ceased	  (ADIFCE	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  This	  has	  had	  tangible	  
impacts,	  including	  weakening	  the	  dinabe	  and	  increasing	  tavy	  along	  the	  line.	  	  
One	  reason	  for	  its	  inactivity	  is	  the	  dependency	  on	  external	  funding	  for	  its	  
operations.	  Although	  ADIFCE	  collected	  membership	  dues	  between	  1,000	  and	  4,000	  
Ariary	  ($0.25	  to	  $2.00)	  per	  year	  from	  around	  100	  active	  members	  (SSI	  with	  
Informant	  2,	  Fianarantsoa,	  24	  Jun	  2008;	  ADIFCE	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  
2009),	  and	  relied	  primarily	  upon	  the	  various	  USAID-­‐funded	  groups	  (i.e.,	  CAP,	  LDI,	  
FCER,	  then	  ERI)	  that	  worked	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  (LDI	  2000:	  6).	  LDI	  and	  FCER	  sought	  
to	  break	  this	  dependency	  by	  developing	  a	  financial	  model	  that	  would	  sustain	  
ADIFCE	  through	  just	  membership	  dues	  and	  the	  proceeds	  of	  a	  tourist	  brochure	  about	  
the	  FCE	  sold	  at	  local	  hotels.	  Due	  to	  an	  expressed	  lack	  of	  interest	  because	  it	  
reportedly	  provided	  less	  revenue	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  collection,	  the	  tourist	  guide	  
intervention	  failed	  to	  produce	  a	  sustainable	  revenue	  stream	  for	  the	  organization	  and	  
the	  donor	  projects	  ultimately	  refused	  to	  fund	  a	  follow-­‐up	  printing	  even	  when	  
eventually	  requested	  by	  ADIFCE’s	  leadership	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  
Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).	  A	  feeling	  of	  increasing	  ineffectuality	  after	  the	  
privatization	  failure,	  perhaps	  combined	  with	  issues	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  financial	  
operations	  of	  the	  organization,	  reduced	  its	  members’	  confidence	  in	  the	  organization	  
to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  stopped	  paying	  their	  dues	  (ibid.).	  
	   	  154	  
ADIFCE’s	  structure	  exacerbated	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  its	  financial	  model.	  In	  order	  
to	  make	  decisions	  and	  to	  choose	  leaders,	  ADIFCE	  would	  have	  had	  to	  organize	  a	  
general	  meeting	  that	  brought	  together	  its	  member-­‐representatives	  from	  all	  the	  
communities	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  7	  and	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008).77	  These	  
meetings	  occurred	  in	  Fianarantsoa,	  Manampatrana	  or	  Manakara,	  which	  means	  
members	  would	  have	  to	  travel	  a	  fair	  distance	  to	  participate.	  Recognizing	  the	  
hardship	  caused	  to	  individual	  members,	  ADIFCE	  paid	  for	  the	  transportation	  costs	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  per	  diem	  for	  the	  attendees’	  lodging	  and	  food	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  19,	  
Ambila,	  13	  Sep	  2009).	  Since	  its	  members	  were	  spread	  over	  a	  large	  distance	  along	  
the	  line,	  this	  made	  holding	  meetings	  a	  very	  expensive	  undertaking.	  Even	  though	  
ADIFCE’s	  president	  wanted	  to	  step	  down	  after	  his	  mandate	  ended,	  by	  default	  he	  
remained	  in	  his	  position	  because	  a	  general	  meeting	  could	  not	  happen	  after	  they	  ran	  
out	  of	  money.	  With	  his	  recent	  death,	  it	  is	  unclear	  who	  will	  fill	  this	  leadership	  vacuum	  
or	  if	  ADIFCE	  is	  even	  capable	  of	  existing	  anymore.	  Had	  members	  been	  permitted	  to	  
vote	  on	  issues	  by	  proxy,	  the	  costs	  of	  running	  the	  organization	  would	  have	  been	  
substantially	  reduced.	  	  
Although	  a	  handful	  of	  informants	  claimed	  ADIFCE	  was	  a	  grassroots	  organization,	  
others	  stated	  the	  opposite	  (SSIs	  with	  Informants	  2,	  7,	  8,	  and	  19,	  Fianarantsoa	  and	  
Ambila,	  24	  Jun	  2008,	  13	  Jul	  2008	  and	  13	  Sep	  2009).	  ADIFCE’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  
railway’s	  administration	  helped	  maintain	  open	  communication	  that	  could	  resolve	  
issues	  the	  local	  population	  had	  with	  the	  administration	  as	  well	  as	  act	  as	  a	  watchdog	  
for	  the	  railway’s	  financial	  and	  administrative	  activities	  (Freudenberger	  2000:	  7;	  
ADIFCE	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  21	  Sep	  2009).	  When	  it	  communicated	  complaints	  
to	  the	  FCE	  administration,	  members	  viewed	  it	  as	  bottom-­‐up,	  but	  more	  often	  it	  acted	  
in	  a	  top-­‐down	  fashion	  to	  sensitize	  the	  local	  population	  to	  the	  environmental	  and	  
practical	  implications	  of	  their	  farming	  practices	  (ADIFCE	  focus	  group,	  Tolongoina,	  
21	  Sep	  2009).	  The	  overwhelming	  bulk	  of	  their	  energy	  focused	  inward	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Each	  station	  had	  at	  least	  two	  local	  ADIFCE	  representatives,	  but	  there	  are	  other	  fokontany	  (villages)	  
next	  to	  the	  line	  that	  may	  have	  had	  ADIFCE	  members	  important	  enough	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  attend	  the	  
meeting.	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population	  living	  along	  the	  line	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  influencing	  their	  mindset	  and	  
behavior.	  This	  supports	  the	  assertion	  that	  ADIFCE	  was	  a	  highly	  top-­‐down	  
organization	  that	  never	  lived	  up	  to	  its	  goal	  of	  lobbying	  national	  political	  leaders.	  	  
Still,	  this	  group	  of	  railroad	  stakeholders	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  critically	  important	  
element	  of	  the	  strategy	  due	  to	  its	  public	  lobbying	  role.	  (Freudenberger	  2000:	  7).	  LDI	  
sought,	  in	  fact,	  to	  strengthen	  ADIFCE’s	  lobbying	  function	  (ibid.;	  LDI	  2000:	  8).	  With	  
the	  exception	  of	  a	  few	  letters	  written	  by	  the	  organization’s	  president	  to	  government	  
ministers,	  though,	  ADIFCE	  seems	  to	  have	  made	  little	  effort	  to	  lobby	  for	  support	  from	  
the	  national	  government	  or	  IDIs.78	  For	  example,	  no	  letter	  writing	  campaign	  was	  ever	  
organized	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  the	  national	  government	  –	  a	  strategy	  successfully	  
used	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  TAZARA	  railway	  to	  preserve	  service	  to	  certain	  stations	  
(Monson	  2006:	  116).	  Unsurprisingly,	  almost	  no	  IDI	  staff	  members	  or	  even	  national	  
public	  officials	  recall	  ADIFCE.	  One	  key	  player	  in	  the	  rehabilitation	  process	  lamented	  
that	  no	  organization,	  including	  OPCI	  and	  ADIFCE,	  argued	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  FCE	  in	  the	  
capital	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  9,	  Antananarivo,	  15	  Jul	  2008).	  
The	  question	  of	  lobbying	  the	  government	  has	  become	  more	  urgent	  since	  the	  FCE	  
rehabilitation	  effort	  ceased	  and	  as	  the	  population	  along	  the	  railway	  finds	  themselves	  
in	  an	  increasingly	  precarious	  position.	  When	  asked	  what	  they	  would	  do	  if	  the	  FCE	  
were	  to	  shut	  down,	  villagers	  at	  one	  station	  said	  that	  they	  would	  ask	  visitors	  to	  send	  
a	  request	  to	  the	  government	  to	  get	  the	  trains	  running	  again	  (Women’s	  Focus	  Group,	  
Ranomena,	  01	  Sep	  2009).	  This	  effort	  would	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  being	  more	  
effective	  if	  coordinated	  with	  the	  other	  villagers	  living	  along	  the	  line	  so	  they	  could	  
speak	  with	  a	  unified	  voice.	  This	  united	  front	  would	  also	  bolster	  attempts	  to	  lobby	  
public	  officials	  and	  experts	  as	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  railway.	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  be	  ideal	  
to	  avoid	  any	  shutdown	  by	  having	  a	  constant	  presence	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Samuel	  Razanamapisa	  wrote	  to	  the	  minister	  of	  public	  works,	  transportation	  and	  meteorology	  on	  
03	  October	  2006	  to	  express	  their	  organization’s	  concerns	  over	  the	  delay	  in	  privatizing	  the	  railway,	  
which	  would	  have	  led	  to	  investment	  in	  the	  FCE.	  He	  requested	  support	  from	  the	  government	  for	  
maintaining	  the	  railway	  in	  the	  meanwhile.	  He	  wrote	  another	  letter	  to	  the	  new	  minister	  of	  
transportation	  and	  tourism	  on	  21	  March	  2007	  introducing	  ADIFCE	  and	  other	  actors	  while	  also	  asking	  
for	  continued	  government	  support	  for	  the	  FCE’s	  rolling	  stock.	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generates	  resources	  for	  basic	  operations,	  maintenance	  and	  repairs.	  Clearly,	  lobbying	  
directly	  and	  proactively	  is	  a	  source	  of	  power	  that	  can	  bring	  civil	  society	  into	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  earlier,	  which	  will	  be	  key	  to	  having	  the	  population	  accept	  
any	  major	  decision	  about	  the	  railway	  –	  one	  that	  will	  ultimately	  need	  to	  be	  made.	  	  
Even	  with	  its	  weaknesses,	  ADIFCE	  had	  positive	  impacts	  and	  shows	  the	  potential	  
that	  TCSOs	  hold	  for	  transportation	  infrastructure.	  ADIFCE	  provided	  legitimacy	  to	  
civil	  society	  actors	  while	  reinforcing	  a	  sense	  of	  unity	  along	  the	  line.	  Sidestepping	  the	  
structural	  weaknesses	  of	  ADIFCE	  is	  possible	  by	  recognizing	  how	  a	  TCSO	  can	  be	  
more	  effective	  over	  large	  geographical	  distances.	  Particular	  attention	  should	  
therefore	  be	  given	  to	  making	  the	  organization	  less	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  aid	  and	  
enabling	  it	  to	  be	  self-­‐sustaining.	  Keeping	  TCSOs’	  operating	  costs	  low	  is	  essential	  –	  
especially	  when	  their	  membership	  is	  spread	  over	  hundreds	  of	  kilometers.	  
Improving	  transparency	  would	  also	  allow	  members	  to	  feel	  confident	  that	  their	  
membership	  dues	  go	  towards	  the	  intended	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  their	  
transportation	  interests	  while	  leveraging	  external	  funds.	  	  
Despite	  the	  challenges	  in	  making	  TCSOs	  viable,	  they	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  both	  the	  transport	  sector	  and	  in	  the	  broader	  project	  of	  inclusive	  
policymaking.	  The	  ability	  of	  TCSOs	  to	  sustain	  efforts	  over	  time	  and	  over	  a	  large	  
distance	  can	  make	  the	  other	  four	  spheres	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  transportation	  
needs	  of	  actual	  people,	  their	  households,	  and	  their	  communities.	  A	  strong	  TCSO	  
would	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  unify	  its	  prospective	  members	  as	  well	  as	  build	  
external	  support	  so	  essential	  for	  keeping	  transportation	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  
viable.	  In	  a	  society	  of	  individuals,	  “men	  and	  women,	  rich	  and	  poor,	  old	  and	  young,	  all	  
trying	  to	  find	  a	  place	  in	  it,	  some	  [are]	  much	  better	  organized	  than	  others	  to	  express	  
their	  needs”	  (Marris	  1998:	  9).	  Facilitating	  the	  creation	  of	  TCSOs	  in	  SSA	  will	  enable	  
those	  who	  have	  traditionally	  been	  excluded	  or	  overlooked	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  voice	  in	  
the	  provision	  of	  transportation	  services	  and	  infrastructure.	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Chapter	  5	  	  
Conclusion	  
I. Introduction	  
The	  previous	  three	  chapters/articles	  provide	  readers	  with	  the	  history	  of	  the	  FCE	  
from	  its	  initial	  conception	  by	  colonial	  administrators	  through	  the	  period	  of	  its	  
rehabilitation.	  This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  various	  factors	  (e.g.,	  lending	  policies,	  actors’	  
objectives	  and	  rationalities,	  weather,	  conflict,	  etc.)	  that	  can	  affect	  a	  colonial-­‐built	  
railway.	  Much	  has	  transpired	  for	  the	  generations	  of	  people	  who	  have	  used	  the	  line,	  
but	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  not	  closed	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  dedication	  of	  its	  supporters.	  
This	  case	  also	  holds	  lessons	  for	  railway	  supporters	  in	  other	  LDCs.	  Specifically,	  it	  
shows	  how	  civil	  society,	  especially	  TCSOs,	  can	  impact	  outcomes	  affecting	  these	  lines.	  	  
This	  chapter	  synthesizes	  the	  dissertation	  findings	  and	  reports	  the	  answers	  to	  my	  
research	  questions.	  Although	  this	  research	  offers	  specific	  contributions	  to	  other	  
disciplines,	  such	  as	  African	  Studies	  or	  Heritage	  Studies,	  the	  core	  of	  my	  research	  aims	  
to	  address	  inform	  Transportation	  Studies	  about	  the	  potentially	  important	  role	  that	  
TCSOs	  could	  play	  in	  this	  sector.	  These	  findings	  sometimes	  disprove	  the	  original	  
arguments	  I	  put	  forth,	  which	  are	  reiterated	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  but	  how	  they	  
contradict	  those	  initial	  hypotheses	  offer	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  and	  
provides	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  with	  lessons	  they	  can	  bring	  to	  other	  
situations.	  This	  chapter,	  therefore,	  offers	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  may	  apply	  
either	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  or	  to	  other	  contexts	  where	  a	  TCSO	  can	  contribute.	  This	  
chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  section	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  research	  project	  while	  also	  
offering	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  on	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  LDCs	  
and	  especially	  where	  civil	  society	  fits	  into	  this	  picture.	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II. Answering	  the	  Research	  Questions	  
The	  condition	  of	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  can	  be	  dreadful.	  Many	  governments	  have	  
neglected	  to	  invest	  in	  them	  as	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  safe,	  reliable	  transport.	  These	  
lines	  have	  also	  been	  targeted	  for	  closure	  due	  to	  prevailing	  biases	  in	  the	  
transportation	  sector.	  If	  TCSOs	  can	  make	  a	  positive	  impact	  in	  the	  outcome	  for	  these	  
lines,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  they	  could	  do	  the	  same	  for	  other	  transportation	  
infrastructures	  and	  services	  on	  which	  people	  depend.	  Moreover,	  if	  civil	  society	  has	  a	  
role	  to	  play,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  context	  of	  a	  relatively	  neglected,	  yet	  socially	  
valued	  transportation	  service	  like	  the	  FCE	  has	  been	  an	  appropriate	  case	  to	  
investigate	  my	  research	  questions.	  
To	  reiterate,	  the	  primary	  research	  questions	  and	  arguments	  about	  CSOs	  are	  as	  
follows:	  
• First,	  what	  effect	  does	  the	  presence	  of	  CSOs	  have	  on	  preventing	  railway	  
closures?	  I	  argued	  that	  CSOs	  can	  raise	  the	  awareness	  of	  government	  officials	  
to	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  populations	  that	  depend	  upon	  a	  railway,	  but	  they	  would	  
have	  little	  direct	  impact	  on	  IDIs.	  I	  also	  proposed	  that	  while	  CSOs	  may	  not	  
exert	  sufficient	  direct	  political	  pressure	  on	  IDIs	  to	  reverse	  their	  conclusions,	  
they	  can	  still	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  preserving	  railway	  service	  when	  a	  
railway	  faces	  closure	  through	  neglect.	  	  
• Second,	  what	  makes	  these	  CSOs	  effective	  or	  ineffective?	  	  
• Third,	  what	  strategies	  have	  CSOs	  successfully	  used	  to	  motivate	  their	  
prospective	  members	  and	  galvanize	  broad	  support	  for	  an	  unprofitable	  
railway	  facing	  a	  permanent	  closure?	  I	  examined	  how	  CSOs	  and	  their	  allies	  
offered	  different	  arguments	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  intended	  audience	  was	  
local,	  national	  or	  international.	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  
framings	  (i.e.,	  local	  livelihood,	  environmental	  protection,	  cultural	  values)	  
depended	  on	  how	  they	  were	  conveyed	  and	  whether	  they	  coincided	  with	  the	  
intended	  audience’s	  interests.	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In	  answering	  the	  first	  research	  question	  asking	  what	  effect,	  if	  any,	  the	  presence	  
of	  CSOs	  have	  on	  preventing	  railway	  closures,	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  not	  all	  types	  of	  
railway	  closures	  are	  the	  same.	  The	  closure	  of	  a	  railway	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  financial	  
resources	  differs	  from	  one	  stemming	  from	  an	  act	  of	  sabotage.	  Certain	  actors	  may	  
seek	  to	  close	  a	  line	  for	  ideological	  reasons	  or	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  interests.	  Even	  a	  
naturally	  occurring	  event	  such	  as	  a	  cyclone	  can	  halt	  train	  service.	  The	  possibility	  
that	  the	  FCE	  could	  have	  permanently	  closed	  due	  to	  any	  of	  these	  reasons	  was	  very	  
real,	  but	  often	  at	  different	  times.	  Having	  an	  active	  TCSO	  could	  have	  in	  theory	  
contributed	  to	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  each	  type	  of	  closure,	  but	  such	  an	  
organization	  did	  not	  exist	  for	  each	  threat.	  The	  reason	  why	  trains	  still	  run	  along	  the	  
length	  of	  the	  FCE	  depends	  on	  the	  threat	  it	  faced	  and	  who	  participated	  in	  efforts	  to	  
protect	  it.	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  a	  CSO	  does	  make	  a	  difference	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  The	  TCSO	  
called	  ADIFCE	  was	  created	  with	  guidance	  and	  encouragement	  from	  development	  
staff	  to	  work	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  railway	  supporters.	  Although	  railway	  
advocates	  believed	  ADIFCE	  would	  lend	  legitimacy	  to	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  GOM	  and	  IDI	  staff,	  it	  did	  so	  in	  the	  broader	  community	  as	  well.	  ADIFCE	  built	  public	  
support	  for	  privatizing	  the	  FCE	  and	  increased	  villagers’	  sense	  of	  ownership	  of	  the	  
line	  by	  promoting	  the	  heritage	  argument	  and	  adherence	  to	  the	  dinabe.	  ADIFCE’s	  
participation	  in	  efforts	  to	  curb	  the	  use	  of	  tavy	  and	  encourage	  the	  planting	  of	  vetiver	  
on	  nearby	  hillsides	  resulted	  in	  a	  noticeable	  decline	  in	  landslides,	  which	  reduced	  the	  
potential	  for	  service	  disruptions.	  Moreover,	  the	  solidarity	  that	  ADIFCE	  helped	  foster	  
manifested	  itself	  most	  clearly	  in	  the	  actions	  taken	  to	  protect	  the	  line	  during	  the	  2002	  
political	  crisis.	  	  
While	  ADIFCE	  helped	  to	  strengthen	  solidarity	  among	  civil	  society,	  they	  did	  less	  
to	  directly	  raise	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  FCE’s	  plight	  either	  among	  government	  officials	  
or	  IDI	  staff.	  I	  had	  originally	  argued	  that	  ADIFCE	  would	  seek	  to	  affect	  the	  opinions	  of	  
these	  experts	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  by	  proposing	  certain	  framings	  or	  arguments	  to	  
them.	  Contrary	  to	  even	  their	  own	  initial	  ideas	  about	  what	  their	  role	  would	  be,	  
ADIFCE	  did	  very	  little	  to	  lobby	  actors	  from	  outside	  the	  region.	  Other	  FCE	  supporters,	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particularly	  OPCI	  and	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  USAID-­‐funded	  development	  projects,	  were	  the	  
counterparts	  of	  ministry	  officials	  and	  IDI	  staff.	  Aside	  from	  a	  handful	  of	  introductory	  
letters	  sent	  to	  various	  ministers	  over	  the	  years	  and	  meeting	  officials	  during	  the	  
study	  tours	  to	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  line	  for	  actual	  users,	  ADIFCE	  took	  
relatively	  little	  direct	  action	  to	  change	  outsiders’	  opinions.	  Most	  key	  informants	  who	  
worked	  most	  closely	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  for	  IDIs	  or	  the	  national	  government	  could	  
not	  recall	  that	  a	  CSO	  was	  dedicated	  to	  promoting	  the	  FCE	  and	  almost	  none	  could	  
name	  it.	  Some	  informants	  remembered	  OPCI	  when	  prompted,	  which	  is	  probably	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mayors	  who	  made	  up	  this	  inter-­‐jurisdictional	  entity	  participated	  
in	  official	  donor	  meetings	  regarding	  the	  FCE’s	  rehabilitation.	  It	  can	  safely	  be	  said,	  
therefore,	  that	  ADIFCE	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  directly	  challenge	  the	  positions	  or	  
rationalities	  taken	  by	  these	  officials.	  	  
That	  said,	  the	  efforts	  in	  which	  ADIFCE	  participated	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  by	  IDI	  
staff	  or	  government	  officials.	  ADIFCE	  members	  helped	  disseminate	  the	  news	  that	  IDI	  
officials	  were	  coming	  to	  visit	  the	  line	  so	  that	  villagers	  could	  be	  present	  for	  the	  
meetings	  that	  ensued.	  IDI	  staff	  remembered	  having	  met	  community	  representatives	  
on	  study	  tours,	  which	  is	  corroborated	  by	  other	  informants	  who	  added	  that	  these	  
individuals	  were	  mostly	  ADIFCE	  members	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  As	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  
these	  interactions	  helped	  change	  the	  opinions	  and	  especially	  the	  preconceptions	  
these	  staff	  may	  have	  had.	  Although	  the	  heritage	  argument	  was	  not	  oriented	  to	  IDI	  
staff,	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  memorable	  for	  them.	  The	  sense	  of	  heritage	  and	  unity	  to	  
which	  ADIFCE	  contributed	  was	  palpable	  enough	  that	  IDI	  staff	  could	  sense	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  FCE	  in	  people’s	  lives	  –	  enough	  that	  many	  of	  these	  individuals	  
could	  still	  recall	  the	  heritage	  argument	  years	  later.	  	  
	  
	   	  166	  
	  
Figure	  22	  Study	  tour	  meeting	  
	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  second	  question	  about	  what	  makes	  a	  TCSO	  effective	  or	  not,	  
one	  of	  the	  critical	  factors	  is	  funding.	  It	  is	  expensive	  to	  maintain	  the	  communication	  
infrastructure	  across	  long	  distances	  in	  Madagascar	  and	  even	  though	  the	  FCE	  is	  a	  
relatively	  short	  line,	  it	  is	  still	  a	  large	  distance	  to	  maintain	  common	  interests.	  ADIFCE	  
used	  donor	  money	  and	  membership	  dues	  (initially)	  to	  publish	  a	  newsletter	  and	  
organize	  official	  meetings.	  ANP	  members	  received	  a	  small	  stipend	  of	  roughly	  200	  
Ariary	  ($0.10)	  per	  night	  that	  they	  served	  on	  watch	  duty.	  Neither	  group	  was	  
financially	  self-­‐sufficient,	  but	  this	  posed	  more	  of	  an	  issue	  for	  ADIFCE	  given	  that	  their	  
objectives	  could	  take	  years	  to	  realize.	  ADIFCE	  is	  now	  said	  to	  be	  “sleeping”	  due	  to	  its	  
inactive	  state.	  Informants	  all	  agree	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  funding.	  Without	  
enough	  money	  to	  organize	  an	  annual	  meeting,	  though,	  ADIFCE	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  
select	  a	  new	  president	  according	  to	  its	  bylaws,	  which	  became	  an	  even	  more	  
important	  issue	  after	  he	  recently	  passed	  away.	  	  
Source:	  J.P.	  Rajaona	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In	  response	  to	  my	  third	  question	  and	  related	  argument,	  ADIFCE’s	  framings	  were	  
tailored	  to	  their	  target	  audience.	  They	  emphasized	  the	  heritage	  value	  of	  the	  railway	  
and	  the	  shared	  importance	  of	  honoring	  the	  ancestors	  who	  had	  sacrificed	  so	  much	  
during	  the	  line’s	  construction.	  Rather	  than	  preach	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  
protecting	  the	  forest	  for	  biodiversity	  or	  other	  more	  abstract	  environmental	  values	  
that	  may	  gain	  traction	  among	  Western	  audiences,	  railway	  supporters	  (including	  
ADIFCE)	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  the	  forest	  so	  as	  to	  guarantee	  farmers	  
could	  have	  water	  for	  crops	  and	  thereby	  sustain	  livelihood	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  
descendents	  (Young	  Men’s	  Focus	  Group,	  Tolongoina,	  23	  Sep	  2009).	  Even	  in	  their	  
effort	  to	  encourage	  vetiver	  planting,	  they	  did	  not	  dwell	  on	  the	  technical	  aspects	  and	  
benefit	  of	  this	  plant	  for	  the	  railway,	  but	  appealed	  to	  farmers’	  longing	  to	  diversify	  
their	  crop	  production	  in	  ways	  that	  generated	  income	  and	  maintained	  both	  their	  
short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  livelihood	  (Hengchaovanich	  and	  Freudenberger	  2003:	  7).	  	  
So	  even	  though	  ADIFCE	  made	  significant	  contributions	  in	  collaboration	  with	  
other	  railway	  supporters,	  it	  did	  so	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  always	  conform	  to	  my	  initial	  
arguments	  about	  who	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  influence.	  They	  did	  not	  play	  a	  large	  role	  in	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  about	  the	  railway	  or	  actively	  seek	  to	  change	  the	  
opinions	  of	  government	  or	  IDI	  staff.	  Instead,	  ADIFCE	  focused	  on	  uniting	  civil	  society	  
behind	  the	  rehabilitation	  project	  and	  especially	  to	  build	  public	  support	  locally	  for	  
privatization	  and	  to	  discontinue	  tavy	  in	  the	  region.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  
that	  ADIFCE	  did	  not	  work	  alone	  on	  these	  efforts	  nor	  did	  the	  interventions	  on	  which	  
they	  participated	  even	  usually	  originate	  with	  them.	  The	  USAID-­‐funded	  development	  
projects	  conceived	  of	  most	  of	  the	  interventions,	  but	  ADIFCE	  adopted	  them	  as	  if	  they	  
were	  their	  own	  with	  the	  blessing	  of	  project	  staff.	  This	  had	  the	  practical	  implication	  
of	  lending	  legitimacy	  to	  these	  efforts	  so	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  false	  appearance	  that	  
only	  donors	  or	  the	  railway	  administration	  wanted	  to	  save	  the	  FCE.	  ADIFCE	  leaders	  
and	  members	  also	  worked	  seamlessly	  alongside	  FCER	  staff	  to	  realize	  the	  results	  of	  
their	  interventions.	  So	  while	  this	  TCSO	  did	  not	  single-­‐handedly	  halt	  the	  FCE	  from	  
closing,	  their	  participation	  contributed	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way	  to	  the	  effort	  of	  keeping	  
the	  railway	  running.	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The	  future	  of	  the	  FCE	  is	  anything	  but	  assured.	  Even	  if	  ADIFCE	  is	  revived	  and	  the	  
population	  along	  the	  line	  united	  once	  again,	  it	  still	  might	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  keep	  the	  
trains	  running.	  As	  the	  three	  articles	  in	  this	  dissertation	  show,	  its	  closure	  would	  
likely	  cause	  many	  social,	  economic	  and	  environmental	  problems	  as	  well	  as	  cause	  
irreparable	  harm	  to	  the	  cultural	  heritage	  imbued	  in	  the	  railway.	  What	  is	  also	  clear,	  
though,	  is	  that	  had	  nobody—including	  ADIFCE—stepped	  forward	  to	  defend	  the	  line,	  
the	  outcome	  would	  have	  been	  self-­‐fulfilling.	  Having	  a	  TCSO,	  even	  if	  inwardly	  focused	  
on	  civil	  society,	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  that	  made	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  this	  
heritage	  infrastructure.	  	  
	  
III. Implications	  for	  Planning	  and	  Policy	  
This	  case	  and	  the	  related	  literature	  review	  hold	  lessons	  for	  planning	  and	  
policymaking,	  and	  particularly	  for	  advocates	  of	  existing	  transportation	  
infrastructure	  and	  services	  sometimes	  left	  teetering	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  closure.	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  transportation	  planning,	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  have	  tended	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  direct	  economic	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  a	  project	  (like	  a	  railway)	  thanks	  
to	  transportation	  experts’	  adherence	  to	  a	  formal	  or	  instrumental	  rationality	  without	  
adequately	  questioning	  the	  ends	  being	  sought	  (e.g.,	  market-­‐oriented	  approach	  vs.	  
ensuring	  local	  livelihood	  vs.	  environmental	  sustainability).	  Although	  this	  simplifies	  
analyses	  and	  comparisons	  of	  transportation	  projects,	  it	  is	  a	  narrow	  perspective	  that	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  even	  contribute	  to	  development	  goals.	  	  
Introducing	  more	  balance	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  can	  produce	  results	  
that	  better	  serve	  transportation	  users	  and	  beneficiaries.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  shows	  
that	  railways	  in	  SSA	  are	  more	  than	  just	  a	  list	  of	  performance	  measures	  or	  the	  sum	  of	  
their	  balance	  sheets.	  The	  FCE	  has	  positive	  effects	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  environmental	  
protection,	  public	  health	  and	  livelihood	  that	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  for	  use	  in	  
a	  CBA.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  FCE	  also	  influenced	  the	  level	  of	  solidarity	  in	  the	  region,	  
which	  in	  turn	  has	  impacted	  many	  local,	  regional	  and	  even	  national	  issues.	  Other	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railways	  in	  SSA	  provide	  similar	  benefits,	  and	  properly	  recognizing	  them	  could	  
potentially	  affect	  decisions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  preserve	  existing	  lines.	  This	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  factors	  will	  or	  even	  should	  play	  the	  most	  important	  role	  in	  
decisions,	  but	  they	  can	  be	  important	  and	  may	  shift	  a	  close	  decision	  in	  one	  direction	  
or	  the	  other.	  In	  other	  words,	  consideration	  of	  these	  overlooked	  benefits	  is	  not	  only	  
possible,	  but	  also	  a	  necessary	  challenge	  for	  planners.	  
As	  important	  as	  it	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  multitude	  of	  railways’	  benefits,	  it	  may	  be	  just	  
as	  difficult	  to	  learn	  about	  and	  include	  them	  in	  the	  process.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  past	  and	  
even	  current	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  involving	  these	  railways,	  for	  example,	  have	  
not	  considered	  these	  benefits	  early	  enough	  (if	  at	  all).	  Those	  actors	  currently	  
engaged	  in	  these	  processes	  need	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  context	  and	  
specifics	  of	  transportation	  projects.	  Development	  experts	  learned	  about	  the	  FCE’s	  
heritage	  value,	  for	  example,	  by	  meeting	  with	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  They	  then	  
capitalized	  upon	  this	  idea	  and	  launched	  an	  outreach	  campaign	  to	  sensitize	  the	  
population	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  the	  railway.	  Using	  strategies	  from	  the	  
outreach	  campaign	  to	  rekindle	  memories	  of	  the	  deplorable	  acts	  and	  realities	  of	  
SMOTIG,	  railway	  supporters	  were	  able	  to	  build	  solidarity	  for	  preventing	  tavy	  along	  
the	  line	  and	  even	  get	  some	  villagers	  to	  spend	  their	  free	  time	  helping	  to	  preserve	  
service	  on	  the	  FCE	  during	  events	  –	  both	  natural	  and	  political.	  While	  the	  heritage	  
from	  SMOTIG	  may	  resonate	  particularly	  strongly	  with	  Malagasy	  who	  believe	  their	  
ancestors	  are	  present	  even	  after	  their	  death,	  other	  researchers	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  
a	  sense	  of	  shared	  heritage	  is	  present	  on	  other	  colonial-­‐era	  lines	  too	  (e.g.,	  Abé	  2006:	  
224).	  The	  sacrifice	  of	  the	  men	  who	  built	  those	  lines	  across	  SSA,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
families	  and	  communities	  that	  suffered	  alongside	  these	  forced	  laborers,	  opens	  the	  
possibility	  of	  using	  heritage	  as	  a	  potential	  unifying	  force	  elsewhere.	  	  
Employing	  the	  idea	  of	  heritage,	  though,	  raises	  an	  interesting	  contradiction	  for	  
planners	  and	  policy	  makers.	  What	  some	  experts	  may	  call	  “heritage,”	  economists	  
usually	  label	  as	  “sunk	  costs,”	  and	  this	  distinction	  can	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  
assessment	  of	  a	  transportation	  service	  or	  infrastructure.	  Economists	  treat	  resources	  
that	  have	  already	  been	  irrevocably	  incurred	  as	  “sunk	  costs”	  and	  assert	  that	  basing	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decisions	  on	  these	  monies	  already	  spent	  is	  indicative	  of	  bad	  decision	  making	  –	  
labeling	  new	  investment	  based	  on	  past	  action	  as	  a	  “sunk	  cost	  fallacy”	  (McAfee	  et	  al.	  
2010:	  323).	  Yet	  as	  many	  transportation	  economists	  demonstrate	  through	  their	  
actions	  and	  reports,	  they	  are	  themselves	  caught	  up	  in	  a	  “rational	  fallacy”	  because	  
they	  assume	  a	  singular	  form	  of	  rationality	  exists	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Moreover,	  even	  
voices	  within	  the	  field	  of	  economics	  have	  argued	  that	  actors	  may	  respond	  
‘rationally’	  to	  sunk	  costs	  under	  certain	  conditions	  (McAfee	  et	  al.	  2010:	  333).79	  
Bringing	  ideas	  such	  as	  “heritage”	  into	  the	  process	  necessarily	  considers	  sunk	  costs	  
and,	  therefore,	  requires	  that	  experts	  involved	  in	  the	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  need	  to	  first	  recognize	  that	  a	  plurality	  of	  rationalities	  can	  be	  employed.	  This	  
would	  likely	  require	  changing	  the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  other	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  
process.	  
The	  question	  then	  becomes	  how	  can	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  
be	  altered	  to	  consider	  these	  issues.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  illustrates	  the	  potentially	  
important	  role	  that	  a	  champion	  can	  have	  in	  bringing	  attention	  to	  a	  particular	  
transportation	  project	  and	  how	  their	  pressure	  for	  the	  consideration	  of	  these	  
benefits	  can	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  planning	  process.	  This	  person,	  people,	  or	  
group(s)	  can	  articulate	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  transportation	  project.	  Sometimes	  
champions	  are	  self-­‐anointed,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  conceivable	  that	  all	  of	  the	  concerned	  
actors	  come	  to	  recognize	  a	  key	  individual	  or	  group	  over	  time	  to	  be	  a	  champion	  
based	  on	  their	  involvement,	  skills,	  influence,	  etc.	  Clearly	  not	  all	  railways	  or	  other	  
transportation	  projects	  are	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  champion.	  Yet	  for	  cases	  
where	  at	  least	  one	  champion	  can	  lead	  in	  an	  effective	  way,	  there	  are	  potentially	  
significant	  benefits.	  Planners	  can	  help	  champions	  emerge	  or	  succeed	  with	  their	  
support.	  
Study	  tours	  can	  also	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  altering	  the	  preconceptions	  that	  IDI	  
staff	  and	  government	  experts	  may	  have	  about	  a	  railway	  or	  other	  transportation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  McAfee	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  do	  not	  address	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality,	  which	  appears	  to	  take	  a	  singular	  
form	  in	  their	  work.	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project.	  These	  study	  tours	  can	  be	  led	  by	  champions,	  but	  seem	  to	  have	  greater	  
efficacy	  when	  they	  involve	  local	  community	  members	  in	  direct	  discussions	  with	  the	  
recipients	  of	  the	  tour.	  This	  gives	  experts	  and	  other	  actors	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
the	  local	  context,	  which	  also	  puts	  a	  human	  face	  on	  the	  population	  that	  will	  likely	  be	  
affected	  by	  outside	  experts’	  decisions	  that	  adversely	  affects	  local	  transportation	  
service.	  This	  can	  make	  some	  individuals	  more	  receptive	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  
certain	  variables	  into	  the	  CBA	  process	  –	  particularly	  those	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  
quantify.	  More	  broadly,	  study	  tours	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  improving	  decisions	  by	  
acting	  as	  a	  reality	  check.	  Experts	  and	  other	  visitors	  may	  question	  initial	  results	  and	  
assumptions	  if	  they	  do	  not	  match	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground.	  The	  challenge	  for	  
planning	  is	  to	  build	  adequate	  time	  and	  resources	  into	  the	  process	  for	  these	  visits.	  
Another	  key	  lesson	  for	  planning	  and	  policy	  making	  is	  that	  TCSOs	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  impact	  the	  outcome	  of	  transportation	  projects.	  ADIFCE,	  for	  example,	  
successfully	  worked	  with	  other	  actors	  to	  build	  solidarity	  along	  the	  line	  and	  halt	  the	  
practice	  of	  tavy	  that	  threatened	  the	  line’s	  infrastructure.	  Having	  this	  active	  TCSO	  
also	  meant	  that	  local	  Malagasy	  farmers	  did	  not	  interact	  exclusively	  with	  paid	  staff	  
from	  development	  organizations	  or	  government.	  This	  was	  especially	  important	  in	  
early	  2002	  when	  development	  staff	  were	  not	  present	  during	  the	  political	  crisis.	  
Instead,	  ADIFCE	  members	  helped	  protect	  the	  railway	  and	  encouraged	  others	  to	  do	  
so	  too	  through	  ANP	  using	  the	  same	  arguments	  from	  the	  rehabilitation	  project.	  The	  
solidarity	  ADIFCE	  helped	  generate	  and	  channel	  during	  this	  period	  could	  not	  have	  
been	  foreseen	  when	  the	  TCSO	  was	  founded,	  but	  it	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  fortuitous.	  	  
In	  fact,	  organizing	  civil	  society	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  a	  TCSO	  can	  produce	  benefits	  
to	  all	  the	  ‘spheres	  of	  action’	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  For	  civil	  society,	  having	  an	  
effective	  TCSO	  in	  place	  can	  keep	  the	  public	  informed	  of	  potential	  changes	  that	  may	  
affect	  their	  transportation	  services	  and	  can	  in	  turn	  represent	  their	  views	  to	  other	  
actors.	  For	  the	  corporate	  economy	  (i.e.,	  private	  sector	  companies),	  a	  TCSO	  can	  build	  
public	  support	  for	  an	  entity’s	  operations	  or	  a	  privatization	  process,	  which	  can	  
reduce	  uncertainty	  and	  improve	  security	  for	  its	  assets	  and	  services.	  Governments	  
and	  transnational	  nonprofits	  (i.e.,	  IDIs	  and	  NGOs)	  can	  save	  time	  and	  resources	  by	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continuously	  engaging	  with	  TCSOs	  both	  in	  identifying	  problems	  and	  in	  developing	  
projects	  aimed	  at	  resolving	  them.	  	  
The	  question	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  an	  important	  one	  for	  TCSOs.	  These	  organizations	  
can	  lend	  legitimacy	  to	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  external	  actors	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  general	  public.	  While	  this	  has	  obvious	  benefits	  when	  the	  leaders	  and	  
members	  act	  in	  good	  faith,	  the	  risk	  that	  an	  organization	  claiming	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  
of	  civil	  society	  could	  be	  corrupt,	  ineffective,	  unrepresentative	  or	  even	  co-­‐opted	  by	  
other	  actors	  for	  insidious	  reasons	  certainly	  is	  a	  possibility	  too.	  However,	  adequate	  
transparency	  can	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  these	  adverse	  outcomes	  –	  or	  at	  least	  the	  
perception	  that	  they	  plague	  the	  organization.	  Arguably,	  had	  ADIFCE	  been	  more	  
transparent	  and	  inclusive	  in	  its	  governing	  structure,	  prospective	  members	  would	  
have	  seen	  annual	  dues	  as	  a	  valid	  obligation.	  Yet	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  created	  the	  
perception	  that	  improprieties	  or	  wastefulness	  existed	  in	  how	  the	  organization	  spent	  
its	  budget,	  which	  affected	  its	  ability	  to	  collect	  enough	  membership	  fees	  to	  be	  self-­‐
sustaining.	  Other	  TCSOs	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  make	  transparency	  and	  broader	  
participation	  in	  their	  leadership	  ranks	  a	  high	  priority	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  
organizations’	  continued	  legitimacy	  and	  existence.	  
TCSOs	  need	  to	  focus	  not	  just	  on	  winning	  over	  prospective	  members,	  but	  also	  on	  
swaying	  decision	  makers.	  ADIFCE	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  do	  this	  and	  this	  was	  a	  
limitation	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  ensure	  the	  FCE	  continued	  to	  serve	  communities.	  
Planners	  and	  other	  actors	  who	  are	  already	  empowered	  in	  existing	  transportation	  
decision-­‐making	  processes	  can	  encourage	  the	  participation	  of	  TCSOs.	  After	  all,	  
TCSOs	  can	  engage	  with	  public	  officials	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  members	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  is	  
more	  sustainable	  and	  predictable	  than	  individuals	  or	  a	  social	  movement.	  Many	  
policy	  decisions	  or	  actions	  are	  of	  potential	  interest	  to	  transportation	  beneficiaries	  
because	  they	  impact	  them	  personally	  or	  could	  eventually	  lead	  to	  rollbacks	  in	  service	  
(e.g.,	  fare	  changes,	  goods	  handling	  procedures,	  contracts	  with	  suppliers,	  etc.).	  Yet	  
these	  changes	  may	  not	  inflame	  the	  passions	  of	  enough	  people	  to	  initiate,	  let	  along	  
sustain,	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  influence	  outcomes.	  Occasionally,	  though,	  civil	  society	  
has	  mobilized	  quickly	  to	  protect	  their	  transportation	  interests.	  Social	  movements	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have	  been	  highly	  effective	  at	  changing	  outcomes	  and	  decisions	  that	  displeased	  the	  
public,	  but	  these	  activities	  were	  usually	  only	  roused	  by	  drastic	  cutbacks	  to	  service.	  
They	  can	  also	  take	  highly	  disruptive	  and	  costly	  forms	  of	  expression	  such	  as	  protests	  
or	  other	  forms	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  that,	  although	  effective,	  is	  more	  indicative	  of	  a	  
planning	  process	  that	  has	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  different	  perspectives.	  
Any	  organization	  needs	  some	  resources	  to	  conduct	  their	  business,	  but	  TCSOs	  can	  
be	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  this	  issue	  when	  members	  are	  spread	  out	  over	  large	  
geographical	  distances.	  In	  LDCs,	  funds	  for	  operations	  are	  crucial	  because	  
communication	  expenses	  are	  relatively	  high	  anyway.	  As	  has	  been	  seen,	  sustaining	  
operating	  revenue	  over	  the	  long-­‐term	  is	  challenging.	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  
that	  TCSOs	  can	  finance	  their	  organization’s	  activities	  or	  reduce	  their	  costs.	  ADIFCE’s	  
requirement	  to	  have	  annual	  meetings	  and	  votes	  in	  person	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  expensive	  
undertaking	  that	  required	  subsidies	  from	  development	  organizations.	  Mandatory	  
dues	  can	  also	  have	  the	  perverse	  effect	  of	  actually	  shrinking	  membership	  –	  thereby	  
weakening	  the	  organization.	  Funding	  mechanisms,	  therefore,	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  
based	  on	  the	  context	  and	  with	  an	  eye	  also	  towards	  maximizing	  membership.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  resulting	  collection	  and	  handling	  of	  funds	  from	  any	  source	  must	  be	  
handled	  in	  a	  steadfast,	  transparent	  fashion.	  	  
For	  those	  individuals	  and	  groups	  interested	  in	  developing	  sustainable	  
transportation	  solutions	  that	  achieve	  more	  than	  just	  what	  is	  reflected	  on	  an	  annual	  
report,	  the	  lessons	  from	  this	  case	  can	  inform	  planning	  practice	  and	  policy	  making.	  
Balancing	  the	  traditional	  justification	  for	  operating	  transportation	  services	  with	  
other	  important	  factors,	  building	  solidarity	  among	  different	  actors	  and	  especially	  
the	  beneficiaries,	  finding	  champions,	  and	  recognizing	  the	  value	  of	  study	  tours	  can	  
improve	  transportation	  decisions	  and	  outcomes.	  Likewise,	  planners	  and	  
policymakers	  can	  encourage	  the	  formation,	  sustainability	  and	  active	  involvement	  of	  
these	  TCSOs	  by	  ensuring	  they	  remain	  democratic,	  transparent,	  well-­‐funded	  and	  
engaged	  with	  all	  stakeholders.	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IV. Policy	  Recommendations	  
If	  some	  of	  the	  threats	  posed	  to	  a	  railway	  originate	  with	  civil	  society,	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  FCE	  indicates	  that	  TCSOs	  like	  ADIFCE	  who	  work	  to	  unite	  the	  general	  public	  can	  
make	  potentially	  valuable	  contributions	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector.	  Yet	  if	  railway	  
supporters	  want	  a	  TCSO	  that	  affects	  other	  actors,	  then	  steps	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  
realize	  this.	  This	  section	  makes	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  draw	  upon	  
the	  research	  findings	  and	  interviews	  with	  informants.	  
	  
1. Balancing	  Power	  Relations	  and	  Rationalities	  
The	  transportation	  and	  development	  fields	  still	  allow	  only	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  
set	  of	  values	  to	  guide	  investments	  –	  namely	  those	  that	  coincide	  with	  formal	  and	  
neoliberal	  rationalities.	  Social	  movements	  that	  have	  formed	  around	  transportation	  
interests	  have	  shown	  that	  civil	  society	  can	  challenge	  traditionally	  accepted	  
rationalities	  and	  force	  the	  establishment	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  even	  respond	  to	  their	  
position.	  However,	  these	  efforts	  are	  usually	  ephemeral	  because	  they	  are	  hard	  for	  
civil	  society	  to	  sustain	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  planning	  process	  suffers	  
from	  unanticipated	  public	  outcry,	  which	  can	  drag	  out	  projects	  and	  increase	  costs.	  	  
Public	  participation	  can	  help	  reduce	  uncertainty	  while	  ensuring	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
substantive	  rationality,	  or	  value-­‐based	  rationality,	  and	  consideration	  of	  
transportation	  benefits.	  This	  can	  elevate	  the	  profile	  of	  sometimes-­‐overlooked	  
benefits	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  particular	  railway.	  With	  limited	  or	  no	  public	  
participation,	  many	  railway	  benefits	  risk	  being	  excluded.	  Those	  measures	  that	  are	  
typically	  included	  also	  need	  to	  be	  evaluated	  relative	  to	  their	  importance	  to	  other	  
variables.	  As	  Sen	  states,	  “in	  arriving	  at	  an	  ‘agreed’	  range	  for	  social	  evaluation…there	  
has	  to	  be	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  reasoned	  ‘consensus’	  on	  weights,	  or	  at	  least	  on	  a	  range	  of	  
weights.	  This	  is	  a	  ‘social	  choice’	  exercise,	  and	  it	  requires	  public	  discussion	  and	  a	  
democratic	  understanding	  and	  acceptance”	  (Sen	  1999:	  78-­‐79).	  To	  date,	  genuine	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public	  participation	  early	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  concerning	  colonial-­‐era	  
railways	  and	  other	  transportation	  services	  in	  LDCs	  has	  been	  almost	  nonexistent.	  	  
Arriving	  at	  this	  point,	  though,	  requires	  a	  shift	  in	  existing	  power	  relations.	  IDIs	  
have	  made	  progress	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  include	  other	  measures	  and	  citizen	  
participation.	  Yet	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  correct	  the	  power	  imbalances.	  This	  
requires,	  as	  Chambers	  advocates,	  “putting	  the	  first	  last”	  (Chambers	  1997:	  234-­‐237).	  
Whether	  or	  not	  the	  “first”	  do	  this	  voluntarily	  and	  sincerely	  is	  a	  key	  and	  open	  
question	  –	  one	  that	  requires	  critical	  reflection	  by	  all	  actors	  including	  the	  ones	  who	  
traditionally	  wield	  the	  most	  influence.	  Chambers	  at	  least	  recognizes	  the	  challenge	  of	  
such	  a	  reversal	  of	  power	  and	  other	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  experts	  approach	  
development	  by	  admitting	  “ideologically,	  it	  conflicts	  with	  the	  pervasive	  ethos	  of	  the	  
neo-­‐liberal	  market	  and	  the	  materialism	  and	  global	  greed	  of	  the	  mid-­‐1990s”	  (ibid.:	  
234)	  that	  is	  largely	  still	  with	  us.	  While	  this	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task	  and	  despite	  efforts	  to	  
elevate	  civil	  society’s	  voice	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  including	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  it	  
does	  not	  mean	  those	  who	  are	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power	  have	  been	  willing	  to	  give	  it	  up.	  	  
TCSOs	  can	  broaden	  the	  understanding	  and	  perspectives	  of	  those	  actors	  currently	  
dominating	  the	  discussions,	  but	  these	  CSOs	  need	  to	  find	  their	  way	  to	  the	  table.	  In	  
supporting	  these	  groups,	  planners	  must	  listen	  to	  the	  cultural	  or	  historical	  arguments	  
that	  resonate	  with	  these	  groups	  and	  the	  people	  they	  represent.	  These	  framings	  can	  
complement	  the	  economic	  focus	  that	  continues	  to	  dominate	  transportation	  analyses.	  
Already-­‐established	  TCSOs	  could	  provide	  better	  input	  into	  planning	  processes	  and	  
decisions	  affecting	  their	  constituents.	  This	  saves	  government	  and	  other	  actors’	  time	  
and	  resources	  they	  would	  have	  spent	  attempting	  to	  gauge	  how	  certain	  changes	  
would	  affect	  potential	  transportation	  beneficiaries.	  Despite	  this	  advantage,	  the	  
literature	  about	  social	  movements	  trying	  to	  affect	  transportation	  services	  indicates	  
that	  some	  TCSOs	  would	  need	  to	  contest	  existing	  power	  structures	  for	  their	  right	  to	  
participate	  (e.g.,	  Monson	  2006).	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2. Study	  Tours	  
Study	  tours	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  broaden	  individuals’	  perspectives	  and	  
allow	  them	  to	  consider	  other	  rationalities.	  What	  often	  took	  a	  decade	  to	  build	  and	  has	  
provided	  years	  of	  benefits	  can	  all	  too	  easily	  be	  dismissed	  in	  a	  few	  days	  of	  reading	  a	  
summary	  report	  and	  spreadsheets	  of	  performance	  measures.	  Study	  tours	  can	  
balance	  the	  dominant	  rationalities	  found	  within	  professional	  settings	  (i.e.,	  
utilitarian,	  neoliberal)	  with	  the	  substantive	  rationality	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  field.	  
Field	  visits	  are	  not	  passive	  viewing	  experiences	  like	  seeing	  photos	  or	  watching	  a	  
video.	  Rather,	  they	  provide	  outsiders	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  immerse	  themselves	  
in	  the	  world	  of	  those	  people	  living	  along	  a	  railway.	  A	  study	  tour	  can	  include	  a	  flyover	  
or	  a	  drive	  along	  the	  infrastructure	  to	  gain	  context,	  but	  they	  also	  allow	  the	  public	  into	  
the	  process	  so	  that	  stakeholders	  can	  meet	  each	  other	  at	  least	  once	  before	  any	  
decision	  is	  made.	  	  
FCE	  supporters	  aimed	  to	  create	  what	  one	  informant	  called	  “a	  learning	  
environment”	  that	  allowed	  outsiders	  to	  actually	  get	  out	  of	  the	  train	  and	  meet	  with	  
people	  who	  use	  or	  benefit	  from	  the	  line.	  They	  based	  this	  key	  intervention	  on	  the	  
idea	  that	  seeing	  the	  railway	  and	  meeting	  with	  stakeholders	  held	  tremendous	  
opportunity	  to	  shape	  people’s	  opinions	  about	  the	  line.	  As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  IDI	  
staff	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  confirm	  that	  riding	  the	  railway	  influenced	  their	  
opinion.	  Seeing	  the	  line	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  conveys	  information	  that	  photos	  or	  
reports	  never	  could	  –	  including	  providing	  a	  tangible	  representation	  of	  the	  context	  in	  
which	  railway	  beneficiaries	  live.	  
TCSOs	  can	  either	  give	  these	  tours	  or,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ADIFCE,	  actively	  
participate	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  certain	  information	  during	  them.	  Whereas	  a	  public	  
railway	  administration	  may	  find	  it	  impertinent	  to	  extend	  an	  offer	  to	  government	  
officials	  and	  IDI	  staff	  to	  see	  the	  context	  in	  person,	  TCSOs	  can	  do	  this.	  TCSOs	  can	  also	  
save	  time	  for	  outside	  actors	  coming	  to	  the	  region,	  which	  could	  make	  them	  and	  the	  
process	  more	  effective.	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3. Direct	  Lobbying	  
One	  of	  the	  greatest	  missed	  opportunities	  for	  ADIFCE	  was	  its	  failure	  to	  take	  a	  
more	  direct	  role	  in	  influencing	  actors	  from	  outside	  the	  region.	  It	  is	  an	  
understandable	  omission	  because	  many	  railway	  supporters	  feared	  ADIFCE	  would	  
be	  perceived	  as	  partisan.	  This	  concern	  of	  being	  labeled	  the	  proxy	  of	  one	  political	  
party	  continues	  to	  be	  risky	  given	  that	  the	  reins	  of	  government	  have	  changed	  hands	  
multiple	  times	  since	  2000	  and	  because	  Fianarantsoa	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  “swing”	  city	  that	  is	  
not	  dominated	  by	  any	  one	  political	  party.	  Yet	  the	  events	  of	  2002	  demonstrate	  that	  
the	  support	  for	  the	  railway	  transcended	  political	  divides	  and	  even	  brought	  people	  
closer	  together	  –	  having	  accomplished	  what	  could	  not	  be	  done	  for	  road	  bridges	  
across	  the	  country.	  Moreover,	  the	  decision	  to	  cancel	  the	  concession	  was	  made	  by	  the	  
president,	  who	  benefitted	  from	  the	  FCE	  during	  the	  crisis	  yet	  feared	  his	  perceived	  
adversaries	  could	  come	  to	  control	  the	  line	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Without	  any	  real	  political	  
force	  in	  place,	  his	  decision	  went	  almost	  uncontested.	  
TCSOs	  should	  be	  non-­‐partisan	  and	  should	  focus	  on	  serving	  its	  members,	  but	  this	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  need	  to	  be	  apolitical.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  transportation	  decision-­‐
making	  is	  highly	  political	  with	  many	  competing	  interests	  and	  actors	  pushing	  to	  
achieve	  conflicting	  objectives.	  Ignoring	  this	  fact	  is	  a	  disservice	  to	  the	  people	  who	  
depend	  on	  existing	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  colonial-­‐era	  railways.	  Therefore,	  TCSOs	  
can	  and	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  exert	  political	  pressure	  directly	  on	  government	  
officials	  –	  particularly	  those	  in	  elected	  positions.	  	  
One	  way	  that	  they	  can	  do	  this	  is	  by	  providing	  factual	  information	  to	  their	  
members	  about	  politicians	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  elections.	  TCSOs	  can	  ask	  all	  candidates	  
about	  their	  position	  towards	  the	  transportation	  infrastructure	  in	  question.	  For	  
incumbent	  candidates,	  TCSO	  officials	  can	  ask	  them	  what	  actions	  they	  have	  taken	  to	  
support	  the	  railway	  during	  their	  term,	  including	  evaluating	  them	  on	  any	  
transportation-­‐related	  promises	  they	  have	  made.	  Candidates	  would	  know	  that	  their	  
responses	  would	  be	  provided	  not	  just	  to	  organization	  members,	  but	  would	  be	  
disseminated	  by	  organization	  members	  to	  all	  households	  in	  the	  communities	  along	  
the	  line.	  This	  effort	  would	  help	  inform	  voters	  about	  an	  issue	  and	  how	  candidates	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plan	  to	  represent	  their	  interests.	  It	  also	  reminds	  candidates	  of	  the	  transportation	  
issue’s	  importance	  to	  the	  population	  and	  alerts	  them	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  nonpartisan	  
organization	  exists	  solely	  to	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  people	  who	  depend	  upon	  
it.	  	  Encouraging	  TCSO	  members	  to	  be	  an	  active	  and	  informed	  electorate	  bloc	  without	  
going	  so	  far	  as	  endorsing	  a	  particular	  member	  would	  make	  TCSOs	  like	  ADIFCE	  a	  
powerbroker	  without	  aligning	  them	  with	  any	  one	  candidate	  or	  party.	  
TCSOs	  can	  also	  exercise	  political	  power	  and	  influence	  public	  officials—even	  
experts	  from	  IDIs—through	  letter	  writing	  campaigns	  and	  petitions.	  ADIFCE’s	  
president	  did	  send	  a	  handful	  of	  letters	  to	  government	  officials	  just	  to	  let	  them	  know	  
that	  the	  organization	  existed	  and	  what	  its	  goals	  were.	  This	  is	  arguably	  less	  
impressive	  than	  a	  bundle	  of	  individual	  letters	  from	  villagers	  along	  the	  line	  telling	  
national	  government	  officials	  and	  even	  IDI	  staff	  how	  important	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  
train	  is	  to	  their	  lives.	  Organizing	  a	  mass	  letter	  writing	  campaign,	  like	  some	  social	  
movements	  do,	  would	  demonstrate	  that	  TCSOs	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  organize	  
hundreds	  or	  even	  thousands	  of	  people	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  common	  goal.	  It’s	  one	  thing	  to	  
say	  in	  a	  single	  letter	  that	  the	  population	  is	  unified;	  it’s	  another	  to	  show	  it	  with	  a	  
thick	  stack	  of	  letters.	  	  
TCSOs	  should	  be	  cautious	  not	  to	  start	  aligning	  themselves	  too	  closely	  with	  one	  
politician	  or	  one	  party.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  mayor	  of	  Fianarantsoa	  organizing	  the	  
meeting	  that	  angered	  the	  president	  of	  Madagascar	  (see	  Chapter	  3)	  is	  a	  prime	  
example	  of	  how	  introducing	  political	  figures	  can	  be	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  cause	  
of	  helping	  a	  railway.	  Sometimes	  TCSOs	  may	  feel	  pressure	  (real	  or	  perceived)	  to	  align	  
themselves	  with	  one	  political	  side.	  Forming	  an	  alliance	  with	  powerful	  interests	  may	  
seem	  strategically	  expedient	  to	  achieving	  their	  goals,	  but	  politicizing	  the	  TCSO	  in	  
this	  way	  can	  risk	  it	  being	  ostracized	  should	  the	  political	  winds	  fail	  to	  blow	  in	  their	  
direction.	  TCSOs	  can	  temper	  politicians’	  feelings	  of	  being	  slighted	  by	  clearly	  
communicating	  in	  advance	  that	  any	  and	  all	  politicians	  can	  be	  an	  ally	  of	  a	  
transportation	  service.	  This	  acknowledges	  that	  people	  can	  have	  different	  viewpoints	  
on	  other	  issues,	  but	  that	  there	  is	  room	  under	  the	  tent	  for	  everyone	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
a	  specific	  transportation	  service	  or	  infrastructure.	  In	  fact,	  designating	  certain	  TCSO	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members	  from	  different	  parties	  to	  communicate	  the	  organization’s	  ideas	  with	  their	  
own	  parties	  would	  perhaps	  be	  more	  effective	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  not	  trying	  to	  form	  a	  
political	  alliance	  against	  the	  other	  parties.	  
	  
4. Funding	  and	  Budgeting	  
TCSOs	  need	  financial	  resources	  to	  operate	  and	  implement	  their	  strategies.	  The	  
costs	  of	  paying	  for	  staff	  and	  consultants,	  office	  expenses	  and	  supplies,	  transport	  and	  
holding	  meetings	  can	  add	  up.	  The	  cost	  of	  communication	  is	  especially	  high	  in	  LDCs	  
like	  Madagascar	  (SSI	  with	  Informant	  8,	  Fianarantsoa,	  13	  Jul	  2008),	  which	  can	  hinder	  
many	  of	  these	  organizations’	  objectives.	  However,	  the	  idea	  of	  having	  a	  group	  like	  
this	  is	  to	  recoup	  these	  costs	  and	  generate	  enough	  revenue	  to	  allow	  the	  group	  to	  
achieve	  its	  goals.	  Ideally,	  every	  bit	  of	  funding	  expended	  will	  pay	  dividends	  in	  
rehabilitating	  a	  railway.	  
Finding	  funding	  for	  railways	  in	  LDCs	  is	  difficult	  and	  also	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  
TCSOs	  that	  would	  seek	  to	  preserve	  them	  or	  other	  types	  of	  transportation	  
infrastructure.	  To	  facilitate	  railway	  rehabilitation,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  use	  
certain	  development	  projects’	  funding	  because	  their	  mandates	  might	  not	  be	  
sufficiently	  close	  to	  the	  transport	  sector.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  FCE	  receiving	  funding	  from	  
agricultural,	  economic	  or	  environmental	  programs	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  framing	  
a	  railway’s	  benefits.	  In	  cases	  of	  other	  transport	  infrastructure,	  the	  benefits	  may	  be	  
less	  clear,	  but	  still	  important.	  Transportation	  does	  affect	  other	  sectors,	  though,	  so	  
projects	  can	  often	  justify	  investments.	  Still,	  this	  often	  takes	  some	  skill	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
advocates	  to	  make	  the	  case	  to	  support	  an	  intervention	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector	  –	  
particularly	  because	  this	  sector	  is	  usually	  considered	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
government.	  So	  the	  challenge	  for	  TCSOs	  has	  been	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  to	  find	  pots	  
of	  funding	  for	  which	  they	  too	  are	  eligible.	  	  
Typically,	  CSOs	  receive	  support	  from	  donors.	  Donor	  support,	  though,	  usually	  
requires	  applying	  for	  grants.	  This	  takes	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	  skill	  and	  knowledge	  
about	  what	  sources	  of	  funding	  exist	  –	  two	  things	  not	  always	  initially	  available	  to	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civil	  society	  when	  it	  first	  wants	  to	  form	  into	  an	  organization.	  Even	  once	  they	  
successfully	  form	  a	  TCSO,	  the	  task	  of	  finding	  money	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
mobilizing	  people	  to	  support	  transportation	  infrastructure	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  effort.	  The	  
cycle	  duration	  of	  donor	  projects,	  which	  is	  often	  between	  three	  to	  five	  years,	  is	  not	  
always	  conducive	  to	  such	  efforts.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  not	  much	  time	  for	  a	  campaign	  to	  
rehabilitate	  a	  railway.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  donor	  funding	  is	  an	  excellent	  resource,	  
it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  inevitable	  result	  of	  organizing	  and	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  
sustain	  operations	  indefinitely.	  TCSOs	  need	  to	  pursue	  funding	  options	  other	  than	  
development	  projects	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  sustainable	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  to	  long-­‐term.	  
CSOs	  often	  rely	  on	  membership	  fees	  to	  bolster	  their	  budgets,	  but	  these	  can	  be	  
expensive	  for	  cash-­‐poor	  populations	  –	  particularly	  for	  those	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  
areas	  who	  may	  rely	  largely	  on	  subsistence	  farming	  or	  use	  their	  money	  for	  other	  vital	  
needs	  like	  medicine	  or	  education.	  The	  true	  value	  of	  TCSOs	  having	  many	  members	  is	  
to	  support	  their	  claim	  to	  legitimately	  represent	  civil	  society	  and	  to	  marshal	  their	  
members	  to	  achieve	  goals	  rather	  than	  increase	  their	  proceeds.	  Many	  people	  along	  
the	  FCE	  were	  too	  poor	  to	  pay	  this	  annual	  fee	  or	  were	  unsure	  whether	  their	  hard-­‐
earned	  money	  would	  be	  spent	  wisely.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  TCSOs	  should	  tailor	  the	  
membership	  fee	  structure	  to	  maximize	  their	  membership	  size	  rather	  than	  their	  
revenue.	  
Ideally,	  TCSOs	  should	  have	  free	  basic	  memberships,	  but	  also	  encourage	  users	  to	  
make	  a	  financial	  contribution.	  Removing	  the	  membership	  fee	  reduces	  this	  potential	  
barrier	  to	  joining	  as	  well	  as	  a	  potential	  cause	  of	  friction	  with	  the	  community.	  They	  
can	  even	  offer	  certain	  incentives	  for	  voluntary	  donations	  by	  members	  such	  as	  using	  
their	  combined	  purchasing	  power	  to	  negotiate	  with	  transport	  providers	  for	  
discounts	  that	  allow	  contributing	  members	  certain	  privileges.	  Donating	  members	  
could	  receive	  a	  gift	  such	  as	  an	  individual	  or	  family	  portrait,	  which	  in	  LDCs	  are	  not	  
plentiful	  or	  cheap	  for	  rural	  households.	  They	  can	  also	  offer	  free	  off-­‐peak	  trips,	  class	  
upgrades	  depending	  on	  availability	  and	  excess	  baggage	  allowances	  –	  all	  things	  that	  
might	  appeal	  to	  their	  members	  and	  which	  would	  concurrently	  improve	  performance	  
on	  the	  transportation	  service	  by	  removing	  excess	  capacity.	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Developing	  a	  sustainable	  funding	  model	  for	  a	  TCSO	  does	  not	  always	  depend	  on	  
boosting	  revenue.	  Using	  a	  decentralized,	  streamlined	  model	  that	  reduces	  the	  need	  
for	  cash	  expenditures	  may	  be	  preferable	  to	  the	  top-­‐down	  system	  ADIFCE	  had.	  For	  
example,	  informants	  criticized	  ADIFCE	  as	  overly	  bureaucratic	  because	  it	  took	  a	  lot	  of	  
effort	  to	  organize	  meetings,	  including	  voting	  for	  its	  leadership,	  and	  even	  then	  these	  
meetings	  sometimes	  failed	  to	  happen	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  funding.	  Instead	  of	  requiring	  
all	  members	  to	  vote	  at	  a	  single	  meeting	  held	  in	  one	  location	  on	  one	  day,	  members	  
could	  vote	  for	  their	  officers	  at	  their	  local	  chapter,	  at	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  meeting,	  by	  
proxy	  or	  by	  mail.	  A	  TCSO	  that	  does	  this	  would	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  travel	  and	  a	  
per	  diem	  that	  ADIFCE	  had	  to	  pay	  to	  get	  members	  to	  come.	  	  
Paying	  a	  per	  diem	  for	  either	  attending	  meetings	  or	  almost	  any	  other	  type	  of	  
activities	  is	  an	  undesirable	  precedent	  that	  has	  become	  standard	  practice	  in	  some	  
parts	  of	  LDCs	  where	  NGO	  and	  donor-­‐funded	  projects	  are	  active.	  Civil	  society	  
members	  now	  expect	  and	  even	  demand	  these	  payments.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  has	  
fostered	  the	  idea	  that	  participation	  is	  designed	  to	  benefit	  outside	  aid	  groups	  rather	  
than	  the	  population	  for	  whom	  they	  are	  working.	  This	  mentality	  must	  change	  and	  
will	  require	  sensitizing	  the	  population.	  While	  this	  might	  be	  an	  acceptable	  cost	  when	  
a	  TCSO	  like	  ADIFCE	  receives	  funding	  from	  donors,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  primary	  reason	  given	  
as	  to	  why	  the	  organization	  is	  no	  longer	  active.	  Members	  will	  know	  that	  their	  
attendance	  at	  meetings	  will	  not	  be	  for	  cash,	  but	  they	  will	  receive	  donated	  food	  and	  
refreshments,	  hear	  news	  from	  outside	  the	  community,	  receive	  the	  latest	  newsletter	  
and	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  feedback	  that	  will	  be	  transmitted	  to	  the	  
relevant	  authorities.	  
Another	  way	  to	  both	  reduce	  costs	  and	  still	  provide	  similar	  perks	  to	  their	  
members	  is	  for	  TCSOs	  to	  request	  in-­‐kind	  contributions	  from	  the	  communities	  
should	  also	  be	  pursued.	  For	  example,	  they	  can	  ask	  community	  leaders	  and	  local	  
merchants	  to	  sponsor	  the	  refreshments	  at	  their	  meetings,	  which	  is	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  
buy-­‐in	  by	  members.	  Donors’	  contribution	  can	  be	  explicitly	  recognized	  at	  the	  
meetings	  by	  the	  facilitators	  or	  in	  newsletters	  circulating	  along	  the	  line.	  It	  is	  
reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  many	  community	  members	  will	  appreciate	  the	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contribution	  of	  food	  and	  this	  could	  build	  loyalty	  for	  the	  store	  or	  give	  the	  community	  
member	  a	  feeling	  of	  respect	  and	  prestige	  among	  their	  peers.	  
Still,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  TCSOs	  dedicated	  to	  railways,	  some	  innovative	  forms	  of	  
funding	  could	  be	  generated	  –	  namely	  from	  tourists	  with	  disposable	  income.	  Many	  
people	  ride	  trains	  for	  the	  experience	  and	  would	  like	  souvenirs	  to	  commemorate	  
their	  trip.	  The	  FCE	  tourist	  brochure	  was	  a	  promising	  idea,	  but	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  
model	  failed	  to	  be	  a	  sustainable	  revenue	  stream	  for	  ADIFCE.	  Mostly,	  the	  failure	  lies	  
in	  its	  execution	  because	  the	  locations	  where	  tourists	  could	  buy	  them	  were	  dispersed	  
and	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  limit	  the	  loss	  of	  brochures	  and	  resulting	  revenue.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  tourist	  guide	  could	  still	  be	  feasible	  if	  TCSOs	  close	  the	  “gap”	  
between	  the	  outlets	  and	  tourists.	  TCSO	  staff	  should	  be	  able	  to	  sell	  brochures	  directly	  
on	  the	  train	  and	  at	  the	  platforms.	  Selling	  to	  tourists	  directly	  on	  the	  train	  will	  
minimize	  TCSO	  staff	  time	  and	  collection	  expenses,	  as	  well	  as	  loss	  of	  the	  items.	  
Tourists	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  vendor	  and	  with	  a	  written	  flyer	  that	  the	  revenue	  
from	  their	  purchase	  would	  be	  used	  to	  support	  the	  group	  and	  its	  effort	  at	  
rehabilitating	  the	  FCE.	  Properly	  conveyed,	  tourists	  will	  learn	  that	  their	  purchase	  will	  
benefit	  their	  own	  experience	  on	  the	  FCE	  and	  the	  communities	  that	  depend	  upon	  it.	  
They	  may	  even	  decide	  to	  make	  a	  larger	  purchase	  or	  donation.	  
TCSOs	  could	  also	  expand	  the	  range	  of	  items	  that	  appeal	  to	  tourists	  who	  either	  
want	  a	  unique	  souvenir	  or	  the	  convenience	  of	  buying	  one	  on	  the	  train.	  These	  
souvenirs,	  supplied	  by	  local	  artisans	  and	  merchants,	  could	  come	  from	  the	  area	  the	  
train	  traverses	  (e.g.,	  baskets	  woven	  from	  vetiver),	  embody	  a	  railway	  theme	  (e.g.,	  
carved	  wooden	  or	  pottery	  trains),	  or	  bear	  the	  railway’s	  picture	  or	  logo	  (e.g.,	  clothing,	  
bags,	  wallets,	  postcards,	  professional	  photos,	  etc.).	  The	  TCSO	  could	  decide	  to	  
dedicate	  a	  small	  percentage	  the	  resulting	  profit	  to	  the	  railway	  for	  administrative	  
reasons,	  which	  serves	  the	  larger	  goal	  of	  demonstrating	  the	  line’s	  ability	  to	  develop	  
new	  revenue	  streams.	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5. Finding	  Passionate	  Champions	  
Having	  some	  money	  is	  essential	  for	  a	  TCSO,	  but	  having	  passionate	  stakeholders	  
is	  an	  invaluable	  asset	  –	  especially	  those	  individuals	  who	  can	  serve	  as	  champions	  of	  a	  
transportation	  service	  or	  infrastructure.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  having	  key	  
advocates,	  or	  “champions,”	  is	  critical	  to	  shifting	  the	  balance	  of	  rationality	  that	  can	  
help	  preserve	  train	  service.	  Finding	  a	  champion	  is	  not	  necessarily	  something	  a	  TCSO	  
can	  plan	  to	  do.	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  just	  serendipity	  that	  a	  champion	  decides	  to	  step	  into	  
that	  role,	  but	  there	  are	  times	  when	  a	  suitable	  person	  just	  needs	  convincing.	  TCSOs	  
can	  provide	  champions	  with	  support	  that	  makes	  this	  sometimes-­‐exhausting	  role	  a	  
little	  easier.	  	  
These	  champions	  do	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  members	  of	  the	  TCSO.	  They	  can	  
be	  staff	  at	  governmental	  entities	  or	  at	  development	  projects.	  By	  virtue	  of	  their	  
position,	  status	  or	  even	  professional	  role,	  champions	  could	  gain	  access	  to	  key	  
international	  and	  national	  actors	  and	  review	  documents	  related	  to	  the	  project.	  
Although	  they	  can	  be	  politicians,	  this	  brings	  certain	  risks	  of	  politicizing	  the	  effort.	  
Ideally,	  the	  champion	  will	  not	  be	  politically	  polarizing	  and	  should	  be	  able	  to	  navigate	  
the	  political	  landscape	  to	  build	  support	  across	  party	  lines.	  There	  are	  advantages	  to	  
having	  outside	  champions	  because	  champions	  who	  have	  more	  freedom	  from	  these	  
pressures	  can	  often	  be	  found	  outside	  of	  government.	  Members	  of	  civil	  society	  could,	  
depending	  on	  their	  skills,	  fill	  this	  role.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  the	  strongest	  
champions	  tended	  to	  be	  expatriate	  development	  experts	  with	  a	  few	  Malagasy	  
stepping	  forward	  at	  times.	  While	  there	  are	  advantages	  to	  having	  champions	  who	  are	  
outsiders,	  it	  helps	  to	  have	  champions	  within	  the	  organization	  too.	  This	  includes	  
providing	  control	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  
Communication	  and	  facilitation	  skills	  help	  define	  effective	  champions.	  These	  
skills	  allow	  them	  to	  speak	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors	  and	  grapple	  with	  competing	  
rationalities	  and	  objectives.	  The	  interactions	  they	  have	  with	  other	  actors	  can	  help	  
determine	  if	  a	  line	  is	  worth	  saving.	  For	  example,	  champions	  can	  provide	  other	  
railway	  supporters	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  challenge	  assumptions,	  arguments,	  and	  
statistics.	  Their	  ability	  to	  secure	  funding	  and	  donated	  equipment	  from	  both	  IDIs	  and	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non-­‐governmental	  sources	  can	  help	  keep	  a	  railway	  like	  the	  FCE	  alive.	  In	  fact,	  their	  
communication	  skills	  are	  key	  to	  their	  effectiveness.	  They	  are	  key	  actors	  recognized	  
by	  both	  insiders	  and	  outsiders	  as	  passionate	  about	  the	  cause	  and	  capable	  of	  
marshalling	  support.	  Backed	  by	  evidence	  and	  arguments,	  persuasive	  champions	  
could	  also	  take	  risks	  that	  others	  are	  unwilling	  to	  take	  and	  show	  a	  level	  of	  dedication	  
others	  do	  not	  exhibit.	  
	  
6. Expertise	  and	  Social	  Organizing	  
Perhaps	  even	  more	  critical	  to	  a	  TCSO’s	  success	  than	  a	  champion	  is	  having	  
volunteers	  or	  staff	  with	  the	  right	  skills	  working	  for	  them	  –	  particularly	  if	  no	  other	  
railway	  supporters	  have	  those	  necessary	  abilities.	  Having	  access	  to	  these	  human	  
resources	  becomes	  particularly	  important	  where	  development	  agency	  staff	  are	  not	  
as	  supportive	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE.	  These	  people	  could	  possess	  
technical	  skills	  or	  cultural	  knowledge	  that	  aids	  the	  TCSO.	  With	  the	  right	  contacts	  and	  
resources,	  an	  organization	  can	  find	  experts	  who	  can	  critically	  examine	  the	  
assumptions	  and	  arguments	  that	  may	  otherwise	  go	  unquestioned.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  understanding	  CBA	  and	  providing	  constructive	  feedback	  on	  how	  to	  
modify	  it	  can	  completely	  change	  the	  calculus	  and,	  thereby,	  many	  experts’	  view	  of	  a	  
project.	  Yet	  if	  nobody	  with	  the	  skills	  is	  motivated	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  CBA,	  
then	  certain	  errors	  and	  omissions	  may	  be	  overlooked.	  The	  same	  problem	  arises	  if	  
someone	  wants	  to	  challenge	  it,	  but	  does	  not	  possess	  the	  technical	  or	  community	  
skills	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  arguments	  favoring	  
preserving	  the	  railway	  gained	  so	  much	  traction	  was	  due	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  railway	  
supporters	  to	  bring	  arguments	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  that	  normally	  not	  
considered.	  Namely,	  by	  quantifying	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  line’s	  closure	  on	  forest	  
resources	  and	  local	  livelihood,	  railway	  supporters	  expanded	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  CBA.	  
Expertise	  is	  not	  just	  the	  possession	  of	  those	  who	  can	  respond	  to	  technical	  and	  
economic	  analyses.	  TCSOs	  can	  bring	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  local	  expertise	  to	  the	  
discussion,	  resulting	  in	  more	  appropriate	  and	  sustainable	  solutions.	  The	  case	  of	  the	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FCE	  shows	  the	  value	  of	  people	  who	  have	  the	  right	  skills	  to	  complement	  the	  passion	  
and	  motivation	  of	  members.	  Malagasy	  social	  organizers	  working	  on	  the	  FCE	  dossier	  
were	  able	  to	  tease	  out	  important	  information,	  such	  as	  the	  heritage	  value	  of	  the	  line,	  
while	  also	  recommending	  a	  more	  positive	  approach	  to	  interacting	  with	  the	  general	  
population.	  Local	  knowledge	  proved	  valuable	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  cyclones	  along	  the	  
FCE	  when	  villagers	  helped	  railway	  workers	  identify	  locations	  where	  drainage	  
infrastructure	  had	  been	  buried	  or	  where	  soil	  was	  unstable.	  The	  director	  of	  FCER	  
emphasized	  the	  value	  of	  having	  a	  social	  organizer	  position	  built	  into	  their	  budget	  so	  
that	  they	  could	  adopt	  a	  participatory	  approach	  from	  the	  start	  (Correspondence	  with	  
Karen	  Freudenberger,	  27	  Jul	  2009).	  
	  
7. Transparency	  and	  Regular	  Communication	  with	  Community	  Members	  
In	  order	  to	  maintain	  legitimacy	  with	  both	  members	  and	  outsiders,	  TCSOs	  need	  to	  
be	  as	  transparent	  as	  possible	  in	  their	  internal	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  in	  the	  
management	  of	  the	  organization’s	  resources.	  For	  example,	  having	  written	  bylaws	  
and	  a	  formal	  voting	  process	  for	  relevant	  decisions	  can	  help	  ensure	  that	  a	  TCSO	  
responds	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  its	  members.	  It	  also	  reassures	  outsiders	  and	  members	  
that	  the	  organization	  is	  not	  acting	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  another	  actor	  in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  process.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  that	  a	  TCSO	  regularly	  meet	  with	  
its	  members.	  Having	  a	  strong,	  formal	  framework	  and	  actually	  abiding	  by	  it,	  helps	  
ensure	  the	  organization’s	  continuation.	  	  
Railway	  supporters	  might	  have	  wanted	  to	  portray	  ADIFCE	  as	  grassroots	  that	  
implies	  transparency	  and	  democratic	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  TCSO	  
was	  a	  top-­‐down	  organization.	  Although	  ADIFCE	  has	  bylaws,	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  hold	  
regular	  meetings	  due	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  transporting	  and	  hosting	  key	  voting	  members.	  
Inconsistent	  and	  irregular	  consultation	  by	  the	  leadership	  with	  members	  might	  have	  
reduced	  costs	  and	  sped	  certain	  decisions,	  but	  it	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  that	  
villagers	  would	  consider	  themselves	  members	  because	  it	  decreased	  transparency	  of	  
what	  ADIFCE	  was	  doing.	  A	  TCSO	  does	  not	  need	  to	  consult	  with	  its	  members	  on	  each	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issue	  that	  arises	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  campaign,	  but	  the	  public	  needs	  to	  know	  how	  
decisions	  are	  being	  made	  and	  what	  those	  decisions	  are.	  
Voluntary	  public	  disclosure	  of	  financial	  information	  is	  also	  critically	  important	  
both	  for	  donors	  and	  dues-­‐paying	  members.	  Nobody	  donating	  funds	  to	  a	  TCSO	  likes	  
the	  idea	  that	  money	  is	  being	  spent	  frivolously	  or	  for	  the	  personal	  gain.	  Whether	  or	  
not	  a	  country	  has	  a	  mandatory	  reporting	  mechanism	  for	  a	  non-­‐profit	  CSO	  like	  
ADIFCE,	  the	  leadership	  should	  voluntarily	  make	  its	  books	  available	  for	  public	  
inspection.	  Showing	  the	  revenues,	  expenses	  and	  savings	  can	  cut	  down	  on	  the	  
perception	  that	  an	  organization’s	  leadership	  is	  corrupt	  or	  its	  operations	  wasteful.	  
Some	  may	  think	  that	  a	  TCSO	  showing	  the	  size	  of	  its	  war	  chest	  gives	  an	  unfair	  
advantage	  to	  opponents	  who	  are	  not	  so	  transparent	  or	  that	  it	  invites	  unsolicited	  
funding	  requests	  that	  cannot	  be	  met	  –	  perhaps	  even	  for	  paying	  for	  a	  railway’s	  
deficit.	  Opponents	  in	  transportation	  conflicts	  will	  not	  care	  so	  much	  about	  the	  TCSO’s	  
budget	  as	  how	  it	  can	  muster	  its	  influence,	  which	  includes	  non-­‐monetary	  human	  
resources.	  Fear	  that	  they	  may	  be	  asked	  to	  help	  pay	  for	  the	  actual	  operations	  of	  a	  
railway	  is	  unfounded	  because	  a	  TCSO	  could	  not	  generate	  enough	  money	  to	  support	  
service.	  Moreover,	  if	  its	  mission	  is	  clear,	  as	  ADIFCE’s	  was,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  easy	  to	  
deflect	  inappropriate	  funding	  requests	  that	  cannot	  first	  be	  put	  to	  a	  general	  
membership	  vote.	  Rigorous	  reporting	  and	  auditing	  open	  to	  public	  inspection	  can	  
also	  offer	  TCSO	  administrators	  sufficient	  cover	  to	  prevent	  racketeering.	  	  
Being	  transparent	  requires	  a	  strong	  communication	  structure.	  One	  of	  the	  
greatest	  deficiencies	  along	  the	  railway	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  reliable,	  credible	  information.	  
Residents	  of	  some	  FCE-­‐adjacent	  villages	  will	  walk	  uphill	  for	  30	  minutes	  in	  search	  of	  
a	  sufficiently	  strong	  cell	  phone	  service.	  Radio	  reception	  is	  limited	  both	  by	  the	  
topography	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  electricity	  in	  these	  communities.	  Most	  information	  
travels	  by	  letter,	  word	  of	  mouth,	  or	  the	  CB	  radio	  of	  the	  railway	  in	  urgent	  situations.	  
While	  ADIFCE	  used	  to	  provide	  their	  color	  newsletter	  Ny	  Dian’ny	  Mpianala	  to	  its	  
members,	  this	  source	  of	  information	  has	  stopped	  since	  the	  organization’s	  funding	  
disappeared.	  In	  villages	  that	  have	  relatively	  little	  printed	  material,	  even	  a	  black	  and	  
white	  printed	  newsletter	  of	  roughly	  four	  to	  eight	  pages	  could	  attract	  a	  steady	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readership.	  A	  TCSO	  like	  ADIFCE	  can	  inform	  the	  public	  about	  their	  actions	  and	  
budget	  in	  this	  way.	  The	  scarcity	  of	  the	  printed	  material	  will	  help	  it	  be	  shared	  by	  
multiple	  readers.	  The	  newsletter	  could	  also	  attract	  a	  broader	  audience	  to	  its	  core	  
content	  if	  it	  also	  includes	  a	  page	  or	  two	  oriented	  towards	  public	  interest	  items,	  such	  
as	  recipes,	  prices	  of	  goods,	  poetry,	  cartoons,	  short	  stories	  and	  even	  jokes.	  	  
	  
V. Conclusion:	  Reflections,	  Questions	  and	  Further	  Research	  
It	  would	  be	  an	  ironic	  outcome	  if	  efforts	  to	  save	  colonial-­‐built	  railways,	  which	  
many	  experts	  have	  viewed	  as	  an	  anachronistic	  mode	  of	  transportation	  (e.g.,	  Bickers	  
1976:	  1),	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  inclusive	  planning	  approach.	  After	  all,	  this	  approach	  so	  
markedly	  departs	  not	  only	  from	  the	  deplorable	  origins	  of	  these	  lines	  where	  a	  
colonial	  power	  imposed	  them	  onto	  an	  often-­‐unwilling	  population,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  
existing	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  paradigm.	  Yet	  it	  should	  not	  be	  too	  
surprising	  given	  the	  complex,	  important	  and	  yet	  often	  underappreciated	  benefits	  
that	  these	  lines	  are	  providing	  in	  a	  region	  with	  relatively	  few	  transportation	  
alternatives.	  Beneficiaries	  of	  these	  lines	  have	  much	  at	  stake	  and	  are	  right	  to	  criticize	  
railway	  detractors	  for	  glossing	  over	  this	  mode’s	  benefits	  while	  emphasizing	  their	  
weaknesses.	  As	  with	  any	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  the	  public	  
(especially	  existing	  users)	  should	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  as	  partners	  
rather	  than	  passive	  recipients.	  A	  genuine	  public	  participation	  process	  would	  be	  a	  
key	  step	  forward	  to	  remediating	  the	  existing	  power	  imbalances	  and	  the	  deficiency	  in	  
acknowledging	  colonial	  railways’	  benefits.	  	  
Public	  participation	  is	  far	  from	  a	  panacea.	  Even	  when	  the	  public	  is	  invited	  to	  
participate,	  it	  rarely	  is	  asked	  to	  help	  develop	  the	  criteria	  or	  weighting	  used	  to	  judge	  
the	  merits	  of	  projects	  or	  services.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  comment	  period	  
based	  on	  options	  already	  developed	  by	  experts;	  civil	  society	  must	  be	  meaningfully	  
involved	  throughout	  the	  entire	  process.	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  experts	  would	  cite	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  public	  participation	  component	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  as	  a	  
defense	  of	  actions	  taken,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  public	  were	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ultimately	  considered.	  Experts	  often	  use	  positivism’s	  claim	  to	  objectivity	  for	  political	  
advantage	  or	  cover	  (Simon	  1996:	  56-­‐57).	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  public	  participation	  
would	  serve	  the	  same	  purpose.	  Leivra	  asserts	  that	  efforts	  to	  expand	  the	  role	  of	  
participatory	  governance	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  decisions	  could	  
actually	  result	  in	  “the	  subordination	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  noneconomic	  realm	  to	  
the	  logic	  of	  transnational	  capital”	  (Leivra	  2008:	  17).80	  So	  even	  though	  the	  alternative	  
of	  no	  public	  involvement	  is	  not	  desirable	  either,	  caution	  must	  be	  exercised	  in	  how	  it	  
is	  done.	  
Incorporating	  transparency	  and	  reflexivity	  into	  the	  process	  can	  reduce	  the	  
likelihood	  that	  public	  participation	  is	  used	  merely	  to	  justify	  decisions	  already	  taken	  
by	  powerful	  interests.	  Making	  transparent	  the	  ways	  that	  various	  actors	  and	  their	  
power	  influence	  transportation	  information,	  values,	  and	  decisions	  means	  that	  
constructive	  steps	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  a	  fairer	  process	  –	  one	  that	  considers	  the	  
perspectives	  of	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  planning	  decisions.	  Giving	  people	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  voice	  their	  views—including	  about	  the	  methods	  and	  process—also	  
increases	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  decisions.	  If	  the	  process	  is	  done	  well,	  stakeholders’	  
differing	  perspectives	  can	  uncover	  the	  hidden	  ideologies	  at	  play	  and	  question	  long-­‐
standing	  rationalities	  –	  including	  those	  that	  actors	  inadvertently	  hide	  from	  
themselves.	  This	  reflexivity,	  and	  especially	  self-­‐critical	  reflection	  by	  individuals	  and	  
groups,	  can	  enable	  actors	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  realities	  of	  others	  and	  allows	  for	  
“doing	  better”	  (Chambers	  1997:	  201-­‐203).	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  
transportation	  sector	  could	  do	  better	  to	  incorporate	  civil	  society’s	  perspective	  and	  
TCSOs	  seem	  like	  a	  promising	  option	  for	  doing	  so	  in	  a	  consistent	  manner.	  	  
A	  key	  question,	  though,	  is	  whether	  existing	  actors	  will	  permit	  TCSOs	  to	  make	  
meaningful	  contributions.	  More	  research	  on	  transportation	  decision-­‐making	  in	  LDCs	  
and	  especially	  where	  civil	  society	  fits	  into	  this	  picture	  is	  needed.	  This	  case	  study	  was	  
limited	  to	  Madagascar	  and	  so	  other	  LDCs	  likely	  have	  different	  political,	  cultural	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Leivra	  does	  not	  elaborate	  on	  this	  point,	  but	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  funding	  of	  political	  groups	  and	  
NGOs	  by	  private	  interests	  could	  be	  motivated	  by	  intentions	  that	  are	  far	  from	  altruistic.	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economic	  processes	  at	  work.	  It	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  see	  how	  transportation	  
decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  other	  countries	  handle	  investment	  decisions.	  The	  
more	  common	  TCSOs	  become,	  the	  easier	  it	  will	  be	  to	  study	  this	  manifestation	  of	  civil	  
society	  and	  how	  it	  interacts	  with	  the	  other	  actors	  already	  heavily	  invested	  in	  the	  
existing	  arrangement.	  The	  introduction	  of	  direct	  participation	  through	  TCSOs	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  unwelcome	  by	  many	  actors	  in	  a	  sector	  dominated	  by	  government,	  IDIs,	  
and	  business	  interests.	  Having	  another	  potentially	  powerful	  set	  of	  interests,	  
particularly	  one	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  share	  the	  same	  form	  of	  rationality,	  could	  
be	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  predictable	  form	  and	  balance	  that	  has	  been	  maintained	  for	  
decades.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  upsets	  the	  status	  quo.	  Too	  few	  transportation	  processes	  
have	  been	  undertaken	  with	  genuine	  public	  participation	  from	  the	  start	  to	  
understand	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  this	  affects	  investment	  outcomes.	  Morally,	  though,	  public	  
participation	  should	  be	  an	  expectation	  not	  an	  option	  extended	  by	  invitation.	  
Another	  question	  is	  how	  will	  TCSOs	  be	  encouraged	  and	  formed.	  Although	  
researchers	  and	  activists	  tout	  the	  cases	  where	  civil	  society	  can	  organize	  themselves	  
into	  a	  potent	  force,	  it	  is	  worth	  asking	  whether	  such	  grassroots	  organization	  is	  even	  
possible	  for	  transportation	  infrastructure	  spanning	  the	  distances	  that	  railways	  and	  
roads	  often	  do.	  Moreover,	  as	  Friedmann	  points	  out,	  spontaneous	  popular	  action	  that	  
forms	  within	  a	  community	  is	  not	  common	  and	  is	  often	  limited	  in	  scope	  (Friedmann	  
1992:	  144,	  158).	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  rhetoric	  of	  spontaneity”	  should	  be	  abandoned	  
and	  that	  theorists	  should	  accept	  that	  “external	  agents,”	  or	  animateurs,	  play	  a	  vital	  
role	  in	  blowing	  “the	  breath	  of	  life	  into	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  community	  and	  move	  it	  to	  
appropriate	  action”	  (ibid.:	  144).	  These	  animateurs	  “are	  meant	  to	  ‘spark’	  endogenous	  
change	  ‘from	  within,’	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  change	  program;	  this	  is	  a	  responsibility	  of	  
the	  organized	  community”	  (ibid.).	  
The	  case	  of	  ADIFCE	  shows	  TCSOs	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  self-­‐organizing.	  Expatriate	  
development	  experts	  helped	  encourage	  ADIFCE’s	  formation.	  These	  external	  actors	  
also	  conceived	  and	  paid	  for	  many	  of	  their	  activities.	  Yet	  FCE	  supporters	  also	  
constrained	  the	  role	  of	  ADIFCE	  –	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  The	  question	  is	  
whether	  outsiders	  can	  create	  a	  TCSO	  without	  imposing	  too	  many	  restrictions	  or	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biases.	  In	  addition,	  at	  what	  point	  do	  these	  groups	  become	  just	  an	  arm	  of	  another	  
actor?	  They	  must,	  however,	  have	  the	  choice	  to	  follow-­‐through	  on	  those	  
interventions	  and	  make	  other	  decisions	  on	  how	  to	  run	  their	  organization	  without	  
undue	  outside	  influence.	  
The	  role	  that	  TCSOs	  do	  and	  should	  play	  in	  planning	  and	  development	  efforts	  may	  
actually	  differ.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCE,	  a	  TCSO	  focused	  on	  making	  its	  own	  
constituents	  conform	  to	  certain	  expectations	  without	  trying	  to	  make	  outside	  actors	  
change.	  They	  should	  play	  one	  that	  is	  perhaps	  best	  explained	  by	  Marris’s	  larger	  view	  
of	  the	  interaction	  between	  civil	  society	  and	  planning.	  He	  explains	  that	  planning	  
strives	  to	  articulate	  and	  resolve	  societal	  tensions	  between	  the	  state,	  the	  market	  
economy	  and	  “the	  membership	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  rich	  and	  poor,	  old	  and	  young,	  all	  
trying	  to	  find	  a	  place	  in	  [society],	  some	  much	  better	  organized	  than	  others	  to	  
express	  their	  needs”	  (Marris	  1998:	  9).	  Although	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  planners	  must	  
be	  sure	  to	  “represent	  the	  needs	  of	  that	  part	  of	  civil	  society	  which	  is	  most	  vulnerable,	  
whether	  from	  economic	  or	  political	  disadvantage”	  (ibid.),	  they	  can	  also	  enable	  civil	  
society	  to	  speak	  for	  itself.	  Planners	  can	  play	  their	  role	  by	  giving	  civil	  society	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  organize	  into	  TCSOs	  and	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  
pursue	  their	  goals.	  
We	  should	  not	  underestimate	  the	  role	  that	  these	  individuals,	  brought	  together	  
under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  a	  TCSO	  and	  in	  partnership	  with	  other	  actors,	  can	  play	  in	  
framing	  arguments	  that	  benefit	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  and	  other	  existing	  
infrastructure	  upon	  which	  people	  depend.	  In	  addition,	  the	  fate	  that	  has	  befallen	  
many	  colonial-­‐era	  railways	  in	  SSA	  with	  increasing	  frequency	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  
conclusion.	  Now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  hear	  the	  unified	  voices	  of	  those	  communities	  and	  
individuals	  too	  often	  left	  out	  of	  the	  process.	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i	  	  «	  Cependant,	  le	  souvenir	  vivace	  du	  SMOTIG	  comme	  symbole	  du	  travail	  forcé	  
colonial	  traduit	  une	  distorsion	  entre	  mémoire	  et	  histoire.	  Car	  il	  n’a	  été	  en	  réalité	  
qu’une	  forme	  atténuée	  des	  pratiques	  antérieures	  beaucoup	  plus	  lourdes	  pour	  les	  
populations.	  »	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  180).	  
«	  Quand	  on	  constate	  les	  dégâts	  du	  TCE,	  du	  TA	  et	  du	  MLA,	  on	  se	  dit	  que,	  sur	  le	  FCE,	  le	  
SMOTIG	  a	  été	  un	  moindre	  mal	  en	  ne	  touchant	  que	  des	  jeunes	  non	  encore	  enracinés.	  
»	  (Frémigacci	  2006:	  187).	  
ii	  «	  Qu’a-­‐t-­‐on	  fait	  maintenant	  pour	  l’outillage	  de	  nos	  colonies	  ?	  L’effort	  pour	  
l’amélioration	  du	  bien-­‐être	  matériel	  et	  des	  conditions	  générales	  de	  l’existence	  des	  
populations	  que	  nous	  amenons	  peu	  à	  peu	  à	  la	  civilisation,	  l’effort	  de	  colonisation	  des	  
pays	  sur	  lesquels	  s’étend	  notre	  action,	  n’est	  pas	  moindre	  que	  celui	  que	  nous	  avons	  
accompli	  dans	  l’ordre	  moral.	  »	  (Sarraut	  1922:	  310).	  
iii	  	  «	  Mais	  l'idée	  d'un	  chemin	  de	  fer	  de	  Fianarantsoa	  à	  la	  mer	  n'en	  est	  pas	  moins	  une	  
idée	  juste	  et	  rationnelle	  dont	  il	  faudra	  poursuivre	  la	  réalisation	  dés	  que	  les	  
circonstances	  le	  permettront.	  »	  (Roques	  1900:	  22).	  
iv	  «	  Common	  pourrons-­‐nous	  donc	  trouver	  le	  contingent	  nécessaire	  et	  comment	  
pourrons-­‐nous	  le	  trouver	  sans	  désorganiser	  les	  entreprises	  agricoles	  et	  
industrielles?	  »	  (Olivier	  1925,	  Délégation	  Économique	  et	  Financières:	  40).	  
v	  «	  Utilisant	  pour	  son	  recrutement	  les	  méthodes	  de	  l’Armée,	  le	  S.M.O.T.I.G	  conserve	  
dans	  tous	  ses	  rouages	  un	  caractère	  qui	  l’apparente	  aux	  unités	  militaires.	  »	  (Olivier	  
1931:	  114).	  
vi	  «	  Mais	  une	  colonie	  reste	  en	  <état	  de	  guerre>	  tant	  qu’un	  outillage	  médiocre,	  la	  
faiblesse	  numérique	  de	  ses	  populations	  et	  leur	  adaptation	  insuffisante	  aux	  
conditions	  de	  la	  vie	  civilisée	  la	  tiennent	  à	  la	  merci	  d’un	  krach	  ou	  d’un	  cyclone,	  d’un	  
coup	  de	  Bourse	  ou	  d’une	  période	  de	  sécheresse.	  »	  (Olivier	  1931:	  112).	  
vii	  «	  Il	  ne	  suffit	  pas	  de	  maintenir	  les	  travailleurs	  dans	  un	  état	  physique	  tel	  que	  
l'effectif	  présent	  sur	  les	  chantiers	  soit	  aussi	  complet	  que	  possible,	  il	  faut	  encore	  se	  
préoccuper	  de	  l'évolution	  morale	  des	  individus	  et	  s'efforcer	  de	  leur	  inculquer	  le	  
goût	  du	  travail	  qui	  leur	  manque	  si	  souvent.	  »	  (Olivier	  1927a:	  2).	  	  
viii	  «	  La	  formation	  requise	  pour	  ces	  deux	  ordres	  d'attributions	  est	  nettement	  
différente:	  l'un	  exige	  avant	  tout	  des	  capacités	  juridiques	  et	  administratives,	  l'autre	  
l'aptitude	  à	  manier	  des	  hommes	  et	  à	  s'occuper	  de	  détails	  pratiques	  d'organisation.	  »	  
(Olivier	  1927c:	  6).	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ix	  «	  Le	  résultat	  recherché	  est	  d'augmenter	  les	  possibilités	  du	  rendement	  des	  
travailleurs	  en	  leur	  inculquant	  les	  notions	  du	  rendement	  des	  travailleurs	  en	  leur	  
inculquant	  les	  notions	  du	  respect	  de	  leurs	  chefs	  et	  de	  l'obéissance	  à	  leurs	  ordres,	  en	  
les	  assouplissant	  aux	  rassemblements	  rapides	  et	  ordonnés	  par	  lesquels	  seront	  
évitées	  les	  pertes	  de	  temps	  dans	  les	  camps	  ou	  sur	  les	  chantiers,	  lorsqu'il	  s'agira	  de	  
distribuer	  les	  vivres	  ou	  les	  outils	  et	  de	  répartir	  les	  tâches.	  »	  (SMOTIG	  1927:	  45)	  
x	  «	  Les	  indigènes,	  qui	  ne	  savaient	  pas	  travailler	  parce	  qu'on	  ne	  leur	  avais	  jamais	  
appris,	  sont	  rompus	  maintenant	  à	  la	  discipline	  des	  chantiers,	  certains	  se	  sont	  
spécialisés	  et	  c'est	  ainsi	  que	  l'on	  peut	  en	  voir	  manœuvrant	  seuls	  des	  pelles	  à	  vapeur.	  
»	  (Forgeot	  1931:	  3).	  
xi	  «	  Au	  vrai,	  les	  camps	  de	  travail	  du	  S.M.O.T.I.G.	  ne	  sont	  ni	  des	  camps	  d’écoliers	  en	  
vacances,	  ni	  des	  camps	  de	  forçats.	  »	  (Olivier	  1931:	  119).	  
xii	  «	  Avec	  la	  main-­‐d’œuvre	  ordinaire	  ou	  avec	  les	  prestataires,	  il	  est	  presque	  
impossible	  de	  maintenir	  une	  organisation	  rationnelle	  des	  chantiers,	  car	  les	  effectifs	  
varient	  journellement	  dans	  de	  fortes	  proportions.	  …	  La	  régularité	  des	  effectifs	  du	  
S.M.O.T.I.G.,	  la	  discipline	  des	  chantiers	  présentent	  les	  plus	  grands	  avantages	  pour	  
l’exécution	  des	  travaux.	  »	  (Olivier	  1931:	  122).	  
xiii	  «	  Il	  s'ensuit	  que	  l'appel	  du	  2ème	  contingent	  portera	  principalement	  sur	  les	  
régions	  où	  l'on	  ne	  doit	  pas	  travailler	  pour	  le	  moment	  du	  moins.	  Les	  villages	  de	  ces	  
régions	  seront	  donc	  assez	  sérieusement	  dépeuplés,	  disons-­‐le	  diminués	  de	  leurs	  
forces	  jeunes	  et	  les	  plus	  effectives.	  »	  (Perrier	  1927:	  11-­‐12).	  
xiv	  «	  Les	  Hovas	  ont	  un	  grand	  attachement	  pour	  leurs	  tombeaux;	  les	  familles	  mettent	  
toutes	  leurs	  ressources	  à	  ces	  constructions.	  »	  (Roques	  1900:	  36).	  
xv	  «	  Certes	  son	  échec	  serait	  moins	  apparent	  que	  la	  faillite	  de	  l'œuvre	  sanitaire,	  mais	  
le	  fait	  même	  que	  ses	  résultats	  ressortent	  moins	  nettement	  nous	  incite	  à	  une	  
vigilance	  plus	  grande.	  »	  (Olivier	  1927a	  :	  9).	  
xvi	  «	  Il	  faut	  tenir	  compte,	  en	  effet,	  de	  ce	  qu'au	  temps	  de	  la	  royauté	  hova	  tous	  les	  
travaux	  de	  voirie	  étaient	  exécutés	  par	  la	  classe	  servile	  et	  que	  les	  indigènes	  restent	  
tentés	  d'assimiler	  à	  des	  esclaves	  les	  individus	  employés	  aux	  grands	  travaux	  publics.	  
»	  (Olivier	  1927a:	  3).	  
xvii	  «	  Il	  est	  nécessaire	  de	  ne	  point	  se	  laisser	  développer	  dans	  les	  milieux	  indigènes,	  
l'idée	  que	  le	  travailleur	  est	  le	  plus	  souvent,	  sinon	  toujours,	  sacrifier	  aux	  intérêts	  des	  
agents	  chargés	  de	  la	  surveillance.	  »	  (Olivier	  1927c:	  2).	  
xviii	  «	  En	  juin	  1930,	  tandis	  que	  la	  Conférence	  Internationale	  du	  Travail	  discutait	  à	  
Genève,	  ce	  que	  l’on	  a	  appelé	  d’un	  mot	  impropre	  la	  question	  du	  <	  travail	  forcé	  >	  -­‐-­‐	  il	  
serait	  plus	  exact	  de	  dire	  :	  <	  travail	  obligatoire	  >	  -­‐-­‐	  un	  grand	  journal	  étranger	  
imprima	  tout	  crûment	  que	  le	  <	  S.M.O.T.I.G.	  >	  <	  avait	  fait	  en	  1928	  plusieurs	  milliers	  
de	  victimes	  >.	  »	  (Olivier	  1931:	  103).	  
xix	  «	  Organiser,	  à	  longe	  terme,	  la	  mise	  en	  place	  d’un	  système	  participatif	  (par	  
information-­‐sensibilisation-­‐conscientisation),	  afin	  d’assurer	  la	  bonne	  utilisation,	  la	  
protection	  des	  acquis	  de	  la	  ligne	  ferroviaire	  Fianarantsoa-­‐Manakara.	  »	  (Statut	  de	  
l’Association	  des	  Usagers	  ‘ADIFCE’	  1999:	  1).	  
	  
